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ABSTRACT
The National Socialist organisation the NS-Volkswohlfahrt was
officially recognised by the Nazi Party on the 3rd May 1933. From
modest beginnings in the 'Kampfzeit', the NS-Volkswohlfahrt (NSV)
grew into a huge organisation which provided welfare both in the
Altreich and in the occupied territories (from 1940) for the
Volksdeutsche populations living there. Decidedly uncharitable in
emphasis, the NSV intended to provide aid only for those deemed
'worthy' to receive the benefits of Nazi welfare. The NSV, from
1933/4, provided a whole range of social welfare, from help in kind
which was distributed by the charity scheme the Winter Aid, to
welfare for expectant mothers. The youth of the nation were not
neglected by the NSV, and it became enthusiastically involved in
providing kindergarten care for 'Aryan' children who were regarded to
be 'biologically healthy' as well. The NSV slowly came to replace
the kindergartens of the churches with its own facilities and from
1941, the churches would increasingly find that the NSV had taken
over the running of their kindergartens and pre-school arrangements.
At the decision-making level the churches would find that they had
lost total control, even though church personnel were allowed to
continue working in the kindergartens themselves. By 1942, the NSV
was fully established and the racial policies of the regime would be
reflected in all of the measures provided by the Party organisation.
Welfare for women would fully support the goals of the regime by
encouraging, through certain support measures, a rise in the German
birth-rate. Given the already existing system of state welfare in
Germany the NSV did not have everything its own way; the
organisation would have to be prepared to cooperate with state
officials who, only at first, welcomed the creation of an extra set
of facilities which could offer much needed help. But the relations
between state and Party officials would soon begin to sour when it
was realised that the NSV had ambitions which extended into the state
system itself. The increasing difficulties which the German welfare
system experienced were caused by 'double' welfare provisions coming
from Party and state, neither of which wished to see its power and
influence reduced by a rival. These uncooperative practices would
run through the whole welfare^.system to the detriment of the actual
provisions of social welfare. This thesis covers the period from
1933 to 1943, and it is argued that the impact of the problems of
Party and state in Nazi Germany filtered down into the social welfare
system. For this reason, a study of social welfare from 1933 in
Germany reveals the effects of the social and political problems of
the regime as they affected substantive areas of the welfare system.
The nature of the irrational juxtaposition of charismatic and
rational grounds of authority, as it existed in Nazi Germany, is
referred to in the thesis. State welfare officials who were
constrained by the need to conform with the rules and regulations of
the state bureaucracy, inevitably came into conflict with the NSV
which was dedicated to pursuing ideological aims. These aims, even
when they were described as 'rational', came into conflict with the
state officials' comprehension of rationally achievable goals. The
two versions of 'rationality' perhaps came to destroy any hope of the
state and the Party being able to work fruitfully together, virtually
>
until the end of the war.
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Introduction
From 1933/34 the system of social welfare in Germany was
required to meet the increasing claims coming from the Party
organisation the NS-Volkswohlfahrt (NSV) which had been created in
May 1933 to provide additional (zdstandiqe) welfare. A study of the
organisation of the NSV must inevitably take into account the
relationship which existed between the Party organisation and the
system of social welfare which was run by the state. The NS\l was
introduced into a well-developed and sophisticated system of welfare
which had been greatly expanded during the time of the Weimar
2
Republic. But the NS\l leadership was ambitious, and not always
content merely to provide an 'additional' set of provisions. It
sought to insert the organisation fully within the 'primary'
responsibilities of social welfare, such as juvenile care, according
to the statutory provisions of the law. These ambitions pointed to a
desire to become a competent welfare agency, which could, when fully
developed, replace the state's facilities at some future date.
The structure of the NSV can best be described as falling into
three mains parts: Winterhilfswerk (WHW) or Winter Aid, a huge NSV
organised charity scheme which came under the control of the
Propaganda Ministry, specific health-oriented measures such as the
running of holiday/recuperation schemes, including welfare for
mothers and the provision of kindergartens, and lastly, the NSV's own
juvenile welfare section the NSV-Juqendhilfe. The three-fold
division of the NSV's basic structure reflected the development of an
organisation, which had begun its semi-official existence as a
1. See Chapter Two.
2. See Chapter Five.
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winter-time aid scheme in Berlin in 1932 with Goebbels' support.
From May 1933, the NSV would also undertake to organise welfare for
mothers and children (the Mutter und Kind section was formed in the
summer of 1934) and lastly, the arrangements for juvenile care (also
1934). From this time, the NSV would undertake to provide welfare
measures which, to some degree or another, were already being
provided by state officials and the local communities. However, far
from immediately viewing the Party organisation with distrust, at
first state officials seemed to welcome the participation of an extra
set of social welfare arrangements which could offer both help and
additional personnel when needed. Indeed this function was the one
which had been written into Hitler's official acknowledgement of 3rd
May 1933. Neither in 1933, nor in 1944, when new regulations came
into force by the express order of Hitler, was it intended that Party
welfare should be used as a replacement for the entire state welfare
system, even though one study of the NSV has claimed that this was
the case."^ Not even during the war, when the NSV began to expand its
entire operation, did Party welfare facilities completely oust those
of the state.
Nevertheless it is true to say that from the beginning of the
war, there developed a greater NSV participation in child and youth
care. This was entirely with the support of Dr. Conti, the head of
the Office for the People's Health. It can be argued that Conti's
support would have an important effect upon the future development of
the NSV which only the worsening conditions of the war could
interrupt. New regulations in 1941 promised a greater NSV
1. Mark Siegel, 'The National Socialist People's Welfare
Organisation 1933-1939: The Political Manipulation of
Welfare', University of Cincinnati PhD thesis 1976.
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involvement in infant welfare, child care measures including
kindergartens which included the assumption of control over all new
kindergartens which would be built for the purpose of meeting the
demands of an expected (or hoped for) increase in the numbers of
working mothers. From 1941, the NSV and the Office for the People's
Health cooperated more closely together, and Conti included in his
plans for health after the war the full participation of the NSV."''
Indeed the NSV came increasingly to function as a people's
welfare-care/health-care service. While not itself offering medical
treatment of a specific kind, the NSV supplied an extensive welfare
service for expectant mothers, and fully supported the drive to make
children healthier and better fed. But the NSV also had a right, and
a duty, to become involved in the manipulative practices of
MenschenfUhrunq (the manipulation of social attitudes). This was
seen as a prime responsibility of Party welfare. It was with great
enthusiasm that this role would be undertaken in all sections of the
NSV, from Winter Aid, to welfare for expectant mothers.
By 1936 the NSV's position within the German social welfare
system was firmly established, as leading officials in the state
welfare offices knew only too well. Officials such as Karl Fiehler,
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the leader of the Deutscher Gemeindetaq, and champion of all state
welfare, would come to realise that the NSV was seriously challenging
1. BA, R18/3793, speech given by Dr. Conti, 'Zur Neuordnung des
Gesundheitswesen nach dem Siege', n.d. (71943).
2. The Deutscher Gemeindetaq (DGT) represented the interests of
state officials. Karl Fiehler was also head of the Hauptamt fdr
Kommunalpolitik. In these capacities he was in a position to
watch over the interests of state welfare officials who looked
for support from the DGT and from Fiehler in particular. See
also BA, NS 23/124 Fol. 1, VB, 'Der Auftakt der kommunal-
politischen Schulungswoche', 3th December 1933; Ibid.,
'Kommunalpolitik im neuen Deutschland', 6th December 1933.
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state provisions in every one of its various aspects, including
public assistance. Attempts to take on the responsibilities of the
state would greatly anger many state officials who did not regard the
NSV as a fully competent agency. It was frequently pointed out that
the voluntary workers (a significant part of the NSV work-force),
could hardly be expected to match the valuable contribution made by
the trained personnel of the state.
Two other studies of the NSV which exist have stopped short of
the war and have tended to describe the NSV mainly from the point of
view of the Winter Aid."'' This particular NSV measure has been
regarded by these studies as the most important of the NSV's welfare
scheme. However, it is argued in this thesis that this is to
misunderstand the NSV, for there is good reason to believe that child
and youth welfare measures were held to be a vital part of NSV
welfare by the leader of the NSV, Erich Hilgenfeldt. He and other
leading officials made strenuous attempts to develop these particular
facilities, and it seems certain that the NSV nursed a growing desire
to take over this type of social welfare. The gigantic Winter Aid
Scheme, important as it was, does not fully describe the NSV, for the
organisation's true ambitions lay with FamilienfUrsorqe/family
welfare, and the growing NSV3 itself. The Winter Aid Scheme offered
little opportunity for an NSV incursion into the existing state
welfare system - the state itself did not run a comparable scheme.
Indeed, German social welfare was largely characterised by the
juvenile welfare system which had been created in 1922-24, and also
by other well-established welfare schemes. The NSV would come to
1. See Thomas de Witt, 'The Nazi Party and Social Welfare 1919-
1939', University of Virginia, PhD thesis 1972; Siegel, 'The
National Socialist People's Welfare Organisation 1933-1939'.
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cast an envious eye upon the kindergarten provisions of the state,
and of the churches too. The NSV was not the Winter Aid with extra
summer-time aid schemes existing in a subsidiary manner, as de Witt
has tended to show,"^ but a growing, Party-based system of welfare
which, from 1941, promised seriously to threaten state facilities.
This meant that the NSV had completely outgrown its original form by
1941. While the leadership had not intended a direct take-over by
the NSV, it certainly seems that a victorious Reich would have seen
such a development come to the fore.
By 1938/39 the NSV was increasingly seen by state officials to
be the 'cause' of serious 'inefficiencies' arising within the welfare
system as a whole. The danger of 'Doppelarbeit', was a subject which
was raised whenever state officials wished to offer a plausible
reason for restricting the developments of the NSV. But it is also
true to say that if the NSV had been content to restrict itself to
providing welfare in kind from the Winter Aid, and some support
measures for mothers and children (and in a modest way, for families
as well), then it would have been greeted most warmly by the
officials of the state. Instead, given the plans of the Party
organisation, NSV welfare was soon regarded mainly as a threat of a
future take-over of the entire system of social welfare in Germany.
Attempts to protect the state's facilities came to sour the relations
between NSV and state officials, who themselves would come to see the
NSV as an implacable enemy, bent on replacing every
single state facility. However the NSV provided useful measures and
ran popular holiday schemes for mothers and also for
children (Kinderlandverschickunq), and possibly well-run kinder¬
gartens as well.
1. Ibid.
NSV plans frequently came into conflict with state provisions
but this did not hold true for every single section of the
organisation. It can be argued that the mammoth charity scheme the
Winter Aid which distributed the money collected during the months of
the winter to those in need, in the form of a donation of welfare in
kind (food and fuel in winter), operated as a huge fund raising
operation and came directly under Goebbels' control. It remained
entirely undisturbed by the jurisdictional problems which seriously
affected other NSV provisions. Operations such as welfare for
mothers (Mutter und Kind), the care of infants and young children, an
organisation of community nurses (NS-Schwesternschaft) run by the
NSV, the provision of kindergartens and youth welfare all, at one
time or another, came into conflict with state facilities.
The NSV - Youth Welfare Section (NSVJ) would have to deal with
serious, and continually arising, jurisdictional problems. This was
practically inescapable, for the NSVJ was required to function in
'cooperation' with state officials who were in a position to delegate
juvenile welfare cases to the NSVJ according to the law of 1924,
the Reichsjuqendwohlfahrtsqesetz. Bearing no statutory responsi¬
bility to provide welfare for juveniles, the NSV/NSVJ could only take
on youth welfare cases in a 'secondary' manner, for the JuqendSlmter
(state youth welfare office) had first responsibility for the care of
the young. The state Juqend^mter and the Hitler Youth were
themselves closely involved in the provision of correctional
education, while the NSV provided 'preventive' welfare measures.
Indeed the NSVJ did not begin to become significantly committed to
the provision of correctional education until 1943.
Perhaps inevitably, the weltanschauliche emphasis of NSV
policies, as it is described in this work, falls into the danger of
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becoming one-dimensional and repetitious. But this is because the
philosophical basis (if it can be so described) of the policies of
the NSV was itself supported by a particularly rigid, narrow frame of
reference. It also depended upon a harshly conceived set of
irrational propositions about the nature of charity for its
inspiration. NSV welfare reflected policies which were based upon a
few, rather ill thought-out arguments about the nature, and the
function, of aid for the members of the new Nazi Volksgemeinschaft.
The NSV perspective was based upon a cruelly conceived idea of
'efficiency' and 'rationality', and the philosophical basis of Party
welfare, profoundly influenced as it was by the Nazi obsession with
'purity' and social 'worthiness', was ruthlessly non-charitable in
intention. The contribution of the NSV to German social welfare had
been conceived out of an ideologically based idea of who should be
given the benefits of Nazi welfare - those who deserved it or those
who needed it regardless of considerations of 'worth'. As far as the
NSV was concerned however, the claims of 'need' could not be
separated from those of 'worth', and for this reason a
charitably-based conception of social welfare disappeared entirely
from NSV aid. The NSV firmly refused to consider social 'worthiness'
and 'biological health' apart from ideas about a 'rational' use of
scarce resources when allowing its own measures to be put into
operation. From the 'biologically unfit', to 'ineducable' juveniles,
all 'hopeless' and 'worthless' cases would either be excluded
*
completely, or placed last in line if they were included in the less
serious 'socially unacceptable' categories. But the NSV would be
entirely ruthless when it came to discharge its duties from the point
of view of 'biological worthiness/biological health' at all times.
In this way the NSV fully supported the vicious racial policies of
the regime. It can also be argued that the NSV was, frequently, more
ruthless in this respect than the state youth welfare officials.
Indeed some state officials, at least privately, admitted that the
'erbbioloqische' theories of the Party hardly stood up to a close
examination. Neither did they provide an adequate means of selecting
welfare cases which showed promise of a 'good' response to treatment,
either in Homes or other facilities. Indeed it is possible to argue
that two versions of 'rationality' came to be used by state and NSV
officials. On the one hand, the NSV leadership was determined to
attach 'rational' aims to its own ideological perspective, while on
the other, state officials continued to see the functioning of an
'efficient' welfare service from the point of view of
bureaucratically achievable goals. Indeed the NSV would criticise
the state's arrangements for being 'too' bureaucratic. As time went
on, the two versions of 'rationality' came to dominate the arguments
of the officials of state and Party. The NSV was utterly committed
to an ideologically motivated idea of 'efficiency', while state
welfare officials remained attached to their own particular frame of
reference which was the need to respond to their own legal
responsibilities to provide welfare."'' It was for this reason, among
others, that it would become possible for committed Nazi state
welfare officials to criticise NSV practices which were regarded by
them to' be so ideologically 'rigid' as to be practically worthless,
regarding a 'real' provision of welfare. Not surprisingly perhaps,
NSV provisions were also accompanied by ideological training so that
1. Max Weber, see 'Characteristics of Bureaucracy', in
'Bureaucracy', 0. Grusky and G. Miller (eds.), The
Sociology of Organisations: Basic Studies, New York
1970 pp.5-11.
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it was impossible to escape from overt attempts by NS officials to
mould social attitudes. The facilities for women in the NSV Mutter
und Kind section took an emphatic ideological line. This was also
relentlessly undertaken in the housewifery and child-care courses
provided by the NSF/DFW (the women's organisation) with the
cooperation and the guidance of the NSV. The provisions of welfare
were seen by the NSV leadership as a means of helping to foster
certain qualities in individuals. For example the NSV would demand
that their facilities were to be regarded by those receiving aid as a
means of 'strengthening' the practice of 'self-help', the continuing
and all pervasive theme of NSV welfare. The NSV ceaselessly
claimed that it provided aid in order that the 'self-help' abilities
of individuals could come into play later.
NSV welfare also provided some support for the government's
low-wage policy, and the welfare in kind which came from the Winter
Aid was meant to act as a support-mechanism for such a policy. On
the other hand, Winter Aid could also be used as a means of
'controlling' the work-force through the practice of refusing to give
aid to those who had come into conflict with the regime. The
unemployed too would find that a refusal to take on an unpalatable
job would lead to the loss of much needed welfare in kind in the
winter. But NSV welfare in many cases, was realistically viewed as a
hand-out' by the Party to supplement low wages, even though the
propaganda of the NSV and the Winter Aid put an opposite view."''
Perhaps one of the most ambitious aspects of NSV welfare lay in
the attempts to foster new attitudes regarding the role of the
citizen in the new Volksqemeinschaft. This emphasis would exist most
1. See Chapter Three.
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clearly in the propaganda which accompanied the Winter Aid drives in
the months from October to March every year. The population was
bombarded with visual and other reminders of the new responsibilities
of the Volk. Indeed, the Winter Aid showed the manipulative side of
the NSV most clearly for it joined together propaganda and welfare in
a unique way, which has been correctly commented upon."^ The Winter
Aid would show how the NSV, with the help of the Propaganda Ministry,
tried to shape attitudes in the most blatant manner. However, this
aspect should not be examined without giving equal consideration
to the ambitious developments of NSV health-care/welfare-care
provisions, for this reason a study of the NSV needs to include the
youth welfare section, NSVJ and the early years of the war. Indeed
the early part of the war had an important effect upon the whole
future direction of the NSV, ensuring that it would have an important
part to play, until 1945, both in the Altreich and in the occupied
territories where the NSV would organise welfare for the
Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans) living there. But perhaps inevitably,
the conduct of the war also had a negative impact on NSV
developments. NSV plans were interrupted by the responsibility to
provide a whole new set of measures for the evacuation of the
civilian populations from the cities and towns of Germany. The
'largest welfare organisation in the world' came to act as a civilian
rescue operation towards the end of the war. It would be this duty
which would remain as a last task, both in the Altreich and in the
occupied area as well.
1. C.W. Guillebaud, The Social Policy of Nazi Germany,
Cambridge 1940, p.96. See also de Witt, 'The Nazi
Party and Social Welfare 1933-1939'; Siegel, 'The
National Socialist People's Welfare Organisation
1933-1939'.
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It is argued in this thesis however, that until that time,
social welfare in Germany was represented by the double provisions of
Party and state. But these provisions were profoundly influenced by
two opposing views of a 'rational' and 'efficient' means of carrying
them out which, in most cases, were entirely incompatible. This
would mean that the time and the efforts of numerous officials of the
NSV and the state were kept fully occupied not with the problems of
welfare as such, but with the problem of finding the best way to
'protect' their own welfare provisions. In addition, the distinctive
socio-political structure of the regime which necessitated the
merging of two, theoretically incompatible types of legitimate
authority (the 'charismatic' and the 'rational'), profoundly
influenced the system of welfare."^ The two different perceptions of
'rationality' held by the NSV on the one hand, and state officials on
the other, forms a main theme of the thesis. The inability of state
and Party officials to cooperate arose out of this problem, and the
jurisdictional issues which frequently arose were, much of the time,
a manifestation of this fundamental and perhaps unsolvable issue.
1. For an explanation of Weber's analysis of the three 'pure'
types of legitimate authority (Rational; Traditional;
Charismatic), see Max Weber, 'Bureaucracy', in Grusky
and Miller (eds.), The Sociology of Organisations, p.5.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE N5-VQLKSW0HLFAHRT
Social Welfare in the 'Kampfzeit'
In the Nazi Party's own history of the NS-Volkswohlfahrt (NSV),
a brief outline is given of the difficulties which faced the existing
welfare services during the 1920s and early 1930s.^ Contained in
these particular documents is an indication of the Nazi view of the
socio-economic situation as it affected the scope and organisation of
social welfare, measures in the post-war period. Both the health and
the welfare services in Weimar Germany had been experiencing periods
of difficulty and economic set-back; for example in 1924 the
ambitious plans for a national system of juvenile care had to be
seriously curtailed only two years after the new laws for child and
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youth welfare (Reichsjuqendwohlfahrtsqesetz) had been drawn up. It
is also true to say that after the war the impact of a rise in prices
in Germany was further exacerbated by the difficulty of improving the
existing inadequate housing conditions in towns and cities throughout
the country. This is to say that a significant proportion of the
industrial population was having to endure both a fall in real living
standards and severe over-crowding. Such essentials as food, fuel
and payment of rent were transformed into luxuries for many ordinary
families at this time, and it was this situation, the worsening of
the conditions of social life in Germany, which prompted the
anonymous author of the history of the NS-V/olkswohlfahrt to claim
that:
1. HA, Reel 14, Folder 262, pp.1-496.
2. W. Friedlclnder and E.D. Myers, Child Welfare in Germany before
and after Nazism, Chicago/Illinois 1940, p.7.
1.
'Clemenceau's dream, that twenty million German souls
would be shovelled into their graves, seemed to be on the
way to be fulfilled.'
(1)
Of decisive importance in the development of the Nazi Party's
own arrangements for the distribution of welfare aid to its
sympathisers and supporters was the growth in mass unemployment and
the collapse in 1932/33 of the relatively new system of unemployment
2
insurance which had been established only shortly before in 1927.
Governments had tried to meet the crisis by making increases in the
level of contributions and imposing cuts in benefit. The period
during which the full insurance benefit could be claimed was
shortened so that the unemployed became dependent upon various public
relief organisations, which involved a means test and lower payments
all round. Of the 5.8 million unemployed who registered at the
labour exchanges in December 1932, 1.3 million were receiving neither
benefits nor relief payments of any kind, and to this latter figure
must be added the 'invisible' unemployed whose numbers were estimated
to be over one million. Of the 4.5 million unemployed who were
receiving benefits, only 18% were receiving the full insurance
benefit while some 29% were being supported by the government's
crisis relief scheme. The remainder were dependent on local relief
schemes. Timothy Mason has calculated that out of some 7 million
unemployed only 792,000, who were in receipt of full insurance
1. HA, 14/262, p.2.
2. de Witt, 'The Weimar Replublic's Welfare Crisis', in
'The Nazi Party and Social Welfare, 1919-1939', pp.43-55.
3. Ibid.
4. Timothy W. Mason, Sozialpolitik im Dritten Reich: Arbeiterklasse
und Volksgemeinschaft, Opladen 1978, pp.90-91.
2.
benefit, were sure of having enough to eat."^ The average real income
of the unemployed, in all categories including the professions, fell
by 10?o between 1930 and 1933. If one includes the increases in
taxation rates and social insurance contributions, a further 3% was
lost to all wage earners at this time. A realistic figure for the
fall in living standards for those in work during the crisis is
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therefore calculated to be nearer 15?^. It ought to be remembered
that for the lower paid worker this fall represented the important
margin between just managing and debt, deprivation and hunger.
Though there seems little doubt that the Nazi Party would have
eventually established some form of social welfare scheme which would
favour a rise in the German birth-rate, it would be misleading in the
extreme to suggest that economic hardship and unemployment played an
exclusive role in bringing forth Party-sponsored aid. While this was
true of the late nineteen twenties, at which time indigent Party
activists and the SA (Sturm Abteilunq) were supported by the Party,
from 1930, when the economic situation worsened and the NSDAP gained
significant political victories, it became increasingly urgent that
welfare facilities should be established to deal with the growing
number of the unemployed, regardless of whether they were members of
the NSDAP, or other Nazi supporters. From 1930 social welfare
increasingly took on an ideological tone and became the means by
which the NSDAP could consolidate its position by extending its
welfare facilities to non-Nazis and Nazis alike.^
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. HA, 14/262, 'Wohlfahrtsausschdsse werden besetzt', pp.8-14;
Ibid., 'Der NSV-Gedanke taucht auf', pp.134-156.
3.
The development of National Socialist welfare may be divided
into two, one part consisting of those measures which were undertaken
almost entirely by the Nazi women's groups from 1923 to 1930, and the
other part consisting of measures which, from the end of 1930, became
increasingly propaganda-oriented and organised by Party officials and
Gau personnel who were, of course, exclusively male."'' Social welfare
measures were organised and carried out at first by the numerous
members of the women's groups, and from 1931 the newly formed
NS-Frauenschaft. From 1930/31, there were individually organised Gau
welfare arrangements one of which was the newly established
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NS-Volkswohlfahrt in the Gau Gross-Berlin. Many individuals, on a
voluntary basis, were kept increasingly busy supplying much needed
aid for those who were, quite literally in the case of the SA, in the
forefront of the political struggle."' Nazi welfare arose mainly as
circumstances dictated, with measures being put into operation in a
more or less sporadic and uncoordinated fashion. Welfare work which
was organised by the individual Gaus only established itself
gradually and went under a variety of names, such as N5-Hilfe and
NS-Nothilfe. One Gauleiter, BUrckel, established a measure called
Volksozialistiche Selbsthilfe which name gives some indication of the
character of the measures being put into force at that time, given
that the emphasis upon self-help was something which would be
1. Ibid., 'Besondere Organisationen entstehen', pp.37-48.
2. Ibid., pp.154-136.
3. Conan Fischer, 'The Occupational Background of the SA's Rank and
File Membership during the Depression, 1929-1934', in Peter D.
Stachura (ed.), The Shaping of the Nazi State, London 1978,
p. 147. The unemployment rate for SA men ran as high as 60%/70%
overall while in Prussia it was calculated to be nearer 100%.
4. HA, 14/262, pp.37-48.
4.
retained later in all Nazi welfare measures organised by the NSV/.
Youth welfare was not neglected, and in Munich a special section
called Soziale Arbeit was formed and administered by the Hitler Youth
(HJ). Even although the NSV/ was formally given a monopoly within the
area of youth welfare, the HJ would continue to run its own section,
in spite of the fact that the NSV/ eventually took over other
previously existing Party organised measures during 1933.
Compared with the scope and complexity of the NSV/ after 1933,
Party-sponsored welfare at the end of the 1920s was a modest affair
indeed, consisting mainly of the collection and distribution of
essential foodstuffs, articles of clothing, and the provision of hot
meals in soup kitchens for unemployed SA men and other Nazi
sympathisers.^ The importance of examining the provision of welfare
as it was undertaken by the Nazi women's groups who were carrying out
this work should not be underestimated, for it seems reasonable to
suggest that the NSV was able to establish itself more quickly by
building upon an already existing, and indeed familiar system, of
Nazi welfare - a system moreover, which had been painstakingly
established out of the voluntary efforts of the hard-working women
who belonged to these groups in the middle and late 1920s. It is
possible that without this (albeit tenuous) network of welfare
activity, which had been building up throughout the industrial areas,
and which was being supplemented by Gau welfare arrangements, the NSV/
would have had a longer, if not a harder, struggle to convince Party
officials in the Spring of 1933 that they, in the NSV/, would be able
to establish a Party welfare organisation on a national level.
1. Ibid., pp.4-7.
5.
Before the official recognition was granted by the Party to the NSV,
in the early Spring of 1933, the infant organisation seems to hav/e
drawn attention to the existence of the welfare network which now
existed in addition to the state and denominational arrangements.
Moreover, these particular arrangements were regarded, certainly by
the NS\l and perhaps by Geobbels too, as being ripe for a takeover by
a Party agency which would be dedicated to systematizing all
previously uncoordinated party sponsored welfare aid. The rapidity
with which the new leader of the NSV, Erich Hilgenfeldt, set about
this activity from May 1933, when the Party finally agreed to
acknowledge the NS\l, suggests that such was the case."^
In order to understand this Party welfare network, it is
necessary to examine the development of the welfare-oriented
activities of the various women's groups in the 1920s. In the
official history of the NSV it was pointed out that in 1924, fourteen
women in Bernburg had gathered together to take over those activities
which would leave their male comrades 'free to participate in the
political struggle without having to bother themselves with the
2
practical cares of ordinary daily life'. While the women members
and supporters of the other political parties, such as the DDP
(Democratic Party), the DVP (People's Party), and the SPD (Social
Democratic Party), freely engaged in discussion and interested
themselves in feminist and pacifist issues, the expectation of the
NSDAP was that their female members and supporters would be allowed
to fill supportive roles only. Thus Nazi women were expected, in the
main, to be less interested in problems which related to the issue of
1. Ibid., 'Das Winterhilfswerk setzt ein', pp.180-211.
2. Ibid, p.6.
b.
women's rights than in issues which related to the supportive and
nurturant aspect of female activity. Given that feminists per se
were anathema to the Nazis, it was made clear that in relation to the
political sphere, women in the NSDAP could hope only to fulfil an
overtly non-political function, being expected to co-operate with
their male Party comrades, not to compete with them."'' The supportive
work of the women Party members and adherents often enough consisted
of attending to the needs of the unemployed SA men who regularly
required first-aid treatment after street battles. It was clear from
the start that Nazi women would be encouraged to become aware of the
significance of the Party's positive redefinition of traditional
female roles, to rediscover for themselves the value of the
2
complementary and cooperative nature of feminine activity. After
1933, through the means of propaganda, the Nazis would try to
'upgrade' female roles by bestowing upon the activities of the
housewife and mother a significantly higher status than had hitherto
prevailed.^ Women were to be encouraged to carry out their work:
'Without asking whether this work was menial or not
they did this work quite simply and as a matter of course
out of the healthy maternal instinct of the uneducated
woman who perceived her strength to lie in a purposeful
desire to work and to serve'.
(4)
During the period of the Kampfzeit lavish praises which were often
directed towards the so-called healthy mother instinct of the
ordinary, largely uneducated woman must be seen as a clear attempt to
1. Jill Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation of Women, London 1981.
See Introduction, pp.11-20.
2. Jill Stephenson, 'Women in German Society, 1930-40', Ph D
thesis, 1974, University of Edinburgh, p.423.
3. Ibid.
4. HA, 14/262, p.6.
7.
persuade working class women to join, or at least give support to,
the NSDAP. Nevertheless, this theme, which would take on an
increasingly sentimental tone in the publications of the NSV,
continued unabated after 1933, after the partial stoppage of
applications for party membership in May of that year."''
Although the activities, motivation and organisation of Nazi
2
women have been adequately dealt with elsewhere, it is necessary
here to give a brief indication of how the women's groups in the late
1920s were organised to provide the practical work, which was their
main contribution to the provision of welfare. The organisation of
the Nazi women's groups existed in three tiers, from local to Reich
level. The flrtliche Frauenqruppen were intended, insofar as they
were involved in welfare work, to restrict their activities to within
the boundary of the local branch. According to the history of the
NSV this was in order that a systematic arrangement of existing
voluntary labour be injected into all welfare activities.^ The
Arbeitsqemeinschaften vfllkisch gesinnter Frauen operated on a larger
scale in, and including, more than one local; it was the Deutscher
Frauenorden (Rotes Hakenkreuz) (hereafter DFO) which functioned at
both the local and the national levels and took in the largest
numbers of Nazi women. It was therefore the 'stSrkeste organisation
4
nationalsozialisticher Frauen'. It has been pointed out that
1. Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party: 1933-43,
Pittsburgh 1969, p.49.
2. See Stephenson, 'Women in German Society 1930-40';
Women in Nazi Society, London 1975; The Nazi Organisation of
Women.
3. HA, 14/262, p.5.
4. Ibid.
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there were two broad strands of women's group activity. There
existed firstly, those few women who were paid up Party members,
along with those who were the wives, daughters, or other close
adherents of male Party members. In addition, there were others who
were not connected with the NSDAP but who were members of vtilkisch
groups which generally shared the aims and prejudices of the NSDAP.
As Stephenson points out, the 'common motivation' for participation
in the Nazi Party's groups, or in vdlkisch groups, 'derived from the
catalogue of post-First World War German disasters from the
Versailles Treaty to the growth of Bolshevism at home'."'' Given the
presence of a preparedness to take on the tasks of unpaid voluntary
welfare work, the women's groups seem to have supplied an ideal
training ground for the future voluntary welfare aides of the NSV.
The DFO had been founded by Elsbeth Zander in Berlin, and until
1931, when the organisation was dissolved, it existed as the largest
2
organisational grouping of Nazi women. From 1928, with the
affiliation of the DFO to the NSDAP, the activities of DFO members
were concentrated upon the field of welfare. DFO members were
expected to acquaint themselves with current political issues, and
gain a useful working knowledge of the law as it affected the sphere
of the family. Of the numbers of the female Party members, which in
1930 amounted to 7,623, one half were DFO members who, because of
their involvement in social welfare, may be counted as amateur social
1. Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation of Women, p.25.
2. HA, 14/262, p.5. For an examination of this topic see
Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation of Women, pp.28-37.
9.
workers."'' To this figure must be added the numbers of welfare
enthusiasts working within the local groups. On the whole it seems
safe to say that several hundreds of women were being encouraged,
during the later 1920s and early 1930s, to regard themselves as being
able to provide a worthwhile contribution within the area of private
social welfare, and in addition to that which was being organised by
the churches and the other political parties. The type of welfare
which was available to needy Nazis in 1929 and 1930, and which was
organised by their own female supporters, was not always restricted
to hand-outs of food, clothing and a hot meal in a soup kitchen.
Children too were given consideration, and wives of Party activists
could, when facilities allowed, arrange for their children to be sent
on holiday. From 1930 a system of holiday arrangements for children
was set up which ran parallel to the already existing governmental
schemes. Organised country holidays had been operating in the Berlin
area from 1923, when the Berlin State Child Welfare Bureau set up
arrangements for holidays for children. It seems likely that the
addition of a Nazi organised scheme was inspired by the need to
become involved in general family welfare, though the Nazi
arrangements were modest in the extreme, with the city of Hamburg
2
managing in 1930 to send only sixty children to the country. A
comprehensive system of family care was something the Nazi women were
interested in providing, albeit on a very modest scale. All the work
1. HA, 14/262, p.5; pp.13-20 Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation
of Women, p.23, and for a description of the training schemes
of the Nazi women's organisation, pp.136-172.
2. HA, 14/262, p.18; numbers of children sent on holiday from
Hamburg: 1930 - 60; 1931 - 120; 1932 - 500.
which was put together under the general title of 'Familienhilfe',
before 1933, was an attempt to provide an all-embracing scheme,
something which could be regarded as a 'package deal' of family
care. This included, as well as the distributions of food and
clothing, the care of children, the sick, and pregnant and nursing
mothers."^ Clearly there would gradually develop a determination,
which was channelled through new Nazi welfare measures, to separate
every aspect of the social life of Party members and supporters from
the Weimar political system as far as this was possible. All of
these measures were of a practical nature but also unavoidably modest
at this time, with relatively small groups of hard-pressed women
collecting what they could, in order to help their needy comrades who
were involved in promoting the Nazi cause. It certainly seems that
many were inspired to give time and effort, motivated as they were by
a sense of 'sacrifice' which later became the model for the citizens
of the Third Reich.^
The local women's groups continued to flourish, and
increasingly took on the practical work of providing support and
material aid for Party activists and supporters. In 1929, the
N5-F rauenarbeitsqemeinschaft (FAG) of Neustadt/Aisch in the Gau
Franken, sent two crates of foodstuffs to Berlin."* As far as can be
discovered, this particular measure seems to have been the forerunner
of the later NSV Patenqau, or 'donor Gau', system which was run by
1. Ibid., 'Familienhilfe wird geleistet', pp.13-23.
2. Ibid., 'Mittagstische werden eingerichtet und Unterkunft
gewdhrt', pp.23-29. This may have been true only of the
period of the Kampfzeit rather than the peacetime years of




the NSW's Winterhilfswerk (Winter Aid Scheme). After 1933, during
the winter months, the NSV/'s Winter Aid saw to it that essential
foodstuffs which could be obtained from the surrounding country areas
were collected and sent off to towns and cities; Gaus in the country
districts were assigned specific industrial areas to which supplies
of farm produce were dispatched. For example, the Gau Gross-Berlin
could expect to be supplied with produce, paid for by the Winter Aid
Scheme, as the need dictated, from LUbeck, Mecklenburg, Pomerania
and Kurmark."^ In addition, the same hard-working Neustadt/Aisch
group, again in 1929, set to work to organise two hundred centres for
the distribution of potatoes to unemployed Party members and
supporters. This type of measure, again, would later be adopted by
the NSV and carried out by the Winter Aid Scheme. Dictated by
necessity, these measures of the Nazi women, before 1933, may be
described as having laid part of the essential groundwork of the more
grandiose schemes of the NSW whose vaunted 'originality' in these
2
matters is thus called into question.
There seems little reason to doubt that in the late 1920s a
genuine sense of gratitude was generated among Party activists, and
the SA in particular, for the welfare which was provided by the Nazi
women, not all of them Party members themselves. The provision of
food and clothing, or free meals in an SA canteen, must be counted as
an essential lifeline for the growing numbers of impoverished Nazis.
The work of the women did not go unacknowledged by the recipients
of such welfare as was available at the time. The Frau-
enarbeitsqemeinschaft Altmark was sent the following letter from
1. See Chapter Three.
2. BA, NSD 30/31, Peine Arbeit; Dein Werk, Berlin, 1942.
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an anonymous member of the SA who had received much needed aid:
'Dear Frau Pgn. L.,
Only now can I write to you to thank you. My
comrades and I send to you our heartfelt thanks for your
sacrifices and the work which has been undertaken on our
behalf. You have never forgotten us and there is not one
moment when we do not feel grateful to you. In the name
of all my comrades, I thank you and your group.'
(1)
From the end of 1930 however, it was becoming clear that the Nazi
women's groups could only look forward to participating in a more
organised, and significantly expanded, Nazi scheme by playing a minor
2
part. Indeed, in some new arrangements, they were excluded, as the
example of new activities in the Gau Gross-Berlin showed, for the
N5-Frauenschaft was effectively prevented from participating in the
creation of the NSV in the Berlin area during 1931.^ Not
surprisingly, however, in the severe economic conditions of 1930 to
1933, it could have hardly been expected that even the hardest
working women would be able to provide, and systematically organise,
a whole range of welfare activities with the resources which were
available to them at that time. An expansion of welfare would need
the support of the Party which could itself make funds available to
the Gaus, but the Gaus themselves would increasingly have to provide,
through collections, for those in need. However, within the area of
practical welfare work, it is fair to say that the women's groups had
always been at the forefront, with many individuals giving support to
those in need. During the period when the Nazis were struggling for
political recognition, such practical aid which was made available




was crucial for the Nazi cause. The Party organisation, the
NS-Volkswohlfahrt, owed a particular debt to the Nazi women who had
been involved in paving the way for a Party welfare scheme which
would eventually challenge, in many areas, the provision of welfare
by the .State."''
Developments in Welfare Provisions at Gau Level from 1930-33.
During 1930 and 1931 in addition to the massive increase in the
numbers of the unemployed there was another important development
which was to have a significant effect on the future organisation of
Party welfare. This was the success by the NSDAP in the Reichstag
election of September 1930, where significant gains made it a
political force to be reckoned with: the Party had won some 6.4
million votes, and thus 107 Nazi delegates entered the Reichstag. In
order to capitalise on these electoral gains, it became urgent that a
completely new arrangement should be set up to deal effectively with
an expanded programme of social welfare; inevitably it would be
2
dealt with exclusively by Party officials. A close connection,
therefore, existed between the electoral victory of 1930, an ever
worsening economic situation, and the expansion and development of
Party welfare throughout the Gaus. Given the appalling hardship
which was descending upon all classes in German society, it was
absolutely vital that the unemployed, both party members and
supporters (including new supporters), be given the full extent of
what material assistance could be gathered together. The NSDAP could
not afford at this time to lose the foothold which had been gained in
popular sympathy, as shown in the election, through failure to
1. BA, R36, Folders 1001; 1996.
2. HA, 14/262, pp.37-48.
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provide adequate material help for unemployed Party activists, and
most importantly, for the increased numbers of actual and potential
supporters. From this time on it would be Gau office personnel who
would take on the increased responsibility of providing systematic
arrangements for welfare at local level.^
An overall expansion of Gau office personnel at first preceded,
and then accompanied, a steady growth and reorganisation of all
Party-sponsored aid. After the Nazi victory in Ammerland in 1930,
welfare committees were set up throughout the Gau (Weser-Ems), to
supervise the newly created 'welfare districts' which were designed
to offer facilities for giving advice, and distributing assistance to
2
'HilfsbedUrftigen Parteigenossen'. Significantly, there is a total
absence of any reference to participation by the women's groups in
these new arrangements, whether on a reduced level or not. It was
abundantly clear that, following an expansion of Gau supervised
welfare, important decisions would be taken by Party officials alone,
that is, by men. As unemployment continued to rise in Germany, so an
expanded system of Nazi welfare was established. In the Magdeburg
area, for example, it was decided by Party officials that such help
as had been previously supplied by the local women's groups was no
longer sufficient to meet the swiftly developing economic crisis in
the area."^ A new social welfare scheme was called into being and
4
given the name Kamaradenhilfe. The scheme was designed to operate
throughout every Drtsqruppe and it was expected that all Party





members and sympathisers in the district would go willingly to the
task of organising collections for the Magdeburg Party members whose
situation, it was said, was 'truly deplorable'."^ Collections were
organised in every Ortsgruppe and donations were solicited from Party
members, Nazi sympathisers and indeed anyone who was prepared to
contribute. While an exaggeratedly rosy picture is given of the
success of these particular efforts, with no more than a slammed door
to hinder the efforts of the Party workers, it was obvious that the
value of the propaganda effect of these collections was not,lost on
some Party officials at least. When discussions took place after the
house-to-house collections it was noted with some interest, and a
great deal of satisfaction, that some previously unsympathetic
citizens had, in fact, donated something, though not always 'in the
2
required spirit'. Thus it was decided that, if a donation had been
given, however reluctantly, it was to be counted as a 'gain'."' It
was in this way that the groundwork for the propaganda activities of
the NSV was laid.
One of the Nazi Party's major assumptions had begun to emerge,
it manifested itself in the refusal to recognise that passive
acquiescence on the part of many who offered this, instead of real




4. See Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation of Women, pp.160-161,
for a description of the contrast between some support for
practical training courses for women, as opposed to the
unpopularity of the ideological training courses on offer
by the DFW (Deutsches Frauenwerk). Membership of the NSV
often signalled a desire to be left in peace rather than a
sign of active support for the Nazi cause.
'support' was consistently and deliberately misrepresented, from
1933, by Goebbels' Ministry, as active and enthusiastic support for
the Nazi government and its measures."^
The founding of the NS-Volkswohlfahrt in the Gau Gross-Berlin
The city of Berlin was, in 1931, a most appropriate place in
which to provide an additional scheme of welfare aid. The
difficulties which faced the population at the end of that year were
seemingly endless, with many people facing economic disaster, poverty
and homelessness. The numbers of the unemployed in Berlin were
higher, on average, than in the rest of Germany. For example, at the
time of the MachtUbernahme in January 1933, the number of unemployed
per thousand of the population within the Reich was 96.4, whereas in
Berlin, the number of the unemployed per thousand of the population
came to 152.2. Expressed another way, of every six Berliners, one
was out of work, while in the rest of Germany the relationship was
Year
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1. Reher, Social Welfare in Germany, Berlin 1938, p.12^
BA, NS 22/751, letter from Hilgenfeldt to Ley including a
detailed report of the WHW collections with a breakdown of
amounts donated by household and individuals, both at Reich
and Gau level, 17th April 1939.
2. David Kramer, 'Das FUrsorgesystem im Dritten Reich', in
Geschichte der Sozialarbeit, (hrsq.) Rolf Landwehr and RUdeger
Baron, Basel 1983, p. 198.
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17.
According to the NS\l history, the Berlin Statistical Office had
reported that a majority of the inhabitants of Berlin were enduring
filthy and insanitary conditions in their homes, and the problem of
over-crowding was being added to the misery and discomfort of life in
the city.
The founding of the NS-Volkswohlfahrt in the Gau Gross-Berlin
coincided with that period in the Party's history which saw, at the
end of 1931, a consolidation of the Party's organisational systems,
with the Party militants '...more firmly integrated into the
organisational framework than before...'."'' A uniform accounting
system had been established in all the Gaus by Schwarz, a necessary
measure considering that the Party's full-time staff exceeded at this
time one thousand in almost every Gau. Financial troubles too were
beginning to be resolved, and successful links had been established
with German agricultural interest groups. In mid-1931 a successful
onslaught was made on the business community, the tangible results of
which were the sums of money which the industrialists made available
to the Nazi Party. Membership of the Party had reached approximately
430,000, and the SA received an increase in membership of 100,000
2
between December 1931 and February 1932. The decision by Party
officials in the Gau-Gross Berlin to establish a welfare association,
one which would be officially registered in the same way as the other
independent welfare associations, was no doubt inspired by the
general upswing in the Party's fortunes. But it also indicates that
some Party officials, at least, felt that there was a need to
establish a foothold in Berlin within the area then occupied by the
1. Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933,
Pittsburgh 1969, p.239.
2. Ibid.
Catholic Caritas, the Protestant Innere Mission, and the SPD's
Arbeiterwohlfahrt, among others.
It was in the Wilmersdorf district of Berlin that the new
welfare association was founded, after numerous discussions between
the district adviser of the Communal Policy Department (Kompola), of
the Party, Erich Humbert, and other Party officials."'' With the
growing numbers of Nazi town councillors it was felt that the time
had come to set up a new welfare association. Humbert was very well
aware of the increasing difficulties which were being experienced by
the existing welfare services, and he could, with some justification,
point to the necessity for supplying a 'homegrown' association in the
city of Berlin. There seems, however, to have existed at this time a
strong desire to become involved within the field of independent
welfare, which would exist as a real alternative to the other private
agencies, and it is this particular goal which distinguishes the
Berlin-based association from the other Gaus' organised measures.
Whilst other Gaus sought to support the indigent and the poor within
their district, it is clear from the start that in Berlin, ambitions
went further, and it seems probable that the idea of developing the
2
NSV on a national scale was already in some activists' minds.
Before the new organisation sought official recognition, and after
discussion with the welfare adviser to the Nazi faction of the Berlin
city council, Johannes Engel, it was decided to alter the name of the
welfare association from NS-Wohlfahrt to NS-Volkswohlfahrt.^ The
1. HA, 14/262., p.156.
2. It certainly seems to have been in Kluge's mind at least,
see HA, 14/262, p.172.
3. Ibid., p.156.
18a.(error)
addition of the emotive term 'Volk' seems to have been a very early
indication of the future emphasis upon community responsibility for
welfare; clearly the intention to induce the population to make
contributions and undertake voluntary unpaid work for the NSV existed
right from the start.Voluntary welfare workers would soon be
recruited to carry out their duties according to the principle of
2
'selfless service'. Nazi welfare was intended to be designed to
uphold the 'natural' order of the family, the neighbourhood, and the
community of the people."^ Later criticisms of Weimar welfare
arrangements by the NSV consistently centred round a passionate
rejection of the Weimar system which, it was claimed, failed to
promote a valuable sense of civic responsibility, either in those who
dispensed welfare, or, consequently, in those who were on the
receiving end of it. The NSV tirelessly emphasised the call to
promote a healthy community dedicated to upholding collective, not
individualistic, goals. The early decision to include the vfllkisch
element within the name of the welfare association only signalled the
4
future direction of NSV intentions. From 1933 the concept of the
value of the individual would suffer a total eclipse in the writings,
utterances and activities of the NSV."'
1. Ibid., P.160; pp.134-136.
2. Ibid., p.156.
3. Ibid.
4. Erich Hilgenfeldt, Idee der Nationalsozialistische
Wohlfahrtspfleqe, Berlin 1937;
Hermann Althaus, NS-Volkswohlfahrt, Berlin 1937.
5. Erich Hilgenfeldt, 'Die Volksgemeinschaft als Ausgangspunkt und
Ziel im heutigen Deutschland', speech given to an international
audience in London in 1936, in which the community is stressed as
being of more importance than the individual, in Social Work and
the Community, a contribution for the III International Confer¬
ence on Social Work in London, 1936, Karlsruhe 1936.
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The new association gained the first stage in its official
recognition as an independent agency after meetings with its
founders, and local Party officials which resulted in the submission
of a request for recognition to the Arbeitsqemeinschaft der Freien
Wohlfahrt in the Wilmersdorf area. This request was written and
signed by Erich Humbert, August Lang, Hildegard Loeser, and Herbert
Bdhme. Due acknowledgement arrived on the 25th September 1931, and
official recognition was granted on the 19th December 1931. The next
stage, which turned out to be protracted, would involve a request to
become a registered Verein. At about the same time, the end of 1931,
the Gau consultant of the Communal Policy Department, Herbert Treff,
became aware of the existence of the new organisation."^ Treff was
also the business manager of the NSDAP faction of the Berlin city
council. He willingly gave his support in promoting the cause of a
new welfare association, and became involved in seeing that all party
members who were either already participating in welfare activities,
or interested in such matters, got to know about the existence of
2
the NS-VoIkswohlfahrt. This interest which was shown in the NSV by
the Berlin section of Kompola seems to have been a crucial factor in
helping to establish it in the eyes of important Party officials in
Berlin. To ensure that the new association developed as effectively
as possible, its expansion across the Gau as a whole had to be
coordinated. For this purpose, five officials were appointed who
would act as advisers within each of the five districts of the Gau.
The new officials were, Hans von Freyburg (North), Herbert Volz
(East), Hermann Kluge (South), Waldemar Wensel (Mid.), and Erich
1. HA, 14/262, p.160.
2. Ibid.
Humbert (West).'*'
With its basic internal organisation complete, the NSV now
required to be registered as an official organisation to enable it to
conduct its activities among the public at large. It would not,
however, be Treff, who would lead the new organisation as its
president, though it seems that he had wished to do so; as a
well-known Nazi he had to step aside when it was decided that a less
prominent character would have to be found before the application to
be registered could be made. While the officials in Gau Gross-Berlin
felt it necessary to draw attention away from the very close
connection between the NSDAP and the NS-Volkswohlfahrt, there seems
to have been, at this time, no real danger that the NS-Volkswohlfahrt
2
would be unable to obtain official approval. It was only after many
meetings in the Gauhaus in Hedemanstrasse, within the offices of the
Communal Policy Department, and after one especially difficult and
drawn out discussion between Treff and the other officials, that an
acceptable document was drawn up which set out the aims of the new
NSV. The name of the new president was Hermann Kluge though the
period of his stay was short indeed, only lasting eleven months; his
subsequent career was destined to remain outside the NSV."^ The
document which had been drawn up was presented for authorisation and
in April 1932, the NS-Volkswohlfahrt was included in the
Vereinsreqister of the Berlin Tempelhof district and given the number
4
582 VR. The new NSV was now an officially recognised independent
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., pp.160-162.
3. Ibid., p.188; Kluge continued to be a State official after
1933 and was Bdrqermeister in Gransee during the war. See
Erich Hilgenfeldt file, Berlin Document Center.
4. HA, 14/262, p.162.
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association which had official permission to function within the
Berlin area, which meant that it now had the opportunity to become
closely involved within the provision of welfare in the city of
Berlin.
The early spring of 1932 was a time of exhausting activity for
the Nazis, and especially Hitler, who had agreed to stand as a
candidate in the Presidential elections. Germany was blanketed by
literally thousands of rallies, and the presidential campaign was
organised by an enthusiastic Goebbels whose propaganda material was
designed with every socio-economic group in mind."'' Hitler's failure
to win on March 13th resulted in important changes in the policies
and organistion of the Party itself. That period in the Party's
history began which witnessed the revival of Strasser's power and
influence. Consequently, Goebbels' own influence suffered an
eclipse, and his aggressive strategy of 'pure propaganda' was
abandoned. The Strasser emphasis once more prevailed, whereby a Nazi
victory was conceived as being possible only through gradual effort,
within the context of a general undermining of the social and
economic structure of the Republic. Once more, organisational
activity became a central issue, and Strasser's reforms were
extensive and designed to 'tighten the administrative lines of
2
control which had been allowed to fall loose during the spring'.
There seems good reason to believe that the NSV in Berlin had
everything to gain from this revival of Strasser's fortunes, for it
now seemed likely that the safe haven of the Communal Policy
Department might offer an ideal base for the further development of
1. Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, 1919-1933, p.249.
2. Ibid., p.238.
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the new association. The Communal Policy Department was now
incorporated into Main Department III of the Party's administrative
structure."^ Besides this department, Strasser set up departments for
Interior, Educational and Public Health policies. At this time,
officials of the Communal Policy Department and the NSV worked
closely together on ambitious plans for the future organisation of
2
Nazi welfare. One of the most influential and enthusiastic
supporters of the NSV at this time was the new head of Hauptabteilung
III in Berlin, Karl Spiewock. Not only did he supervise a 'massive
array of offices which concerned themselves with virtually every
aspect of governmental life', but Spiewock was also actively prepared
to support the development of the new welfare association."^'
It was through Herbert Treff that Spiewock had first become
aware of the NSV. Treff had made it known that various difficulties
were hampering the activities of the infant organisation, not the
least of which were lack of office space and a shortage of money.
Spiewock showed himself willing to help, at least with the
accommodation problem, and the first discussions between Kluge, the
new NSV leader, and Spiewock, resulted in office space being made
available. Not only this, but the NSV which at this time would be
local only to Berlin, was given the assurance that by virtue of its
connection with the Communal Policy Department, it would be
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officially included within the Main Department III. The office
space which was now allocated to the NSV belonged to Main Department
1. Ibid., pp.274-275; HA, 14/262, pp.160-168.
2. Ibid., pp.160-171.
3. Ibid., pp.166-167; Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party:
1919-1933, p.275. '
4. HA, 14/262, p.168.
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Ill, and though it was described as small, and extremely
uncomfortable, no more that a Durchqanqzimmer or small ante-room, the
NSV/ was grateful for the use of this accommodation for three days in
every week. Such a modest beginning also required that the NSV/
members provide their own writing materials, make use of a borrowed
typewriter, and share a telephone. Heating too had to be provided
by the new officials themselves, and the small office was manned only
as existing full-time jobs allowed. In other words, the NSV/ was run
at this time entirely by part-time officials. The main task of these
new officials, a dozen in all at first, who were responsible for the
ten Kreise of the Berlin area, was to find a suitable number of
trainee social workers."''
It seems certain that Spiewock was as enthusiastic as Herbert
Treff about the establishment of a comprehensive system of Party
welfare, which it would fall entirely to the new organisation to
dispense. The significance of such a development was that activities
which had hitherto been the responsibility of the Nazi women's groups
(now the NSF) would ultimately be taken over by the NSV/, though a
complete takeover of all Gau-organised welfare on a national level
would, of course, have to wait upon an acknowledgement from Party
headquarters. The new NSV/ lost no time in making a start on the
exclusion of the NSF from the field of welfare. In the autumn of
1932, there was a determined attempt by the new NSV and Spiewock to
discredit the work of the NSF, two members of which were prepared to
support NSV/ allegations that work, with regard to the provision of
welfare, was being carried out 'without any kind of system', neither
was it 'unified', nor attempting to make full use of existing
1. Ibid., p.167.
resources. The person who made these 'facts' known, was one Erna
Silomon, a member of the Berlin NSF. She seems to have been at the
centre of a plot, for such it was, to help the NSV to take over from
the NSF women within (ultimately) the whole organisation and
arrangements of Nazi welfare, at first in Berlin, and later
throughout the Reich. On the basis of these criticisms, a meeting
was held in the home of another NSF member, Ingeborg Altgelt, and it
2
included Spiwock, Silomon, and Frau Eva von Schroeder. After many
issues were discussed, it was agreed that in all future welfare
measures, a consideration of the political significance of such work
would have to be given stronger emphasis. A political dimension was
therefore to be added to Nazi welfare. Indeed, it was recognised
that welfare activity, as dispensed by the Nazis, should no longer be
regarded simply as a remedy for social and economic misfortune."^ To
be given emphasis was the idea of 'Socialism of the Deed' through the
dispensing of effective welfare measures. Certainly this ersatz
socialism would figure somewhat in NSV/WHW rhetoric into the
mid-1930s. Essentially, from 1933, 'Socialism of the Deed' was meant
to supplant socialism per se; the message was that the existence of
a Nazified 'real' socialism would render unnecessary the continued
existence of political parties who were dedicated to socialist
principles. As far as the Nazis were concerned, within a future Nazi
society, social welfare policies would be pursued which would render
the claims of socialist idealists superfluous. While these trends
only became generally apparent later, from 1933, it seems that they
1. Ibid., pp.170-171.
2. Ibid., no date was given for this meeting.
3. Ibid. , Eva von Schroeder is reported to have emphasised that
social welfare must be understood to be a political task.
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were present in discussions about welfare policies right from the
start. The strong desire to politicise social welfare took all
future welfare arrangements effectively out of the hands of the women
of the NSF, as the Berlin Gau leader of the N5F knew only too well."^
She, Frau Fikentscher, was forced to confront both Erna Silomon and
Ingeborg Altgelt after the clandestine meeting; not surprisingly the
two co-conspirators were asked to leave the Nazi Women's
Organisation. From this point Ingeborg Altgelt would enjoy a
successful career with the NSV, obtaining an important administrative
post in Berlin; so also, it appears, did Erna Silomon, who was
2
appointed to organise an NSV department in 1933.
At the beginning of December 1932, the NSV could claim 1,680
members within the Greater Berlin area."^ While the NSV would
eventually come to all the activities which came under the label
of Party welfare, it is necessary to emphasise how rapidly they set
about effecting the beginning of a transfer of the work which had
previously been undertaken almost solely by the women's groups. From
'winter aid' (the provision of expanded help in winter months) to the
organisation of children's holidays in the summer, the NSV proceeded
1. Ibid., p.171; it certainly seems that von Schroeder was the
instigator of this particular line. Her file in the Berlin
Document Center reveals little with regard to her earlier
activities before her work with the Berlin NSV. She obtained
a post with the NSV in Berlin after 1933, in the department
which dealt with personal requests.
2. Ibid., p.171; pp.220-221; Silomon was appointed to be in charge
of 'Heime und KUchen' in Berlin in 1933, which department
disappeared later. Altgelt was appointed to head 'Schrifts-
fUhrunq und Geschdftsfdhrunq' in Berlin at the end of May
1933. She remained with the NSV until about 1935 when for health
reasons she resigned her position as an administrator in Berlin.
3. BA,NSD 30/3, NS-Volksdienst, Organ des Hauptamtes fUr Volks-
wohlfahrt, 'Die Entwicklung der NSV bis zu ihrer parteiamtlichen
Anerkennung durch den FOhrer', Berlin, January 1939, pp. 4-21.
See also HA, 14/262, p.173.
quickly to involve itself in making initial arrangements for the
closest participation in existing independent welfare in the Berlin
area."^ After the autumn debacle, the NSV did an about-turn and began
to attempt to cooperate more amicably with the NSF in a share-out of
2
the welfare work in which the NSF has been closely involved. No doubt
the NSV wished to adopt a more cautious approach and avoid a head-on
confrontation which might jeopardise its own ambitious plans. By the
beginning of December 1932, the organisational plan of the NSV had
taken shape, but most importantly the leader, Kluge, was described as
President at Reich level; the leader at the local Berlin level was
one Pg. Wolff.^ It is tempting to suggest that the later problems
which the NSV would experience with the Party in Munich may have been
caused by this premature 'appointment' of a Reich level leader for
the NSV. It is sure that such a title was an entirely fantasy one,
with no basis in reality. Certainly Kluge may have gone too far, and
his 'national leadership' would come to an end in February, or early
March, 1933. It may have been that Strasser had merely permitted
such a move but that the uncertainty consequent on his resignation
prevented any clear contradiction of it from the centre until things
4
had settled down.
In the winter of 1932 the first NSV Winter Aid drive took
place. An ambitious scheme was set in motion by NSV officials, and
Eva von Schroeder, in particular.^ After permission had been
1. HA, 14/262, pp.173-173.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.172.
4. Ibid., p.188; Kluge seems to have been appointed at this time to
work (as a State official) in the Verwaltunqsbezirk Tempelhof.
3. Ibid., 'Die NS-Volkswohlfahrt e.V., hat im Einvernehmen mit der
NSDAP zu einem NS-Winterhilfswerk', pp.180-188.
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obtained in November from Goebbels, the whole scheme took off. First
of all, arrangements for the delivery and distribution of essential
foodstuffs were made, with Eva von Schroeder taking a leading role in
encouraging donations for the NSV drive. Letters were sent off to
the owners of estates in the surrounding country areas, and the State
Governers of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brandenburg, with a plea that
any produce which could be spared should be sent to an NSV depot in
Berlin."'' Such produce would then be sorted and distributed by the
NSV for the sole purpose of alleviating the misery of Berliners who
were increasingly suffering acute hardship. By this time, an average
of 148 per thousand of the population were unemployed during that
2
year. Requests for help for the NSV 'Winter Aid' drive were also
sent off to Rust, Gauleiter of Hanover South, and Telchow, Gauleiter
of Hanover East. Permission to have a street collection was also
sought, and a letter was sent to the Berlin Police President's
office. It contained the important reminder that the NSV would be
giving valuable help by adding to the city of Berlin's own winter
welfare provisions.
It was during this first NSV 'Winter Aid' drive that a large
NSV canteen was set up in the Charlottenburg district of Berlin. It
was hardly surprising, at the time of the collapse of the
unemployment insurance system, that the NSV regarded the opening of a
new soup kitchen, or canteen, which would be open to Nazis, and
non-Nazis alike, as a 'significant political act'."^ This particular
move on the part of the NSV was a sure sign that the new organisation
would act without real cooperation with the NSF, which had itself
1. Ibid., p.181.
2. See page 17 this Chapter.
3. Ibid., p.183.
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been providing this type of welfare for some time. The new provision
was set up in an old building in 22 Spandauerstrasse, (then a disused
tram station or terminal), and from the outset it was designed to be
used by all Berliners within the area. A keen effort was made to
attract the inhabitants of this run-down area of the city, regardless
of political persuasion."^ To this purpose, it was settled beforehand
that all inflammatory speeches by Nazi sympathisers would be
forbidden, and the SA were instructed to refrain from the baiting of
political opponents on the premises, and presumably in the immediate
area. A really big effort was to be made to provide a welfare
measure for the use of hungry Berliners who would be encouraged to
see how the Nazis could provide aid for all-comers, in a peaceful
2
setting. This particular venture underlined the trend of a
politically motivated policy for welfare by the NSV. The population
of Berlin was to be the first to be exposed to the notion that Nazi
measures within the area of welfare, could exist as a legitimate
replacement for socialist, or communist, political aims and ideals.
The spirit of this 1932 version of 'Socialism of the Deed' was a
forerunner of that kind of actively propagandists 'socialism' which
would characterise, at first, the later NSV schemes. The NSV
canteen, it is also clear, was intended to prove, by example, that
the Nazis were more humane than their enemies had made out in the
past."^ Berliners who could steel themselves to put up with the
decorations of the interior, such as portraits of prominent Nazis and





good, cheap nourishment. Above all, the NSV set out to show that
they had the well-being of the Berlin people at heart, that their
concern was for the poorer citizens and the working-class population
as a whole, even if they had shown themselves to be supporters of the
communists or the SPD. It was the officials of the Communal Policy
Department, the NSV, and, indeed, Eva von Schroeder, who took a
leading role in the formulation of this particular policy.
Propaganda and welfare would, from this time on, become inextricably
2
linked within the policies of the NSV.
On the 15th December, a week after Strasser's resignation, it
was announced from the Reichsleitung in Munich that no actual or
ideological connection existed between the NSDAP and the organisation
calling itself 'Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt' in Berlin,
furthermore, the NSV was ordered to remove the title
'Nationalsozialist' from its name at once."^ This was no less than a
bombshell to the leaders of the new organisation; it was an
especially bitter blow, given that the Winter Aid drive had been
successful, and the NSV was growing almost daily more effective.
Both Dr. Conti and Dr. Goebbels had been prepared to support the NSV.
Conti had asked the NSV to involve itself further with the work of
holidays for children, and the activities of the NSV's Winter Aid
drive had been publicised in the pages of Per Angriff on October 11th
that year. However, this aggressive stance on the part of the NSDAP
in Munich followed hard upon the resignation of Gregor Strasser, and





and Main Department III, than with the growth and development of a
new welfare measure."^ In addition, as suggested above, some notice
may have been take of the activities of Kluge who, it seems, named
himself 'national leader' for Nazi welfare at the beginning of
December. Whatever the cause, this development promised to destroy
the NSV, almost from the beginning. Though the NSW was offered the
possibility of making an appeal with regard to the change in name,
what really mattered was that a virtual prohibition on the activities
of the NSV had been received from Munich. The Party had seen fit to
publish a statement to the effect that no links existed between the
new NSV and the Reichsleitunq; the statement had been signed by
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Schwarz, Bouhler and the Chief Party Counsel, Frank. Such a
statement would only be interpreted by Party officials as a total
repudiation by the Party of this new welfare organisation. As Kluge
and the other NSV officials knew only too well, it would be the kiss
of death for the NSV, and any hopes that it might later become a
nationally-based organisation would be doomed to failure. The
aftermath of the Strasser resignation seemed to threaten an eclipse
of all NSV plans for the future. All the hard work of the past few
months would be utterly lost if the NSV were unable to reinstate its
connections with the NSDAP. It was for this reason that Kluge and
Eva von Schroeder made frantic appeals both to Dr. Frank and
Reinhardt Neubert, the President of the Reich General Counsel of the
Bar Association.^ It seems, however, to have been a personal meeting




lifting of the 'ban' on the NSV. Recently David Kramer has pointed
to the crucial involvement of Magda Goebbels, and her part in the
reinstatement of the NSV. However it seems more likely that her
involvement, which was of relatively minor importance, occurred after
the reinstatement, and not before."'' There seems every reason to
believe that Eva von Schroeder, who took urgent action, managed to
convince Schwarz, at least, that the NSV ought to be supported.
However, von Schroeder was unable to convince Schwarz that the name
of the new organisation ought to be fully restored. Thus the NSV/ had
to be content with calling itself Volkswohlfahrt e.V., until May
2
1933. Though the very serious setbacks of December had been
quickly resolved, at the time of the Party's greatest triumph, in
January 1933, the NSV was having to deal with several serious
problems at the same time. For example, with the Nazi victory came
the partial dissolution of Main Department III, and the loss of the
connection with the Communal Policy Department. Spiewock seems to
have lost all effective contact with the NSV at this time, and Kluge
was asked to step down as NSV leader."' An 'old fighter', Kluge may
have come to be regarded as less than able to carry out his duties,
given that he had been seriously wounded, both in the war and in an
anti-Nazi skirmish during the twenties. However, it may also have
been that he was now seen as a rash and ineffectual leader who had
allowed himself to push the NSV prematurely into making a strong bid
to take on the responsibility for setting up a nationally-based
1. Kramer, 'Das Ftlrsorgesystem', p.183.
2. HA, 14/262, p.179.
3. Ibid., p.188, one of Kluge's few public appearances as
leader of the Berlin-based NSV was to officiate at a
Tombola stall in 1932.
organisation."^ Most importantly, it might have been feared that he
would prove to be unable to tackle the most urgent problem of all,
namely the necessity of building anew a really effective relationship
2
with the Party in Munich. Until the Party officially recognised the
primacy of the NSV in matters of welfare, a nationally-based
organisation could not materialise. Following the lifting of the ban
of December 1932, there would have to be a rapid creation of support
from Party leaders themselves for the organisation. Without this, it
is altogether likely that the NSV would have gone under during the
early months of 1933. This fate was, however, avoided through the
interest which was shown by Goebbels during the early part of 1933."^
On the 28th of February, 1933, Goebbels gave formal recognition
to the NSV when he decided to have published a statement that, 'the
Volkswohfahrt e.V., is an essential part of all future social welfare
measures and any welfare activity in Berlin is to be undertaken with
4
the collaboration of this association'. It is not absolutely clear
exactly how he came to this decision, notwithstanding his wife's
interest in the organisation, knowing as she did Ingeborg Altgelt and
Frau von Schroeder. Precisely what her possible role was in
interesting him in the NSV is uncertain, but it seems more than
likely that his real attention had been aroused in November 1932, at
the time when the NSV had sought permission to organise a 'Winter
1. Ibid., 'Vorsitzender f(Jr das Reich Pg.Kluge', p.172.
2. Ibid., p.188.




Aid' drive in Berlin during the winter of 1932/33."'' It may have been!^
his attention was drawn to the importance of the propaganda aspect of
the NSV's first Winter Aid. It may also have occurred to him that
after January 1933, social welfare measures offered a potentially
valuable means of helping to unite the nation behind the new
leadership. The attraction of a propaganda measure which also raised
large sums for the poor may have been regarded by him as a
heaven-sent opportunity to see six or seven million unemployed safely
through the first winter of the new leadership's rule and also
function as a device to create a substantial number of grateful
supporters for the new government. Geobbels had seen, at first hand,
the reasonably effective measures of the first NSV Winter Aid drive
which, more emphatically than some of the other Gaus' organised
welfare measures, introduced a politically motivated element into aid
for the hungry. But the NSV also had a uniquely powerful sense of
the importance of propaganda, indeed a propagandists view of the
nature of social welfare in general, which was evident right from the
2
start. Subsequent developments during the early part of 1933
support the view that Goebbels had become strongly interested in
using social welfare as a propaganda measure, with the NSV
undertaking to organise a series of collections in the spring. This
measure would show the NSV in its best light and may have hastened
its official recognition which came on 3rd May 1933. A powerful ally
had been found in Goebbels, and his support, freely given in February
1. Ibid., p.180. Per Anqriff had published an 'Aufruf' for the
NSV to obtain the use of halls and rooms for its 'Winter Aid'
drive.
2. Ibid., pp.180-188;
BA,NSD 30/3, 'Die Entwicklung der NSV', in NS-Volksdienst,
January 1939, pp.4-8.
1933, was of utmost importance. While it is true that Magda Goebbels
was honoured for her work and support for the NSV in 1942, when she
was awarded an 'Honour Medal for German People's Welfare Care'
(Ehrenzeichen fUr deutsche Volkspfleqe), a decoration which was
granted through the Propaganda Ministry in the name of the Party, it
is likely that her husband had assessed for himself the value of a
Party Welfare Organisation which, through propaganda and welfare
would win support for the new leadership's measures and plans."''
The appointment of a new leader for the NSV at the beginning of
1933 was preceded by many discussions in which Goebbels' deputy seems
2
to have played a leading role. On the 14th of March 1933, the job
was finally offered by Gdrlitzer to the former Gauinspektor I of the
Gau Gross-Berlin, Erich Hilgenfeldt."' Prom this time on, until the
end of the war, Hilgenfeldt acted as leader of the NSV. Born in
Heinitz in the Saar region, he had served in the first World War and
in industry
held posts^before becoming a Party official. He had joined the Party
in August 1928, and had been appointed a Kreisleiter in Berlin,
before being appointed a Gauinspektor. Prom the start, Hilgenfeldt
showed himself to be an efficient and enthusiastic administrator, and
from the moment of his appointment, he set about putting into
operation a series of measures which were designed to coordinate all
NSV practices and systematize the organisational arrangements of the
1. BA,R55/103, list containing Frau Goebbels' name to be awarded an
'Ehrenzeichen fUr deutsche Volkspflege', II class.
2. HA, 14/262, p.189.
3. Ibid., p.189. See also BA,NS 37ii/1006, letter from Werner
Reher, Reichshauptstellenleiter of the NSV, to all NSV leaders in
the Gaus, giving instructions for the press guidelines for the 10
year celebrations of the existence of the NSV. Included was a
short 'Lebenslauf' of Hilgenfeldt, 20th March 1942.
35.
Berlin-based welfare organisation.^ The personality and character of
the new leader can best be described as hard-working, frequently
2
ungenerous and sometimes ruthless. His colleagues especially Eva
von Schroeder, had every reason to fear his ever vigilant, eagle-eyed
attention to detail."' A well-padded frame, which gave the impression
of a more easy-going character, somewhat concealed an obsessive, hard
worker who did not balk at the prospect of furthering the cause of
the NSV in the face of frank opposition from other powerful Nazi
leaders who had cause to Tear the encroachment of the NSV upon their
own particular interests.*1
The first NSV measure under Hilgenfeldt which occurred after
the February announcement by Goebbels, and before official Party
approval, took place from the 12th to the 21st of April, 1933.
Collections were held throughout the whole of Berlin under the title
'Hitler's Birthday Donation Fund' and, according to the NSV history,
as many as 573,000 Berliners were helped by this measure. This
figure took in a majority of the unemployed as well as the old, the
poor and those who had suffered the loss of insurance benefits."'
1. Kramer, 'Das Fursorgesystem', pp.184-187; HA, 14/262, pp.189-210.
2. BA,R55/103, 'Verleihung des Ehrenzeichens (Medaille) fdr
deutsche Volkspflege', 6th May 1939. Hilgenfeldt made much in
1942 of the granting of the Honour Medals for German People's
Care and refused to accept von Schroeder's list of names for
medals to be granted in the 1st Class category; most
especially, Kluge was mentioned by Hilgenfeldt as having only
worked for the NSV for a very short time, and therefore didn't
deserve such an honour. Much time and effort was spent on these
discussions with a great deal of ill-will, on the part of
Hilgenfeldt and von Schroeder, who disagreed quite violently at
this time, i.e. in 1941-42.
3. Ibid.
4. BA,R36/1001, Spiewock to Hilgenfeldt, 'ZuschUsse der Stadt
Berlin fdr die NSV' letter of 17th May 1938.
5. HA,14/262, pp.203-210.
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A big effort was made to include all categories of the needy and
there is no reason to doubt the claim that everyone who needed help
received it, regardless of political or religious affiliations."''
Help came in the form of food vouchers or second-hand clothing, but
not cash. The city of Berlin was made aware of the existence of the
NS\l for a second time on the 1st of May, when a day-long action was
arranged, and during which the sale of paper edelweiss flowers was
undertaken throughout the city. The sale of paper facsimiles of the
FUhrer's favourite flower seems to have been undertaken with some
care and thorough planning by Hilgenfeldt, who issued a long list of
instructions to every Kreis. Every Ortsqruppe had to take 'at least
thirteen' collection boxes, three thousand of which had been newly
2
manufactured with red labels for this occasion. These were intended
to be wielded 'throughout the day', by the members of the HO and the
BdM (Bund deutscher Mddel), no doubt to impart a vigorous
impression, and Party officials were required to appear in their
Party uniforms. By these means, maximum visibility was to be
achieved during this action which had the stamp of Goebbels' own
personal supervision on it, with the Party making a show of its
'gentler' side, distributing artificial flowers for purchase through
a Nazi welfare collection. Nevertheless there would be many in
Berlin who had seen another, less agreeable, side to Nazi rule during
the time, shortly before, when leading trade unionists had suffered
the destruction of their offices and severe beatings from local units
of the SA.^ However, on the 1st of May, between the hours of 9 a.m.
and 7 p.m., the HJ and the BdM between them used 900 of the
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p.208.
3. Mason, Sozialpolitik, pp.82-84.
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collecting boxes or tins, and Party officials took charge of the
largest number, 1,966 in all. The NSF made a less impressive
showing, with only 134 boxes taken up during the day. As many as
1,500,000 'flowers' were sold, each one costing ten Pfennigs. These
actions seem to have been a success for Hilgenfeldt and for the N5V,
and demonstrated the ability to carry through a propaganda measure
which drew attention to the new leader's suitability for assuming
control over a nationally-based organisation which would present its
welfare measures within a propaganda-based scheme. The question
remained however whether such 'success' would be similarly
interpreted by the Party leadership, (and Hitler in particular) as a
clear sign that the NSV was ready to take on the responsibility for a
welfare organisation which would function throughout Germany, as an
independent agency and in the name of the Party. A rapid decision
was reached, which suggests that Goebbels had lost no time in putting
forward the merits and advantages of the new welfare association
which had been operating within his Gau."^ On the 3rd of May
permission was granted by Hitler at last, with the official statement
that the NS-Volkswohlfahrt e.V., would be responsible for all
questions of social welfare; it would exist as an organisation of
the Party.^
It is clear that the new Nazi organisation, as the history of
the NSV suggests, achieved a great deal in only a very short time,
1. HA, 14/262, p.210. As the History puts it, the work of the NSV
had been acknowledged in Berlin but would it be similarly
accepted at Reich level?
2. Ibid., p.211. The document signed by Hitler reads:
'Die N5-Volkswohlfahrt e.V., wird hiermit als Organisation
innerhalb der Partei fdr das Reich anerkannt. Sie ist
zustSndig ftlr alle fragen der Volkswohlfahrt und der FUrsorge
und hat ihren Sitz in Berlin. Berlin der 3. Mai 1933'.
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going from shared ante-room to official recognition, at Reich level,
in only a few short months. The NSV could put behind it the worries
and problems of the winter of 1932/3, for it had found an efficient
leader who had shown the ability to ingratiate himself with the
powerful Gau leader of Berlin, Goebbels, who moreover had shown a
willingness to give Hilgenfeldt his chance to show, in the early
spring, what he could do, both as an organiser and as a welfare
official who was sensitive to the dissemination of propaganda. The
NSV celebration on 6th May in the Hotel Kaiserhof was a glittering
affair, attended by Goebbels, his wife (who seems to have acted as a
prominent organiser of the event), officials of the Party and several
important dignitaries. A speech by the new NSV leader emphasised the
achievements of the past few months, outlining the participation of
the NSV in Berlin, and the numbers of the population who had been
aided by the new welfare association."^ From the NSV offices, now in
9 Spandauer Strasse in Berlin, there issued forth a series of
instructions about the organisational shape of the NSV, which went
through several alterations both of shape, and personnel, before the
2
final arrangements were worked out. The five main departments of
the NSV were as follows:
Organisationsamt (Organisation)
Amt Finanzwerwaltung (Finance)
Amt Wohlfahrtspflege und Jugendhilfe
(General Welfare and Youth Welfare)
Amt Volksgesundheit (Health)
Amt Werbung und Schulung (Propaganda and Training
(3)
1. Ibid., pp.211-212.
2. HA,14/262, 'Organisationsplan I and II', pp.248-231, and
'Organisatorische Aufbau', p.239.
3. Ibid., p.260; Ingeborg Altgelt, Weqweiser durch die NSV,
Berlin 1935, pp.20-29.
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This organisational scheme remained virtually unchanged until the end
of the war. The memberhship of the organisation began to build up
rapidly, from a figure of 1,680 members within the Berlin area at the
beginning of December 1932, to 112,000 in Berlin and elsewhere, at










In July 1933, the first organisational guidelines were set out in a
long sixteen page document which gave information about ideological
2
matters, as well as administrative arrangements. From the first it
was clear that the NSV/ would emphasise the need to create a new sense
of 'welfare consciousness', but also that it would at all times
promote the needs of the community over those of the individual. The
rationale, indeed the function, of Nazi welfare was to encourage the
search for a new sense of individual 'strength' which could be put at
the service of the community, above any consideration of the needs of
the individual citizen. As Hilgenfeldt put it:
'The rights of the individual can never be greater than
those of the community, nor can his duty to the community
come second. The National Socialist State places the needs
1. Althaus, NS-V/olkswohlfahrt, pp.42-43.
2. HA, 14/262, pp.234-248.
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of the community ov/er those of the individual and will
raise again the idea of selfless service for others'.
(1)
The constant re-iteration of this theme would occur in the speeches
of Hilgenfeldt, in the written material of the NSV, and in the
training schemes organised for NSV staff, from 1933, propaganda
which fostered the sentiments outlined above was intertwined with
social welfare as it was organised by the NSV in Germany; the call
would go out from the NSV to participate actively in the creation of
a society dedicated to the cooperative values of community
(fcemeinschaft), whose legitimacy would always be supported by pointing
to the destructive tendencies of the 'selfish' and 'egotistical'
2
values of the Weimar System.
9
1. Ibid., Hilgenfeldt's speech of 30th June 1933, pp.233-234;
BA, NSD 30/7, Ewiqes Deutschland, Monatsschrift fdr den
deutschen Volksqenossen, October and March 1937.
2. Ibid., Hilgenfeldt's speech of 14th August to NSV members and
workers, p.235; Hilgenfeldt, Idee.
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CHAPTER 2
THE INTEGRATION OP THE NSV WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF SOCIAL WELFARE
IN GERMANY
The NSV, and all Party welfare which had been developing from
1930 onwards, entered upon a field of activity which had previously
been occupied by the agencies of the churches and other private
charitable welfare associations on the one hand, and those of the
state on the other. Ear from introducing itself into an undeveloped
system of social welfare, Party welfare, as it was now represented by
the NSV, had to set about carving for itself a niche within a system
which had undergone an important expansion between 1922 and 1924. A
significant increase of state participation within the welfare system
occurred in Weimar Germany, when a new system for the care of
children and young people was introduced at that time. While the
agencies of the churches, the Protestant Innere Mission and the
Catholic Caritas, would continue to operate fully, the state welfare
system would experience both an enlargement of its activities,
previously restricted to a fairly modest level of state-organised
facilities, and an extension of its legal responsibilities to provide
social welfare throughout Germany."'' When the Nazis came to power,
the laws which underwrote the administration of welfare in Weimar
Germany, were not simply set aside; on the contrary, the
Reichs/juqendwohlfahrtsqesetz of 1922 was retained, as were the
statutory responsibilities of local government to support and to
provide finance for the non-governmental welfare agencies. This
particular arrangement worked in favour of the NSV right from the
start, for as a frei (private) agency, it could look to the local
1. Friedldnder and Myers, Child Welfare in Germany, pp.6-7.
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communities, the Gemeindefi for financial aid for its various measures
such as, for example, youth care and child care, including the
provision of kindergartens, welfare for mothers and children,
holidays for children and special nourishment programmes including
cheap school meals.^ Reasonably substantial sums were received by
the NSV yearly in the form of a subsidy from the Gemeinde*and the
2
cities throughout the Reich. The levels of these sums were
distributed according to the size of the community or city, although
some at least of the smaller communities would arrange for the NSV
subsidy to be paid in the form of rent-free premises being made
available."^ It should be understood that the finances of the NSV and
those of the NSV's Winterhilfswerk (WHW), operated independently of
one another, with the WHW remaining financially self-sufficient but
4
NSV continuing to receive state subsidies until the end of the war.
Given the huge sums which were collected annually from the public for
the WHW, it was unnecessary for the WHW to look elsewhere for finance
in order to carry out its various measures; the NSV, on the other
hand, very largely depended upon the sums collected through its
membership dues, the state subsidies and, only rarely, upon
collections from the public. There seems no reason to doubt, too,
that Hilgenfeldt regarded the state subsidies as a most important
1. BA, R36/964, Rundfraqe Nr. 111/5661/36, 'Beihilfen an die
NSV in Rechnungsjahr 1936'; HA,Reel 13, Folder 239,
'NSV-Jugendhilfe' - 1924-1937.
2. BA, R36, Folder 964. This contains detailed information
on NSV subsidies.
3. Ibid., Per Dberbdrqermeister der Stadt Saarbrdcken, 'Beihilfen
an die NSV', 18th January 1937.
4. BA, R36/962, state subsidies to NSV 'Zuschussleistung der NSV',
27th February, 1937.
The subsidies were paid out according to the decrees of the
Ministry of the Interior of 1.7.35 - MBliV.S.866; 5.11.35
and 7.12.35.
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source of revenue for the NSV and its various welfare activities.
The organisational plan of the NSV underwent only minor changes
of its organisational arrangements which had been set out during the
summer of 1933, and which consisted of Organisation, Finances,
2
General Welfare, Youth Welfare, Health and Training and Propaganda.
Some additions and changes were made however; in 1936, when a
department Erndhrunqshilfswerk was added; and in 1938, when a new
sub-section Hilfswerk fUr deutsche bildende Kunst (aid for artists)
was added to the office for Organisation in the Reichsleitunq in
Berlin."* In 1938, the organisational plan (not including the two new
sections outlined above) was set out as follows:










HE Heim und Grundstucksverwaltung
HE Revision.
Ill) Wohlfahrtspfleqe u. Juqendhilfe:
IIIA Allgemeine Wohlfahrtspflege
(einschl. Heim- und Anstaltsfragen)
1. BA, R36/962, Hilgenfeldt to the Stadtskommissar, Berlin,
Dr. Lippert, letter of 7th December 1936.
2. HA, 14/262, p.239.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1001, 'Anordnung Nr.22', organisational outline,
14th July 1936.
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Ill) Wohlfahrtspfleqe u. Juqendhilfe: (continued)
IIIB SonderfUrsorge
(StraffdlligenfUrsorge, Trinker, Wanderer
und BahnhofsfUrsorge, FUrsorge fUr Blinde,
Schwerhflrige usw)












IVA Heilverschickung (einschl. T.B. Hilfswerk)








At the end of June 1938, the vertical organisational plan of the NSV
was as follows:
1. Ibid., 'Aufbau des Hauptamtes ftlr Volkswohlfahrt in der
Reichsleitung der NSDAP'.
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1938 -- Altreich 1938/39 -- Austria
443,967 Blocks 37,822 Blocks
83,600 Zellen 7,434 Zellen
21,861 Ortsgruppen 2,427 Ortsgruppen
678 Kreise 82 Kreise
32 Gaue 7 Gaue
'
(1)
At the lowest level of the vertical organisation of the NSV existed
the Blockwalter corps. Essentially in a voluntary position with no
salary, the Blockwalter had the task of attending to all measures
which had to be undertaken vis-a-vis daily announcements and the
giving of advice to those living within his area. He maintained NSV
activity at this lowest level and acted as the eyes and ears of the
NSV with regard to informing upon those deemed to be anti-social or
2
otherwise not strictly eligible for NSV or Wintershilfswerk aid.
The numbers of NSV Blockwalter, according to numbers of households
looked after by each individual Blockwalter were as follows:








In 1939, the numbers of NSV workers who were active within the
1. BA, NSD 30/3,NS-Volksdienst, January 1939, pp.16-17; the NSV
Head Office was in Berlin.
2. Ibid., p.18.
3. Ibid.; see also Leistungen der Nationalsozialistische
Wohlfahrtspleqe, MUnchen/Berlin 1937, p.l.
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offices of the Gau, Kreis and Ort levels were as follows:
Numbers of NSV Staff - 1939
% Salaried % Unsalaried
Gau 6,292 97.9 2.1
Kreis 15,685 58.1 41.9
Ort 124,755 3.3 96.7
(1)
According to one NSV official, a daily average of three hours work
was put in by voluntary staff throughout the year for the work of the
NSV. However given that this particular figure was supplied by the
NSV, in this case in N5-Volksdienst, it seems likely to have been a
generous over-estimate, though some at least of the voluntary staff
must have put in long evenings of hard work in the local NSV office,
especially during the Winter Aid drives during the period from
2
October to March. The new NSV also employed specialist staff,
namely nurses, doctors, kindergarten nurses and other trained welfare
staff and the numbers of these, from 1933 to 1941, is shown as
Numbers of NSV Salaried Staff
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941
Nurses 2,505 3,353 3,758 6,348 12,060 14,433 16,380
Kindergarten Staff 3,192 5,586 11,432 17,095 30,642 36,823 55,425
Welfare Workers 389 471 688 1,204 1,583 1,677 1,815
Youth Workers 149 195 222 308 455 496 560
(Leaders)
Family Care Workers 70 119 182 323 440 366 371
(Leaders)
Family Care Workers 72 170 143 171 229 245 268
Women Doctors 2,288 3,486 3,588 3,504
Other Specialist
Staff 85 112
Total 6,377 9,894 16,425 27,737 48,895 57,713 78,435
(3)
1. BA, NSD 30/3, NS-Volksdienst, January 1939, p.19.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1062, NSV Gau Sachsen, confidential reports,
•Tatigkeitsbericht' (331316), March 1935.
3. BA, NS26/261, 'Leistungen der NSV',1Aufkommen und Verwendung der
Mittel im Winterhilfswerk des deutschen Volkes', p.25.
47.
Social welfare, in the form of support obtainable by virtue of
unemployment or other loss of income for individuals, as it existed
during the 1930s and later, was organised in Germany under a
complicated system of rules which the Nazi takeover did nothing to
simplify. There existed nine branches, with the NSV occupying that
section which came under the heading Freie Wohlfahrt. The nine
sections or branches of the social security system were as follows:
1) Sozialversicherunq (Social Insurance)
2) Versorqunq (War victims and military pensions and benefits)
3) Fdrsorqe (Public Assistance)
4) Familienunterhalt (Soldiers' dependents' allowances Displaced
families' allowances)
3) Unterstdtzunq (Benefits from DAF)
6) Freie Wohlfahrt (NSV and charitable agencies of Caritas and
Innere Mission and other remaining private agencies)
7) Kinderbeihilfen (Children's Allowances)




It seems to have been possible for individuals to obtain several
parallel benefits, so that income from state welfare would be
able to meet most needs, under normal circumstances. This was
because the complicated system did not allow any one branch of
social security to provide fully sufficient cover. Most notable
in this regard seems to have been the section,
Sozialversicherunq, which left a majority of older citizens
(Sozialrentner) with pensions which were barely
and
1. Germany, BasicAZonal Handbook, London 1944/45. Pt.II,
Annexe VIII, 'Social Security'.
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sufficient to meet the most basic of requirements."^ However, some of
those in receipt of Sozialversicherunq were eligible to receive
benefits from Versorqunq as well, and were thus able to exist above
the poverty line because of payments from two separate sections of
the welfare system. To these types of social welfare payment for
citizens were added, in winter time, the benefits in kind which came
from the NSV's Winter Aid scheme, if these were deemed to be
necessary. The WHW would continue to pay out to lower paid workers
and to pensioners a supplement in kind, either of food or fuel, or
2
both, until the end of the war.
The welfare of both the NSV and its Winter Aid scheme was
intended from the beginning to function as a supplement to the
existing state measures. The state would continue to pay out cash
benefits to welfare cases according to existing legal requirements,
so that NSV donations whether in the form of supplements for payment
of rent, gas and electricity accounts, (some of the few monetary
benefits), or in the form of help in kind, were usually given out
when all other possibilities had been exhausted. This aspect of NSV
welfare had a 'last resort' quality about it, given that the NSV
stepped in only after all the other sections of the welfare system
had been explored.^ However, NSV welfare did not only consist of
these types of donation to the needy, for many of its other measures
included an emphasis upon ideological training which was generously
provided within the design of the facilities for welfare for mothers
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; see Chapter Three.
3. BA,NSD 30/34, Winterhilfswerk des deutschen Volkes,
Allqemeine Arbeitsanweisunq 1936/37, MUnchen 1937,
'Grundlage der Betreuung', p.21.
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and infants, and for the youth of the nation. In other words,
ideological indoctrination was freely distributed, while the more
familiar welfare benefits were not. Care was taken to see that NSV
aid was not given out in advance of that which might be given by the
2
state or the churches.
Elements both of miserliness and of generosity characterised
NSV welfare measures depending upon whether they were part of the
schemes for donations to individuals or whether they were part of
ideologically motivated provisions for social welfare, such as youth
welfare, child welfare and training schemes for young mothers."^
Inevitably, NSV facilities for kindergartens, and youth welfare in
general, came to act as rivals to the existing state provisions,
which strictly speaking, they had no right to do. The NSV was
supposed to fit in with the state arrangements, and not to set up in
opposition to them, though no clear guidelines existed as to how it
might be able to achieve this particular goal."' However, neither the
state provisions, nor those of the churches, would suffer a serious
restriction of their services for some time to come, for it would
take time for the NSV to build up its own organisational framework
and levels of staff. For example, the NSV in Berlin in 1936, still
had only three kindergartens, though several more were planned for
1. BA, NSD 30/4a, NS-Volksdienst, December 1943, 'Zehn Jahre
Hilfswerk Mutter u. Kind', p.161.
2. Kurt Mennecke, Ein westdeutscher NSV-Kreis. Seine Entstehung
und sein MenschenqefUqe vom 13. September 1933 bis zum
30. November 1934, Koln 1936, pp.72-94.
3. See Chapter Four.
4. BA, R36/962, Spiewock to Dr. Lippert, letter of 30th December
1936.
3. BA, R36/962 'Erlass v. 12. September 1938, RMBL.IV,S,154'.
50.
the city at this time."^ This is not to say that the NSV did not have
an important impact on the provisions of social welfare. On the
contrary, for the church agencies would increasingly find that they
would be required to provide aid for those who had been rejected by
the Party's welfare organisation on the basis of criteria
stigmatizing 'asocial' or 'biologically inferior' individuals or
families. NSV officials were required to make careful investigations
of welfare claimants who were required to be both 'hereditarily
2
healthy' and 'socially worthy', before aid could be given. These
requirements also constrained the work of state officials, and it
seems to have been an area of possible friction, leading state
officials very frequently felt it to be advisable to make pointed
reference to their own application of these conditions in the light
of an NSV tendency to criticise the state's 'laxity' whenever
possible."^
It was for these reasons that the character of social welfare
in Germany would soon begin to alter, with the Party and state
agencies creaming off those who could be described as the less
troublesome cases for themselves. The resources of the regime would
be spent on those who were regarded as 'worthy' of aid. Those who
were regarded as 'unworthy', and therefore liable to act as a drain
on precious scarce resources, would find that no help would be
forthcoming for the duration of the Third Reich. Nevertheless, the
1. BA, R36/962, Hilgenfeldt to Dr. Lippert, 'Einrichtung der
NSV in Berlin', 7th December 1936. The NSV tended to assume
control over existing kindergartens and nurseries first before
setting up its own arrangements.
2. BA, R36/962, Spiewock to Stadtpr^sident der Reichshauptstadt
Berlin, letter of 20th January 1937.
3. Ibid.
4. The NSV strictly applied these rulings, see BA, NS 37ii/1062,
Gau Sachsen, 'Stimmungsbericht', March 1933.
NSV functioned more ruthlessly in this respect than did the state
officials, whose legal responsibilities acted to restrain (albeit in
a marginal way) this particular aspect of Nazi welfare."'' Inevitably
then, an element of penalisation and preference existed in the state
provisions for welfare after 1933, as well as within those of the
Party. Certain types of socially irresponsible behaviour, now
officially labelled 'asocial' and thereby 'unworthy' of support from
the Nazi regime, allowed that individuals whose behaviour came within
this unacceptable range would find that their benefits from state
welfare could be cut, or withdrawn altogether. Within this category
were, especially, the unrepentantly 'work-shy', and it was they who
2
found that most of their welfare support was cut off. State welfare
officials, however, were keenly aware of the difficulties involved in
applying the 'asocial' category to fathers of families, for there
existed no effective measures whereby the wives, and the
'hereditarily valuable' children of those so labelled could be fully
protected from a withdrawal of a major part of economic aid from the
state. Thus to a degree an anomaly was created within the state
welfare system which allowed that some "hereditary valuable'
children, whose protection the Nazi support systems were meant to
secure, would be denied essential welfare aid which the state itself
had a duty to provide. These developments seem to have been viewed
as entirely unwelcome by some officials who had, in one exceptionally
difficult case, no option but to offer to restore welfare payments to
1. BA, R36/962, see correspondence of December 1936 regarding
the interference of the NSV in welfare cases of the state.
2. Heavy drinkers and childbeaters especially came into this
category; BA,R36/962, Stadtoberinspektor, to Dr. Lippert
on the case of Hellmuth Hdhne, report of 11th December 1936.
a wife and children on condition that they ceased to live in the
family home."'' If repeated attempts to help those certified medically
unfit for heavy work to accept more suitable employment had failed,
and the patience of the welfare officials had become exhausted, the
necessary application of the 'asocial' category only further
complicated the work of those who had to deal with these and similar
cases. The penalising of a husband might, in some cases at least,
mean the long-term dependence of his wife and children upon state
2
welfare benefits. However, the threat of such a penalty must have
acted to encourage many to take on work which they otherwise would
have considered to be undesirable. As one study has pointed out,
many were forced into accepting work which was both upalatable and
back-breaking, and at rates of pay which were lower than welfare
benefits; there was little choice but to accept such work, given the
knowledge that no benefits would be forthcoming when repeated
refusals to do so would result in the 'asocial' label being applied."'
It must be remembered that repeated refusals to take up a job also
involved the loss of WHW aid, for the employment office withdrew the
necessary documents which entitled the unemployed to benefit in kind
from the NSV's Winter Aid scheme.
1. Ibid. Discussions on the case of \lg. Hellmuth HtJhne, Berlin,
30th December 1936. Ibid., Spiewock to Dr. Lippert, letter of
30th December 1936. It seems that welfare in kind from the NSV
would still be available for wives and children however.
2. Ibid.; The repeated attempts to find work for one case at least
shows that the 'asocial' category was not necessarily swiftly
applied by state officials. In the case of HtShne, welfare
officials were prepared to make several attempts to help before
labelling him as 'chronically work-shy'.
3. Ian Kershaw, 'How Effective was Nazi Propaganda?', in Nazi
Propaganda, D. Welch (ed.), London 1983, p.189.
4. BA,NSD 30/34, Allqemeine Arqeitsanweisunq (2), p.21.
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Other problems were created for the state officials too, by the
use of the 'asocial' designation through the tendency of the NSV to
interfere in individual welfare cases when they felt inclined to do
so. It seems to have been possible for the NSV to put forward a
case for withdrawing welfare support or, uncharacteristically, for
asking for the removal of individuals from the 'asocial' category,
2
when they felt that it was justified. Such interference was viewed
with extreme irritation by leading state officials who were forced to
make a reasoned argument to the NSV about the necessity of keeping
out of the affairs of the state welfare offices."^ Such requests to
the NSV to stay out of the state sphere were often accompanied by a
firmly stated resume of the impeccable Nazi viewpoint of the state
welfare officials.^ It certainly seems that it was necessary
frequently to 'remind' Hilgenfeldt of this. Such interference may
have been doubly unwelcome, for the NSV, as an independent agency,
had no legal responsibility to pay out cash welfare benefits to
individual recipients, nor did it; neither was it entitled in law to
encroach upon these responsibilities, without prior agreements
having been reached. It was hardly surprising that officials in
Berlin were not slow to make complaints of such interference to their
superiors in the Deutscher Gemeindetaq.^
1. BA,R36/962, Dr. Lippert to Hilgenfeldt, on five individual cases
in which the NSV had interfered, letter of 4th February 1937.
2. BA,R36/962, NSV to Dr. Lippert, letter of 6th November 1936.
3. BA,R36/962, Dr. Lippert to Hilgenfeldt, letter of 4th February
1937.
4. Ibid.
5. BA,R36/962, 'Schreiben des Hauptamtes fUr Volkswohlfahrt vom
6.11 und 10.12.1936': copies ofNSV letters were sent to the
President of the DGT and to Schldter, of the DGT, amongst
others.
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Almost from the beginning, the NSV experienced varying degrees
of difficulty in achieving a trouble-free working relationship with
the state welfare offices, in order to gain a substantial measure of
cooperation for its own welfare facilities. Leading state officials
were justifiably concerned about the thrust of NSV policy, which
increasingly demonstrated the intention to alter, in its own favour,
the balance between state and Party welfare. The regime, as it
existed, could offer no solution to these problems for it would not,
indeed could not, provide a set of clear guidelines for the
clarification of the relations between Party and state, given the
political developments of 1934."^ The Law for Ensuring the Unity of
Party and State of 1st December 1933, created not the indissolvable
link between Party and state which it promised, but it worked to
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favour the one, the state, over the other, the Party. Indeed the
prime function of this law was to end the Party's revolutionary
thrust, and to aid the consolidation of the internal political
stability of the regime, something which was achieved in the summer
of 1934."^ The system of social welfare could not remain apart from
these political developments, for the innumerable conflict-laden but
shifting relationships of power within the political sphere were
mirrored, albeit on a reduced level, in the function and operation of
state and Party welfare. This would be most clearly demonstrated in
the numerous struggles over the administrative arrangements for youth
welfare from 1934. Both state and NSV officials indulged, until the
1. Martin Broszat, The Hitler State: The Foundation and
Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich,
New York 1981, pp.204-215.
2. Ibid., p.209; Jane Caplan, 'The Civil Servant in the Third
Reich', D.Phil thesis Oxford 1974, p.92.
3. Broszat, The Hitler State, p.209.
end of the war, in a work-creating tug-of-war over the correct
balance between state and Party youth welfare facilities."^ A long,
barely concealed struggle surfaced time and time again, pulling in,
on their respective sides the leading officials of the Party and the
2
state. Bormann, Hess, Frick, Fiehler and others all made
contributions to the discussions of such issues, but without finding
a solution to the central problem of jurisdictional squabbling
between the NSV and the state officials."' Agreements which were
concluded between the NSV and the DGT seem to have been little more
than a formal exercise which the two signatories were obliged to act
out. Little of real substance was contained in the expressions of
Hilgenfeldt that,
'the work of the NSV does not intend either in Berlin
or in the Reich to interfere in, or to weaken in any
way, the essential state welfare arrangements'.
(4)
These statements did nothing to calm the fears of the leading
officials in Berlin, who expressed concern over developments during
1936, when it had become clear that the NSV intended to increase
rapidly its involvement in the provision of kindergartens in the city
by offering rival facilities; denials on the part of the NSV could
not hide the fact that such was the case.^ Much bitterness was
generated by the knowledge that NSV subsidies, paid by the state,
were in effect, being used to further the development of facilities
1. BA, NS/25, Folder 1233; see Chapters Five and Seven.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NS 23/1233, 'Vereinbarung zwischen RMDI, und
Stellvertreter des FUhrers Clber NSV-Jugendhilfe', n.d.
4. BA,R36/962, Hilgenfeldt to Dr. Lippert, letter of
7th December 1936.
5. Ibid.; see Chapter Six.
which would ultimately rival those of the state. Perhaps it was this
specific situation, namely, that the state was obliged to pay for the
dubious pleasure of seeing its facilities made redundant, which made
it unlikely that any agreement could be viewed by state officials as
workable.'*' For this reason alone, apart from the complicated issue
of state and Party relations, no written agreement on behalf of the
NSV and the DGT could add to the search for a peaceful co-existence
2
between state and Party welfare. At the beginning of 1937, a
leading state official wrote of a possible NSV takeover of state
arrangements,
'with regard to the NSV whose welfare work is founded on
freedom to provide, not on a legal basis, its taking over
of public welfare is unthinkable'.
(3)
Understandably, the NSV had far fewer problems to face with
regard to the assumption of control over the plethora of existing
private, non-denominational agencies. During the summer of 1933, it
set about a rapid consolidation of its position as the leading agency
when a majority of the private agencies were forced to go into
liqidation or to be incorporated into the NSV. Control over
existing Party welfare was established, and numerous special
agreements were made between the NSV and the NSF, the DAF, the HJ,
the German Red Cross, the Catholic Caritas and the Protestant Innere
Mission. The NSV was quick to outline its responsibilities vis-a-vis
the other Party organisations and the churches, none of whom
1. BA, R36/962, Spiewock to the Stadtprdsident, 20th January 1937.
2. BA,NS25, Folder 1233.
3. BA, R36/962, report, 'Ubertragung von Aufgaben der Gemeinden
an die NSV', 29th January 1937.
4. HA, 14/262, pp.226-227.
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presented themselves as a serious threat to NSV plans for the
future."'" The developments meant that the women's organisation, the
NSF, virtually ceased to be involved in social welfare on a
significant level, though its members would be expected to provide
help for NSV measures and they would be urged to make themselves
2
available for participation in NSV work when the occasion arose. It
does seem however that NSV and NSF cooperation did not always work
smoothly and served only to hamper the work of welfare in one area
such as Westfalen-Nord.^ The NSF would be allowed, nevertheless, to
organise the arrangements for domestic training courses for women
through its Reichsmdtterdienst operation. This particular facility
4
would be run by the NSF's Deutsches Frauenwerk. However, the
welfare work of the Party would be organised by Hilgenfeldt, with the
NSV's own Gauamtsleiter corps being responsible for all local Party
work undertaken within each Gau area.
By the spring of 1934, the NSV, which was now operating
1. BA, NS 37ii/105., agreements over the employment of women in
the work of the NSV for those undertaking 'Labour Service',
3th August 1937; NS 22/748, 'Vereinbarung', NSV/Red Cross, 18th
December 1937; NS 37ii/1016, 'Vereinbarung', NSV Innere Mission,
22nd March 1938; NS 37ii/1015, 'Vereinbarung', NSV/Caritas, 22nd
March 1938.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen, 'Stimmungsbericht'(331215), 5th
May 1935; the NSF usually helped in the street collections,
such as selling badges and other small items.
3. Ibid.; it seems that complications arose over the sale of NSV
badges at this time (May 1935) allowing the entire action to be
counted as a failure. See also a study of the Gau Westfalen-
Nord with regard to NSV and NSF cooperation in which this was not
altogether effective. Adelheid GrMfin zu Castell RUdenhausen,
'Nicht mitzuleiden, mitzukdmpfen sind wir da!' 'NSV im Gau
Westfalen-Nord', in Die Reihen fast qeschlossen,DReulecke, J.
Peukert (hrsq.), Wuppertal, 1981, pp.230-234.
4. Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, 'Mutterschulung in Deutschland', in Social
Work in the Community, a Contribution for the III International
Conference on Social Work, London, 1936, Karlsruhe 1936.
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throughout Gau, Kreis and Ort lev/els, (with offices at each level
within every Gau), had assumed a virtual supremacy over the
independent or private welfare sector. This was shown when it took
over the presidency in 1934 of an Arbeitsqemeinshaft der Freien
Wohlfahrt, and this leading position would be held until the end of
the war. As well as the NSV, this group included the few remaining
private agencies, namely, those of the churches and the Red Cross.
It would be this collection of independent agencies which would form
the non-governmental welfare sector until 1945."^ All of these
agencies would receive support from the state, though the NSV (and in
some special cases the HJ), would take the largest share of available
2
resources.
By the end of December 1939, the NSV had 12,360,000 members in
the area of the Greater German Reich, and by the end of 1942, this
figure had risen to 16,878,402. This particular figure breaks down
as follows:






It must be emphasised that these gross figures, by themselves, reveal
nothing of the continuous efforts of the NSV staff to recruit new
1. HA, 14/262, pp.226-227.
2. BA, R36/964, state subsidies to private welfare see
'Aufwendungen ftir Vereine auf dem Gebeite der Wohlfahrt,
Titel III, Jugendpflege, 1936'. pp.282-286.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1059, NSV statistics, 'Beim Hauptamt, Berlin,
erfasste Mitglieder im VerhSltnis zu den Einwohnern, Ende
Dezember 1942'.
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members for the organisation. It is necessary therefore to look at
the individual Gau reports which were sent to Berlin for
Hilgenfeldt1s attention, in order to discover how these figures were
achieved. These reports, completed on a monthly basis, reveal the
heroic efforts of the local staff, not only in persuading more and
more to join, but in keeping the numbers steady once the decision to
join the NSV had been made."'' The Gau reports of Saxony show clearly
that the NSV had many problems to face. Lack of support from the
Catholic population in certain areas of the Gau was matched by a
definite reluctance on the part of the low paid non-Catholic sections
2
of the population to join. In Sachsen at the end of May 1935, the
or
numbers of NSV members were 358,922,A6.9?o of the population within
the Gau. By the end of October 1939, this figure had risen to
880,544, or 16.9%.^ Even though the improvement in these figures
looks impressive it gives no indication of the true nature of NSV
support in the area during 1935 and 1936. Even though membership
fees were reduced by half from one mark to fifty Pfennigs per month
for those who could not easily pay the whole amount, Gau officials of
the NSV local office readily admitted that popularity had reached
rock bottom in 1935 where, in certain areas of the Gau, income levels
promised to remain low for some time to come.^
The numerous local difficulties which were being experienced in
the Ortsqruppen of Sachsen, show how complicated the task of gaining
1. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen 'TMtigskeitsbericht und
Stimmungsbericht' (331271), May 1935.
2. Ibid., Gau Sachsen, 'TStigskeitsbericht-Abtlg. Organisation'
(331205), May 1935, p.2.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1059, NSV statistics, 'Ende Dezember 1939'.
4. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen, 'Stimmungsbericht' (331271),
May 1935, p.2.
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support for the NSV was at the beginning with membership drives
having to be cancelled on account of the mood of the population in
certain areas such as Reumten-GrUn and HammerbrUcke especially, NSV
officals were reluctantly forced to conclude that membership drives
were out of the question in these areas, 'for the present'."^ During
1935, the majority of those in employment were having to work shorter
hours, and were therefore having to manage on much reduced incomes
2
because of this. NSV officials reported that if the work situation
in these areas did not quickly improve, then, it would be utterly
impossible to talk of a successful membership drive for some time to
come'*. As one official put it:
'I have at the moment the greatest difficulty in persuad¬
ing some NSV members not to quit the organisation
altogether'.
(4)
The gross membership figures of the NSV cannot show how local
difficulties were hampering the work of officials in many areas of
Sachsen, and no doubt elsewhere in Germany. During 1935, NSV staff
were deeply concerned about the low levels of income in areas such as
the Ortsqruppe Muldenberg, where many workers were not only working
shortened hours, but were also quite unsure of how long such
employment would continue. For this reason one worker in this area
had remarked angrily to the local NSV official that:
'when we can get a secure and a better income, then we
will gladly join the NSV'.
(5)






The example of Sachsen shows that low income on the one hand, and
willingness to join the NSV on the other, sometimes operated in a
mutually exclusive manner.
Added to these worries, were the difficulties which the NSV was
experiencing over the complete failure to gain popularity with the
Catholic populations of the Kreise Bautzen and Kamenz in the
north-eastern part of Sachsen, and these difficulties were perhaps
made the more urgent by the reports of the activities of the priests
in these areas who had been encouraging people to join the Caritas
agency, and to ignore the NSV."^ This meant that the NSV had to deal
with problems which arose out of Caritas activities in the poorer
Catholic sections of the Gau, where support for the NSV was already
weak, as well as within the poorer non-Catholic areas elsewhere. In
Protestant areas there was little real support not only because of
economic and other factors, but because of the lack of interest which
poorer people at this time showed towards the Party's own welfare
organisation, and it seems that the poorer sections of the population
2
had not themselves identified with the aims of the NSV. Given that
these several problems may also have occurred, to a greater or lesser
degree, in other Gaus as well, it must be concluded that a
significant part of the work of the local NSV offices before the war
was taken up with membership drives for the NSV, rather than with the
work of welfare as such. The Gau reports of Sachsen certainly give
such an impression.^ However, even allowing for the successes of
the membership drives, in many cases membership itself only signified
1. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen, 'TMtigskeitsbericht' (331205),
Nay 1935, p.2.
2. Ibid.; see also 'Stimmungsbericht' (331333), January 1935.
3. Ibid.
the desire to be left in peace to get on with the normal daily round
as far as that was possible."^ It is sure that a large passive
membership existed which meant that an over-worked minority undertook
the voluntary duties of Party welfare work. This was something the
2
officials in Sachsen also drew attention to in 1935. But the NSV
seems not to have been unduly concerned about this matter, no doubt
such desultory support was seen to be capable of improvement. It
might even have been seen as a valuable 'first step' which itself
promised a greater degree of commitment by virtue of frequent
'exposure' to the valuable practical work of the organisation. Many,
it was hoped, would come to realise how important this activity was
and thereby make a greater commitment to the organisation. The zeal
with which local staff went about recruiting for the NSV suggests
perhaps that this goal was one reason for the countless drives which
were put into operation, as well as the desire to compete with other
Gaus' membership levels. Indeed Sachsen would eventually emerge as
one of the 'best' Gaus in terms of its membership levels in 1942.^
This is to say by the end of 1942, with a memberhip of 24.7%, Sachsen
had succeeded in becoming second among the Gaus with regard to its
membership levels, so that the tireless efforts of the NSV Gau staff
can be seen to have been entirely successful. The five leading Gaus
in terms of membership levels of the NSV in 1942 were as follows:
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen 'TMtigskeitsbericht' (331316)
May 1935, p.4,
'We must ensure that all this work is shouldered by many more
than at present'.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1059, NSV statistics, 'Ende Dezember 1942'.








The same Gaus, with regard to the relationship between numbers of
households, and the percentage of NSV members by household, is
given as follows:







From the above figures: it can be seen that by 1942 in the Altreich,
no Gau exceeded 30% of it population taking up (MSV membership. The
Gau with the largest percentage of NSVkwas DUsseldorf (28.3%), and
Schleswig-Holstein which reported a figure of 13.3% was the one with
the lowest membership levels among the Gaus at that time (1942).^ It
certainly seems that an organisation with a membership of just under
30% in the best areas (13% in the least well represented ones) could
be forgiven for claiming, as it did , that it was the largest welfare
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., NSV statistics, 1Aufnahme-ErklSrungen im VerjhUltnis zu
den Haushaltungen, Ende Dezember 1942'.
3. ' BA, NS 37ii, Folder 1039
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organisation in the world. However, given that many factors
influenced the decision to join the NSV, most notable of these being
level of income and the ability to pay the membership dues, it can be
seen that the NSV would only be really successful where economic and
other factors, such as religious affiliation, did not seriously come
to hinder the success of the numerous membership drives which had
become a familiar feature in every Gau from 1935. Recognition of the
need to provide oneself with some form of protective colouring within
Nazi society was an important motivating factor in the decision to
join, this may have helped to keep membership figures high. As
the example of one Gau shows, a membership level of 6.9% in 1935
could rise to one of 24.7% by 1942. This shows that it was possible
in one area at least for the NSV to move from a position of undoubted
failure to one of reasonable success, even though it had taken the
best part of eight years to achieve."''
The funds of the NSV have remained, to a very large degree, a
mystery, given that no detailed figures have yet been discovered.
But it seems that the NSV did not provide any details for publication
as the WHW did, so that it is impossible to judge what the income
from membership dues was. Given that these ranged from 50 Pfennigs
and upwards in certain cases, the numbers of NSV members cannot be
used to give an accurate account of income which came from this
2
source. However, the annual subsidies to the NSV from the Gemeinden
in 1936 are included within the files of the DGT, so for that year at
least, it is possible to know how much the organisation received from
1. Ibid.
2. The only balance sheet found so far is the one for the month
of January 1936 in the Gau Sachsen, (331294) NS37ii/1062.
some of the major cities and the smaller communities at that time."^
During 1936, the DGT made an attempt to examine the levels of the
subsidies which were being paid out by them to the NSV. This
examination may have been inspired by worries over the rising levels
of the NSV subsidies, so that every city and community was required
2
to report to the DGT in Berlin on this matter. In the financial
year of 1936, the NSV received as a subsidy from 77 selected
Gemeinde^ (which possessed populations of over 30,000 inhabitants),
the total sum of RM 3,973,856. The sum received from some of the
larger cities for the same year was RM 2,836,669? However, given
that a few of the smaller towns may have been included in the former
figure, it has been decided to present these figures separately to
avoid the danger of including the same sums twice over. In a
comparison with the income from WHW collections for the same year,
1936, which amounted to RM 358,136,000, it is clear that the NSV
subsidies were not large, but given that they were spread throughout
the country and made a valuable contribution to local NSV work in
4
many areas, they were regarded as a most important source of income.
An examination of the sums outlined in the financial reports from
the 77 selected Gemeinden shows how the sums were distributed
according to specific NSV measures, so that these reports show, at
the same time, how the activities of the NSV were operating
throughout the country within the major centres of population during
1. BA,R36/964,'Rundfrage/Beihilfen an die NSV/1936.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 'Rundfrage an die Gemeinden mit mehr als 50,000 Einw.'
4. BA, R36/962, Hilgenfeldt to Dr. Lippert, letter of 7th December
1936.
1936."^ The sums were divided up as follows under the following
categories:
Subsidies to the N5V from 77 Selected Gemeindefl
according to specific measures of the NSV in 1936.
RM
General Welfare 333,480
Kindergartens, day centres 234,861
Youth Care Preventive measure only 119,297
Youth Care Recreational measures only 51,900
Welfare/rent subsidies to individuals 194,803
Holidays for children 493,644
Health and ante-natal care 163,072
Reduced cost school meals 352,585
'Mother and Child' 162,634
Other measures 833,831
2,962,107
Plus special measures 1,011,739
Total 3,973,856
(2)
The sum which the city of Berlin paid out for the NSV subsidy
for 1936, was RM 349,380."^ This particular figure was the second
largest one paid out to an individual private agency for welfare, for
Caritas and the Innere Mission who also received state funds, were
allowed less than that with Caritas receiving a subsidy of RM 45,050
and the Innere Mission RM 204,800. But it was the Hitler Youth which
was paid the largest subsidy in Berlin, and it was awarded the sum of
1. BA, R36/964, 'Aufwendungen ftir Vereine,' 1936.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, R36/964, 'Rundfrage/Beihilfen an die NS\//l936'.
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RM 385,570 in 1936. The sums which the private agencies for welfare,
including the NSW, in Berlin received from the public purse were as
follows:
Private agencies including the






















The amounts received by the NSW from some of the larger cities and
towns is also shown as follows:
Tilsit 500 EUrth 20,500
Plauen 600 Osnabruck 25,500
Zwickau 1,500 Heidelberg 24,500
Wiesbaden 3,250 Hannover 32,000
MOnchen/Gladbach 3,500 Kassel 33,000
Bamberg 4,600 Oldenburg 33,900
Halle 5,000 Mainz 41,760
Freiburg 5,072 Karlsruhe 48,170
Ludwigshafen 5,740 K61n 69,300
Frankfurt/Oder 7,160 Rostock 69,500
Ltibeck 7,700 Nillrnberg 100,000
Liegnitz 8,023 Stuttgart 105,400
Erfurt 9,000 Essen 148,300
Wdrzburg 10,000 Wuppertal 152,696
Darmstadt 10,200 Leipzig 162,310
Aachen 12,000 Duisburg 201,920
Bottrop 12,500 Ddsseldorf 210,500
Jena 13,000 Dortmund 218,700
Regensburg 13,600 Hamburg 263,300
SaarbrOcken 13,840 Mdnchen 267,700
Koblenz 14,581 Berlin 319,680*
Bielefeld 14,750
Kaiserslautern 14,730
Flensburg 15,300 Total 2, 836,669
Breslau 16,500
Augsburg 16,786
Frankfurt/AM 17,000 ♦Berlin figure shows the
Dresden 17,681 projected reduction of
29,700 (2
. BA, R36/964, 11 Aufwendungen f(Jr Wereine', 1936.
2. BA, R36/964, 'Rundfrage/Beihilfen an die NSW/1936.'
«8.
It must be pointed out that the source of this information given
above is a hand-written outline which may not show the final figure
in every single case; however, given that the city of Berlin
provided a final printed reckoning which is the same as the
hand-written figure, less a projected reduction, these figures must
be assumed to be entirely accurate in most cases.
The level of the NSV subsidies, at least in the city of Berlin,
had risen sharply between 1933 and 1936. From RM 13,000 marks in
1933, the subsidy had gone up to RM296,000 and RM 330,000 in 1935 and
1936."^ An attempt to reduce this subsidy in 1936, by RM 29,700, was
unsuccessful and led only to a series of heated exchanges between the
state officials and the NSV. Spiewock, the head of the Berlin
Landes-Wohlfahrts-und Jugendamt, had become anxious over the
increasing level of the subsidy and was agreeable to its being
reduced for that year. However, the imposition of a proposed cut in
the subsidy seems also to have cost Spiewock his position as
Gauamtsleiter of the NSV in Berlin, a job which he had held since
2
1934. It certainly seems as through Hilgenfeldt viewed this measure
as a spiteful move on the part of the Berlin state welfare office and
he may have been determined to get rid of an official who could be
seen to be putting the affairs of the state welfare office before
those of the NSV. Attempts to explain the reduction in the subsidy
as an attempt to reduce costs generally, seem not to have cut any ice
at NSV headquarters, and Spiewock's post was taken over by another
1. BA, R36/962 Spiewock to StadtprElsident, letter of 20th January
1937.
2. Ibid, Hilgenfeldt to Dr. Lipp^t, 7th December 1936. 'Given that
the NSV must be supported through the Decrees of 1st July and
7th December 1935, I cannot understand why the subsidy is to be
restricted'. Questions about Spiewock's dismissal were put to
Hilgenfeldt; Dr. Lippert to Hilgenfeldt, 4th February 1937.
official who was not holding both a state and a Party position at
that time. Spiewock's name was not included in the 1936/37 lists
of NSV Gauamtsleiter.^ Spiewock's close involvement in NSV activity
in Berlin seems not to have prevented him from becoming more and more
anxious during 1936 over the possibility that the state agency would
become, perhaps sooner rather than later, a mere funding body for the
NSV/. This idea, he and many other state officials were agreed, was
an entirely unwelcome one, and they viewed such a development with
2
real abhorrence. Attempts on the part of the leadership to solve
these problems, certainly before the war, could be described as
desultory, with Ministerial Decrees putting the responsibility upon
the NSV/ and the DGT themselves for the discovery of a solution. The
Ministerial Decree of the 22nd September 1938, only reiterated that
which the state and the NSV/ officials already knew, namely that the
NSV/ was intended to provide supplementary measures only, though this
particular decree explains that these Party measures were intended to
be 'comprehensive in their scope', for the aid and the welfare of the
German people.^ At best, the wording of the decree can be described
as ambiguous and unhelpful, although it could also be seen as an
invitation to the two parties to fight the problem out between them,
as best they could, and to leave the leadership out of the issue as
far as possible.
Within the measures of the NSV, it was only the WHW which
1. BA, NSD 30/29, Allgemeine Arbeitsanweisung(l).
2. BA, R36/1002, DGT to Fiehler, 'Ubertragung der Offentlichen
FUrsorge auf die NSV', 9th March 1939; Ibid., it is tempting to
conclude that Spiewock was hoping to keep a close watch on NSV
policy which his position as Gauamtsleiter of the NSV afforded
him, for he seems to have been strongly opposed to NSV
developments in Berlin at this time.
3. BA, R36/962, 'Erlass' of 12th October 1938.
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escaped entirely from the problems of Party and state. The WHW was
economically self-sufficient, and could function without reference to
the state officials, and whilst some rooms and halls were made
available for WHW activities, no subsidies which would be earmarked
for WHW work were paid out by the state. Most importantly, however,
no comparable welfare measure was undertaken by the state welfare
offices, which only assisted the WHW when they became involved with
winter welfare work. The WHW therefore remained in a neutral
position in relation to the existing state provisions."^
The problem of having allowed an organisation for Party welfare
to develop on the scale of the NSV, but without reducing the scope of
existing state provisions, meant that two potentially rival welfare
agencies were unrealistically expected to function effectively, but
without interference, in each respective area. This would of course
prove to be impossible. Increasingly, ill-thought out welfare
policies, which were supported by the jaid hoc decrees and resolutions
of the leadership, only served to create a situation which neither
2
the state, nor the NSV officials, could solve.
1. See Chapter Three.
2. BA, R36/962, 'Erlass'of 12th October 1938; NS 23/1233,




THE WINTERHILFSWERK OF THE N5V.
IDEOLOGY AND WELTANSCHAUUNG
It is essential in any examination of the Winterhilfswerk to
set the goals of the Nazi leadership clearly within the context of
the measures and plans of this particular welfare aid scheme. For
poorer citzens and low paid workers in Germany the Winter Aid Scheme
acted as an emergency welfare facility which operated during the
winter months. It was possible to obtain donations from the
Winterhilfswerk of food, clothing and winter fuel where a low level
of income made the purchase of such essentials difficult, or even
impossible."^ The Winter Aid Scheme had several functions, not all of
which may be readily attributable to the desire to give material
help to the poorer members of the population. Indeed in no other
section of the NSV's welfare arrangements was the combination of
2
welfare and propaganda so potent and potentially successful. In no
other welfare measure was it so obvious that the function of welfare
was predominantly designed to foster attitudes of loyalty and service
for the nation which the Nazi government hoped would be enshrined
within the hearts and minds of Germans. From the start, the new
leadership sought to evolve a new social order by creating the
'Volksqemeinschaft' or People's Community which would exist as a
harmonj^js national community freed from class conflict, and also
1. This was true for many, both before and during 1933.
See Mason, Sozialpolitik, pp.88-98; BA, NSD 30/34,
Allqemeine Arbeitsanweisunq (2) for a detailed outline
of the Winterhilfswerk (WHW).
2. See British newspaper reports on the WHW, 1933-1938,
Clippings Collection, Wiener Library, section P.c.3(119).
HA, 14/262, 'Erdffnung des WHW durch den FUhrer',
pp.306-314.
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dedicated to supporting the Nazi government. However, the
individual citizens or Volksqenossen needed to be informed, educated
and indoctrinated with regard to the standards of behaviour and types
of loyalty which would be appropriate within the newly ordered Nazi
2
Reich. A new type of citizen was envisaged by the Nazis, but he had
yet to be created so that the 'ideal citizen' of the New Germany
existed only as a theoretical construct. It was towards the creation
of this new type of social entity that the measures and plans of the
Winterhilfswerk, including the NSV and the other Nazi organisations,
were directed.
Of the many problems which faced the new government in January
1933, perhaps the most pressing was, as its leaders knew only too
well, that the confidence and support of a large section of the
German Nation had still to be won over. Many still had to be
persuaded of the value and significance of the Nazi movement, indeed
to attain an understanding of what National Socialism demanded from
1. See Althaus, NS-Volkswohlfahrt; Hilgenfeldt, Idee.
2. Johannes Ehrhardt, 'Erziehungsdenken und Erziehungspraxis
des Nationalsozialismus', Ph D thesis, Ereien UniversitSt
Berlin 1968, see 'Die Weltanschauung', pp.32-47; 'Die
Propaganda', pp.32-36; Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy
in Germany, London 1965, pp.402-418.
3. Erich Hilgenfeldt, Aufqaben der Nationalsozialistische
Wohlfahrtspfleqe . Speech given to the Reichsparteitaq der
Arbeit, 1937, MUnchen-Berlin 1937; BA, NSD 30/34, instructions
for Gau organisers of the WHW with short excerpts of speech given
by Hitler on 6th October 1936, 'Es ist ein neuer Mensch ges-
chaffen worden, und dieser Mensch hat unerhtirte Opfer auf sich
genommen'. See Allqemeine Arbeitsanweisunq (2); Stephenson, The
Nazi Organisation of Women, pp.130-172; Wieland Elfferding,
'Opferritual und l/olksgemeinschaftsdiskurs am Beispiel des
Winterhilfswerks (WHW), in Easchismus und Ideoloqie 2, (Hrsq.),
Manfred Behrens, Berlin 1980, p.204.
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the so called 'valuable' or 'Aryan' majority. Even though electoral
successes had shown that a degree of support was forthcoming after
1929 from the ranks of wage earners who, in the main, were neither
organised in trades unions nor had regularly voted for the SPD or KPD
in the past, the leadership knew that a considerable effort still lay
2
ahead. Even though the political parties and the trades unions had
been swiftly abolished, and opponents and critics effectively
silenced, coercive measures were not regarded as being sufficient in
themselves to secure the willing, and most importantly, the active
support of every section of German society."^ The election of 5th
March 1933 had shown that an absolute majority for the Hitler
government had only narrowly been reached when the NSDAP itself had
received 43.9% of the votes cast. While it is true that the NSDAP
had thereafter achieved party political monopoly in July 1933, making
it impossible for other political forces to participate actively
within the political life of the nation, there existed, and would
continue to exist, a 'conflict-ridden' balance between Party and
4
state. These political developments would affect the working and
the activities of the NSV, but not, to any serious extent, those of
the WHW, which operated in a fairly independent manner, rising above
the conflicting interests between Party and state in its operations,
1. HA,14/262, NSV History 'Der Dreimonatsplan fUr
Bevtilkerungspolitische AufklMrung', p.290.
2. Ehrhardt, 'Erziehungsdenken', pp.69-113; Mason, Sozialpolitik,
Chapter Two; David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution,
London 1967, p.71.
3. BA, NSD 30/2 'Davon sprich zur Volksgemeinschaft', in
NS-Volksdienst, November 1938; HA, 14/24/261, pp.306-314;
BA NSD/30/l(5) Hans Bernsee, 'Zwei Jahre NSV', in
NS-Volksdienst, May 1935.
4. Broszat, The Hitler State, see foreword to English
edition, p.X.
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and managing to steer clear of the problems which other NSV sections
found difficult or impossible to avoid.^ Insofar as clashes between
State arrangements for welfare and the WHW could be avoided, leaving
the WHW to operate as, perhaps, the 'purest' form of Nazi welfare, an
examination of the WHW and its intentions reveals a clear picture of
the aims of the leadership with regard to a future social structure
2
dedicated to upholding Nazi 'ideals'.
It was active support which the new government longed to have
from the population, though in many instances a lesser level of
engagement would be all that they could realistically expect, with
passive acquiescence a substitute for real support."' But the means
whereby such support might be achieved still had to be found. No-one
understood this problem better than the Propaganda Minister,
Dr. Goebbels, who warned his staff that it was one thing to break
down the outer resistance of the mass of the German people, but quite
another to overcome their inner resistance. This required a
fundamental change in the point of view of the individual, in his
attitudes and his prejudices. It was this fundamental change of
attitude and perspective which the NSV's Winter Aid Scheme was
1. See particularly the Juqendhilfe section of the NSV. The clash
between the NSV, Deutscher Gemeindetaq and leading state
officials, led to a series of bitter arguments about the Party's
arrangements for youth welfare, as organised by the NSV and those
of the state Juqenddmter. See also Chapter Five and Intro¬
duction.
2. The Winterhilfswerk, which was run by the Propaganda Ministry
and, of course, Goebbels, could operate relatively freely
without interference from state officials; Prof. Dr. Bruno
Rauecker, Social Policy in the New Germany, Frankfurt 1936,
p.37.
3. BA, NS 3ii/1062, confidential reports of 1935 from NSV
Sachsen; Kershaw, 'How Effective was Nazi Propaganda?',
pp.187-190; Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation of Women,
pp.214-219.
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designed to procure. References to the emergence of the ideal
citizen, the 'Aryan' Volksqenosse were tirelessly repeated in
speeches and writings on the Winter Aid Scheme. The creation of
this new social entity (whose English translation 'folk' can only
insufficiently describe the true meaning), had a precise political
function. References to the Volksqenosse or member of the People's
Community in speeches and writings after 1933 were a propagandists
device specifically intended to bring about the development of a
Nazified society. The endless repetition of 'Volk' and
'Volksqemeinschaft' was primarily aimed at the population as a whole,
and was designed to persuade them that the nation would be, under
Nazism, united into one harmonious whole.^ Propaganda statements
which referred to the 'People's Community' were, in effect, the means
by which the leadership might hope to win the support of the
population, and most particularly of the industrial working class
whose existence with reference to the political movements
2
representing it, had been massively repressed in the spring of 1933.
The use of the term Volk was both intentional and in many instances
entirely cynical. But the untranslatable term 'Volk' was carefully
chosen, for it was suffused with meaning for the German speaker at
that time, redolent as it was of romantic longings for the past, and
inspired by an altogether mythical significance which is entirely
lost on the English reader. However, the use of the term Volk was in
truth primarily a device which, it was hoped, would flood with
meaning the utterances of the WHW, thereby allowing the desire,
1. Reher, Social Welfare, pp.1-12. BA, NSD 30/l-4(a),
N5-Volksdienst 1933-1942. See especially 'Soziale
Arbeit ist Aufgabe der Volksgemeinschaft', February
1933, p.129.
2. Mason, Sozialpolitik, pp.42-123.
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previously dormant in the hearts of the people, to awaken and inspire
the nation to unite in such a way as to render class, and party
loyalties meaningless."^ The Party, through the WHW, was continually
able to call upon the idea of the nation which was mystically united
by the ties of blood; it could therefore in effect ignore the
troublesome rhetoric of class ideology. The writings and the
measures of the WHW drew upon what the German writer Thomas Mann has
described as that vdlkisch layer which exists, if it exists
anywhere, within the subconscious, or, at any rate, out of the reach
of rational action. Every appeal to Das Volk, a term which,
moreover, combines three distinct ideas, namely, nationalism, race
and anti-semitism, was an appeal to a particular aspect of
superstitious behaviour in the individual which tends to encourage a
suspicious dislike of others who are, by whatever means, labelled
2
dangerous or merely different. It is not difficult to see that the
ideal of racial purity and the existence of the elite German nation
formed the fundamental basis of the Volksqemeinschaft. The nation as
a whole was the more likely to close ranks behind the NSDAP if it
could be persuaded that the ties of blood superseded any class
affiliations."^ The real significance of the Nazi
interpretation of the vfllkisch myth was that by its constant
re-iteration, disparate groups would be informed by the Party and the
1. BA, NS37ii/1058, Propaganda Instructions, 'Winterfeldzug
1936/37', 'Wir bauen der Fundament des Ewiges Deutschland';
Hilgenfeldt, Idee, p.8.
2. Thomas Mann, Dr. Faustus, London 1983,p.40
3. BA, NSD/30/5, Sondernummer N5-\/olksdienst, Autumn 1933;
BA, N5 37ii/1058, 'Winterfeldzug', p.2; \/B, 'Dr. Goebbels
dankt den Sammlern und Helfern des WHW', 5th December 1938,
see Clippings Collection Wiener Library.
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WHW, being thereafter continually reminded, that they belonged to a
unified (and purified, through the exclusion of certain groups),
elite racial community within which class conflict had been
abolished."^ A mixture of cynical detachment and romantic idealism
and, not infrequently, a measure of sheer opportunism, characterised
every statement which issued forth from the WHW offices in Berlin
concerning the new elite nation, whose very existence was entirely
problematic. There is good reason to believe, however, that all
references to the Volk contained both a plea and a huge gamble,
which functioned as a major element in numerous attempts to gain
support on behalf of the leadership. This added perhaps, some
political weight to the more lunatic utterances which involved the
theoretical existence of a 'superior', 'Aryan' race. Perhaps there
was little choice for the Nazi leadership but to attempt to create a
new type of society, indeed a new social order. When they abolished
the political parties and destroyed the trades unions the leadership
created, not unintentionally, a massive gap within the very fabric of
German social life by ripping away, as it were, the social anchorage
of previously existing class and party loyalties. The role of the
new citizen, the Volksqenosse, would be able to grow and develop
insofar as the opportunity for privately organised activities, either
of a social or a political nature were restricted, and ultimately
2
reduced, in scope. The firm belief that the 'gap' which had been
created through a restriction of opportunities for certain types of
social interaction within German society could eventually be filled
by the debased idealism of the Nazi Weltanschauung is central to an
1. Die NS-Volkswohlfahrt als Kulturtrtlqerin, Munich 1938;
H. Stdrmer,Die NS-Volkswohlfahrtspflege, Berlin 1940.
2. Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, pp.408-413.
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examination of the Nazi organisations in general, and the WHW in
particular. The existence of the new citizen, the Volksqenosse as an
organic member of the new social order, was tied to the conviction,
albeit a mistaken one as events were to show, that an inherent
national unity would develop and sweep aside all social and
ideological barriers. A nation would emerge which would be responsive
only to the virtues of duty and self-sacrifice, courage and
comradeship. According to Timothy Mason, this was the essential
gamble of National Socialism."'' It is within this particular context
that the redefinition of the role of citizen in the Third Reich must
be placed, for though Reich citizenship was given a legal framework in
1935, one which allowed all Jews by virtue of their 'non-German' blood
to be stripped of their rights as citizens, the legitimate existence
of the true member of the People's Community related not so much to a
2
legal category, as to a particular frame of mind. Of the many
lessons to be learned, which were constantly, and almost without
variation repeated in the journals and periodicals of the NSV, the
most important was that a sense of duty responsive to the needs of the
community should emerge. It would replace the essentially disruptive
idea of the free, privately motivated individual acting as a
responsible agent, being legitimately concerned with his own political
rights. The endless repetition of 'Gemeinnutz qeht vor Eiqennutz'
(the community before the individual), expressed the total
rejection of liberal ideas. For example, in the words of one of the
1. Timothy W. Mason, 'National Socialist Policies towards the
German Working Classes 1925-1939', D.Phil thesis, Oxford
1971, p.19.
2. BA, NS37ii/1058, 'Winterfeldzug', see 'Die ideale Erziehung
der Volksgemeinschaft durch das Winterhilfswerk'.
leading officials of the NSV, Werner Reher, it was to be perceived
that,
'the truth that not one of us is self-sufficient but that
we are all dependent on one another has come to be
recognised in its practical implications by all who
desire to see social justice promoted and established.
Thus it may be said that the nation has become as one
great family whose maintenance can be assured only
insofar as the single members of that family are
physically sound, morally steadfast and willing to
sacrifice individual interests to whatever extent that
may be necessary'.
(1)
The extent to which individuals, after 1933, actively pursued a
conscious denial of personal interests, having been persuaded by
propaganda such as this vague, indeed vacuous, statement, which was
typical of many produced by the WHW, seems according to most
2
historians to have been at best, only minimal.
Perhaps more successful was the emergence of a very real
assault on the private existence of countless individuals on the part
of the Nazi organisations, and the WHW in particular.^ The
development within the hearts and minds of German citizens of a sense
of Opferbereitschaft (readiness to serve) may be more correctly
described as a resigned acceptance of the necessity to turn out and
perform the different kinds of voluntary, unpaid work which was the
main, indeed the only,reward apart from certificates of honour and,
only infrequently, 'Honour Badges', for one's membership of a Nazi
Organisation. Nevertheless, the WHW was able to call upon as many as
1. Reher, Social Welfare, pp.9-10.
2. I am grateful to Dr. Jill Stephenson for giving me information
about the shortages of NSV welfare aides through unwillingness
to participate in social welfare measures in WUrttemberg in
1941; Kershaw, 'How Effective was Nazi Propaganda?' pp.187-201.
3. Mennecke, Ein westdeutscher NSV-Kreis, p.l.
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1.5 million volunteer helpers during its first year which does
suggest that the WHW charity drive caught the imagination of
citizens who had perhaps up to then, been indifferent to the idea of
giving of their free time for a public cause."'' National Socialism
was not so much set against individual effort per se, as against
efforts by individuals whose goals were essentially private. The
Volksqenosse was, as a citizen of the Reich, a social type whose
private existence had ceased to occupy a central position within the
constellation of social activities and interests which made up the
life of the individual. This 'type' was, of course, only a
theoretical construct to which, in order to hasten its development
much of the WHW propaganda made pointed reference. However in the
written material the existence of such Volksqenossen was referred to
in such a way as to give the impression that such 'ideal' citizens
already existed and that, in many ways, they had always existed, and
were only waiting for the Nazi Weltanschauung to revivify them. In
most of the written material there exists a confusion about the
'creation', on the one hand, of such a citizen type, and, on the
other, of the 'reawakening' of a slumbering sense of 'Opfer-
bereitschaft'; this was not to be mistaken for 'weak' liberal-minded
charity orientated activity of the kind which had undermined the
2
nation in the past. The WHW at all times, and in every possible
example, emphasised the need to 'strengthen' those who would receive
WHW welfare, above all by not allowing them to become 'dependent'
1. Reher, Social Welfare, p.12; Erich Hilgenfeldt, 'NSV
und Winterhilfswerk', FZ^ 14th September 1935, Clippings
Collection, Wiener Library.
2. Ingeborg Altgelt, Weqweiser, see Section /\, 'Wohlfahrtspflege
einst und jetzt', pp.9-13.
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upon such welfare aid as was forthcoming. Indeed all NS\l welfare
carried this particular emphasis."^
It seems possible to agree with Dahrendorf that the role of the
Uolksqenosse could, and in many cases did, 'swallow up' other
2
memberships and loyalties. Even if as he points out, it was only by
preventing the chances for participation in a social existence which
was not subject to Nazi pressure. Nevertheless at all times, when
the individual Volksqenosse participated in public affairs by virtue
of his or her membership of an organisation (such as the WHW), that
participation existed merely as a 'demonstration of someone else's
power'.^ From this point of view participation in the welfare work
of the WHW was intended, albeit on a trivial level, to legitimise the
'powerless' aspect of all active individual effort by citizens within
4
the Third Reich.
The WHW actively fostered an alteration in the perceptions of
one's loyalties and duties as a citizen so that the leadership could
gain firm support not only for the government, but for the Party's
organisations, including the WHW, which should become 'positive
reference' groups.^ It would eventually become both acceptable, and
'desirable' to put the claims of individual interests second to the
1. HA, Reel 13/259, 'NSV/-Jugendhilfe'.
2. Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy, pp.408-411.
3. Ibid., p.411.
4. BA, R36/1008, instructions from DGT on the collections for WHW
during 1937/38, 18th November 1937. Working for the WHW might
have had the function of distracting attention from the more
unpleasant features of life in the Third Reich, this was
reported to me in conversation.
5. This argument follows a social/psychological analysis of the
formation of social attitudes. See T.M. Newcomb, 'Attitude
Development as a function of Reference Groups: The Bennington
Study', in Understanding Society, London 1970, pp.494-585.
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duties and responsibilities of one's citizen role; but this
difficult transition would be made easier, and perhaps less
intellectually and emotionally suspect, through active involvement in
a welfare scheme which was designed to aid the less fortunate.
Active support for the Nazi leadership was more likely to be given if
Nazi organisations such as the NSV, and the WHW, could be perceived
positively and as a desired group to which many would wish to belong.
But it is true to say that in some cases, though not all, membership
of a Nazi organisation signalled little more than the hope that by
paying lip-service to Nazi ideals one would be left in peace.
Nevertheless, the WHW leadership intended that participation in its
measures and numerous activities would arouse a more positive
orientation in the minds of citizens."'" It was for this reason that,
1. BA, R36/1009, letter from Hilgenfeldt with regard to
recognition of three months uninterrupted work for the WHW,
'Rundschreiben Nr. 98', 29th January 1935; NSD/30/45, copy of
certificate, 'Ehrenkunde dem Ehrenamtlichen Heifer im Winter-
hilfswerk des Deutschen Volkes 1937/38'; St.J., 1938, pp.596-597.
Monthly average figures of voluntary helpers for the WHW are
given as follows:
Numbers of helpers monthly
during the winter





















from the figures given above it seems to have been necessary
to pay more WHW workers as the numbers of voluntary helpers
were falling from 1934. But these figures also show that the
numbers of NSV Walter were rising, apart from 1937/38.
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notwithstanding passive membership by many in Nazi organisations, all
citizens (though not Jews) in Germany were addressed, by the leaders
of the WHW, as by those of other organisations, as Volksqenossen at
all times, whether they themselves had accepted the idea or not;
indeed it was utterly impossible to escape the designation. While it
is certainly true that a seemingly endless stream of inflated
rhetoric flowed from the offices of the WHW, to function in the
service of promoting these ideas, it must be remembered that the
leadership was deadly serious when it called for allegiance from
citizens. Those who openly showed themselves to be unwilling to meet
the claims of the leadership were treated very harshly indeed. A
public show of frank opposition to the Nazi Volksqemeinschaft could
result in the loss of the right to rear one's children, or in the
case of a relatively minor offence, a stay in prison for a short
period. This latter fate also befell those who ignored the rules
which surrounded the use of WHW welfare, which was intended for
consumption by families,not to be sold for profit, or to finance a
drinking habit.^
The citizen after 1933 had duties to perform which, in theory
at least, mirrored the responsibilities of the Volksqemeinschaft to
provide welfare aid for the less fortunate. This symbolic
partnership which both citizens and community were meant to enter
into existed only in theory, but it was one which, itwas intended,
2
neither the citizen nor the Volksqemeinschaft would shirk. The WHW
1. The Manchester Guardian, 23rd March and 29th May 1934;
Elfferding, 'Opferritual', p.219.
2. BA, NS/37ii/1001, folder 2, short article, 'Das Wesen
Nationalsozialistiche Volkswohlfahrt', 1936. I am
grateful to Herr Joachim Weiss of the University of
GOttingen for pointing out this, and other files, in
the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz; Elfferding, 'Opferritual',
pp.220-226; Hilgenfeldt, Idee, pp.17-18.
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was the visible expression of such a partnership between citizen and
national community which was annually, demonstrated throughout the
whole of the Reich."'' Again and again social welfare as distributed
by the NSV and the WHW was defined in terms of a double-sided duty of
2
community and citizen. Both the partners would undertake to
participate in a mutually supportive scheme from which all references
to alms or charity had been excluded. As Reher put it,
'Whatever help is given to the individual must not be
given as an alms. It is the duty of the community to
render assistance in cases of need, not a work of
supererogation but as a work that is necessary to
maintain the existence of the community itself. In the
Marxist and liberalistic systems the individual and his
needs form the point of central interest, but that is not
so with the National Socialist welfare system; here the
community of the people is the primary and essential
object of care'.
(3)
The WHW was charged with helping to inform the population that the
individualistic aims of earlier times were no longer acceptable.
Apart from providing material aid for the less-well off, the WHW
provided a whole range of measures which outlined the new roles of
citizen and community in Nazi Germany. These were intended to be
designed with the most effective use of propaganda available at the
1. BA, R36/1009, Instructions to all Gauleiter der NSDAP,
Gaubeauftragte WHW on WHW, 1934/35, from Reichsbeauftraqter,
'Rundschreiben Nr. 109', 10th May 1935; Ibid., \/B, 'Grossktlche
fdr das Berliner WHW', 17th September 1939. K. Herbst, Die
NSl/ dient der Volksqemeinschaft, Breslau, 1939; pp.2-15.
2. Hilgenfeldt, Idee, pp.11-12.
3. Reher, Social Welfare, pp.6-8. These arguments follow
Hilgenfeldt's exactly.
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time. Some of these measures were purposely created with an
ideological and emotional maleability which was unique among NSV
measures. For example, the collections of money and goods from the
community could be publicly depicted as a 'sign' of willingness to
sacrifice (for other, less fortunate persons), or as 'proof' of
2
support for the Nazi government, in the press and on radio. The
huge sums collected were reported to be an outward display of an
'inner acceptance' of Nazi rule. The act of donating to the WHW,
even a few Pfennings in many cases, was imbued with an emotional
intensity which was manufactured by the Propaganda Ministry into
heady stuff. The 'hot air' aspect of the WHW was easily picked up by
foreign journalists at the time who, almost to a man, saw through the
propagandists aspect of WHW and accurately reported the 'real', that
is the manipulative, function of welfare campaigns run by the WHW.^
E.K. Bramsted has suggested that all special appeals and
campaigns undertaken by the Propaganda Ministry, which included also
the NSV's Winterhilfswerk, masterminded solely as it was by the
Propaganda Ministry, were intended on the whole to enliven the daily
dose of propaganda which was to become such a familiar feature of
1. Ibid., p.8; BA, R36/1008, 'Jeder hat die Pflicht zu helfen', in
Berliner Taqeblatt (October) 1936; Ibid., instructions from DGT,
'Winterhilfswerk 1937/38', 12th October 1937; Ibid., 'Die Stadt
Oberhausen brachte als Opfer fdr die notleidenden Uolksgenossen
317,900 Mk. auf', design for Plaque WHW 1934/35; R36/1009, letter
from Hilgenfeldt reminding all concerned of guidelines for the
acquisition of the monthly poster of the WHW, 'Rundschreiben Nr.
99', 1st February 1935.
2. BA, R36/1009, Letter from Hilgenfeldt on methods and arrangements
for WHW 1934/35 'Rundschreiben Nr. 109', 10th May 1935. VB,
11.10.34; 7.10.36; 17.4.37; 5.12.38, Clippings Collection
Wiener Library
3. Ibid., see British newspaper reports 1933-1938.
86.
German life. While one may agree to some extent with such a point of
view, it must be argued that to describe the WHW in such a manner
misses the real purpose of WHW campaigns entirely. The concept of
National Solidarity and the existence of the Volksqemeinschaft, which
was given prime importance in all WHW campaigns, and written
material, were presented as stolidly and with as much tedious
repetition there as anywhere else."^ It would also seem unlikely that
the WHW's six-month long charity drive, from October to March, could
sustain a lively impact, year in, year out. There seems no reason to
doubt that the leadership viewed the WHW measures, and the street
collections in particular, as a serious exercise in self-help which
had an important educative function. Most importantly, the collect¬
ions were regarded by Hitler as 'one of the most precise means by
which the leadership could ascertain the real attitudes of the people
for its measures and plans'. How wrong this would prove, would be
shown during the war when Gauleiters were more concerned to compete
with one another than follow WHW rules. Even during the war, when
demands on scarce manpower suggested that WHW funds might be
collected and distributed in some other way, the public collections
by individuals continued as before, mainly because of,
'their extraordinary political significance, for the
collection of money and articles indicates to every
person the great tasks of the community in a
propagandistically effective and thorough manner'.
(3)
1. E.K. Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda
1925-45, Michigan 1965, p.102. BA NSD 30/5, 'Sondernummer',
NS-Volksdienst, 1935; NSD 30/2, NS-Volksdienst, November 1938,
'Die Kraft der Gemeinschaft', p.417; Hilgenfeldt, Aufqaben, p.3.
2. Aryeh L. Unger, The Totalitarian Party, London 1974, p.209.
See also Chapter Seven.
3. Ibid., pp.208-9.
87.
The NSV's WHW campaigns and measures have also been described as an
example of 'propaganda of the deed', for they provided an excellent
springboard for the mobilisation of the masses, not only because of
the gratitude which would be engendered by welfare, but because the
mechanics of welfare administration projected Party influence into
the home, and thereby provided an additional channel of Party
control."'' This aspect of NS\l activity certainly shows most clearly
in its 'Mother and Child' section through the activities of the
officials of the NSF's ReichsmOtterdienst (Reich mothers' service)
courses, which, as part of a course, sent the tutors on home visits
2
to assess the domestic arrangements. Thus, welfare administration
projected Party influence straight into the home. As Linger has
pointed out, the insight into the intimate affairs of the individual
and the family that was ordinarily denied the Party functionary was
available to the social workers and voluntary aides of the NSV and
the WHW.
By encouraging a measure which required the use of a personal
act, namely a donation to the WHW, which was perceived as a sign and
a confirmation of one's loyalty, the Nazi leadership regarded the WHW
as a highly useful means by which various lessons could be put across
to the public. The idea of the donation, as it was expressed by the
WHW, was a symbol of a reciprocity of intention which was held by
community and citizen alike.^ Not only that, but it was a truly
1. Ibid., p.204.
2. Scholtz-Klink, 'MUtterschulung', in A Contribution/Ill
International Conference, pp.137-149.
3. Ibid., p.140.; Hilgenfeldt, 'Die Volksgemeinschaft als
Ausgangspunkt und Ziel im heutigen Deutschland', pp.1-6.
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visible action which no-one could ignore, and which displayed the
'concern' of the Party for the mass of the people, who themselves
turned out in their thousands armed with red collecting tins into
which was placed the sign of acceptance, that is to say, one's
donation."'' It must be emphasised that donations to the WHW
frequently were given without a sense of good will or any other
positive attitude. However this fact does not detract from the
manifest intention of the WHW which could, in some instances at
least, elicit support in the form of a donation, freely given. The
extremely personal and emotional impact engendered by this type of
action and support was clearly shown by the donations which were
sent directly to Hitler himself; these particular donations were
2
carefully filed as being personal to the FUhrer. One such donation
from a woman during the war was accompanied by a poem
written by herself: 'Sind wir nicht alle zum Opfer bereit und zu dem
Tod?' ran the last line of one of the stanzas."^ The donations like
other measures of WHW drives show how important the concept of
reciprocity of mutually held responsibility was, within the
ideological framework of all WHW activity. The desire to create a
positive orientation was ever-present in WHW measures and plans right
from the beginning. For example, W. Sheridan Allen says of
1. BA, R36/1010, letter from Hilgenfeldt to all Gauleiter/Gau-
beauftraqte WHW, on slogan to be used on WHW posters 'Give
your donation as a (willing) sacrifice not as an alms',
9th February 1935; Elfferding, 'Opferritual', p.204.
2. BA, R43ii/560, letter to ReichsfUhrunq/WHW, from the Reich
Chancellery, 8th October 1942.
3. Ibid., letter to WHW in Berlin from Reich Chancellery, with
copy of letter and poem from Lieselotte Prdschel, including
donation of RM 2.00, 8th February 1943.
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'Thalburg' in 1933 that most of the citizens there approved the idea
of erecting a Christmas tree in the Market Square (paid for by WHW
funds), 'so that everyone in Thalburg could enjoy one'."^
Though it was emphasised during the WHW drives that 'one must
come to the aid of the poorest of the poor', as Goebbels (succinctly)
put it, it is also true that the donation to the WHW was regarded as
a 'sign' of a pro-Nazi, or potentially pro-Nazi, viewpoint. The
clear knowledge that this was manifestly not the case in many
intances did not deter the WHW, nor detract from the intention to use
the donation to the WHW both as a barometer of opinion, and as a
means in itself, not as an end. It was the reciprocal act of
donating/receiving which was seen to be capable of creating the
intention to support the leadership, not merely the receiving of
2
welfare aid as such, however welcome that might be. The visible
demonstration to oneself, and others, that the community must be
supported, by an action of symbolic giving and receiving, took on as
time passed an almost religious note in the WHW campaigns."^ It is
this facet of WHW activity which makes an assessment of its 'success'
or 'failure' such a difficult undertaking.
The donation to the WHW was something which could be counted by
the leadership as a first step on the road to a 'positive' acceptance
1. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power:
The Experience of a Single German Town 1930-33,
New York 1973, p.269.
2. Elfferding in 'Opferritual' makes a similar point which
differs significantly from de Witt's emphasis, see pp.204-203.
3. BA, R36/1008, from DGT on instructions regarding WHW
1937/38, 12th October 1937, Ibid., 'Adolf Hitler Spende der
Deutsche Wirtschaft', see Section 3, 'Tag der nationalen
SolidaritSt', and list of instructions on WHW 1937/38, 18th
November 1937.
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of Nazi rule. This emphasis on promoting acceptance of Nazi aims
through personal 'action', was present in Nazi welfare measures right
from the start.^ The reciprocal nature of this particular device of
the WHW was clearly shown on the 'Day of Solidarity', always a
Sunday, when prominent Nazis were expected to proffer the ubiquitous
2
collecting tin themselves. It must be suggested that one of the
functions of the WHW was to act as a trigger for the adoption of new
attitudes, such as the ones outlined above. The WHW made a
significant addition within an atmosphere of a general proliferation
of uniforms, insignia and other visual reminders of the Nazi State.
The WHW was itself the most visible presentation of the NSV's social
welfare schemes; probably no other scheme of the NSV so determinedly
pushed itself into the consciousness of the people although other NSV
schemes were meant to be usefully persuasive in pushing the Nazi
message (most notably the NSV's 'Mother and Child' scheme).^ The
stamp of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry existed in every WHW measure
for it was he, Goebbels, who was chosen to run the entire scheme
until the end of the war, not Hilgenfeldt, the leader of the
4
NSV.
1. HA Reel 13, Polders 238/9/260, Reel 14, Folders 61/62.
2. BA, R43ii/564a, from Hauptstelle Aktive Propaganda' to
Reichskanzlei, instructions for 'Day of National Solidarity',
(3rd December 1938), 17th November 1938; Ibid., Gau Gross-Berlin,
Gaupropaqanda Amt, 'Tag der nationalen SolidaritMt, Sonnabend,
den 3.Dez. 1938', 28th November 1938; Ibid., 'Sammelbuchsen-
Liste', with Dr. Lammers' name and information on amount
(1,391.98RM) which he collected on 3rd December 1938; the
Evening Post 1934 reported that Goebbels made his collections
with an SS man's hat to facilitate the collection of notes,
see Clippings Collection Wiener Library.
3. BA, NS 22/750, from Bormann, on instructions to keep the
23rd December free for WHW activities. 'Rundschreiben
Nr.147/37*, 6th November 1937.
4. HA, 14/262, p.306.
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The Winterhilfswerk Drives 1933-39
The first WHW drive which took place during the winter of
1933/34 was pronounced a resounding success in the NSV's journal,
NS-Volksdienst. The first campaign had shown that, 'after only half
a year of Nazi leadership the people were ready to follow the
FUhrer's thoughts and measures'. Not only this, but the same
article asserted firmly that:
'one realised with deep joy that the misguided doctrine of
Marxism had never taken root in the heart of the German
worker, only the dominating influence of Marxism over some
numbers of years had caused a suspension of the critical
faculties of the German worker'.
(1)
The work of the WHW, with its collections of money and distribution
of goods in the form of food, clothing and fuel was, according to WHW
propaganda, meant to show that a 'Spirit of Solidarity' was invested
2
in Nazi measures to counteract poverty and need. The NSV's leaders
were not slow to point out in articles, periodicals, and in the
Vdlkischer Beobachter that all this effort showed just what 'real'
socialism consisted of."^ However, one must treat with care all
statements which dealt with pronouncements on 'socialism' in WHW, and
NSW, propaganda. As Schoenbaum has pointed out, the word 'socialism'
as used by Nazi leaders usually meant something which he describes
quite accurately, as:
'a basic social egalitarianism with a streak of social
welfare, and a considerable element of militancy'.
(4)
1. BA, NSD 30/1, NS-Wolksdienst, October 1934, p.3; Ibid., p.3.
2. Stflrmer, Das Rechtliche VerhMltnis, pp.29-69.
3. BA, NSD 30/1 NS-Volksdienst, October 1934, pp.1-16.
4. Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution, p.57.
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In 1933, Goebbels told an audience in KOnigsberg that 'our socialism
is a socialism of heroes, of manliness'."^
Ley was also heard to declare that, 'our socialism has nothing
to do with pity' a sentiment with which the leader of the NSV could
easily have agreed. Ley also went on to say that:
'socialism is community, struggle and comradeship,
loyalty and honour; socialism, my friend, is the blood
and the race, the holy solemn belief in God'.
(2)
Schoenbaum correctly points out that the socialist label was often
applied to activities that had hitherto been called 'sozial', such as
social work. What seems to have been meant in NSV/WHW propaganda,
when the word socialism was used, was essentially the idea as
expressed by Hitler, that people had to be educated towards an
acceptance of the need to 'help themselves', and also others who
needed assistance and who formed that section of the nation who were
'worthy'. The 'Aryan' nation would be expected to accept, and
subsequently to internalise, the values of National Socialism in
general, and a sense of community responsibility, in particular.
This was what socialism after 1933, as the term was used in Nazi
writings and speeches, really meant. Hitler described the whole
Winterhilfswerk as a means of educating the German people to
socialism."' But it is clear that he meant a type of socialism
resembling the definition given above. The Nazi leadership expected
that the act of participating in a practical exercise, designed to
alleviate social distress and economic hardship, would itself
function in a socially cohesive manner. Moreover, welfare activity
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., pp.57-38.
3. Hitler, Zweites Buch, Stuttgart 1981, p.78.
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would promote, at the level of the community, through a myriad of
personal social contacts, social change of a distinctive kind which,
at all times, would function as a support for Nazi policy. In other
words, people would come to forget, or better still, reject, the
liberal values of earlier times which, as some have argued, had never
taken root in Germany to any significant degree."^ Nevertheless, it
was recognised that some effort would have to be expended in such a
task, and the guiding hand of the Propaganda Ministry was seen in the
design of the WHW drives which had been invested with much hope in
2
their ability to deliver results. In July 1933, the Propaganda
Minister, Dr. Goebbels, was appointed by Hitler to take on the
responsibility for the official Winterhilfswerk welfare campaigns of
the NSV. While the NSV would be charged with organising the
day-to-day running of the annual campaigns, it would be the
Propaganda Ministry which would have the final say on every matter
which related to the design and to the practical procedures of the
WHW drives. This meant that the leader of the NSV, to a large
degree, worked as Goebbels1 deputy in relation to the WHW itself.
There is no reason to believe that Hilgenfeldt was unduly worried by
this arrangement and he seems to have had a good relationship with
Goebbels who, in the spring of 1933, had supported and fostered the
hopes and the plans of the new welfare organisation."^ No doubt the
successful welfare measures undertaken in the early spring of 1933
1. Richard J. Evans, The Feminist Movement in Germany 1894-1933,
London 1976, pp.1-9; Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in
Germany, pp.33-64.
2. See the activities of Goebbels and Hilgenfeldt in the spring
of 1933, HA, 14/262 pp.188-210.
3. Ibid.
influenced Goebbels' decision to undertake to mastermind the
nation-wide Winter Aid drives which were to become such a familiar
feature of life in the Third Reich. To some extent these drives
would show the regime in its best light and engage the interest of
many foreign journalists who, annually, reported to their readers
abroad on the latest developments of the Nazi winter welfare
measures. British readers were kept informed of the amounts
collected from the German population, and journalists commented both
on the social and the economic implications of these particular
measures."'' There is no reason seriously to doubt the popularity of
these drives, at least at first, for they were carefully designed to
elicit the maximum degree of support from the nation as a whole, and
they seemed to have been successful in persuading many to give of
2
their time, and money, in the service of a 'good' cause. It is
hardly surprising that the NSV has been largely identified with the
WHW insofar as the welfare organisation itself has been viewed as
consisting almost entirely of its Winter Aid section by some at
least.^ Neither is it surprising that the few studies of the NSV
1. See British newspaper reports, Clippings Collection, Wiener
Library.
2. See The Morning Post, 6th February 1934, article entitled
'British Winter Help in Berlin', which read:
'Members of the British colony in Berlin have been
contributing in a variety of ways (including observance
of one-dish Sunday) to Herr Hitler's Winter Help Campaign.
For this good cause and that of the British relief fund,
they rallied in large numbers in the KurfUrstendamm
Theatre tonight to see an amateur performance of James
Montgomery's comedy, "Nothing but the Truth"'.
3. Both Grunberger and Bramsted rightly emphasise the
importance of WHW but leave the strong impression that
NSV welfare was epitomised by the WHW. See Bramsted,
Goebbels pp.102-103; Richard Grunberger, A Social History
of the Third Reich, London 1971, pp.100-110.
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which exist, and which deal with its pre-war development, tend to
emphasise the WHW at the expense of its other measures."^ The
glamourous side of the WHW, and its relative independence from the
problems of Party and state, renders it an interesting, though, one
can argue, a less truly representative aspect of NSV welfare as a
whole. The Winter Aid scheme was the NSV (and the regime) e£ fete.
The WHW drive revealed the NSV's most 'attractive' aspect when,
annually, all citizens were shown how the new Nazified charitable
schemes were meant to support the growth of national consciousness.
Goebbels certainly seems to have been successful in catching the
interest and the imagination of many who saw in the WHW an expression
of the regime's less cruel side, but it was an aspect of Nazi rule
which sought to legitimise claims presented to the nation in the form
2
of a demand to give support to the new leadership. The design of
all the propaganda material came under the control of Goebbels and
his ministry and would remain so until the end of the war."^
The speed with which the first campaign of the first WHW was
set up - the nation-wide scheme was in complete working order after
only a few weeks' preparation - suggests that a real sense of urgency
accompanied the frequently stated expressions of concern for the
numbers of the unemployed and for those who were receiving neither
social insurance benefits nor any other relief payments of any type
1. This may be largely unavoidable when studying NSV activities
in the period up to 1939. See de Witt, 'The Nazi Party and
Social Welfare', see also,T.de Witt, 'The Economics and Politics
of Welfare in the Third Reich', in Central European History,
1978, pp.256-278. ~" ^
2. See letters of thanks from the Reich Chancellery to Herr Carsten
Wilhelm Bruening and three associates of Merida in Venezuela for
the donation of RM 1,000 for the WHW fund, BA, R43ii/564, 26th
January to 8th February 1934.
3. NSV History, HA, 14/262, p.306.
whatsoever. The organisation of the WHW operated through Gau, Kreis
and Ort levels, with the Gauamtsleiter, Kreisamtsleiter and
Ortsqruppenleiter of the NSV being responsible to Hilgenfeldt for all
WHW activity in their areas. A Reichsarbeitsqemeinschaft was set up
in 1933 which included agencies of Party and state, as well as the
churches, the Deutscher Caritas Verband and the Deutsche Evan-
2
qelische Kirche. A Reichsbeirat was also formed which included
important Party leaders and others but this body seems not
to have had -any particular role, rather it was a means of engaging
the interest of leading party figures in the Winter Aid scheme as a
whole. While the collections started in October of each year, the
work of the WHW actually began on 1st July so that all administrative
matters could be dealt with before the start of the winter. By
September all the necessary forms were ready to be given out to the
Ort offices, and by the sixteenth of the month, the organisation of
coal distribution was being undertaken in offices at every level,
from Gau to Ort."^ Registration had to be made by certain dates in
the autumn so that by the beginning of October, coal vouchers were
ready for collection. All this work involved a complicated procedure
at each level and no doubt kept all NSV staff fully occupied with WHW
administration. The end of the business year occurred on 30th June
which mean that the work of WHW administration continued virtually
4
throughout the year from 1st July to 30th June the following year.
1. Reher, Social Welfare, p.12. For a description of the whole
operation see BA, NSD 30/34, Allqemeine, Arbeitsanweisunq(2),
'Grundlage der Betreuung', p.21.
2. Ibid., 1Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft des WHW 1936/37', p.23.
3. Ibid., 'Kohlenversorgung', pp.32-67.
4. Ibid., 'Terminkalender', p.77.
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For an unemployed person to obtain food or coal vouchers, it
was necessary to register with the local Arbeitsamt for employment,
for only then would the necessary registration card with a red WHW
stamp on it be allocated. No WHW aid would be given out to the
unemployed unless they could produce such a card."^ Not surprisingly,
an individual's ability to refuse unpalatable work was severely
limited by the rules and the regulations surrounding WHW aid.
Welfare would be withheld if work was not taken up when offered by
the local employment office. Public welfare offices and the local
employment offices provided the WHW with the necessary information on
welfare recipients and the unemployed, but low paid workers would
have to furnish proof of their earnings before aid would be given.
The amounts which could be earned while receiving WHW welfare seem to
have been not more than 75 marks per month for couples and 50 marks
2
per month for single people. The Blockwalter, too, had to give time
to WHW administration in that he was expected to provide information
about WHW recipients, either by bringing needy families to the notice
of the WHW officials, or by reporting on those who were habitual
drinkers or were otherwise deemed to be anti-social in character and
therefore considered unsuitable to receive welfare assistance from
the WHW.^ Only a very few Jewish people were allowed to receive WHW
aid, the levels of which seem to have been negligible. The so-called
'Jewish Winter Aid' (not to be confused with the WHW proper) only
functioned until 1935, or thereabouts, to give the lie to stories
abroad of Nazi ill-treatment of the Jews. This meant that German
1. Ibid., 'Grundlage der Betreuung', p.21.
2. St. J., 1936, p.636.
3. BA, NSD 30/34, Allqemeine Arbeitsanweisunq(2), p.26.
diplomats abroad could truthfully assert that Jewish people were
receiving Winter Aid. Therefore it was entirely accurate for a
German diplomat to claim as he did, in the Manchester Guardian in
1935, that, 'As many as 38,053 Jews ... were assisted by the WHW in
1933-34'."'" No figures so far have yet been discovered which relate
to the pre-war Jewish Winter Aid, for these were not included in the
2
official Rechenschaftsberichten.
When Goebbels declared that by coming to the aid of the poorest
members of the nation, the leadership showed, 'by deed that the
concept of the People's Community was not an empty phrase',"^ he was
making a direct appeal for support, of the unquestioning variety,
which still had to be gained. The population still remained to be
informed, and to be persuaded, of the importance and the significance
of the new government's measures. The social policies of the regime,
as they were reflected within the welfare organisation itself, were
designed with the purpose of gaining support from the majority of the
German people. There seems no doubt that Nazi welfare measures, of
4
which the WHW was only one, were created with such aims in view.
From 1933, the German population was subjected to an intensive
publicity campaign which was designed to elicit contributions from
the public for the WHW scheme. Large sums of money were collected
and then redistributed among the needy in the form of goods, such as
food, clothing and fuel. However, it must be stressed that WHW aid
1. See The Manchester Guardian , 14th June 1935.
2. BA, NSD 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', see part one.
3. Unger, The Totalitarian Party, p.208.
4. Reher, Social Welfare, pp.3-4.
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was not meant to replace other welfare payments from the state, or
the insurance funds: rather, WHW aid was intended to be in the
nature of a generous supplement from the community to those who, in
spite of their existing incomes, were severely short of the basic
necessities."'' The principle items of WHW aid were usuallycoal and
potatoes, though warm clothing and domestic linen (not necessarily
new) were distributed to those in most need. Other basic necessities
were also available including cod-liver oil for children, groceries
and non-perishable foodstuffs; these items were taken out of the
donations of the 'pound-weight* of goods which were collected once a
month during the WHW drive, and held in store for later
2
distribution. In other words a massive collection drive took place
every winter which included, apart from the street collections of
money, the organising of a collection of goods for later
redistribution. Not only this, but it was possible to obtain a meal
in NSV canteens especially designed for dealing with those who were
not in receipt of welfare payments of any kind, this being especially
urgent during the winter of 1933/34. In Berlin this measure seems to
have been of some importance, with 4,000 free (or cheap) hot meals
daily being obtained throughout the winter from twenty NSV canteens
in the city."^ Funds amounting to RM 427,000 altogether from the
first WHW campaign in Berlin were set aside for this particular
1. BA NSD 30/34, Allqemeine Arbeitsaweisunq(2), pp.26-27.
2. Ibid., 'Pfundspende ', p.46.
'Obst und GemUseversorgung', p.46.
'Versorgung mit Kleidung*, p.49.
3. BA, R43ii/564, 'TStigkeitsbericht Uber das Winterhilfswerk im
Gau Gross-Berlin', 12th January 1934.
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measure. The size of the economic and social problem in Berlin at
this time is shown by the number of free meals which were
distributed, which amounted to 228,331 during the period from
November 1933 to the middle of March 1934."^ This important welfare
facility was provided by the NSV together with the other private
agencies for welfare, who received a sum of money from WHW funds to
2
enable them to assist the NSV/WHW in this particular measure. At
the beginning of the Berlin WHW action the number of the destitute
came to 1,324,969, and the existing public welfare offices of the
city of Berlin kept the NSV informed of the numbers of persons no
longer in receipt of welfare or unemployment assistance."^ The total
value of the first Berlin WHW action came to RM 15,703,496.^ This
total included donations of goods as well as small sums of money.
Altogether food vouchers worth RM 3,882,253, along with 899,957 cwt.
of potatoes and 1,664,399 cwt. of coal, were available for
distribution from the end of December 1933 through the Berlin WHW
action.^
Throughout the winter months collections for the WHW were not
restricted to the frequently proffered collecting tin which made its
appearance on the streets on certain days and between certain
specified hours, and which were carried by members of the SA, the
1. Sozialismus der Tat-Das Buch der unbekannten Kclmpfer der
NSV Berlin. Amt fdr Volkswohlfahrt, Gau Gross-Berlin 1934,
Berlin 1934, p.72.
2. Ibid., p.72.




police, the Wehrmacht, members of the Nazi organisations and NSV
voluntary helpers: it was reported that the numbers of the NSV
helpers amounted during the first drive to as many as 1,500,000, all
of whom were untrained and quite inexperienced in such work."^
Indeed, the street collections were only one of a number of methods
used to part citizens from as much as they could spare. Other
methods used were classified under the following headings:
Subscriptions from Firms and Organisations;
Sacrifices from Wages and Salaries;
One-Pot Subscriptions;
Refunds of Coal Transport;
Day of National Solidarity;
Winter Relief Lottery.
The first two items on the list referred to the so-called 'voluntary
subscriptions', which were, in truth, a method of disguised taxation
which none could easily avoid. Significant sums of money were
collected in this way with as much as RM 77,739,075 being received
from 'Sacrifices from Wages and Salaries', in the Reich winter
collections of 1934/35. Clear guidelines were given about the
percentage which could be taken from wages and salaries for WHW
funds.^ The total sum collected for that year for the WHW came to
RM 367,425,484.4
A description of a typical Winterhilfswerk weekend which was
1. Reher, Social Welfare, p.12.
2. BA, R43ii/564, 'Rechenschaftsbericht WHW 1934/35', p.6.
3. BA, R2/4867, 'Winterhilfswerk 1940/41', 'Berechnungstabelle
f(Jr das Opfer von Lohn und Gehalt', this amounted to 10%
of the monthly deduction of tax or a monthly donation of
0.25 RM if no tax was paid due to a small income.
4. BA, R43ii/564, 'Rechenschaftsbericht WHW 1934/35', p.6.
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given in the Daily Telegraph of 6th March 1939 read as follows:
'Regular monthly collections are made throughout the
Reich in the streets, trains, shops, restaurants and
hotels by thousands of uniformed Nazis armed with scarlet
collecting tins. The collections usually begin in the
streets on Friday night and extend over Saturday and
Sunday. The purchase of one of the badges sold is no
protection against further demands by collectors who
continue to rattle their money boxes long after they have
disposed of all their badges. During a recent collection
I was approached over 150 times in the street, in trains
and in restaurants. Shopkeepers and householders are
subjected to periodic visitations by collectors, a
nuisance from which they can only free themselves by
commuting for a lump sum, thus obtaining the right to
stick a numbered "Collecting ban" on their door'.
(1)
But the Propaganda Ministry was well aware of the disruptive effects
of the overt use of force during collection drives and its officials
were obliged time and time again to remind the local Party offices of
the, 'ever-increasing gross infractions of collection procedures'.
It was pointed out that:
'By employing pressure, the local Party Leader builds a
Potemkin Village for his superiors and ultimately for the
FUhrer himself'.
(2)
It can be argued that the efficacy of the collections and the
campaigns of the WHW, as a means of persuasive communication with the
population, is open to doubt due to the methods used during the
collections. For example, one local study points to the
deterioration of the collection procedures through over-zealous
practices such as the flooding of a ten minute tram route with as
many as eight to ten collectors who could ask for successive
donations from the unfortunate captive passengers.^ In this local
1. See article in The Daily Telegraph, 6th March 1939.
2. Linger, The Totalitarian Party, pp.209-210.
3.J. H. Grill, 'The NS Volkswohlfahrt and the Winterhilfswerk',
in The Nazi Movement in Baden 1920-1945, London 1983, p.590.
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study of Baden, it was shown that the collections themselves, whose
significance was all important for the dissemination of propaganda,
were sometimes abandoned in favour of direct contributions from firms
in order that the Kreisleiter might fulfil his statistical quotas."*
Such tactics became increasingly counter-productive, as Schwarz came
to fear during the war when he believed that all enthusiasm for the
WHW had been dissipated as a result of the increasingly aggressive
2
procedures employed during the collection drives. Support and
enthusiasm for the WHW drives were entirely ruined through the
over-assiduous collection practices in the various Gaus, of which the
NSV was aware, but powerless to prevent. Even though each WHW
campaign was given full propaganda treatment, with the opening of
each campaign being undertaken with the maximum publicity and press
coverage,"' it is not difficult to imagine that a growing lack of
trust may have accompanied the realisation that one was obliged, time
and time again, to donate sums of money to the WHW fund when
requested to do so, often enough by forceful-or even aggressive -
collectors. As Linger has pointed out, before the war it was feared
that the effect of carefully prepared propaganda would be altogether
lost through the actions of officials and volunteer helpers who
allowed an abrasive manner to override persuasive methods. However,
given the very large numbers of voluntary helpers and others who
turned out to assume the duties of an official collector for the WHW,
it is difficult to see how this problem could have been prevented.
1. Ibid.
2. See Chapter Seven.
3. However, in 1941, it seems that Hilgenfeldt considered
lengthening the period of the WHW drive believing that
it would not be an unpopular move, see Hilgenfeldt to
Ley, 8th April 1941, BA, NS22/750.
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For example, in the winter of 1934/35 as many as 1,338,335 helpers
were used to carry out the various duties in each of the months from
October to March."'' Of this number, 515,617 belonged to National
Socialist organisations and formations, the rest consisted of
voluntary helpers, of whom only 5,198 actually received some small
2
payment for their work.
The Winterhilfswerk drives were intended to provide a show of
public activity in the service of the Volksqemeinschaft, and even if
the activities of large numbers of voluntary helpers and others were
difficult to control and to direct in some instances, they were,
above all, ideologically necessary as a symbol of the participation
of citizens in the nation's work. WHW activities, which included as
a part of their design the active participation of numerous
individuals, were perhaps aided by the lack of opportunity for taking
part in social clubs and societies which were not under Nazi control.
Even at the level of sports clubs or sewing clubs, the process of
Gleichschaltunq had virtually destroyed the opportunity for privately
organised leisure activities. It may have been that the WHW could
gain from this, given that people were sometimes willing to become
involved in NSV work, or WHW work, even when they shunned other Nazi
organisations. Certainly the levels of the membership of the NSV may
have reflected this point, with a growth in membership by 1937 or
1938, showing that some people were prepared to participate, even if
it was only for a few evenings in the winter, in welfare work for
1. BA, R43ii/564, 'Rechenschaftsbericht WHW 1934/35', p.4.
2. Ibid.
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the nation. It was hoped that more and more individuals would give
of their time, especially in the winter months, making badges,
crotcheted rossettes and other knick-knacks to be sold on the streets
during the WHW street collections.
WHW activities also included entirely light-hearted ones, with
concerts and musical evenings taking place in community halls and
elsewhere, the entrance fee to which was donated to the WHW. The
famous 'Day of National Solidarity' was itself designed as a huge
spree, and marked the highspot of the whole Winter Aid Drive. On
this particular day, always a Sunday, when Party leaders themselves
were expected to turn out and do their share of collecting, famous
film stars and well-known actors and actresses also gave their
services as collectors and proved to be a great attraction for the
Berlin crowds. The first of these occasions was a huge success, it
attracted thousands of people into the centre of Berlin where the
crowds grew so dense outside the arc-light illuminated front of the
Adlon Hotel that it was almost impossible for the cars of the star
2
attractions, Geobbels and Goering, to make any headway.
1. Althaus, NS-Volkswohlfahrt, p.42.






Altgelt, Weqweiser, p.36 for a pictorial outline of
growth in membership of the NSV during 1934-1935,
BA, NS26/261, the number of voluntary helpers is given
as 1,213,091 for 1941/42.
2. See The Evening Post 'Winter Help Fund Scenes',
10th December 1934, see Clippings Collection, Wiener
Library.
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Among other measures which included a strong propaganda element
with a money-raising function, was the somewhat eccentric (for so it
was viewed in the foreign press) Eintopfgericht or Eintopfsonntag.
On the first Sunday of each of the winter months the entire
population was urged to restrict the traditional Sunday meal to one
dish only. It was expected that a simple meal, possibly a stew, or
some other type of simple and inexpensive dish, would be served on
this particular day. The money which would have ordinarily been
spent on a more typical German Sunday dinner was intended to be
donated to the WHW.^ The sums collected by this means during the
first Berlin Winter Aid drive were as follows:
October 1933 RM 154,022
November 1933 RM 380,076
December 1933 RM 424,495
January 1934 RM 411,722
Eebruary 1934 RM 417,906
March 1934 RM 420,757(2)
The figures given above refer only to the sums collected from
households, for not only did private citizens donate a part of the
cost of a typical meal to WHW funds, but so also did hotels and
restaurants which were instructed to hand over part of the payment
for the meals served on Eintopfsonntaq. The amounts to be donated by
individuals were strictly laid down according to income and family
commitment, and an article of 2nd November 1934, in the Vfllkischer
Boebachter drew attention to the spirit in which the donations were
1. Sozialismus der Tat, pp.66-72.
2. BA, NSD30/34, 'Eintopfspende', in Allqemeine Arbeitsanweisunq (2)
pp.33-35.
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to be given and also the precise amounts. The levels of the
donations were given as 50 Pfennigs per person in families where no
children were present; families with children would pay half that
amount per person while on no account would kinderreiche Familien pay
more than they could afford. Hotels and restaurants were expected to
charge the usual amount for a meal but to serve a simple dish and
2
donate the entire payment less 50 Pfennigs to the WHW. Collections
by the NSV officers of the Opfersonntaq donations were made during
the day and had to be delivered to the Kreis office and thence to the
Gau office, at the latest by 8 p.m. on that day. Careful
arrangements were made in order that no misuse of funds might occur,
though the opportunity for this existed, as the WHW officials knew
only too well."^ Altogether the Gau Gross-Berlin collected RM
2,285,882, from households and restaurants during the winter of
1933/34.^ The sum received for the whole of the Reich in 1934/35 for
this particular measure amounted to RM 29,581,378, while the 'Day of
National Solidarity', yielded the smaller amount for the whole Reich
1. VB, 'Eintopfgericht ist Ehrenpflicht', 2nd November 1934:
All fellow citizens this Sunday must stand together in
'readiness to serve' ... all fellow citizens who have an
income of over 200 marks must donate an appropriate sum on
'one-dish Sunday', see Clippings Collection, Wiener Library.
2. Ibid.;
Sozialismus der Tat, pp.65-67.
3. Ibid., pp.66-67;
BA, NSD30/34, Allgemeine Arbeitsanweis ung(2)
'Statistik', p.75.
4. This figure of RM 2,285,882 is listed on the front of the
first page of 'Sozialismus der Tat', and the figure of
RM 983,433 was received, by the beginning of December, in




The British Press responded to the idea of Opfersonntaq
(one-dish Sunday) with a certain degree of amusement, and even some
amazement, with The Times printing an article entitled 'Stew Sunday
2
in Germany'. Perhaps Goebbels' sense of Schadenfreude should not be
discounted, for Opfersonntaq seems to have been his idea entirely.
Not only were the more prosperous members of the community expected
to eat less on this day, but they were required to pay for the
dubious pleasure of doing so. The one-dish meal was, it seems,
intended to be a symbolic gesture which would serve to 'unite' the
whole community on one particular day, each citizen would, so to
speak, be breaking bread with his fellows. He was expected to call
to mind his fellow Volksqenossen who were less well off, and who were
in need of the donation which would be given to the WHW collectors.
Propaganda material included the idea of having an 'invisible' guest
at the table (namely those who would receive the benefit accruing
from the donation), indeed, one's fellow-citizen. Sentimental poems
were included in the propaganda material which was supplied to the
press for publication."^ Articles, photographs and headlines were
also given to the press, and three of these included:
Break bread for the suffering brother.
Housewives-mothers - complete the work of the EUhrer.
Every household is a part of the National Community.
(4)
1. BA, R43ii/564 'Rechenschaftsbericht 1934/33', pp.6-7.
2. See reports of the British Press in the Wiener Library
Clippings Collection.
3. See Ewiqes Deutschland, NSD 30/7/8/9.
A typical poetical expression of Eintopfsonntaq read:
'Du weist es nicht, wer ich wohl sei
Du hast mich nicht gesehen
Und wirst doch merken wie wir zwei
einander gut verstehen.
4. Bramsted, Goebbels, p.103.
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In the same article the housewife was urged to see to it that,
'when the results come in (of the sums collected) the
FUhrer will be filled with joy because sixty million
hearts will rejoice with him in their readiness for
sacrifices'.
To this it must be added that it was more than some of the Party
leaders were prepared to do, for when Hitler served at his own table
the required frugal meal it was observed by Speer that the number of
the guests shrank thereafter to two, or three at most. This provoked
some sarcastic remarks from Hitler about the 'spirit of sacrifice'
among his associates."^
The WHW faithfully published figures with regard to income and
distribution, and the latter figures were given in a fairly detailed
form. The Vtilkischer Beobachter always gave a long report on the
WHW campaign at the end of the winter, listing long columns of the
2
types of goods received and the value of these. Certainly the
population was kept informed as to how much they had contributed;
indeed, they were usually reminded of these sums in terms of 'proof'
of support for the regime.^ The sums of money received by the WHW










1. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, London, 1970, p.120.
2. VE3, 11.10.34; 17.4.37. See Clippings Collection Wiener
Library.
3. Ibid., V/B_, 'Mobilmachung zum WHW', 7th October 1936.
4. BA, NS26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.5.
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A comparison of the amounts received in respect of the Opfersoi
and the Reich street collections is as follows:














It is clear from the sums given above that while the street
collections until 1938 lagged behind the donations from the Eintopf
Sunday collections in the amounts achieved, the street collections
certainly picked up in the first year of the war. This was certainly
due as much to increased efforts by the WHW as to popular support for
the Nazi leadership. However, Hilgenfeldt himself seemed to derive
some comfort from what he viewed to be 'evidence' that a majority of
the population were, at the very least, not implacably against the
measures of the government at this time."'"
According to the figures published by the WHW, as a result of
the 1934/33 WHW Drive, 211 persons out of every 1,000 were allowed
2
some form of WHW aid. The amount received by each family,
representing the entire winter donation in terms of value, came to
approximately 30-40 marks.^ It should be stressed that the published
figures make it difficult to assess the precise amounts which were
distributed, for at all times only gross figures are given. The
numbers of aided families, and numbers of children in each family, is
given as follows for 1933/36:
1. The 'success' of the WHW which the NSV claimed could be
gauged by the amounts collected came into serious
question both before and during the war, see Schwarz
to Bormann on the collection procedures of 1942,
15th December 1942, BA, NS22/751.
2. BA, R43ii/564, 'Rechenschaftsbericht WHW 1934/35', p.4.
3. C.W. Guillebaud, The Social Policy of Nazi Germany,
London 1941, p.99.
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Numbers of Families by Family Size
October November December January February March
Individuals 780,511 864,175 904,864 919,919 920,843 915,380
Couples/ 885,813 955,745 1,015,200 1,040,009 1,046,140 1,039,614
No Children
Families/ 721,354 797,879 854,490 884,580 889,888 885,545
1 Child
Families/ 571,070 607,351 655,717 675,214 662,340 663,059
2 Children
Families/ 359,977 379,898 406,435 409,817 414,944 407,974
3 Children




The average figure with regard to families and individuals receiving










For the year 1935/36, an average of 194 persons out of every 1,000
inhabitants received WHW welfare aid; that is, seventeen fewer than
the previous year, when 211 out of every 1,000 inhabitants were given
1. BA, R36/1007, 'Rechenschaftsbericht WHW 1935/36', p.5.
2. Ibid.
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WHW aid. This figure would fall steadily, until the number of
persons in every 1,000 receiving WHW aid in 1942/43 was reduced to
60, these particular figures refer to the area of the Greater Reich.
The numbers of individual households according to numbers of members
per household, and also the numbers of children and young persons in
total, and also by average monthly figures, are given in separate
tables for 1942 and 1943 as follows:^
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Numbersof Welfare Recipients byHousehold
1942
1943
Singlepersons Householdswith oneperson Householdswith twopers ns Householdwith threepersons Householdswith fourpersons Householdswith fivepersons Householdswith sixandmore persons TOTAL
147,389 772,203 73,194SeptemberOctoberNovembeDeJanuaryF br
March
Monthly Average September toMarch
172,995 912,846
189,063200,74897 285 973,7301,007,92518 874
190,634 994,302
183,0415,649 991,25355,744
437,666517, 1959 0588,93290 27074, 256 7 3,897 164,641199,853221 1 94 ,4853 621231,17527 2921,0 9 104,698128,79444 535 ,9021 08751,343148,39462 91,099102,9022 , 811 316.107,021105 2332,174 106,459132,02248,31162,2980 5 3J53 571,5146, 8 1,806,4522,155,228339 5 5,473, 796 0 602,9522,3 5 528, 07,87
(1)
1.BA,R43ii/560,' echenschaftsberichtWHW942 43',p.3.
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1943Monthly
Average
DecemberJanua yF br rM rchtoM̂arch1^ 792,4251 76762,82748,68871 ,5 988,4753,582950,204934,19700 0 330,20929 697313, 4808,433 ,1 1 2,111,109, 04,7552,026,6791,99 ,32 ,7 1 3,309,3891 ,4233,216, 39,18 ,5253,09 ,777 5,420,498, 214 1785,243,118,17 ,8 05,014,548 65320
(1)
While it may be argued that the value of the goods received was
modest, there seems little reason to doubt that for some at least,
especially from 1933 to 1936/37, the WHW supplement, which came as an
addition to state welfare if that was proved to be insufficient,
acted as a lifeline, seeing them through the months of the winter
until a job could be found."'"
Not only individuals and families received aid from WHW, for
individual Gaus were also given assistance in order to ensure that
adequate food supplies were available to provide for their
2
populations. The so-called Patenqau or donator Gau system allowed
for a regular exchange (and donation) of surplus food to be made. If
necessary, certain Gaus were designated as distressed areas
(Notstandqaue), if they were finding it hard to provide essential
foodstuffs such as potatoes and flour. Other districts which could
allow for an adequate supply for themselves, such as the
potato-growing areas, were meant to provide for the surrounding
areas, so that purchases of supplies of this commodity would be kept
to within a specific district. The WHW, in other words would know
which districts were able to supply this important food and which
could not.^ Produce which existed as a surplus in certain Gaus was
organised to provide for those areas in need of that surplus. In
this way the industrial areas received from specified country areas
produce which could be regarded as being in excess of need. The WHW
made sure that these surpluses were distributed to certain areas, to
which a regular donation would be made. The Gau Gross-Berlin could
1. BA, NSD30/34, Allqemeine Arbeitsanweisunq (2), p.26.




expect to receive supplies of rye flour from Kurmark, Mecklenberg,
Pommern, LUbeck and Schlesien."* Those areas which could provide for
themselves without having to look for help outside the immediate











The economic importance of the WHW was described by Werner
Reher as enabling demand within the economy to rise through the
important donations of necessary items in the family budget. This he
argued released the spending power of low income families who could
begin to purchase goods which otherwise would remain unsold."^ Help
for the economy also came through purchases which were made on behalf
of the WHW. In the Gau Sachsen for example, unemployed SA men
received 2,130 pairs of shoes, 'of especially rugged quality' costing
22.30 to 28 marks per pair, and the same number of new suits; these
4
items were all purchased through the WHW in 1935. Many small
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Reher, Social Welfare, p.18.
4. BA, NS/37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen, 'TStigkeitsbericht',
March 1935.
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factories in Gau Sachsen had been given work because of the WHW whose
funds were also used to purchase beds for kinderreich families
(families with several children), so that as far as possible each
child would have his own bed, an important measure to improve the
general health of children in Germany. In Gau Sachsen in 1935, 3,200
beds were purchased and given to those most in need of them.^
Altogether, throughout Germany by the end of August 1937, as many as
897,725 beds had been distributed out of WHW funds:
'just under the number„ of the entire population of
NUrnberg and DUsseldorf together'.
(2)
The WHW also encouraged fish consumption throughout the country by
purchasing and distributing this important source of protein. It
seems that the WHW supported the fishing industry generally by buying
up large stocks of fish which could be kept in cold store for later
distribution. This amounted to nearly 3,000 tons in 1934/35,
increasing steadily to 8,250 tons in 1935/36, and 9,350 tons in
1936/37."^ Other goods which were purchased in large numbers included
small porcelain badges which were then later sold in the streets
during the collection drives. firms such as the Staatliche Majolika
1. Ibid.
2. Leistunqen der Nationalsozialistische Wohlfahrtspflege, p.10.
3. Reher, Social Welfare, p.17.
4. Ibid., p.19. See numbers of badges sold in 1935/36 by Gau,
in BA, R35/1007 'Rechenschaftsbericht WHW 1935/36', p.19,
this amounted to 71,537,377 badges sold throughout the Reich
during the Winter campaign; Ibid., 'Anzahl der verkauften
Abzeichen bei den Reichsstrassensammlungen'.
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Manufaktur of Karlsruhe, could rely ori large orders from the WHW.^
The coal industry too was supported by the WHW, which, annually,
bought up large amounts for the purpose of free distribution to those
in receipt of WHW aid. While Eintopfsonntag epitomised the altruism
combined with practical aid which was supposed to inform the WHW as a
whole, other practical measures were carried out on a large scale to
meet the basic needs of impoverished fellow-citizens during the
winter months. Distribution of coal certainly proved to be one of
these and perhaps one of the most important measures of WHW,
certainly before 1936. The organisation of coal distribution was
achieved through a system of purchase by coal coupons which were
themselves obtained from the WHW Ort offices. These coupons could
then be exchanged for a hundredweight of coal or lignite briquettes,
and were intended for household use only. The total number of such
coupons issued during 1933/34 was 8,000,000. This, according to
Reher, amounted to 16% of the whole domestic consumption of coal in
Germany, and the average winter issue for each person was eight
coupons (eight cwt. of coal). The method of payment to coal
producers was as follows, the coal merchant delivered the coupons
which had been handed in by WHW recipients to the local
coal-distributing centre of the WHW, where he was given a payment
voucher. He then passed the vouchers on as payment to the
wholesaler, who could then pass on the vouchers to the coal
1. BA, R43ii/560, letter to the Director of the firm from
Dr. Lammers with the news that two artists employed by the
firm would receive a reward of the sum of RM 1,000 for their
successful designs undertaken for the WHW badges, 1st
February 1940.
2. Reher, Social Welfare, pp.6-7.
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syndicate, which itself received payment in cash from the N5\l
Understandably, the distribution of these goods involved expense and
in order to save the WHW from having to exhaust its funds in meeting
the cost of transportation, the railways, national and private, were
required to transport goods for the WHW without cost. This service
was regarded as a donation to the WHW, and expressed in the form of
money value, it came to RM 17,525,980 in 1936/37.^
By 1936, WHW activities had become part of the familiar social
scene throughout Germany,, from collections in the streets to
attendances at concerts, even though by this time, as the material
given out by the Propaganda Ministry showed, unemployment had dropped
considerably so that a large part of the original raison d'etre of
the measure was slipping away. By 1936, it had become clear that the
WHW would not diminish either in size or scope, for the sums
collected would be earmarked for other important NSV schemes such as
the 'Mother and Child' section of the NSVThe educative function
of the WHW increased markedly from 1936, and it seems to have
extended somewhat its range of options for the 'enlightenment' of the
population, now including as it did, in the light of Goering's Four
4
Year Plan, information and advice about the importance of autarky.
In the Winterfeldzuq (Winter Campaign) of 1936/37 the most obvious
change,perhaps reflecting the drop in the numbers of the unemployed,
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NSD 30/34, Allqemeine Arbeitsanweisunq(2),
'Frachtfreiheit', pp.68-69; Reher, Social Welfare, p.33.
3. BA, NSD 30/36, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', 'WHW Zuwendungen
fOr andere Soziale Zwecke', p.12, in 1940/41 Mutter
und Kind received RM 484 ,°00,000 from the WHW.
4. BA, NS37ii/1058, 'Winterfeldzug', p.4.
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was the almost entire absence of references to 'socialism of the
deed'. The title of this campaign was, 'We are building the basis of
the eternal Germany', but without, in the course of the campaign of
1936/37, having to continually stress the idea of the need to build
'socialism' as well."^ The five main themes of the 1936/37 campaign
were:
1. The spiritual foundation of the eternal Germany is
National Socialism;
2. The German Folk of the future shall be healthy and
able-bodied (wehrhaft, i.e. capable of bearing arms);
3. Securing self-sufficiency in food production and
National Socialist economic superiority as the essence
of the Four Year Plan;
4. The Wonder of National Socialism;
3. The ideal education of the people through the means
of the Winterhilfswerk.
Photograpic slides provided for this campaign illustrated several
themes such as:
1. Healthy parents, healthy children;
2. German racial policy;
3. Bolshevist subversive activity.
(3)
A film would also be provided, which was strongly anti-Bolshevist in
intent and was inspired by the conduct of the civil war in Spain.
This was shown under the title of 'Bleeding Spain'. The campaign
programme included very detailed instructions from the Propaganda





NSV Gau officials to interfere by themselves contributing to the
material as such. Goebbels' speech, given at the beginning of the
campaign, was on 'Bolshevism in Theory and Practice', and it provided
the material for the first set of brochures for the winter which went
out to the Gaus. The Press too was given strict instructions about
articles to be published. All reports and headlines would have to
emphasise the general line of that year's campaign and its political
emphasis. The main thrust of WHW propaganda in 1936 was meant to
show the Party in the guise of the 'eternal' leader of the people
towards the spirit of National Socialism. Other themes included, for
example,
'A new Germany, thanks to National Socialist ideas and
through National Socialist leadership, is in existence'!
And on National Socialism,
'One can love it or hate it, but no-one can alter it or
remove it'.
The goal of National Socialism was described as being neither Marxist
chaos nor bourgeois individualism, but the creation of a unified
nation out of the previous disunity of Weimar Germany."^ Economic
facts and figures were also to be stressed with information on the
fall in unemployment and the growth of German industrial production.
As time went on the WHW continued to stress the theme of the building
of the community of the people and to set aside the original emphasis
of 'socialism of the deed', though this term occasionally crept back
2
in, in some of the articles in the NS-Volksdienst.
It might be argued nevertheless that the Propaganda Ministry
was trying to do too much, given that the WHW was intended to foster
1. Ibid., p.5.
2. BA, N5D 30/l-4a, NS-Volksdienst, 1933-43.
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new attitudes with regard to some fundamental issues, such as the
role of the citizen, the idea of 'real socialism', and not least,
political indoctrination of a barely disguised variety."^ It
certainly seems that in many ways the design of the WHW drives was
too clever by half. Indeed, it may have functioned in a negative way
through a determination to push really hard, to 'saturate' the
perceptions of the population and, unintentionally, foster a
tendency to blank out the message being delivered. This process
would be only the first step towards popular disregard of the real
function of the WHW as the Gauamtsleitunq of the Gau Westfalen-Nord
2
knew only too well. Collections for the charitable work of the
Catholic church in this Gau in 1936 were far more successful than
those of the NSV/WHW, much to the chagrin of the NSV officials.
While such an example shows that the churches were effective in
certain instances in encouraging people to show opposition to Party
demands, in this case by a denial of support for the NSV and the WHW,
it also shows how ineffectual the propaganda of the NSV and WHW had
been in this particular area. This may have been all the more
galling for the WHW/NSV in Berlin, given the special efforts
undertaken in 1936/37 for the WHW drive for that year."* Nevertheless
in Sachsen in many of the poorer areas, support for the welfare
measures of the WHW was demonstrated. It may have been that,
initially, the WHW was greeted with some general enthusiasm as one
1. Ibid.
2. RUdenhausen, 'NSV/Gau Westfalen-Nord', p.241.
3. BA, NS 37/1038, 'Winterfeldzug', 'Sicherung der
NShrungsfreiheit und die nationalsozialistische
Wirtschaftsfdhrung als Inhalt des neuen
Vierjahresplanes', p.2.
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local study of Baden has shown, but the example of Sachsen poses the
question as to how strongly such support extended itself throughout
the area of one entire Gau. Perhaps only detailed local studies
might be capable of showing the nature and extent of support for NSV
and WHW measures and plans. However the NSV's determination to gain
popularity, with the help of the Propaganda Ministry which created
the material for WHW drives, was shown in every effort made to elicit
support.
As time went on, more and more money continued to flow into the
coffers of the WHW, less and less of which actually went to the
measures of the Winter Aid scheme; for they were, increasingly,
transferred to othermeasures of the NSV, though any suspicions that
WHW funds might be misappropriated were treated with care. When, in
1936, gossip began to circulate after a lavish party thrown by
Goebbels on Peacock Island (at the time of the Berlin Olympics), a
few days later the island was opened up to the public with
decorations left intact, so that 'the German people' could enjoy the
sight.^ This was meant to show that Goebbels had nothing to hide;
although one wonders how such a condescendingly cynical attempt to
allay suspicion of this type could have increased the public's trust
in the WHW, or in Goebbels himself. The suspicion that Goebbels had
used a part of these funds for his own purposes in 1936 was an
entirely understandable one; but it was, it seems, based mainly on
speculation and gossip circulating at that time. However, Martha
Dodd herself seemed to think there may have been an element of truth
in these suspicions of the misuse of the Winter Aid funds. On the
other hand, the misappropriation of WHW funds by the recipients of
1. Martha Dodd, My Years in Germany, London 1939, p.203.
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WHW aid was treated very harshly indeed and in a highly visible
manner."^ One unfortunate who had obtained 6 cwt. of potatoes for his
family, but who sold the largest part to get funds to finance a
drinking bout, was sentenced to one year's imprisonment in Dortmund
in 1934. On the day of his arrest he was led through the streets of
the city carrying a placard which described the nature of his crime,
and to drive home the lesson, both to the culprit and his
fellow-citizens, he was placed in a public square in the evening, in
2
the beam of a search-light. Such an example must have been a
powerful deterrent against the misuse of WHW aid.
The Beginning of War-time Winter Aid
From the outbreak of war in 1939, it was clear that the WHW
would continue to play an important role and provide the funds for
the provision of independent, or non-state welfare activity in
Germany. Not only would the extremely visible and 'public' aspect of
WHW remain - that is, the collection procedures would continue as
before - but new collections undertaken in the summer months in
support of war-time measures would be put into operation."^ One of
the first activities of the WHW in 1939, just after war was declared,
was to arrange to put into operation the directive of 13th October
1939, which was signed by Hess, Hitler's deputy. This directive
instructed that every Party organisation should fully participate in
1. BA, NSD 30/34, Allqemeine Arbeitsanweisunq (2), pp.26-27.
2. See The Daily Telegraph, article of 29th May 1934.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1055, letter from Hilgenfeldt to all
Gaubeauftraqten on co-operation of Party Organisations
with the German Red Cross, 14th October 1939.
4. BA, NS 37ii/1055, 'Anordnung Nr. 195/39', from Hess,
' Zusammenarbeit der Parteiorganisation mit dem Deutschen
Roten Kreuz', 13th October 1939.
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giving every support to the Deutschen Roten Kreuz (DRK). It would
fall to the WHW and the NSV alone, to arrange for the collections
which would be held throughout Germany for the measures of the DRK.
Through the WHW and the newly named Krieqswinterhilfswerk or KWHW,
the DRK would be able to raise much needed funds by a direct appeal
to the public, much as the peace-time WHW had previously done with
some success. Similarly, donation, not taxation would finance part
of the war effort in the same manner as it had financed the Party
collections for welfare; from 1939, the WHW had the increased task
of raising money for the German Red Cross. The first DRK collection
drive took place in the spring and summer of 1940. The drive was
organised by the WHW under the title of Krieqshilfswerk given that it
was to take place in the early summer and continue through June, July
and August 1940. The entire action in aid of the DRK held under the
auspices of the WHW, followed exactly the form of the normal WHW
drive, though it was much reduced in size and scope. Indeed it was a
2
miniature version of the WHW drive. The DRK drive was given an
official opening in Berlin on 17th April 1940, and, following custom,
Goebbels made a speech; no mention was made at this time of Hitler's
personal attendance at the opening which may have taken place in the
Propaganda Ministry, and it was not specified in the instructions
distributed by Hilgenfeldt.^ Again, as was customary, the Goebbels
speech heralded the official start of the campaign which was meant to
swing into action on certain dates during the summer. From the
1. BA, NS 37ii/1055, from Hilgenfeldt to all Gaubeauftraqten,





instructions which had been worked out in the Propaganda Ministry,
the campaign can be seen to have resembled nothing other than a
massive advertising campaign for the DRK. House-to-house collections
were intended to take place during April, May and June, numbering six
in all, with two main street collections taking place at the end of
June."'' the DRK would itself take an important part in the street
collections and instruct its members to turn out on the special days
indicated. After a short break it was intended that further
house-to-house collections would be resumed, and the action would end
2
with two further street collections in August. All WHW symbols
would be removed from the collecting tins and were to be replaced by
the letters 'DRK' for the duration of these collections. It seems
that the WHW would continue to run these fund raising drives for the
German Red Cross which was not itself allowed to undertake any
fund-raising activity without the permission of the WHW."^ The
directive from Hess made this quite clear. It was not however the
first time that the WHW had organised a collection of funds for the
DRK, but this had previously been undertaken on a very small scale
within the WHW drive itself. However, future collections for the
DRK from 1939 would be run like a WHW drive, but on a smaller scale.
Far from being reduced in scope or in size in time of war, the WHW
(now KWHW) would continue to operate fully. Income for KWHW for the
4
year 1942/43 seems to have amounted to RM 1,737,337,620. So far,
1. Ibid., Section 3, 'Laufzeit, TrSger und Terminplan der
Aktion'.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1055, 'Anordnung Nr. 193/39, Section 3',
'Geld-und Sachspenden'.
4. BA, R43ii/560, 'Rechenschaftsbericht WHW 1942/43', p.5.
however, no figures have been found which refer to the collections
undertaken by the WHW for the German Red Cross during the war.
By 1941/42 the WHW had a staff of 11,485 paid workers and
could call on 1.2 million voluntary helpers. The amount which the
recipients obtained at this time seems to have been (for the duration
of the Winter), in terms of value of goods received 49.9 marks,^ an
improvement of 10 marks over the previous year's figure. Thus out of
every 1,000 inhabitants of the area of the Altreich, including the
Generalgouvernment, 60 were in receipt of WHW assistance. War-i^ne
WHW was given only as the limitations of ordinary rations allowed.
But, as before, vouchers for the payment of rent, gas and electricity
accounts were allowed. During the winter of 1941/42, 12.4 million
marks were distributed to expectant mothers and to large families in
the form of non-rationed goods. Free meals were also available as
were free film and theatre tickets. It seems that by this time the
chief recipients of WHW aid were old people on fixed incomes, large
families and widows of soldiers and their children, though WHW still
2
functioned as a subsidy to low wage-earners in certain cases.
According to one report it seems that at this time (1942) suspicions
on the part of the general public were aroused about the activities
of some WHW organisers, for it was becoming widely believed that they
were encouraging the growth of the black market by auctioning off
some of the scarce goods which had been collected, for very high
prices."^ However it seems that no very serious degree of grievance
1. Basic and Zonal Handbooks, Chapter 11, p.255.
(2)
2. BA, N5D/30/34, Allqemeine Arbeitsanweisunq,^pp.22-23.
3. Basic and Zonal Handbooks, Chapter 11, pp.275-276.
129.
was held against the WHW at the time, though further investigation of
this particular issue needs to be carried out. It must be remembered
that the public had no means of ascertaining whether the funds which
the WHW controlled were being used as reported in the press.
Nevertheless, the WHW law of 1936
facilitated any actions against the mishandling of funds, from 1936
it was possible for the WHW itself to prosecute those who had been
discovered to be mishandling WHW funds.^ The enactment of this law
promised that the WHW had become a permanent feature of the Third
Reich, and that the WHW had achieved the status of a state
institution which, however, came under the direct control of the
2
Party. It had therefore developed into a hybrid, taking on, as it
had, the character of a state institution and a Party agency, at one
and the same time.
So far it has been impossible to discover how far and by how
much WHW funds were directed towards re-armament and the war effort,
though it has been suggested that WHW funds made significant
contributions to both."^ It seems possible that the WHW had become
connected in the minds of the majority of the population with
4
'Waffenhilfswerk'. However, in 1940 Hilgenfeldt found it necessary
to obtain a sum of RM 25,000,000 from Goering's Four Year Plan office
in order to lay up a stock-pile of WHW coal.'' This does suggest that
1. BA, R43ii/564, 'Gesetz Uber das Winterhilfswerk1.
2. Aryeh L. Unger. 'Propaganda and Welfare in Nazi Germany', Journal
of Social History, Vol. 4, No.2, 1970-71, p.134.
3. Kershaw, 'How effective was Nazi Propaganda?', p.189.
4. Kramer, Das FOrsorge system, p.191.
5. BA, R2/4867, Hilgenfeldt to the Finance Ministry, letter of 19th
March 1940.
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funds may have been stretched too far for that year, and were not
sufficient to cover certain war-time exigencies. Certainly, this
point does not prove that WHW funds did not go to the war effort,
though it is worth mentioning that after 1936 WHW funds substantially
supported another NSV measure, the 'Mother and Child' Scheme. The
subsidy from the WHW to the MuK (Mutter und Kind), rose year by year
so that by 1940, one half of all WHW income was diverted to the MuK.
This proportion did not decrease, but rather, rose until nearly
three-quarters of all income of the WHW was diverted to MuK in
1941/42."'' The funds of the WHW had to support two charitable schemes
of the NSV/, not one, and there is good reason to believe that WHW
funds were not earmarked for specific war-time measures. It
certainly seems however, some NSV funds were, as Schwarz
admitted in 1943, handed over to the Reich Chancellery and the
armaments industry, though no specific reference at this time seems
to have been made with regard to the WHW funds and their
2
destination. Further investigation of these matters needs to be
undertaken before a clear assessment of the mishandling of WHW funds
can be made.
From 1933 the WHW was charged with involving itself within the
general attempts by the Nazi leadership to drum up support for the
Nazi regime. It can be held to have been successful in only a very
limited way, and only at the beginning when unemployment was still
very high; later, when many returned to work, the WHW must have been
seen for what it was, namely, an ad hoc and informal means of taxing
the population. From the start of the war it was clear that the WHW
1. BA, NS26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.21. See also Chapter
Seven.
2. Kramer, 'Das FUrsorgesystem', p.194.
would become more and more involved in helping the war effort, and it
would be expected to support war widows and their children, which it
seems to have done with some effect. However, it is
unlikely that this task would engender much support for the regime in
itself, being a constant reminder of the unhappiness of numerous
individuals who had lost relatives in the war. Far from reducing in
size or scope, the WHW continued to operate, taking up scarce
manpower when this might have been regarded as wasteful and
counter-productive in time of war. However, Goebbels would
stubbornly cling to the idea that the WHW could provide the basis for
a belief in the Volksqemeinschaft, which if nothing else, shows how
persistent some, at least, of the Nazi leaders were in their own
'faith' in Nazi Germany. Perhaps Thomas Mann's view of the Winter
Aid was one which many would quickly come to share; as he put it in
the^entry of 28th February 1934,
'this is again fraud and pretense like all the rest, a
cheap semblance of democracy comparable to the charade of
the "high-up" leadership^ going out onto the streets to
take up a collection for the Winter Aid campaign. Fake
charity, a brilliant display of lying and clever advert¬
ising, in short, propaganda for its own sake like
everthing else these counterfeits and bunglers dream up'.
(1)
J




NSV Welfare for Mothers and Infants
The Nazi Government's first priority in the realm of welfare
provision was to meet the continuing and urgent claims of deprivation
in yet another depression winter, 1933/34, through the first
official WHW campaign. But in spring 1934 the NSV was able to turn
its attention to another area which the regime perceived to be of
urgent importance, the provision of advice and welfare for mothers
with young children. This was to be dispensed through a new section
within the NSV organisation,the Mutter und Kind (MuK) whose goal was
the,
'promotion and furtherance of the erbqesunden (heredit¬
arily sound) German family, but also unmarried mothers
who will receive economic help and advice on all health
matters'.
(1)
Goebbels firmly stated in 1934 that National Socialism sought to
place the promotion of the bioligically sound race at the forefront
2
of its actions and to promote the health of future generations.
Welfare which was organised by Mutter und Kind (MuK) was restricted
to that section of the population which could claim impeccable
'Aryan' descent.'' The setting up of the MuK was in effect a
determined attempt to provide a nation-wide maternity service which
1. BA, NS 37ii/1035, 'Bericht fiber das Hilfswerk Mutter und
Kind vom 1.4.34 - 31.12.34'. (Hereafter 'Bericht MuK').
2. Ibid., p.l.
3. BA, NSD 30/4a, NS-Volksdienst, December 1943, 'Zehn Jahre
Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind', p.161.
BA, NSD 30/3 NS-Volksdienst, July 1939, 'Mutter und Kind
im Westgau',pp.307-312
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would function differently from the earlier state and church-based
provisions which had existed during the Weimar period."^ After 1933,
while state and charitable welfare would continue, the NSV's leaders
intended that they themselves would eventually come to dominate the
entire system of maternity and child care in Germany; the result was
that, by 1938, over 60% of all existing maternity welfare clinics
2
were run by the MuK. The most obvious differences between MuK and
earlier arrangements lay in the extent to which the NSV's maternity
care would be dispensed, or withheld, according to racial criteria or
to the Nazi definition of 'asocial'."^ There was, however, a slight
softening of the harsh rules with regard to the latter category, when
some mothers who were labelled 'asocial' (or Gemeinschaftsunfdhiq)
but who had very young children, were given help. This seems to
have been given on a much reduced level and only in order that very
young infants could have proper nourishment in the crucial first few
months of life. However, it is not clear for how long, or in what
amounts, such aid was given. Neither is it clear how many were
helped, for this category does not appear in the official figures of
4
MuK costs. All of this was entirely in line with general NSV
1. Friedldnder and Myers, Child Welfare in Germany, pp.234-248.
2. BA, NS 22/457, 'Arbeitsbericht des Hilfswerkes Mutter und Kind
fdr das Jahr 1937/38', p.23. (Hereafter 'Hilfswerk MuK
1937/38'). By the end of December 1937, there were 24,478
advice centres visited by 3,573,486 women.
3. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst March 1939, 'Gesunde Ehen',
'Gesunde Familien', 'Kampt den Erbkrankheiten', pp.100-101.
HA, 13/259, 'Artikeldienst' 1/303/910, Hauptamt fdr
Volkswohlfahrt Presse'. 'Die NS-Volkswohlfahrt das soziale
Gewissen der Nation', BA, NS 22/457, 'Hilfswerk MuK 1937/38',
pp.1-22.
4. BA, NS22/457, 'Hilfswerk MuK 1937/38', pp.23-28.
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policy."'' While the new government wished to see the birth-rate
climb, it did not allow this desire to weaken the resolve to see it
climb qualitatively and not merely quantitatively. The MuK was
intended, above all, to provide the means whereby the continuing
decline in the German birth-rate would be halted. The fall in these
figures, which had been steadily continuing since the late 1870s, was
a matter which the new government in 1933 took seriously, not least
because the rate of the decline had become sharper during the years
2
of the Depression. The figure of 39 live births per thousand of the
population in the late 1870s was reduced to 29 in 1910, and thence to
the low figures of 15 per thousand in 1932 and 14.7 in 1933."^
The pro-natalist policies of the Nazis had two aims: firstly,
to halt the declining rate of births per thousand of the population,
and secondly, to secure a significant rise in the numbers of live
births. A pro-natalist policy would be supported by both the state
and the Party and the provision of economic and welfare aid
would themselves be presented within a framework of propaganda-
oriented schemes for the care of women and children. The NSV's
1. See Chapter Two.
BA, NS 37ii/1035, Bericht MuK, Section I, 'Allgemeines', see
Goebbels' speech.
2. D.V. Glass, Population Policies and Movements in Europe,
Oxford 1940, p.311. As Glass points out, 'Whereas in England
and Wales the birth-rate followed a fairly steady curve between
1928 and 1932, the German rate turned downwards very sharply
in 1930. But for the particularly marked depression the German
birth-rate might have been about 16 per thousand in 1933,
instead of the actual rate of 14.7 per 1,000 (live births) in
that year'. See also St.J. 1936, p.35; W.R. Lee, 'Germany', in
W.R. Lee (ed.), European Demography and Economic Growth,
London 1979, p.166.
3. St. J., 1936, p.35.
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maternity care would be presented in the form of an appeal to achieve
rational skills in child care and health care for pregnant and
nursing mothers, but it would also carry the ideological emphasis on
fertility and fecundity, and the need to have as many children as
possible, for the good of the German race."* To achieve a rise in the
birth-rate however would mean securing the reversal of demographic
and social trends which had become established at the end of the
nineteenth eentury, not only in Germany, but in western Europe
2
itself. A dramatic decline in fertility in Germany had set in which
can be seen clearly by referring to the numbers of infants born to
women of childbearing age between the years of 1910/11 and 1933."^
From a figure of 128 live births per thousand of this age group in
1910/11, the number of births dropped unrelentingly, reaching the low
figures of the years 1930, 1931, 1932 and 1933, at 67.3; 62.0; 39.5;
4
and 58.9 respectively. Whatever the complicated reasons for this
trend, for such it was, anxieties concerning these developments which
surfaced during the Nazi period were only part of a longer search for
the causes of the decline in births."* In Germany during 1912 this
1. BA, N5 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK'. BA, NS 22/747, NS\l propaganda
instructions 'Rundfunkwerbung in den Gauen, Allgemeine Werbung
ftir die NSV-Arbeit'; NS 22/653, Arbeit, Volk und Staat:
Ausztlqe aus Reden, Erkldrunqen und Aufsatzen Adolf Hitlers und
seiner Mitarbeiter, Berlin 1938, p.37., 'The mother decides the
fate of coming generations; by the numbers and the health of her
children, stands or falls Germany's future'. Speech given by
Erick on Mother's Day, 16th May 1938.
2. Glass, Population Policies, p.165. Lee, 'Germany', p.165.
3. St. J., 1938, p.47.
4. Ibid.
5. J.E. Knodel, The Decline of Fertility in Germany, 1871-1939,
Princeton 1974, p.48.
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search had fixed itself upon the growth of the feminist movement
blaming its emancipationist ideals for the fall in the numbers of
births. In France, too, a developing pro-natalist viewpoint gave
rise to an 'endless flood' of population propaganda which accounted
for the decline of fertility by referring to a variety of causes,
from socio-economic reasons to bicycle riding by women."'' Thus
pessimistic pronouncements about the reasons for a decline in
fertility were just as likely to be based upon non-rational as
rational grounds. It seems clear that German fears were only
heightened by the French example, and from 1911, there seems to have
developed a growing anxiety that the German nation might be heading
towards a similar lack of growth in the population, for in France the
2
population had ceased to grow by the turn of the century. Certainly
such fears were not groundless, given that by 1938, sixty-five of the
ninety Departements of France showed an excess of deaths over
births."^ These particular figures would alarm the Nazi officials of
the NSV who wrote anxiously at that time of the folly of
participating in policies which had been strongly influenced by the
writings of Malthus.^
The population policies of the Nazi Government provided for
measures which were all meant to support the drive towards a
significant rise in the birth-rate. The state offered economic
inducements on the one hand, while the Party, through the MuK,
1. R.J. Evans, The Feminist Movement in Germany 1894-1933,
London 1976, pp.182-187; Glass, Population Policies, p.148.
2. Ibid., p.196.
3. Ibid., p.218, Note 2.
4. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst, November 1938, p.36.
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offered increased facilities for the care and well-being of pregnant
women, infants and small children. Most importantly, the MuK would
support, through the design of its welfare measures,an ideological
emphasis which was meant to underline the new status of mothers
whose role in the new Germany would be seen to be upgraded. Such
desired alterations in the system of social esteem, and within the
perceived attribution of social status itself, were ambitious to say
the least, but perhaps were essential to ensure the achievement of at
least some of the Nazi goals.^ It was through racial" policies and
the desire to foster these that a real willingness to jettison
traditional practices showed itself. The formation of a welfare
scheme such as the MuK, which promoted both increased fertility and
a return to the values of the essentially nurturant function of
women's activities, at the same time tried to raise expectations of
2
the role of women as it related to the task of child-bearing. The
MuK was intended to support the health and welfare of actual and
future mothers, which became a matter for concern at the highest
level, and it was for this reason that women of child-bearing age
would find themselves enjoying, from officialdom at least, greater
1. Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the
Third Reich, Bavaria, 1933-45. Oxford 1983, p.l. Kershaw
points out that, 'Nazi social aims were extraordinarily
ambitious. They amounted to no less than a revolution in
attitudes and values, a transformation of subjective consc¬
iousness more than of objective realities'.
See also Martin Broszat, The Hitler State, p.18.
2. Scholtz-Klink, 'M^tterschulung in Deutschland', p.140, as she
pointed out:
'the training of women for motherhood is no longer a
matter for a small group of interested women, but a
political task of the state in order that a woman can
become aware of her duties to the nation'.
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social esteem than hitherto."'' However, it must be stressed that this
improvement was limited in scope, confined mainly, though not
exclusively, within a period of a few short years when the regime was
2
concerned to persuade women to quit the workforce. Nevertheless it
is clear that an intention existed whereby 'every day housework'
would be elevated to the level of a skilled occupation.^ However,
the activities of women as they related to work within the home did
undergo some radical alterations in perspective, on the part of the
NSV and N5F leadership, (and Scholtz-Klink in particular) who were
required to provide extensive training courses for women in those
activities which had previously been learned in the home or, only
marginally, within the school. Housewifery and child care would
become a matter for two organisations of the Party who would provide
a whole programme of mothercare and homecraft instruction, and it
would fall to the N5F to organise the practical courses through its
DFW section. The RMD course was a clear attempt to fuse the mundane
and the practical with the 'higher' aims of the regime. This served
to introduce a particular perspective into the course content which
itself stressed the 'exhalted' aspect of the previously low-status
occupations of housewifery and child-care. Whether women attending
these courses were fully persuaded of the new emphasis is itself
questionable, however, many were introduced to the racially oriented
nationalist goals of the regime in the form of a training for
motherhood, whose significance for the future of Germany was stressed
ad nauseam .
1. Stephenson, Women in Nazi Society, pp.196-197.
2. Ibid., pp.99-100.
3. Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation of Women, p.163.
4. Scholtz-Klink, 'Mtltterschulung j _pp^L40-142 ._
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These provisions existed both as a practical and as an
ideological support for other economic measures such as the Marriage
Loan Scheme, which allowed a tax-free loan on condition that a wife
leave her job. This ruling was lifted in 1937 which had the effect
of raising the number of loan-assisted marriages from 24% in 1933 to
42% in 1939. Generous repayment arrangements meant that the birth of
a first baby would result in the cancellation of 25% of the loan plus
a year's grace on the repayments. If a further three children were
born to a couple, then that meant the cancellation of the entire
sum. The state also provided family allowances which were made
available in addition to those already in existence. Only a very few
non-governmental allowances schemes survived the inflation of the
1920s, most notable of these being the scheme of the pharmacists
which allowed for payments to wives and children under a complicated
system of payments for each dependent child. From 1936, in addition
to the Einmaliqe Kinderbeihilfen, which was a grant of up to 100
marks for the purchase of household goods to those parents who
applied (and who were of 'unobjectionable' character), family
allowances were available, and these amounted to 10 marks per month
for the fifth and each subsequent child under the age of
sixteen. However, other means-tested allowances for the third and
subsequent children were also available; if the family size increased
to seven children, then a monthly grant of 80 marks would be
2
received. The pro-natalist policies of the Nazi government allowed
1. Stephenson, Women in Nazi Society, pp.46-47.
2. Glass, Population Policies, p.296. These allowances
were the 'laufende Kinderbeihilfen' (allowed for the
fifth and subsequent children) and the 'erweiterte
Kinderbeihilfen', or allowances for the third and
subsequent children.
that every possible measure to encourage couples to take on the
burden of larger families would be explored. Not all of these would
be of a material nature, though many, of course, would take this
form. The Party itself offered an honorific incentive which carried
the mark and the recognition of the Party's approval, this was given
in the form of an Honour Cross.* These crosses, to be worn much in
the manner of a battle honour, were only awarded to mothers of more
than three children, and in three classes of bronze, silver and gold.
However, it was not the MuK which presented them, but the
Ortsgruppenleiter of the NSDAP who distributed them on Mother's Day,
2
in the local Party offices. It is clear that this measure was
intended as a symbolic representation of the value which would be
placed upon the birth of 'racially valuable' children, and to act as
an encouragement to mothers to produce more children, an activity
which was intended to be undertaken as much for the sake of the
nation as for more private ends. Indeed, these distributions of
medals for motherhood were only part of the general urging of the
population towards the laying aside of individualistic aims which was
contained in the propaganda material of the NSV.^
Clearly, the 'Mother and Child' section of the NSV was intended
before the war to act as a buttress for the various measures of the
government's pro-natalist policy, rather than as a fully independent
major activity such as the Winter Aid scheme. The MuK distributed a
1. BA, NSD 30/3 NS-Volksdienst, January 1939, 'Das Ehrenkreuz
der Deutschen Mutter', p.37.
2. Ibid., bronze crosses went to mothers of four and five
children, silver was awarded for six and seven, and gold for
eight and more. A careful character search was carried out
with regard to each request to be included in the numbers of
Honour Cross holders.
3. HA, 13/239, 'Artikeldienst', for a useful selection of
articles/information/propaganda pieces on N5V welfare.
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constant barrage of propaganda which reminded women of the joys of
motherhood, and the duty to provide healthy children for the sake of
the future of Germany. The MuK did, however, make extensive
arrangements for the provision of advice and help for women who would
undertake to produce large families, so that there existed some
justification for the torrent of requests, reminders and persuasion
to procreate which characterised MuK pro-natalist propaganda."^ The
new provisions for welfare for mothers and children claimed to have a
(new) unity of purpose, they were intended to function throughout the
nation efficiently and even 'generously', and they were directed
towards every potential or actual mother who could be regarded as
racially and socially 'worthy'. However, there remained at the basis
of the new Nazi arrangements an overwhelmingly partial view of the
2
nature of social welfare as such. This had the effect of
underpinning the discriminatory policies of the NSV/ which, at all
times, stressed the importance of 'self help' not charity. Indeed,
NSV welfare, even if it was part of the arrangements for mothers and
children, was never intended to be charitable in nature, nor was it;
MuK facilities, as well as every other NSV/ measure, were supposed,
ultimately, to 'strengthen' the ability of welfare recipients to help
themselves, so that they would not need to turn to the Party's
1. BA, NSD/30/7, Ewiqes Deutschland May 1937. This NSV/
publication contained articles and sentimental items with
a strong pro-natalist slant. See 'Zum Muttertag', and
'Die Hdnde einer Mutter', pp.3-4; Jill Stephenson,
'"Reichsbund der Kinderreichen": the League of Large
Families in the Population Policy of Nazi Germany', in
European Studies Review, London, 1979, p.363.
Stephenson points out that pro-natalist propaganda
continued undiminished during the war.
2. Reher, Social Welfare, p.24.
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welfare provisions on a continuing basis.
Family oriented welfare for Nazi sympathisers had begun in 1932
in Oldenburg at the time of the successful activities of the Party in
that area, when the states' elections in Mecklenburg-Schwerin and
2
Oldenburg brought the NSDAP to power, Party welfare, at this time in
this area, consisted of the nucleus of a special nourishment
programme for expectant and nursing mothers, and also the
distribution of articles of clothing for infants and young children
of SA men and other Nazi supporters."' The much expanded and
systematised arrangements of the MuK after 1934 retained much of the
character of the Oldenburg facilities which had been organised only
to help Nazi supporters and their families. But the inward-looking,
'self-help' emphasis of 1932 remained, to some extent, within the
later arrangements for family welfare within the MuK. A determined
effort to assist those supporters whose need was not of their own
making (the unemployed, the badly housed), during the Depression
years marked indelibly the later design of the MuK. Indeed the MuK
from 1934, for all the rhetoric, was only a Party self-help facility
writ large, with the constituency of the needy being enlarged from
small groups of Party activists, to take in the wives and the
families of the 'racially valuable' members of the entire group which
made up the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft. During the formative period of
Nazi welfare, one of the most useful ways of establishing an
effective welfare measure was to make sure that families were given
1. Ibid., pp. 4; Erich Hilgenfeldt., Idee, p.10.
2. Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party; 1919-1933, p.254.
3. HA, 14/262, 'Familienhilfe wird geleistet', p.15.
help and advice in making-do with meagre resources."^ Both the MuK,
and the measures for the training of women to become efficient
housekeepers and child carers through the DFW's ReichsmOtterdienst,
certainly retained the flavour of these earlier measures. Perhaps
this was for the important reason that the Nazi imagination was fixed
permanently, it seems, within the philosophical and ideological
framework of the 'time of struggle'. The perception of social
welfare by the NSV was profoundly influenced by the experiences and
the difficulties of the period prior to the assumption of power, when
'self-help' became the dominant means by which Party activists could
survive financially. The necessity of making full use of existing
scarce resources before 1933, was a 'virtue' which later became
enshrined within the welfare provisions of the NSV and its various
sections, including the MuK.
In order to establish the MuK nationwide, an advisory committee
was formed and included representatives from the Ministry of
Interior, the Propaganda Ministry, the Deutscher Gemeindetag, the
Office for the People's Health, the women's organisation and several
2
other agencies. Under the presidency of Erich Hilgenfeldt, the
leader of the NSV, the administrative committee met together on the
28th February 1934, for the first time, and it was on 1st April 1934
that the Mutter und Kind section of the NSV came into being. The
Reich Minister of the Interior publicly welcomed the new measure and
said at the time:
'Such a welfare scheme which is now being established can
only be greeted most warmly because of its significance
for population policy in general; the state organs will
be expected to provide a good working relationship with
the NSV's whole MuK project'.
(3)
1. . Ibid., 'Kinder werden gespeist', p.16.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK', pp.1-4.
3. Ibid.
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These hopes, however, would only be realised where the MuK and the
state provisions were not seeking to provide parallel facilities;
where the MuK became involved in the setting up of kindergartens and
other pre-school provisions, the state officials would monitor every
new MuK or NSV attempt to increase its participation within this
field.^ This is not to say that the Nazi organisations themselves
did not provide a measure of cooperation and help in the setting up
of the new welfare section of the NSV. Agreements were made between
the NSV and the NSF, the NSLB, the midwives' association and the
ReichsjuqendfOhrunq (Reich Youth Leadership). Most importantly,
the NSF/DFW had been charged with organising the mothercare courses
which were intended to provide the basis of new training schemes for
2
German women. The provision of training and education within the
ReichsmUtterdienst mothercare courses should be seen as an
intrinisc part of the attempt to form an extensive, and perhaps
comprehensive, welfare scheme for mothers and infants. Other aid
which would be forthcoming included the Domestic Aid scheme of the
NSV, and the holiday schemes for mothers run by the Muk". Mothers of
families with more than two children would be given the opportunity
of a free holiday for those who could not themselves pay, and a
domestic help on a daily basis, where the arrival of a new baby was
making extra work to an intolerable degree for the mother of the
family."^ In other words, every inducement to increase family size
was provided by the Party's welfare organisation, from economic help
1. BA, R36/962; 964.
2. Scholtz-Klink, 'Mfitterschulung', pp.137-149.
3. BA, NSD 30/4, N5-Volksdienst, September 1941, 'Die
Haushalthilfe der NS-Volkswohlfahrt', p.180.
HA, 13/259, 'Informationsdienst', Nr. 18, 'Die
Haushalthilfe der NSV'.
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(in the form of food supplements and donations of clothing for
infants), to free holidays and increased welfare facilities in the
form of clinics and advice centres which would be set up throughout
Germany."^ To achieve a rise in the birth-rate, all of these measures
would be required, it was recognised, and the MuK would set itself
the urgent task of improving the infant mortality rates through the
2
increased care of pregnant and nursing mothers. To some degree
these goals were beginning to be realised by 1936, when the infant
mortality rates showed a continuing tendency to fall, from 7.7% in
1933, to 6.6% in 1936."^ However, as suggested above, these figures
had been falling steadily long before the advent of the MuK, so that
it is difficult to assess how far the NSV's new welfare facilities
can be held to have been instrumental in achieving lower figures.
For example, these rates had already shown some improvement, going
from 18.3 deaths in every hundred live births in 1905/9, to 13.1 in
1920, and 10.5 in 1925.4
For the organisation of the various practical measures the MuK
required the cooperation of the N5F at first, such cooperation was
especially forthcoming as well as welcome where an NSF member was
already acting as an adviser in the NSV Gau offices.'' But the MuK
1. BA, NS 22/457, 'Hilfswerk MuK 1937/8', p.23; N5D
30/51, Peine Arbeit, see 'Hilfstellen "Mutter und Kind'",
clinics numbered 16,466 in 1935.
2. Ibid.
3. St.J., 1938, pp.66-67.
4. Ibid.; BA, NSD 30/4a, NS-Volksdienst, December 1943, 'Zehn Jahre
Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind', p.167; HA, 13/259 'Informationsdienst
I', 4406 (1940).
5. BA, NS 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK', see, 'Zusammenarbeit mit
parteiamtlichen Organisationen'.
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would quickly establish its own corps of domestic helpers through the
Women's Labour Service and through the recruitment of girls and young
women who wished to become NSV social workers and kindergarten
nurses."^ A shortage of personnel would remain as a continuing
problem, however, and the MuK would find itself hard-pressed to
provide enough domestic helpers in order to fulfil earlier promises
2
to give a helper to every mother who needed one.
From 1934, every Ortsqruppe made special facilities available
where mothers with young children could receive general help and
advice. Specialist medical advice was on hand if required, and it
was possible to obtain useful hints on child care from the local
Party office, for at specified times, mothers were able to consult a
child-care specialist who was available for this purpose. These
services would soon expand into the network of MuK infant care/advice
centres (Hilfstellen/Beratungstellen), numbering 24,478 by 1937."^
The staff of the MuK clinics and advice centres stressed the
importance of rational and modern methods of child-care, even though
the published material of the NSV continued to show a romanticised
view of motherhood in articles and photographs.4 The help and advice
on offer in the MuK clinics, and in the Reichsmdtterdienst courses,
1. BA, NSD 30/30, Schule fUr das Leben, ein Beruf in der NSV,
Berlin n.d.(71938) p5.
2. I am grateful to Dr. Jill Stephenson for giving me information
on this, SD reports in 1941 and 1943 outlined shortages in
respect of household helpers (WUrttemberg 1941) and in infant
care centres throughout Germany (1943).
3. BA, NS 22/457, 'Hilfswerk MuK 1937/8', p.23.
4. Ibid., p.5.; BA, NSD 30/7, Ewiqes Deutschland, May 1937, see
'Die Kunst gehdrt dem Volk: Hilfswerk fdr deutsche
bildende Kunst', and also, 'Briefe zum Muttertag', p.5.
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were based on good hygienic practices and the dissemination of these,
plus a grounding in the efficient health care of the family in
general and a basic knowledge of the dietary needs of children."^
Above all, young women were encouraged to abandon any reliance on
traditional methods of child-rearing if these could be proved to be
2
inefficient or ineffective as well as positively damaging. An
examination of the numbers of women attending these clinics shows
that they were reasonably popular, and many did make use of MuK
facilities. Numbers of visits in 1936 amounted to 3,410,848 and rose
to 3,373,486 in 1937. For a useful comparison, it can be seen that
the total number of women of childbearing age (1937) amounted to
16,547,000, and each clinic received approximately twelve visits per
month before the war."^ The numbers of visits to MuK clinics from
1935 to 1941 can be seen as follows:
Numbers of visits to MuK clinics and advice centres 1935-1941










1. HA, 13/259, 'Informationsdienst1 I I/If. See, Schulungsplan
'Die Mutterschaftshilfe', p.37; Scholtz-Klink, 'Mtitterschulunq,
p.143; Frau Dr. Johanna Haarer, Die Deutsche Mutter und ihr
erstes Kind, MUnchen/Berlin 1944, pp. 269-273.
2. BA, NS 22/746, 'Arbeitsplan fdr die lehrgMnge der
Heimleiterinnen von Muttererholungsheimen', January 1938.
3. BA, NSD 30/51, Peine Arbeit, numbers of clinics (Hilfstellen
only) rose from 16,466 in 1935 to 29, 818 in 1940; St.J. 1938,
p.47.
4. BA, NSD 30/51, Peine Arbeit, see tables given.
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Visits to clinics as can be seen from the above figures rose markedly
during the war years, however, this matter will be dealt with in more
detail below, in Chapter Seven.
During 1934 however, the clients who might use MuK facilities
still had to be found, and there was a determined effort made to
discover those who might usefully attend."'' With the active
participation of the NSV Blockwalter who made the existence of the
MuK known to every pregnant woman or mother of young children within
his area, the NSV's aim was to ensure that, as far as possible,
everyone who could benefit was made aware of the new welfare
2
arrangements. But it certainly seems as though the 'reminding' of
women to attend MuK clinics, a task of the NSV Blockwalter, was for
the most part, successfully carried through, although officially at
least, such reminders were meant to stop short of duress. On the
other hand, the clinics themselves were capable of being seen as
inherently useful to women where weighing and other useful facilities
were on offer. Nevertheless, no particular mention is made of the
MuK clinics in the confidential reports of the Gau Sachsen, apart
from the reference to an expansion of the ReichsmOtterdienst
courses which were to receive in 1935 an extra RM 3,000."* But it is
fairly certain that the MuK holiday schemes were proving to be one of
4
the most popular of all the NSV schemes at this time in Saxony.
The MuK also obtained help from the professional midwives'
1. BA, NS 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK', 'Erfassung der
HilfsbedUrftigen'.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen 'TStigskeitsbericht der
Wohlfahrtsabteilung M3rz 1935', (331251).
4. Ibid.
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association in the attempt to locate many needy cases, for the
midlives were required to pass on to the NSV information on all such
cases which came to their notice. District welfare offices too
passed on relevant information, and the files of the Winterhilfswerk
were combed for suitable cases to be taken up by the MuK."'' In other
words, all relevant sources of information about mothers and infants
came under the scrutiny of the officials of the NSV/MuK. Given that
the Public Registry Office was required to inform the NSV/ of all
births which had taken place, the MuK was in a position to try to
establish its influence over the guidance of new mothers who, in the
normal run of things, were likely to be receptive to the infant-care
2
advice on offer from the MuK clinics. But it was intended that such
advice would be accompanied by pro-natalist propaganda, and racialist
ideas about the 'strengthening' of the nation. While it is possible
to say that the practical help which was made available proved itself
to be welcome, in some cases at least a rise in the disposable income
of the family would have been far more welcome than the hand-outs
from the NSV/ or the MuK.^ More difficult to assess is, of course,
the impact of MuK propaganda on mothers who passed through the MuK
clinics and advice centres. Willingness to accept help with the
problems of infant care did not, necessarily, signify an acceptance
of some of the more extravagant ideas about the duty to produce more
1. BA, NS 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK', 'Erfassung der
HilfsbedUrftigen'.
2. BA, NSD 30/2, NS-V/olksdienst May/June 1938, 'Die Aufgaben
der Hilfstelle Mutter und Kind', p.247; Erich Hilgenfeldt,
Aufqaben der NS-V/olkswohlfahrt, Berlin 1937; Reher, Social
Welfare, pp.22-23.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1062; Kershaw, Popular Opinion, p.101.
children for the sake of the Nazi Volksqemeinschaft. ^ While it is
true that the German birth-rate showed an improvement from 1933,
going from 14.7 per thousand of the population in that year, to 19.0
in 1936, it is by no means clear how far Nazi population policies can
2
be held to have been responsible for such a rise. Not surprisingly,
the NSl/ would continue to claim that such was the case. However,
this point will be dealt with in more detail below.
The practical work of the MuK was put into an operational plan
which remained virtually unchanged and consisted of six main
elements:
1) Material assistance (economic assistance)
2) Workplace help (aid in finding employment)
3) Aid with housing needs
4) Aid for pregnant women
5) Aid for single mothers
6) Holidays for mothers
7) Other measures.
With regard to the first item, the NSV always intended that MuK
material welfare would only be granted as an addition to that which
4
was already being received from the state. Thus the MuK organised a
1. Stephenson, 'Reichsbund der Kinderreichen', p.369.
2. Glass, Population Policies, pp. 306-313; Stephenson,
'Reichsbund der Kinderreichen', p. 368-369.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK', (IV) 'Wirtschaftliche
FUrsorge'; HA, 13/259, 'Informationsdienst' II La/2149,
Hilfstellen Mutter und Kind.
4. BA, NS 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK', 'Zusammenarbeit mit der
Offentlichen FUrsorge' ;F.Wunderlich, Farm Labor in Germany,
Princeton 1961, d.271.
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distribution, for needy families, of food parcels, food stamps, bed
linen, bundles of baby clothes and, if families were especially
needy, second-hand clothing and lengths of dress material."^ This
list shows how MuK economic assistance was intended only as a fairly
modest supplement to other welfare measures available from the state.
In spite of the fact that the figures given by the NSV in 1935 were
expressed in thousands and therefore look somewhat impressive, the
amounts of goods distributed were usually quite modest. For example,
in the Gau MUnchen/Oberbayern in 1935, MuK disposed in a single
month of 25,800 litres of milk; 1,500 food parcels, each worth two
marks and containing coffee, sugar, flour, rice, semolina and rolled
oats; parcels of clothing for a new baby, each worth ten marks and
containing six vests, swaddling bands, nappies, cot-blankets, a
rubber sheet, three infant jackets and one bath towel. Gau Weser-Ems
also distributed in the same year (1934/35), during a one month
period, 25,000 pieces of assorted bed linen and blankets worth 13,380
marks; 360 kg. of knitting wool worth 3,900 marks; 5,160 kg. of
quilt-making material and 31,000 kg. of peat as a supplement to
2
Winterhilfswerk coal. Every Gau was involved right from the start
in providing through MuK the necessary items for a new infant, thus
easing the burden for those who were unable to buy a minimum of baby
clothing without a real struggle."^
The MuK holidays for mothers scheme seems to have been viewed
as one of the most effective propaganda assets of the whole MuK





programme. It was also viewed as being a popular and effective
means of arousing interest in the NSV as a whole. In the attempt to
gain more voluntary helpers for the NSV, it was decided during the
course of one campaign to ask one of the mothers who had been sent on
a free MuK holiday 'to say a few words' to the assembled audience."^
Not only this, but some new members joining the NSV in 1935 were
said to have been encouraged mainly by the favourable impression
2
which had been given by the MuK holiday schemes. On the part of the
MuK itself, the whole holiday programme was valued for its useful
contribution in bringing back to health and strength those women who
had been unable previously to afford an annual holiday."' The
provision of free (or nearly free) holidays was perhaps also one of
the ways in which support from women for the MuK facilities as a
whole could be drummed up without having to rely too heavily on
propaganda material which was given in a written form and which was
distributed in the clinics and advice centres. Inevitably, such
material, whether it was in the form of pamphlets or of speeches
given at an organised event, had less immediate impact on a busy
mother who had little time to read, and had little interest in
attending party-organised events, or in joining the NSV or NSF/DFW.^
It certainly seems that the courses in mothercare, and the holidays
of the MuK, carried a major responsibility for putting across the
message of Nazi population policies, as far as they were being
1. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen, 'Stimmungsbericht'
Wohlfahrtsabteilung, May 1935.
2. Ibid.
3. Reher, Social Welfare, p.22-23.
4. Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation of Women, p.170.
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distributed through the welfare measures of the NSV. For those
working-class women who were perhaps less accessible than most, the
holiday scheme of the MuK gave an opportunity for a concentrated
exposure to Nazi family and health care policies. Nevertheless, at
the same time, there existed a genuine wish to offer a rest, in the
form of a summer break, to every woman in need of one; farmers'
wives were of course offered a winter or early spring vacation, as
work on the land allowed."^ The aim to return mothers renewed and
refreshed to the care of their children, no doubt also contained the
2
expectation that further pregnancies would occur in due course.
The categories of those who were eligible for free holidays were as
follows:
a) mothers with more than two children;
b) those, who whether through illness or recent
childbirth, were in need of a rest;
c) those who had participated during the Kampfzeit
in work for the Party. (3)
As Werner Reher, a senior NSV official pointed out,
holiday/recuperation homes were quickly put into service and for the
period of May 1934 to April 1933, some 43,000 mothers obtained free
1. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen ' Tdtigskeitsbericht
Mtlrz, 1935'.
2. Reher, Social Welfare, pp.23-26.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK', 'Muttererholungsfdrsorge
u. Mutterschulung'.
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and partly self-financed holidays in MuK homes in the country."^ Such
holidays afforded the participants, it was stressed, a well-earned
2
rest, possibly 'for the first time ever'. During the period of a
three week break, informal discussions took place between the
holiday-makers and the MuK staff whose task it was skilfully to
direct attention towards issues of a domestic nature, such as
household and kitchen management and the exchange of recipes for
cheap and nourishing meals. Such kitchen-orientated discussion
provided an opportunity to impress on the mothers the importance of a
healthy diet for their children, and they were given information
about the preparation of nutritious but low-cost dishes for the whole
family. Given that these subjects were the ones, apart from
unsupervised gossip, which were discussed in the presence of the MuK
helpers while basking in the sun, one must assume that every possible
opportunity to educate and to train women to carry out their
traditional tasks would be grasped. One NSV official was inspired to
write of the MuK holiday thus;
'those weeks of rest and recuperation are also weeks in
which the minds of the mothers are stimulated and
furnished with new and brighter ideas'.
(3)
1. BA, NSD 30/51, Peine Arbeit, 'laufende Mutterverschickung';
BA, NS 26/261, 'Aulkommen und Verwendung', p.31.









2. Reher, Social Welfare, p.23.
3. Ibid., pp.23-24.
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While MuK welfare discriminated in favour of the 'eugenically
valuable', it did not discriminate only in favour of women Party
members, or those who had been frankly and openly in support of the
Nazi cause. On the contrary, the NSV/'s leaders were keen to point
out that former supporters of other parties, 'even those who had
formerly been opposed to National Socialism', would receive an MuK
holiday and be included within other NSV and MuK facilities just the
same. Though Reher's statements were, in the main, part of the
attempt to publicise abroad the new arrangements for welfare in
Germany, the NSV/ was quite genuine about the offer to include all
women in its arrangements if they fulfilled the conditions of the
2
'racially valuable', 'socially worthy', category.
The cost to the NSV/MuK of the holiday scheme was relatively
small, and represented in 1937, 12% of the total spent on the MuK as
a whole; that is, to send 77,169 mothers away on holiday during 1937
the sum required was RM 11,877,250."^ Costs to an individual Gau for
the scheme can be seen to have amounted to RM 1,281 in one month in
4
1935 in Sachsen. This sum represented the travelling and other
costs of mothers for a rest in MuK holiday homes. The first quarter
of the year 1935, saw 1,093 women from Sachsen being sent away for a
break, and they were suitably furnished with some money and knitting
wool to take with them. The relative success of the MuK holidays by
1935 is shown in the rising demand for these in Sachsen where,
1. Ibid., Reher's book was written by him in English.
2. Ibid.; see instructions on this, BA, NSD 30/11,
Informationsdienst, March 1939, Teil II/
'Wohlfahrtsflege u. Jugendhilfe', pp.99-101.
3. BA, NS 22/457, 'Hilfswerk MuK 1937/8', p.28.
4. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen 'Tdtigkeitsbericht
der Wohlfahrtsabteilung Mclrz 1935' (331251).
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given an increased number of requests for places, many more suitable
recreational homes were reported to be required. These would have to
be found and made ready as soon as possible."^ The costs of a stay
in an MuK Home were not met only by the NSV/MuK, for grants from the
state, the local communities, or health insurance, would all be
2
sought before MuK funds were called upon. However, MuK was happy to
provide suitable clothing for those requiring light-weight summer
wear for their holiday without charge, which they were allowed to
keep."'
Inevitably, the absence of a mother from the family, when she
was on an MuK break, meant that someone had to stand in for her, so
that the household could continue to run smoothly. One of the
functions of the NSV Haushalthilfe scheme (Domestic Aid), was to
4
provide such help. However, the main function of this particular
NSV welfare scheme was to provide a daily help, for up to eight weeks
(or longer in certain special cases), in the home of a newly
delivered mother if there were very small children in the family
already.^ The promise of such practical help was intended to add a
realistic and an attractive inducement to the numerous appeals to
increase family size which, over the years, would take on an
increasingly strident note.^ The duties of the NSV domestic helper
1. Ibid.
2. BA, N5 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK', 'Muttererholungsfdrsorge u.
Mutterschulung'.
3. Ibid.
A. HA, 13/239 'Informationsdienst' Nr. 18, 'Die Haushalthilfe der
NSV'. BA, NSD 30/4, NS-Volksdienst September 1941, p.178.
3. Ibid.
6. NSD 30/7/8, Ewiges Deutschland, May 1937; September 1938.
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were exactly those of the normal workload of the mother to whose
family she (the helper) had been assigned. An eight-hour working day
was meant to be extended, if needed, so that every important task was
completed before the end of the day; indeed, the domestic helper was
supposed to 'remain at her post until the last job was finished'.
An NSV daily help would be assigned only when certain specific
situations arose within a family's circumstances. These were
described to be as follows:
1) during the period before and after delivery for mothers
with more than one or two children;
2) during the mother's absence in a recreational Home or
when a mother was undergoing a spell in a clinic or
having treatment in a hospital;
3) general help for 'kinderreich' families and motherless
households;
4) aid for families where the mother was in need of extra
help through illness.
(2)
Such a list suggests that the NSV might experience some difficulty
with regard to finding enough helpers to carry out an extensive
programme of aid for new mothers and those who were unable to look
after their children through ill-health, as well as acting as a
support scheme for mothers who were away from the family home on an
MuK holiday for a few weeks. This ambitious set of aims ran into
difficulties as events were to show. The two categories which would
1. BA, NSD 30/4, NS-Volksdienst, September 1941, p.180.
2. Ibid., p.181.
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later experience the most difficulty in obtaining a household help
were the two which needed such help most, that is to say, mothers of
several children and farmers' wives. In the Gau Westfalen-Nord in
the country area of LUbbecke in 1937, the entire holiday scheme of
the MuK came to grief through the impossibility of finding a
temporary replacement for the poorer mothers of the area whose
neighbours, or relatives, were unable (rather than unwilling) to give
any help by acting as a stand-in for an absent mother. At this time
the NSV in this area seems to have been unable to provide sufficient
2
personnel for this task. The NSl/ looked to the women's Labour
Service to provide numbers of suitable helpers for the Haushalthilfe
scheme, and it seems that girl students, who were required to work
for six months in domestic service or in agricultural work from
March 1934 (in order to be eligible for first matriculation), were
one of the sources for the NSV's domestic help and other services."'
In 1937, 0.6% of girl students doing their Labour Service were
working for the NSW as domestic helpers, and 5.7% as kindergarten
helpers. The majority, 80.1% were employed as cheap labour on the
4
land while the rest, 13.6% were working in towns and cities. With
1. Ibid. p.180;
I am grateful to Dr. Jill Stephenson for confirming this
impression in relation to research being undertaken with
regard to WUrttemberg in war-time.
2. RUdenhausen, 'NSV/Westfalen Nord', p.239.
3. Jill Stephenson, 'Women's Labor Service in Nazi Germany',
Central European History, 1982, p.246; Reher, Social Welfare
in Germany, Reher suggests misleadingly that girl students
'volunteered' in all cases, p.22; for an examination of this
topic see Ddrte Winkler, Frauenarbeit im 'Dritten Reich',
Hamburg 1977, pp.129-133.
4. Wunderlich, 'Farm Labor', pp.318-319.
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regard to its own personnel, the NSV required that a period of work
in a family household was an essential prerequisite for entering a
training course for NSV Volkspfleqehelferinnen (nursery nurses).
Those who wished to be taken into the training courses for
kindergarten nurses, or welfare work in general, were advised to opt
for a stint as an NSV household help before they started a training
course."^ This was the kind of measure which the NSV favoured, in
that one feature of the NSV welfare programme supported another but
without necessarily costing any more money. In the above example,
young girls were given an initial training for work in children's
Homes and nurseries while, at the same time, they provided stand-in
duties for absent mothers of families or acted as a daily help for
2
newly delivered mothers.
By 1938, a monthly average of 6,000 young women were involved
in the NSV's domestic help scheme and the numbers of families who
obtained such help were as follows:






The numbers of available domestic helpers were significantly raised
from 1938 by the contribution of young women who were involved in the
1. BA, NSD 30/50, 'Schule fUr das Leben', pp.2-13.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NSD 30/4, N5-Volksdienst, September 1941, p.186.
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compulsory year's service in the Pflichtjahr. All Pflichtjahr girls
were meant to be employed either in domestic service or in
agriculture. From the period of February to July 1938, 30,400 girls
were undertaking this service in the agricultural sector, and 47,000
were busy in domestic service both in town and country."^ In 1939, as
many as 217,000 PflichtJahrmMdel were similarly occupied within the
same time span. Even during the first year of the scheme, however,
it was clear that not all of the girls were being employed in
families with Several children, or with farmers' families. Many of
these girls were managing to obtain a position in childless
2
households in towns and cities. This particular practice was still
in operation during the war, for in 1941, the NSV/ drew attention to
the serious inefficiencies which had been allowed to take place with
regard to the assignment of girls who were undertaking domestic
service which was not being organised by the NSV. The 'shocking
example' of one Ortsgruppe of the Gau Kdln/Aachen had revealed that
many of the Pflicht.jahr/Labour Service girls were being placed within
households with no children."^ Of the 224 girls undertaking domestic
service in the unnamed Ortsgruppe, as many as 86 had managed to
obtain a place in a childless household and of the rest, 52 were
working with a family which had only one child, while 48 were working
with families with two children. The remainder, only 38 in all, had
been assigned to families with three children or more. It is unclear
from this report whether there were very many families with several
children in the same area who were going without a domestic help
1. Winkler, Frauenarbeit, p.58.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NSD 30/4, NS-Volksdienst, September 1941, p.180.
161.
altogether because most girls were at pains to avoid a placement with
the larger families in Kflln/Aachen. However, in this report the NSV
wished mainly to emphasise that many of the domestic helpers, who
were being organised through the Pflichtjahr/Labour Service were
shirking work which they wel-e intended to undertake. Not only this,
but the NSV and the MuK both expressed dissatisfaction with the
conspicuous lack in the Pflicht.jahr girls of a 'correct point of
view', unlike those in the NSV Haushalthilfe scheme in the past, so
that a shortage of suitable war— time help had contributed to a "
'lowering of standards' in terms of ideological acceptability."^ This
feature was one which the NSV was at pains to discover when taking on
new personnel, but especially regarding those to be employed as
kindergarten nurses. The NSV head office in Berlin circulated all
local NSV offices with a list of those who had shown themselves to be
unsuitable while undertaking training, to make sure that none slipped
2
through the net.
By the autumn of 1941, it was clear that a serious shortage of
domestic help, both from the NSV or the Women's Labour Service, was
causing many to go without promised help. A serious shortage of such
help in WUrttemberg during 1941 meant that the most hard-pressed
mothers were having to wait for 'weeks and weeks' according to one SD
report, for help with newly born infants."^ It was to be wondered,
added the report, where the idealism of the young women had gone,
since they were clearly unwilling to help their sisters who were in
1. Ibid. This applied also to kindergarten staff, see Chapter Six.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1030, to all NSV Gauamtsleiter, Amt fdr,
Volkswohlfahrt, 'Meldungen fdr die Warnkartei',
23rd November 1937.
3. I am grateful to Dr. Jill Stephenson for confirming this.
some need."'' As though in response to this situation it was announced
at the same time, during the Autumn of 1941, that the NSV intended to
expand the numbers of its own domestic helper corps and that a new
category, namely all unsupported mothers, would receive help for two
2
weeks before, and four weeks after, a delivery. For the time being,
shorter periods of help would only be available until 'new
arrangements', as the NSV said, were put into force,"' in other
words, until more helpers could be recruited. But the NSV were
hopeful of an increase in the numbers of these, for with the
extension of the period of compulsory service for girls in the RADwJ
(Reichsarbeitsdienst der weiblichen Juqend), from six months to
twelve months in July 1941, it seemed clear that the NSV would obtain
an increase in the numbers of its helpers from this source.^ From
the summer of 1942, the NSV was able to take girls in the age group
16 to 18, now included in the Kriegshilfsdienst, into domestic
service for families with several children (kinderreichen Familien).~>
It may also have been that the NSV hoped to keep a closer watch upon
those girls who were assigned to domestic service so that they would
be unable to avoid a placement with larger families.
Requests to be allowed an exemption from Labour Service were
allowed however in those cases where a girl was already working in a
munitions factory, or if there were several younger brothers and
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NSD 30/4 NS-Volksdienst, September 1941, p.181.
3. Ibid.
4. BA, NSD 30/4a NS-Volksdienst, December 1943,
'Zehn Jahre Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind', p.169.
3. Ibid.
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sisters at home. Indeed, at least until 1940, thfere existed a fair
degree of leniency in this respect."^ There seems little doubt too
that compulsory service, when not actually avoided, was made less
onerous for some. As people at the time were quite aware, those most
likely to achieve this were the daughters of 'so-called better
2
families'. For those girls who had managed to obtain a placement
with families within the parents' immediate circle, domestic service
was rendered as painless as possible. It was also shown that
Pflichtjahr was being avoided altogether in some cases, at least in
1938 when the Pflichtjahr scheme came into operation."^ A definite
lack of a conscious sense of service for others, which the NS\l wished
to inject into its welfare provisions - and thereby help to engender
within the population at large - can be seen to have existed among
those girls undertaking compulsory service. Far from taking up such
work with the appropriate sense of Opferbereitschaft, Pflichtjahr
girls managed to escape domestic and other work with farmers'
families by opting for more congenial duties in the Labour Service,
with the aid of the existing loophole of being exempt from
Pflichtjahr if engaged in Labour Service. It was also possible to
shorten the total length of service by switching from one category to
another (from Pflichtjahr to Labour Service), and, incidentally,
leaving in the lurch those farmers' wives who had been assigned a
Pflichtjahr girl. The NSV were not unaware of the difficulties of
1. Stephenson, 'Women's Labor Service', p.260;
Winkler, Frauenarbeit, p.58.
2. Ibid., pp.58-59.
3. Stephenson, 'Women's Labor Service', p.253;
Winkler, Frauenarbeit, p.58.
4. Stephenson, 'Women's Labor Service', p.253-258.
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fulfilling promises made to provide help to those in most need of it.
But these promises, first given in 1934, were contained within the
MuK range of objectives which had been originally part of the drive
to increase the birth-rate, not an intention to supply domestic
servants for those who could, even if it were with some difficulty,
manage without one."^ The NSV household help scheme was intended to
help only those whose need was inordinate, either through the
addition of a new baby to an already sizeable family, or through
illness, where very young children would be without the mother's care
2
for weeks on end. It was for these reasons that the NSV officials
were so incensed in 1941 by the knowledge that the organisers of the
Women's Labour Service . allowed a domestic help to many families
who, according to the aims of the MuK, had no right to one."^ There
is no reason to doubt the sincerity of NSV pronouncements on this
matter, or that the NSV, certainly from 1939, would attempt to pursue
rigorously the deployment of girls within the Haushalthilfe scheme.
from the start of the war there existed the intention to
increase the provisions of the Haushalthilfe scheme in relation to a
better provision for the hard working Landfrau. The ReichsnShrstand
was involved in new agreements with the NSV and with Conti's approval
it was intended that domestic helpers should spend as long a
period with farmers' families as possible. A sum of 4,800,000 marks
1. HA, 13/259, 'Informationsdienst Nr. 18', 'Die
Haushalthilfe der NSV'.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NSD 30/4 NS-Volksdienst, September 1941, p.180.
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was set aside in 1939/40 for these new provisions and the NSF was
expected to provide expanded training courses for intending domestic
helpers."^ Apart from the supply of helpers from the Women's Labour
Service who were directed to the NSV on a regular basis, students
undertaking agricultural science courses, and some teacher training
courses, would be required to do a spell as a domestic helper as part
of the practical part of their courses. It certainly seems that the
NSF and the NSV from 1939 cooperated in this venture and the womens1
organisation became more closely involved in the domestic helper
2
scheme during the war.
1. BA, R18/3781, Hilgenfeldt to Conti, 'Hauspflege und
Haushalthilfe', letter of 13th November 1939.
2. BA, NS37ii/1031, 'Mother and Child' to all Leiter NSV,
'Erweiterung der Haushalthilfe zur Mutterschaftshilfe',
5th July 194D.
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The Finances of MuK
The funds for MuK came initially from collections from the
public so that the end of the winter 1933/34 did not signal a respite
from the ever-present collecting box into which the donations from
the public were gathered. Notwithstanding the generous funding of
the first official Winter Aid by the population, they would be asked
again to dig deeply into their pockets to provide the finances for
another Nazi welfare scheme. Surprisingly, perhaps, these
collections undertaken in the spring and summer of 1934 raised
substantial amounts for the new MuK and reflected perhaps the
beginning of a return to work for many."^ The first collections took
place on the 29th and the 30th March 1934, managing to raise RM
1,680,764 between them. Other collections followed in rapid
succession and took place in May, July and September. The NSV,
together with the DFW, collected RM 1,410,000 on 2nd July, the
2
fragrantly entitled 'Day of the German Rose'. A comparison with the
collections for Winter Aid shows that the MuK could match the sums
collected during the winter months.^ Altogether, six Reich street
collections in 1934 for MuK yielded RM 9,798,377; this figure
compares favourably with six (Reich) street collections for WHW in
1934/33 which together raised RM 8,471,482. From the end of the
summer of 1934, however, public collections undertaken on behalf of
MuK would all but cease, so that the NSV/'s new scheme would have to
be funded from another source, and it would be the WHW which would
1. BA, NS 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK', (\/) 'Finanzierung des
Hilfswerkes'.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, R43/564, 'Rechenschaftsbericht WHW 1934/35', p.14
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undertake to provide increasing sums yearly to support MuK measures."''
An awareness of the danger of exhausting the good-will and patience
of the population through incessant collecting, caused the
leadership to impose a ban on indiscriminate street collections being
carried out by the Nazi organisations. It was recognised fairly
quickly that public collections had developed into what can only be
described as indiscriminate importuning by the members of such
2
organisations. During the winter months of 1933/34, due to the
WHW collections, and on into the spring and early summer too, it had
virtually become impossible peacefully to walk the streets of Berlin,
and elsewhere, without meeting requests to contribute to one or other
of the various Nazi money raising endeavours, and a ban was imposed
on these activities in July 1934."^ The decision to provide a major
part of the costs of the MuK from other sources was influenced not
only by this ban, but also by the possible realisation that it would
be very difficult to find another, equally successful, formula as
the one which had been discovered for the Winter Aid drives. Through
the measures of the Propaganda Ministry, the WHW had laid claim to a
rich variety of collection procedures, money-raising campaigns and
publicity schemes, all of which would have been virtually impossible
to sustain in a really effective manner later in the summer months.
It was for this reason, perhaps, that the MuK would cease to
undertake public collections, even though the summer collections of
1934 showed themselves to be quite successful in the amounts raised.
1. BA, N5 26/261, 'Zuwendungen an Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind',
'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.21.
2. BA, NS37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK 1, (\/) 'Finanzierung1.
3. Ibid.
The NSV seems to have been sensitive to the problems and inherent
dangers involved in depending too greatly upon endless street and
house-to-house collections. At the end of the summer they were
pleased to record that, in spite of the 'overburdening of the
population through incessant collecting', unsolicited sums of money
had been sent in to the NSV offices in Berlin for the MuK, a welcome
sign, so they said, that support was forthcoming. One might also
suppose that the summer collections in 1934 were a way of 'testing
the water' with regard to a second NSV welfare scheme, and when the
signs looked to be not unfavourable, it was decided that the WHW
could be allowed to provide finance in order that the winter
collections would remain the prime propaganda measure of collections
through donation from the public."^
In 1935/36, the MuK obtained a substantial sum from the funds
of the WHW. This amounted to RM 7,302,000 and it represented
approximately between one tenth and one twelfth of MuK expenses for
2
that year. It is impossible to be completely precise about this
particular figure for no record of MuK expenses for the year 1935/36
has been found. However, Per Anqriff included in 1937 a short report
on the achievements of MuK in 1936 which suggests that the WHW
subvention was about one tenth of all expenses at this time."^ From
1. Ibid., 'Diese Kleine Sachspenden...sind ein Beweis dafdr wie
stark der Gedanke des Hilfswerkes und die Verantwortung ftlr
sein Gelingen im deutschen Volke lebendig ist'.
2. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', 'Zuwendungen an
Hilfserk Mutter und Kind', p.20.
3. Der Anqriff 1937, p.9, MuK costs seem to have been RM
81,700,000 for the year 1936; BA, N5D 30/51, Peine Arbeit.
See 'Leistungen des Winterhilfswerkes' and bar chart.
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this point on, however, the sums received by MuK rose year by year so
that, increasingly, WHW income was transferred to welfare for mothers
and children instead of providing increased supplies of the usual
WHW welfare in kind. There seems to have been no shortage of WHW
aid, and it looks as though there was more than enough to go round in
terms of funds collected to finance NSV welfare measures. Given the
semi-compulsory nature of some at least of the collection procedures
of the WHW, there seems to have been no concern on the part of NSV
officials that an unwelcome burden would be placed upon WHW funds.^
WHW subventions to MuK were as follows:









Of the various NSV welfare measures, only the MuK received
substantial sums of money from the WHW funds, so that it was unique
in this respect even though some small sums were given by the WHW to
a few other NSV welfare measures such as the adult holiday schemes
and health schemes also organised through the NSV."^ While the sums
1. Efforts by Party officials saw to it that amounts
remained high, see Chapter Seven.
2. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkornmen und Verwendung', p.20;
NSD 30/51, Peine Arbeit, 'Leistungen WHW'.
3. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.21.
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received by the MuK from WHW funds appeared in the Statistisches
Jahrbuch fUr das Deutsche Reich, and in the official reports of the
NSV, no particular mention was made in the Vfllkischer Beobachter of
the fact that money collected on the streets of the Reich for one
welfare scheme was being earmarked for another."^ Thus the propaganda
material of the WHW, which emphasised ad nauseam the necessity to
contribute in order to combat the scourge of hunger and cold,
neglected to point out that, strictly speaking, the purpose of sums
collected was to finance, in part, the summer holiday schemes as well
as the other measures, run by the MuK. This untruth, which was
hardly the worst one which the Nazis saw fit to perpetrate, seems to
have been of a particularly cynical variety, given that some of the
population at least were pleased to donate to the WHW on the basis of
2
stopping others from suffering from winter-induced misery.
However, the decision to refrain from widening the frame of reference
of the WHW collection procedures was no doubt made in order that no
perceptual complications might arise and only serve to take away from
the simple message of donating for winter measures to alleviate the
poverty of the members of the Volksqemeinschaft. An admission that a
much wider range of welfare facilities was actually being funded
%
could only underline that which many must have realised, namely, that
the population was being illicitly taxed without an admission of this
by the government.
By 1937, the MuK was receiving as much as 50% of its total
costs from WHW funds, a sum which represented just under one sixth
1. Virtually nothing was mentioned either in the Vfllkischer
Beobachter or in the N5-Volksdienst articles on Winter Aid.
2. See Chapter Three.
of all WHW income for that year. The remaining 50?^ of MuK costs were
supplied by state subsidies and, where possible, insurance funds, the
NSl/ itself making up the short-fall."'' By 1940/41, however, the WHW
subvention had risen from one sixth to just over one half of all WHW
income for this particular year so that the amount of the subsidy at
this time was RM 597,680,000. In 1940/41, the entire income for WHW
amounted to RM 916,240,000. The subventions from WHW to MuK and to
other welfare measures at this time were as follows:
WHW subventions to Muk and other measures 1940/41
Mutter und Kind 552,200,000 RM
Volksqesundheitsdienst/
Hitler Freiplatzspende 20,000,000 RM
ReichsmUtterdienst 19,120,000 RM
Sommerarbeit/
HJ 2,500,000 RM (2)
U/Ji ifaMsfoftrfe fconsHy e oshe 6 1 0,0 00 RM
From 1941/42 as much as two-thirds of all WHW income would be
directed to MuK and it can be argued therefore that the size and
importance of the WHW drives (not diminished during the war), and the
tireless efforts to raise larger and larger sums of money only makes
sense in the light of the explanation that such funds collected, from
1937, were called upon to finance not one but two NSV welfare
measures.^ Apart from the propaganda function of the WHW which
remained as a prime motivating factor in the design of the drives, a
less ideologically motivated goal also under wrote the efforts made
being
to collect huge sums of money from the population, who wereA
1. BA, NS 22/457, 'Hilfswerk MuK 1937/38', pp.26-28.
The total cost of MuK welfare for 1937 was RM 99,298,457.
vn^
2. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen^Verwendung', p.21.
3. Ibid., p.20.
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called upon to finance a substantial amount of practical welfare
activity on behalf of the Party. The population from 1933 was urged
and cajoled into donating to welfare schemes which, as far as MuK was
concerned, as well as the other NSV schemes, did benefit many, though
on a far more modest scale than the Nazis claimed, and in some cases,
at least, remained less welcome than a rise in income or, lower
taxation, would have been.
The value of the various measures of MuK in 1937 was RM
99,298,437. This figure is represented as the costs to the MuK of
its various measures. The largest proportion of this sum went not to
the running of the clinics and the advice centres for mothers and
infants, but to the holidays for children scheme (Kinder-
landverschickunq) which was organised within the administrative
framework of MuK."'' The running of kindergartens and the care of
very small children also came within the scope of the MuK under the
section Kleinkinderfdrsorqe (department 3) of the office Mutter und
Kind, which was itself within section (C) of the department for
2
general welfare within the NSV's administrative structure. In
1937, the value of economic aid through MuK for families in need came
to 20?^ of the total of MuK funds for that year. As far as can be
discovered, such financial assistance remained for the most part in
the form of welfare in kind until the end of the war. As the head of
the section Familienhilfe (MuK) pointed out in 1942, there was no
1. BA, NS 22/457, 'Hilfswerk MuK 1937/38', p.28;
See Chapter Six.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1001, Reichsleitunq Hauptampt fdr,
Volkswohlfahrtj 'Hausrundschreiben Nr. 113/35',
29th June 1935.
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place for a reine WirtschaftsfUrsorqe within MuK aid for families.
Economic aid would remain in the form of advice on how to manage
one's resources and a distribution of dietary supplements and
clothing for small children as before. Part of the rationale of such
aid before the war was, it is clear, the intention to save money and
restrict welfare from the Party to a form which would also prevent
dependent attitudes from forming. This type of aid would ensure that
help would be distributed until economic circumstances improved but
without encouraging a sense of welfare dependency on the part of
2
those receiving NSV welfare assistance. It certainly seems that
poorer families were pleased enough to receive such aid when given,
as the example of the Gau Sachsen shows, but there seems little doubt
that the sense of gratitude was far less than the NSV hoped and most
seemed to view such aid as a hand-out, rather than the more elevated
'donation from the community', which the NSV and the WHW usually
tried to claim characterised their welfare in contrast with that of
the previous Weimar period.^ But it seems that this quality was
exactly the one which was discerned by the poorer families in
Sachsen. It seems in Bavaria too, that during 1937, workers who
were on short-time (as in Sachsen during 1933), viewed WHW help
merely as charity and not as a gracious donation from the Party which
lifted away the hardship of their lives both in a symbolic and in a
practical manner through the knowledge that the spirit of the
1. BA, NSD 30/75, NSV. Propagandadienst, 25th November 1944.
Those in urgent need would be allowed monetary aid according
to the Hitler Order of 1944, see NSV tasks, BA, R36/963,
'VerfUgung 11/44', 22nd August 1944.
2. Hilgenfeldt, Idee, p.5.
3. Ibid.
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Uolksqemeinschaft expressed itself through welfare aid."^ From this
point of view, the NSV and the WHW both had failed to persuade people
of the 'true function' of Party welfare. MuK aid too, was received
in just such a way in Westfalen-Nord, where concern over lack of
money and a low standard of living was not alleviated by the needy
being given a few food parcels and other welfare in kind from MuK in
1937.2
The exact value of such MuK aid is difficult to assess in
respect of individual families, for the figures shown only set out a
monthly average in relation to the numbers of children existing
within each family. It certainly seems as though the amount of MuK
welfare was worth as little as RM 20 per family per annum, though
larger families would receive more than this."^ However, donations
for the needy of items of welfare for infants and children in the
form of dietary supplements, linen, beds and blankets, makes it
difficult to say more precisely what the value of such aid was to
those receiving help in kind. MuK does seem to have made
improvements for the neediest of families in their sleeping
arrangements through its BettenfOrsorqe whereby children would be
ensured separate sleeping facilities in the family home through the
4
donation of a new bed and bedding. Interestingly enough, relatively
little was written about the specific economic aid which came from
1. BA, NS 37ii/1062, see reports of March to May 1933
from Gau Sachsen; Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion, pp.84-86.
2. RUdenhausen, NSV/Westfalen-Nord, pp.239-241.
3. BA, NS 22/437, 'Hilfswerk*1937/38', pp.23-25.
4. Leistunqen der NS-Wohlfahrtspfleqe, p.10.
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MuK; often enough it only merited a few lines where other MuK
measures were given much greater emphasis, most notably the holidays
for mothers scheme."'' This, to some extent, reflected the balance of
the design of MuK measures in general, which stressed far more the
provisions for the care and welfare for mothers rather than specific
aid for the needy, unless it were in the form of dietary supplements
2
for children as well as pregnant and nursing mothers. In the main
however, it was the welfare measures of the WHW which would undertake
to supply most of the welfare in kind which came from the NSV.^
By 1937, the MuK was well established with a total number of
visits to clinics and advice centres amounting to 3,373,486 for that
year. The number of clinics and advice centres at this time amounted
to 24,478. While newspaper articles gave an impression of the
overwhelming success of this venture by quoting the total number of
recorded visits up to, and including, 1942, that is, 36.3 million
visits in all, it seems reasonable to say that the clinics of the MuK
were showing themselves to be reasonably popular, and visits annually
4
to these were being recorded in millions rather than thousands. An
examination of numbers of visits per month, however, shows a less
impressive figure. During 1937, the total number of visits per month
was reported to be approximately from just under 200,000 to just over
300,000.^ This is to say that throughout the country, each clinic
1. BA, NSD 30/4a NS-Volksdienst, December 1943, 'Zehn Jahre
Mutter und Kind', p. 168.
2. BA, N5 37ii/1035, 'Bericht MuK'.
3. See Chapter Three.
4. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.26.
5. BA, NS 22/457, 'Hilfswerk MuK 1937/78', p.27.
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was receiving approximately twelve visits per month. Altogether,
219,187 married women during 1937, were said to be receiving some
form of MuK care before the birth of a new baby, with 21,701 single
women receiving similar help."^ Such ante-natal care from MuK usually
consisted of advice about a healthy diet and a distribution of
vitamin supplements if required, plus reminders to attend the
Reichsmdtterdienst courses of the DFW when that was deemed to be
appropriate. According to the photographs published by the NSV,
such clinics were well furnished with suitable equipment and, it
would seem, showed a welcoming atmosphere where mothers, who were
accompanied more often than not by toddlers, could also receive
advice on the care of their small children as well as ante-natal care
as such.^
1. Ibid., p.23; BA, N5D 30/36, 'Aufkommen und V/erwendung1, p.20.
2. BA, NSD 30/51, Peine Arbeit, 'Aus Einrichtungen der NSV.
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Nazi population policies; success or failure?
A contemporary British assessment of the measures being
undertaken in Germany to improve the birth-rate began with the
statement that:
'one of the most striking phenomena of recent years is
the change in the trend of marriage and birth-rates in
Germany since 1933. The change has attracted widespread
attention only because Germany is the sole country in
which, so far, population policies appear to have had any
appreciable results, but also because the rapidity with
which these results followed the coming to power of the
National Socialist regime'.
(1)
This study also emphasised how difficult it was to
account for the reason (or reasons) for the rise in the German
birth-rate from 1933, but it was certainly as likely to have been as
Glass pointed out due to factors other than the implementation of
2
Nazi population policies. The problem of discovering how far these
policies played a significant part in 'causing' the improvement in
from
the birth-rate arisesAthe fact that one may have to cite changes in
psychological perceptions and in social attitudes when explaining
changes, and improvements, in the figures of the post-1933 German
birth-rate. The Nazis themselves were not slow to point to these two
potentially unmeasurable factors as forming the basis of improvements
in the movement of the figures from 1933.^ But the 'cause' of a rise
in the birth-rate has to be discovered not so much in a single set of
contributory factors, most of which rest within a socio-psychological
frame of reference, but in a multiple and varied set of influences
1. Glass, Population Policies, p.269.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.306; HA, 13/259, 'Artikeldienst III/3G41 Hauptstelle
Presse, Hauptamt ftlr Volkswohlfahrt', 'Der Sieg des
Lebenswillens'.
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which consisted of economic and other factors. For whatever reason
the German birth-rate began to improve from 1933 and continued to do
so until the outbreak of war in 1939. The figure of 14.7 live
births per thousand of the population in 1933 rose markedly to 18.0
in 1934, 18.9 in 1935, 19.0 in 1936 and 20.0 in 1939.2 Not only
this, but the illegitimate birth-rate was showing a tendency to drop,
reaching its lowest point in 1935, at 7.8 (illegitimate) live births
per hundred babies born in that year."^ It seems necessary to
conclude, therefore, that for whatever reason, married couples from
1933 were contributing to the rise in the German birth-rate.
However, this important development was due more to an increase in
marriages contracted from 1933 rather than an increase in fertility
4
within marriage itself. The year 1932 represented the lowest level
recorded of marriages contracted, namely 516,793 and this figure
represented the nadir of a decline in numbers of marriages from 1930
at which time the Depression had started to bite hard. In other
words, it was the end of the Depression which signalled the beginning
of an increase in the numbers of marriages and a rise in the
birth-rate, rather than a growth in perception of the values of a new
social order which fostered a strident population policy."* Therefore
an increase in the numbers of births might have been expected to
occur in any case even in the absence of economic inducements and the




5. Glass, Population Policies,pp.269-272.
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pro-natalist propaganda of the Nazi government. Even though the
monetary aid provided by the Marriage Loan scheme produced results in
terms of numbers of marriages contracted, there was no really
significant rise in marital fertility which was arguably the main
purpose of such schemes. There would be no return to the levels of
the early part of the century when the birth-rate showed figures per
thousand of the population of between 29.8 (1910), and 33.1 (1906).
Perhaps only similarly high rates could have been regarded as a
revolutionary reversal of the declining rates.^ But this was beyond
the power of the Nazi (and possibly any other) government to achieve
and it had to make itself content with something far less than that,
with figures which could be seen as a return to pre-depression levels
2
of the mid nineteen-twenties.
Birth-rate from 1920-26 and 1929-36, per one thousand of the
population - live births only.
1920- 1926 1929- 1936
1920 - 25.9 1929 - 18.0
1921 - 25.3 1930 - 17.6
1922 - 23.0 1931 - 16.0
1923 - 21.2 1932 - 15.1
1924 - 20.6 1933 - 14.7
1923 - 20.8 1934 - 18.0
1926 - 19.6 1935 - 18.9
1936 - 19.0 (3)
A clear assessment of MuK and its policies is, as has been
suggested above, made more difficult given that the new welfare
1. St. J., 1937, p.37.
2. Ibid.; Stephenson, 'Reichsbund der Kinderreichen', p.369.
3. St. J., 1937, p.37.
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measure was put into operation almost at the same time as the upturn
in the German economy. Therefore one must treat with caution the
claims of the officials of the MuK who usually claimed a major role
for their policies when discussing the question of the 'success'
shown in the rising birth-rate of their pro-natalist measures. The
improvement in the numbers of second and third children born to women
from 1933 (increasing from 54.0 to 67.7 per thousand women of
child-bearing age between 1933 and 1934) only shows a return to the
figures of eight years previously, that is to say, before the
2
Depression. For this reason, it is possible to say that, even
without the various Nazi pro-natalist measures, such figures would
more than likely have been achieved when unemployment began to
disappear.
By 1938, only one family in thirty had four or more children
under the age of fourteen, and even fewer, only one in every hundred
families, had five children or more."' Out of a number of just over
sixteen and a half million women of child-bearing age in 1938, four
million three hundred and fifty-two thousand, just under one quarter
of these, were involved in attending some form of Nazi social welfare
scheme. That is, 500,000 women attended the DFW's
Reichsmdtterdienst courses while 3,852,160 attended an MuK clinic
4
during that year. By 1938, therefore, a fairly substantial
attendance of women in MuK clinics and RMD courses had failed to
1. HA, 13/259, 'Artikeldienst', 'Der Sieg des Lebenswillens';
BA, NSD 30/4a, NS-Volksdienst, December 1933, p.167.
2. St. J., 1938, p.47.
3. Stephenson, 'Reichsbund der Kinderreichen', p.368.
4. Stephenson, Women in Nazi Society, p.165; BA, NS 26/261,
'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p. 31.
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provide the kind of success which the Nazi population policies had
been designed to secure, that is, the persuading of women to return
to the practices of an earlier period (l91l)when out of every 1,000
women of childbearing age, as many as 100 had produced a fifth
child.^ But this development needed to be based within a general
figure of approximately 128.0 live births per thousand women as in
1910/11, not 77.1 or thereabouts , as in 1938. It was hopelessly
unrealistic to expect a return to the high figures of the turn of the
century, which themselves showed a drop from the higher figures of
the decades of the 1870s.^ Nazi population policies grounded as they
were in irrationality, with their vicious promotion of 'racial
purity', could not succeed in reversing what might be described as
the irreversible. The falling birth-rates in western Europe were
part of a demographic development which governments had little chance
of moulding, or altering in a really significant way. Only an
improvement in the infant mortality rates was capable of securing an
improvement in the numbers of infants surviving, and also perhaps
through an increase in the numbers of live births, through improved
ante-natal care. An examination therefore of the infant mortality
rates is perhaps a more useful way of deciding how successful the
maternity and infant care of the NSV was.''
In 1913 the infant mortality rate was 13.1?^ (not including
1. St. J., 1938, p.47.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 1937, p.37.
4. Glass, Population Policies pp.145-269.
5. St. J., 1938, pp.66-67;
BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst, November 1938, Teil IV:
'Statistik', p.29; pp.42-43.
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still-births)."^ By 1937, this rate had fallen to 6.4%, a substantial
improvement over the 1913 figure; but in 1933 the rate had already
fallen to 1.1%, so that the measures of the MuK were introduced at a
2
time when such rates were falling in any case. The post-neonatal
mortality rate (a rate normally calculated of deaths between four
weeks and one year) had also been falling steadily from 1910/14 in
4 Germany, from 18.3 per hundred live births to 7.7 in 1933."^ Between
1933 and 1934, this figure was reduced to 6.6 but thereafter it
remained static up to and including 1936. In other words, there was
a marginal improvement in such rates from the time that the MuK
became established. The neonatal mortality rate (deaths occurring
within the first month) improved slightly between 1934 and 1936,
falling from 4,109 deaths in every 100,000 males born in 1934, to
3,932 in 1936; the figures for the female infant neonatal mortality
rates were 3,241 in 1934, and 3,092 in 1936. In specific areas
including Berlin, the infant mortality rates were stabilising around
a figure of 6.6% from 1933/34 until the start of the war. In Berlin
the infant mortality rate went up slightly, from 5.9% to 6.4% between
1934 and 1935.^ However, this latter figure was still an improvement
over the rates for 1932 and 1933, these showing 6.7% and 6.8%
respectively. Other areas too showed at first a fall, and then a
rise in 1935. In areas such as Saxony, WUrttemberg, Baden and




5. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst November 1938, p.42.
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Thuringia a fall in the infant mortality rates was experienced
between 1933 and 1934, and then a slight rise between 1934 and 1935.
These figures (as well as those for Berlin) can be seen as follows:










Berlin 6.8 5.9 6.4
Saxony 6.3 5.2 5.4
WUrttemberg -6.1 5.7 CO•iir>
Baden 6.6 6.0 6.3
Thuringia 7.2 5.6 6.2 (1)
While these figures show only a very slight movement upward between
1934 and 1935, actually showing the same hiccup in the rate of
decline which had occurred between 1928 and 1929, it can be seen
that the efforts of MuK were managing only to hold the infant
mortality rates still, and in some cases, not even that. It seems
likely that the Nazi measures were unable to make an impact on what
seems to have been a slowing down of the fall in the infant mortality
2
rates from 1929. The effectiveness of Nazi maternity and infant
care certainly comes into question given the almost static figures of
the post-neonatal infant mortality rates between 1934/36. These
rates had improved hardly at all with infants continuing to die
during this periodjfor each month of life, at the same rates, up to
the age of one year. For example, in 1934 - but also in 1936 - 335
out of every 100,000 male infants failed to survive the sixth month.^
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., calculated from table of figures of infant
mortality rates by LSnder/Landesteile, p.42.
3. St. J., 1938, p.67.
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Girl infants in 1934 and 1936 showed a rate of 238 and 236 per
100,000 dying within the sixth month. While it is possible that
these rates were close to reaching an irreducible minimum, it seems
that the efforts of the MuK had been only marginally effective. The
neonatal and post neo-natal mortality rates came under the scrutiny
of the Berliner Akademie fUr grztliche Fortbildunq in 1941, when
they published in one of their own journals the rates from 1932 to
1937."'' This was shown as follows:
Infant deaths: neonatal/post-neonatal rates from 1932/37
Deaths/One 1^onth Deaths/2-12 1Months
Year Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total
1932 23,350 17,612 40,962 20,549 15,940 36,489
1933 22,625 17,017 39,642 19,296 14,345 33,641
1934 24,837 18,340 43,177 20,030 14,641 34,671
1935 26,393 19,124 45,886 23,555 17,208 40,763
1936 25,873 19,124 44,997 22,874 16,731 39,605
1937 24,676 18,414 43,090 22,632 16,472 39,104
(2)
These figures, as the article points out, did not present an
encouraging picture, but even showed a rise in 1937 over the figures
for 1932 - however, it was to be remembered the article emphasised,
that the numbers of live births had also been rising steadily from
1932 so that these figures in themselves did not represent an overall
rise in the annual infant mortality rates.^ The infant mortality
rates for the years 1932/1937 per 100 live births, were as follows:
1. BA, R18/3814, 'Die SSuglingssterblichkeit in den












However, it is clear that in the period between 1939 and 1943
in the Gau Westfalen-Nord in the Kreis Beckum, the infant mortality
rates had been rising steadily Horn a high 7?o to the even higher
figure of 9%, a fact which the head of the Kreis office for people's
health was most concerned to have to report to the Gau office in
2
March 1943. This increase in the infant mortality rates in the area
was, however, accompanied by a serious and steady decline of the
birth-rate, another matter for concern at this time, which had
prompted the setting up of an advice centre for childless couples in
MUnster.^ An increased effort to get all pregnant women in the area
to obtain NSl/ dietary supplements was reported to be underway and
unmarried mothers and their new babies were to be given as much help
as was available. The household help scheme too would be called
upon in all needy cases, which suggests that such help might not have
been as readily available in Westfalen-Nord up to then, though this
4
specific point was not made. It certainly seems that an examination
of local areas may be the only way in which specific claims of the
NSV can be put to the test, given the variation in the figures of
1. Ibid.
2. BA, R18/3781, 'Amt ftlr Volksgesundheit an das Gauamt Kreis




infant mortality rates throughout the country. By 1939, the infant
mortality rate had fallen to 6%, and it was to be hoped, as Dr. Conti
pointed out in his speech regarding the health of the population in
1943, the fifth year of the war, that it would be reduced further -
after the war - to or thereabouts."^ Thd war-time infant mortality
rates, he admitted, had shown a marked tendency to rise, this was for
various reasons, including an increase in digestive illnesses and the
increase in the numbers of air-raids. In 1943, the rate was 1.1%,
but showing a tendency at that time to fall slightly, so that it had
become all the more urgent to evacuate from the cities as many
pregnant women as possible.^
At a time of a growing effort by the MuK, the almost static
figures of the infant, neonatal and post-neonatal mortality rates
were mirrored in the death rates from 1931 to 1933 of small children
from the ages of 3-6 years, though not for those aged 1-3 years, more
of whom were surviving in 1933. Both accident and serious illness,
mainly lung infections, were seen to be taking a toll of the older
age groups with as much as 30?o of deaths of older children in 1935
being due to accident alone."'
1. BA, R18/3805, report of Dr. Conti, Stand der Volksqesundheit
im 5. Kriesgsjahr, Berlin-Wien, 1944, p.12.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst 1938, p.29.
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% of Deaths of children aged between one to six years
from 1931/1935











1-2 12.6 12.1 11.0 10.5 10.9
2-3 6.0 6.0 5.8 5.5 5.1
3-4 4.4 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.1
4-5 3.5 3.5 3.7 4.1 3.8
5-6 - 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.5 3.4 (1)
Bombastic statements which senior NSV officials were fond of
making, which underlined how the NSV should be regarded as having a
parental function, failed to point out that such 'parental' care
frequently missed the mark and only provided a watchful eye rather
2
than real welfare care as such. Interference by the NSV within the
lives of young women, who were roped into the RMD courses or were
persuaded to attend the MuK clinics, may have been the main or even
the only success of which the NSV could genuinely boast. The process
of interference and involvement within the socialisation process (in
the secondary phase) of young people, starting as it did with the
formation of the HJ, was further extended by the NSV's involvement in
the organisation of a training scheme for motherhood."^ The NSV/MuK
intended to alter the manner in which child-care skills were
1. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst 1938, p.29.
2. BA, NSD 30/4a, NS-Volksdienst, 1943, p.163.
3. for a clear explanation of the process of secondary
socialisation, see Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman,
The Social Construction of Reality, London 1971, pp.157-166.
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learned through the provisions of the RMD courses and the MuK
clinics. Skills which had earlier been picked up in an ad hoc manner
through contacts with older women family members were, from 1934,
intended to be transmitted primarily through the DFW and the NS\l.
Such interference showed itself too in the changes which were made in
the school curriculum after 1933 when, in the senior schools, the
provision of domestic science was extended at the expense of
mathematics, science and languages."'' It was not so much that an
intention existed whereby most women would be turned into housewives
and mothers rather than doctors or scientists, but that those who
were going to take up the occupation of motherhood would be trained
2
as never before to carry out their traditional duties.
The dissemination of sentimentality as well as rationality
within NSV pro-natalist propaganda reveals that a double-sided attack
upon the perceptions of women would be launched. The sentiments
contained in tear-jerking articles and poems about a mother's love,
were meant to be taken in along with advice about good hygenic
practices in infant care. This was no doubt to impart a 'rounded'
approach to the whole question of learning about motherhood, an
activity intended to relate closely to the values of the
Volksqemeinschaft. These two particular emphases would support and
maintain the goal of racial purity and the drive towards securing
the birth of 'Aryan' children. For those women who had previously
1. Stephenson, Women in Nazi Society, pp.116-128.
2. Jill Mclntyre (Stephenson), 'Women and the Professions
in Germany, 1930-1940', in A. Nicholls and E. Matthias
(eds.), German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler,
London, 1971, pp.203-209. Scholtz-Klink, Mutterschulunq
in Deutschland, p. 143; BA, NSD 30/7, Ewiqes Deutschland,
May 1937, 'Eine Wanderlehrerin des ReichsmOtterdienstes
im Deutschen Frauenwerk erztlhlt', p.12-14; c.f. V/.R.
Berghahn, Modern Germany, Cambridge 1982, pp.138-141.
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undertaken the activity of housewife and mother without consciously
being aware of the 'significance' of this occupation for the nation
as a whole, NSV and MuK propaganda would ceaselessly point up the
necessity of considering the needs of the community above, and
before, those of the individual. The numbers of women being
encouraged by the DFW to re-think the role of mother within Nazi
society came to five million by 1944. They had attended RMD courses
numbering thirty thousand in all, and at a rate of approximately
500,000 yearly from 1934. By 1941, the MuK clinics were being
visited by just over 10 million in one year which means that just
under 11 million women in 1941/2 were being taken into the welfare
facilities of the MuK and RMD together.^ By 1942, 36.3 million
women had passed through the MuK clinics and advice centres
altogether.^ In spite of all of this effort and expense, which had
not come out public funds but those of the private donations to WHW,
the birth-rate of 1942 was recorded at 15.2 live births per thousand
4
of the population. This war-time figure was higher than the one
recorded during the Great War, as the Nazis themselves boasted, but
it was also the same as the one recorded at the time of the
Depression in 1932 when the birth-rate was regarded as being at an
all-time low.^ Perhaps the infant mortality rates, which seemed to
have remained at about 6.4 and 6.6 per hundred live births until
1943, showed that a marginal success could be chalked up by the MuK.
1. Erich Hilgenfeldt, Idee, 'Der nordische Gedanke in der
Wohlfahrtspflege', pp.19-31.
2. Stephenson, 'Women in German Society, 1930/40', p.378.
3. BA, NSD 30/4a NS-Volksdienst April 1942, p.74.
4. Stephenson, 'Reichsbund der Kinderreichen', p.367.
5. Ibid.; St.J., 1937, p.37.
However, given that maternal mortality rates must also be included
in an assessment of successful maternity and child care, until these
are examined, it is clearly impossible to give more than a tentative
appraisal of MuK facilities. According to Dr. Conti, the maternal
mortality rate for women after giving birth had fallen during 1940
from 1 in every thousand to 0.6. The rates for 1936 had been 100
deaths due to child-bed fever in every 100,000 after giving birth;
this figure had fallen to 60 in every 100,000 in 1943."''
The chief successes which MuK could claim were the free holiday
schemes which proved to be both popular and successful, providing as
they did holidays for those whose income could not meet the extra
2
expense of a much-needed vacation. MuK welfare in the form of a
hand-out to the needy of food supplements, and other donations in
kind, on the other hand seems only to have been regarded as a
stop-gap until a better income could be achieved, and was less
welcome because of that and certainly less popular than MuK
officials intended they should be. An improvement in the birth-rate,
which was meant to be one of the main functions of the MuK, seemed to
exist to the extent of a return to the figures of the pre-Depression
period rather than of a substantial rise in the figures as such.^ It
also seems as though the improving infant mortality rate had reached
something close to its optimum level, in any case, with the MuK
apparently unable to encourage a further move downward in these
1. BA, R18/3803, Stand der Volksqesundheit, p.11.
2. BA, NS 22/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung',
'Mutterverschickung', p.31.
3. St. J., 1937, p.37.
Kershaw, 'Popular Opinion', pp.95-103:,
Stephenson, 'Reichshund der Kinderreichen', p.369.
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figures before the war. During the war itself the infant mortality
rate began to creep upwards again so that the welfare aid provided by
the MuK was unable to hold the figures steady, certainly by 1943 at
least. Maternal mortality rates seem to have been improving slightly
for they were not rising in war-time; however, this issue must be
gone into in greater detail before a conclusion can be reached. In
addition, the provision of MuK welfare, even when it was distributed
in the form of a daily help, did not necessarily persuade women to
take on the burden of another pregnancy, especially so since many
women were returning to the factory and the office from 1933/34."^
During the war, propaganda which was designed to persuade women to
return to work in order to contribute to the war effort was
singularly unsuccessful, even though MuK welfare would be available
to working mothers in the form of a daily help during short periods
2
of need, when circumstances proved to be making life intolerable.
It seems clear that the more 'successful1 aspects of mothercare
training in Nazi Germany was its ability to interfere in the lives of
women, for they had to open up their homes and reveal their kitchens
to the scrutiny of RMD officials (when undertaking a course in
child-care), in order that areas of 'inefficiency' could be
pinpointed.^ But it seems that there was little that the government
could do to influence women to produce more and more children, even
though emphatic pro-natalist propaganda was continually supplied
through the MuK and the RMD. Women who had completed their families
1. Berghahn, Modern Germany, p.140.
2. Stephenson, Women in Nazi Society, pp.136-172.
3. Scholtz-Klink, 'Mutterschuling', p.143.
were not persuaded by arguments to consider the needs of the nation
before their own, and they would continue to restrict the number of
children born to manageable proportions, in spite of continual
reminding to do the opposite.*
1. St. J., 1938, p.67.
Stephenson, 'Reichsbund der Kinderreichen', p.367.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE YOUTH WELFARE SECTION OF THE NSV
In 1934, the NSV/ set up a section for youth welfare. This was
the NSV-Jugendhilfe (NSVJ) and it was intended to function as an
addition to the existing arrangements for child and juvenile care
which was then being carried through by the state welfare system."^
To the extent that the NSV's own youth welfare facilities had to fit
in with the existing state system, it was closely involved with the
work of the state youth welfare offices at all times. For this
reason a study of Nazi youth welfare may be viewed also as a case
study of the impact of Party and state rivalries upon a substantive
area of social welfare from 1933. The following chapter can only be
regarded as an initial examination of the organisation of youth
welfare in Germany after 1933, for this requires not only a long
study devoted to itself which would examine the problems of Party and
state cooperation, but also the involvement of the churches as well.
For this reason, the following sections can only be regarded as a
preliminary study of the German youth welfare system from 1933/34.
The Party organisation's own youth welfare section operated
completely independently from the Hitler Youth which itself carried
out a programme of youth care. Indeed, the war would see the two
organisations coming more closely together in the work of
correctional education. The jurisdictional problems which sometimes
arose between the HJ and the NSVJ were nevertheless totally eclipsed
by the serious problems which would stubbornly continue to arise
1. EriedlSnder and Myers, Child Welfare in
Germany, pp.1-24.
between the NSV and its youth welfare section and the leading
officials of the state JuqendSmter. But the NSVJ would
nevertheless be forced to cooperate, however reluctantly at times,
with leading state officials who were in a position of some power
over the delegation of suitable cases to the NSVJ. Inevitably, youth
welfare in Germany after 1933 would exist as a double-sided provision
of Party facilities on the one hand, and those of the state's on the
other. Given the inherent contradictions which arose out of the very
nature of Party/state relations, youth welfare would be bedevilled by
the appearance of conflicting sets of proposals and counter
proposals coming from both NSV and state officials. Not until the
war would a more fruitful cooperation emerge in new formal
agreements, though at local level often enough these would be seen
as unworkable. From the beginning, jurisdictional problems would
come to vitiate the efficient provision of welfare within the youth
care measures of party and State; perhaps inevitably; problems
between rival officials would assume greater importance than the
actual practice of youth care itself.
As its newly created organisational framework indicated, the
NSVJ intended to achieve a powerful position in relation to the
existing social welfare system."^ The NSVJ had been created
ten years after the post-war developments of the Weimar system of
1. BA, NS 23/1162, discussion documents Hauptamt fdr
Kommunalpolitik, 'NSV und Gemeinden'; 'Gemeinden und
NS-Volkswohlfahrt, 1942j
BA, R36/1002; 1003, see documents with reference to
discussions by the officials of the DGT over a proposed
NSV assumption of control over 'dffentlichen FUrsorge'
(public assistance), 1938/39.
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youth welfare, albeit one which had suffered severe restrictions in
the years of the Depression. Nevertheless, even allowing for some
later reductions in the new arrangements, youth care had experienced
a complete overhaul of its organisational and operational procedures
when the new law of 1922 was put into force. The law of 1922 the
Reichsjuqendwohlfahrtsqesetz (RJWG) was of great importance to the
NSVJ in planning its new tasks. Given that the new government in
1933 had substantially retained these legal arrangements, they were
of some significance to the NSV officials who were required to
organise and to set up the new youth welfare measures. It is for
this reason that it is necessary to outline the shape of the Weimar
facilities in order to understand more easily how welfare for young
people was organised through the NSV, but also the state, from 1933."^
In the first few years after the Great War there had taken
place a reorganisation of the whole system of social welfare. In
1924 the Social Welfare Decree (ReichsfUrsorqepflicht) had
aimed to provide the legal framework within which new welfare
facilities would be made available to the most needy. Poverty and
distress, some had come to realise, were perhaps mainly attributable
to the impact of economic circumstances rather than to individual
2
fecklessness. State welfare was enlarged and it was grouped into
three branches:
1. Friedldnder and Myers, Youth Welfare in Germany, see Chapter
Three, 'The Legal Basis of Child Welfare in Germany', pp.3-23.
Elizabeth Harvey, St. Antony's College, Oxford, see unpublished
Conference Paper, June 1984, 'Youth Welfare in the Final Phase
of the Weimar Republic'.






It certainly seems as though this particular decree was also retained
after 1933, but it was the Reichs jugendwohlfahrtsqesetz to which
NSVJ officials would make frequent reference, rather than the law
for social welfare.
In line with the general reorganisation, it was decided after
the Great War that the existing system of youth care should be
extended and completely overhauled. Given the greatly increased
numbers of needy young people in the post-war period, it was
recognised that the facilities of the uncoordinated arrangements of
church and, only marginally, state provisions then in existence could
no longer be expected to meet the demands of an increasing need for
child and juvenile care. The knowledge that the war had created many
orphans and fatherless children also generated a growing concern
about the need to protect and support them. The intention to expand
and reorganise was therefore part of the current changes taking place
within the welfare system as a whole. The participation of the state
in the system of youth welfare would be designed with the cooperation
of the officials of the existing private agencies of the churches and
other independent bodies such as the Red Cross in mind. To some
extent the continued participation of the churches after 1933 was
firmly secured by these legal provisions, for there would remain




church facilities; state officials, as before, would continue to
direct welfare cases to church institutions and other facilities when
the occasion arose."'' The willingness of Nazi officials after 1933 to
use them was in many cases as much a matter of habit as of anything
2
else. This aspect of the Weimar youth welfare system would later
show a particular resistance to change even in 1939 when the churches
had been prevented from participating in certain important areas of
youth care."^ The Reichsjuqendwohlfahrtsqesetz, which had intended
to secure a cooperative partnership with the Juqendamt, the
protestant Innere Mission, the Catholic Caritas, and other agencies,
can be seen to have fulfilled many of its intentions given the
difficulties inherent in trying to make changes later, in the middle
and late nineteen thirties.
Before 1933, state facilities had been intended not only to be
participatory in nature but also democratic in intent. The
domination of the private charitable agencies would come to an end in
1924, and from that time the Juqenddmter would undertake to provide
an expanded system of care (albeit reduced in time of severe economic
difficulty).^ State officials, some of whom would later fight tooth
and nail to retain their own continuing participation, administered
the system of juvenile care, and it was the Juqendamt which would
have the duty of coordinating all this work.'' Commenting on the
1. BA, NS 23/403, Bormann to Frick, 'Auslegung des
Reichsjugendwohlfahrtsgesetz1, letter of 9th December 1935.
2. From 1934 the state Juqenddmter continued to make use
of church facilities according to the provisions of the
new law of 1922. These were often much cheaper than NSV
facilities.
3. BA, R36/974, Hilgenfeldt to DGT, letter of 1st October 1937.
4. FriedlSnder and Myers, Child Welfare in Germany, pp.1-14.
5. Ibid., pp.6-7.
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provisions of the new law, Dr. Gertrud BMumer, a senior government
official until 1933, praised the essential idea which lay at the
centre of its intentions:^
'The National Child Welfare Law which became effective on
the 1st April 1924, is an attempt to increase achievement
through purposeful centralisation. It brought together
the already existing public child welfare activities and
delegated them to one official body, the Juqendamt. It
went further however and included the entire private
activity in the field of child welfare, combining it with
the public in definite fashion. Private child welfare
activities are not only represented in the governing
committee of the youth welfare office, but the youth
welfare office is expected to encourage the private
agencies to cooperate actively and to make of them an
adaptable agent for carrying out particular activities.
(2)
The Weimar arrangements were intended to secure the long-
established and valuable contribution of the churches and sought to
retain what amounted to a wealth of experience within the whole area
of child and youth care.^ However, not only would the churches
continue to function after 1933, but they would, additionally, be
expected to take on part of the responsibility for the care of those
rejected by the Party welfare organisation, whether these were on the
grounds of 'diminished responsibility', or other unacceptable
categories such as the 'unworthy', 'asocial' or 'biologically
inferior' ones. The NSV issued guidelines on this and care would be




4. BA, NS 37ii/1031, Hilfswerk MuK,
'Richtlinien fdr die Beurteilung der Erbgesundheit',
14th October 1940. BA, NS 23/1199 (fol.l), Guidelines/
Agreement, NSW/Juqendamt, over.the work with 'erbgesunden',
'erziehbaren', 'rassisch', 'wertvollen' Juqendlichen, 1941.
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within the framework of the youth care of the Party. But the
familiar system of church/state facilities would not disappear; it
would very largely remain, and be recognisable to state officials who
would continue to organise the state subsidies for both Innere
Mission and Caritas.^
On the governing boards of the state Juqendamt before 1933 were
included representatives from the non-religious charitable agencies
as well as ministers of religion, officials of the Red Cross, the
political parties and other independent groups involved in the
provision of organised arrangements for the care and well-being of
2
juveniles. It was through this particular legal provision that NSVJ
representatives would have an opportunity to participate in meetings
(from 1934) of the Juqendamt boards, mainly, as observers. This
opportunity to participate would, however, not give any particular
advantage to the NSV, either in its claims for greater participation
in the work of youth care, or in its relations with the officials of
the JuqendSmter themselves."' When in 1939 new 'advisory' committees
were formed from which the ministers of religion were excluded, these
would fail to provide a forum from which a greater degree of
cooperation could develop. One may argue that lack of participation
on the new committees did not signify, even for the churches, a
particular loss of potential influence, for such participation was in
any case enervated by the process of Gleichschaltunq which had
removed the decision making function,
1. BA, R36/962; 964.
2. Friedldnder and Myers, Child Welfare in Germany, pp.3-21.
3. BA, R36/1418, 'Zusammenarbeit der JugendSmter mit der NSV/' ,
guidelines of 28th October 1938.
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transferring it upwards to the most senior officials of the
Juqendamt"^
The primary and compulsory duties of the state JuqendSmter,
ones which would largely remain, apart from certain alterations in
favour of the HJ, were as follows:
1. The foster-care of homeless children
2. Matters pertaining to guardianship of minors
3. Care of children in need
4. Assistance in the Juvenile courts
5. Protective supervision
6. Correctional Education
7. Cooperation in probation work
8. Supervision of the work undertaken by minors
9. Cooperation with war veterans' Bureau in the care of
orphans and children of persons injured in the war
10. Cooperation with police officials in the treatment of
juveniles through supervision with a view to preventing
unnecessary cases being taken into police custody
There existed a number of secondary (voluntary) duties which
included:
1. Counselling in matters affecting children and young
persons
2. The care of expectant mothers
3. The protection of infants and children of pre-school
years
1. Friedldnder and Myers, Child Welfare in Germany, pp.15-24.
The DGT and Fiehler had responsibility for making all top level
decisions. See also BA, R36/1002, 'Aufzeichnung zu der Frage
einer etwaigen Ubernahme der Offentlichen Fufsorge durch die
NSV', report of August 1939.
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4. The protection of children of school age
5. The protection of children who are no longer in school,
(1)
After 1934, the Party agency would be involved in the work
which referred to the first set of responsibilities, but in a
voluntary and a participatory manner only, for the NSV would not be
legally bound to provide social welfare measures in the light of its
2
frei status. Nevertheless, the NSV/ would also be involved in
measures with regard to the second list from 1-3; the section NSVJ
would include the last categories within its own particular frame of
reference. Fdrsorqe or remedial welfare measures would remain to be
a prime responsibility of the state, both before and after 1933, and
the NSV would be viewed as being able to offer its facilities as a
participatory contribution to that of the state agency. From this
point of view, Fdrsorqe would remain a prerogative of the state.
Most notably in this respect would be Fdrsorqeerziehunq (hereafter
FE) which was the most custodial of all the measures; eventual NSV
participation in this work (which included the transferral of cases
to reformatories for the purpose of receiving 'correctional'
education), would be limited to acting as a support for those cases
assigned to AussenfOrsorqe. ^
1. FriedlSnder and Myers, Child Welfare in Germany, pp.9-10.
2. BA, R36/962, Ministerial 'Erlass' (RMBL. U.S. 1314)
12th September 1938. See Chapter Two.
3. BA, R36/1996, Amt fdr Volkswohlfahrt Gau Kurhessen;
Hessen-Nassau, 'Richtlinien fdr Beaufsichtigung von
Kindern und Jugendlichen die in FUrsorgeerziehung
oder in freiwilliger Erziehungshilfe untergebracht
sind'. n.d. (71939); Ibid., instructions from the
Juqendamt Wiesbaden to Oberprdsident Hessen-Nassau,
'Aussenftlrsorge in der FUrsorgeerziehung' , with
regard to RMdl 'Runderlass' of 24th June 1939,
17th June 1939.
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But it is not clear how 'serious' these cases were in terms of
treatment required and the more difficult cases would of course be
sent to a reformatory or other similar facility, not to an NSVJ Home.
Often enough these would be run by the church agencies for they had a
long history of such work and would continue to be involved after
1939. The NSV had neither facilities nor staff for the full
application of correctional education and it would not be until 1943,
at the earliest, that the NSV would become involved - even then still
marginally - in such work, although preliminary attempts to become
more closely involved in £E were made during 1941."'' To some extent
the NSV would exist rather more in the manner of an agency which was
well able to provide Juqendpfleqe, or recreational care for
juveniles; when it also provided vorbeuqende (preventive) care, it
made what state officials regarded as being a worthy contribution.
Had the NSV been content to do only that then the history of juvenile
care after 1933 would have been quite different.
Before the Nazi takeover of the youth care facilities of the
Juqenddmter, which would be later organised and run by trusted Nazi
civil servants and other state welfare officials, there had occurred
a serious, even damaging curtailment of facilities due to the
Depression. This had the effect of allowing interested factions to
emerge who fostered particular emphases which had the effect of
introducing measures which by their use of selective processes
pre-dated certain inhumane practices of the NSV. Most notable of
these was the exclusion of certain types of 'less responsive' cases
1. BA, R36/1996. See correspondence August/September 1941;
Ibid., Verwaltunq des Provinzialverbandes Kiel, Landeshauptmann,
Dr. Schow to DGT, 'Zusammenarbeit zwischen FUrsorgeerziehunjS-
behdrden und NSV-Jugendhilfe' report of 12th August 1941.
from the expensive facilities of FT. It seems as though in 1929/30
many FT cases were released mainly in response to necessary cuts in
welfare funds, rather than on the basis of treatment completed. FT
itself was drastically reduced through selection procedures which
2
excluded the more hopeless cases. The financial crisis encouraged a
reduction of state participation in favour of that of the churches,
so that the 'balance' between state and non-state facilities altered
once more. This development did not dismay the Red Cross who looked
forward to an increase of the work of the independent, non-state
agencies once again.^ Indeed it has been argued in a recent study of
youth welfare in Weimar that the earlier balance between state and
private/non-state youth care, and the provisions of the law itself,
had been achieved only out of a hard-won compromise between prominent
liberal and social democratic reformers, radical left-wing social
4
workers and right-wing politicians.





The Organisation of the NS-Juqendhilfe
The creation of the NSV-Juqendhilfe in 1934 finally provided
the new Nazi welfare organisation with a fully comprehensive
programme of social welfare. At head office in Berlin the youth
welfare section Juqendhilfe was incorporated into Department III,
Wohlfahrtspfleqe und Juqendhilfe, under the control of Herman
Althaus."^ With the addition of a department designed to carry
through measures according to Nazi doctrines for the care, guidance
and general welfare of the young, the NSV had completed one of the
last stages in its pre-war development. Arrangements were set up for
the participation of full time and honorary staff in the work of the
juvenile courts, the care of illegitimate children, protective
supervision of juveniles, full abrogation of parental rights and the
2
official guardianship of minors and, later, adoption procedures.
All of these duties would of course continue to be carried out fully
by the state JuqendElmter which had prime responsibility for
providing these by virtue of the law. The Juqend3mter would now,
however, find that they would have to make provisions for a
cooperation with the NSV, and delegate to the NSVJ part of the work
of juvenile care. The NSVJ would thus provide extra help which was,
often enough, gratefully received."^
Once the organisation of the NSVJ had become established, more
ambitious plans would begin to make themselves apparent. In choosing
1. See Chapter Two, p.44.
BA, NS37ii/1001 fol. 2. 'Organisation Plan'.
2. Ibid., 'Das Wesen der nationalsozialistischen
Volkswohlfahrt', 1936 pp.1-2.
3. BA, NS25/1162, 'Gemeinden und NS-Volkswohlfahrt', 1942,
pp.1-2, such remarks refer only to the peace-time years.
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an initial form which was based on the state arrangements the NSVJ
hoped to be able to assume a fully competent role in relation to all
the legal responsibilities of the youth welfare offices, even though,
as an independent organisation, it was required only to fulfil a
supportive function. No precise requirement existed with regard to
either its form or its provisions. These were worked out as NSV
staff participated with the Juqendamt, so that it was a process in
action, not a previously worked out plan, and such arrangements were
meant to be supportive of the JuqendSmter mainly. For example, it
was impossible for the NSVJ to take up a case of FE_ without
participating with and through the Juqendamt.Right from the start
it was clear that Erich Hilgenfeldt and Hermann Althaus took very
seriously indeed the NSV's incursion into the whole field of child
and youth care.^
The organisation of the NSV-Juqendhilfe fbbtioned at Reich, Gau
and Ortsqruppe levels, although not every administrative form was
exactly duplicated throughout each one. At the level of the Reich,
the Haupstelle Juqendhilfe which was within the head office of the
NSV in Berlin, worked in direct contact with the Reich Ministry of
the Interior. Within the Gaus, responsibility for all NSV youth
welfare work was organised by a special Unterabteilunq Juqendhilfe,
and this special department was situated within the Kreis and Ort as
well. At Gau level, the department was responsible for the
systematic undertaking of all work carried out, indeed it acted
1. BA, NS25/1233, see RMdl 'Runderlass' of 1941, Section D.,
'FUrsorgeerziehung'.
2. HA, 13/239, 'Reichsrichtlinien fdr die NSV-Jugendhilfe',
'Organisation', pp.16-19.
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as a 'check and command point' and gave instructions to the Kreis and
Ort with regard to NSl/J measures. Unterabteilung Juqendhilfe was, in
turn, responsible to head-office in Berlin, and to Althaus in
particular. All correspondence with the leading administrative
authorities, for example, the Reichsleitunq or the Landes.juqenddmter
was channelled through the Gau office itself."'' The NSVJ at Gau
level also had the duty of making sure that a suitably trained
official was present at any discussions which took place between
leading Party officials of the Juqendamt and perhaps from the DGT as
2
well. Gau staff were expected to exercise control over the work
udertaken within the Kreisleitunqen; advice and support from senior
staff were made available to the Kreis offices especially with regard
to problems over finances (a most important issue). Questions
regarding the more troublesome welfare cases were referred to the
specialist staff of the Gau office. However, since the Kreisleiter
had the duty of advising and supporting the offices at Ort level too,
a completely hierarchic al system predominated, and was designed to
facilitate the 'filtering down' of expertise and advice.^ However,
all of this framework was regarded by state officials as being
insensitive to needs at local level, and it showed itself to be
unresponsive and slow to act; indeed they seemed to dislike the
rigidity which had been built into the NSV/J organisational plan.
This complicated structure had been designed, surprisingly enough,
with economy of operation in mind. It was expected to be reasonably





opinion thereby avoiding the employment of too many expensive
workers, or specialist staff, at each level.* None of this would
prevent, however, claims that the NSV was both inexperienced in the
work of youth welfare (which it was), and proving to be employing too
many voluntary, as opposed to paid and fully trained, workers who,
even if they were instructed and guided by the Gau staff, were
2
really not well-trained enough. The fact that inmost experienced
staff existed in the NSVJ Gau office with the duty to issue
instructions down through each level was one which failed to impress
most of the leading state officials who would continue to be
concerned about the lack of expertise among NSVJ honorary welfare
workers.
The Kreis office was responsible not only for passing on
instructions to the Ort level, but for supervising and organising all
training of the NSVJ voluntary and other staff. Most importantly,
the Kreisleitunq had the task of assuring, as far as possible, a
coordination of all ideological/political training in order that work
undertaken by the NSVJ staff was closely aligned with NSV welfare
policies in general.^ The Kreis office was also expected to form a
close cooperation with the Hitler Youth, an area in which it was not
always successful, and also with the schools and the employment
offices as well. It was therefore the Kreis office which handled
day-to-day problems, operating at the sharp end of the provision of
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NS25/1233, Kreisamtsleiter fdr Kommunalpolitik, Kassel to
DGT on increased NSVJ participation, 'Stellungsnahme zu dem
Entwurf einer Vereinbarung zwischen Jugendamt und NSV'. n.d.
(71941).
3. HA, 13/259., 'Reichsrichtlinien' , 'Organisation', pp.16-19.
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NSV youth welfare. Recruitment of voluntary or honorary workers fell
to the Kreis office too and it was expected that suitable persons
would be drawn from every possible source; from the civil service,
the teaching profession, the ranks of the women's organisation and in
some cases, the League of German Girls. The essential qualities of
the ideal NSVJ social worker were the ability, and the willingness,
to put in many hours of unpaid labour."'' A fairly typical example of
such a voluntary worker was someone who was just as likely to be
fully employed during the day, as well as non-employed housewives.
They would be expected to give generously of such free time as they
could, both in the evenings and at the weekends, and to attend
courses before taking up such work. If a man, he might be an NSV
Blockwalter or part-time worker for the Winter Aid, and perhaps even
a member of the SA too.^ By 1936, 34,291 trained staff of the NSVJ
(who were all salaried) were occupied in running the 26
Juqendheimst8tten and working in the 3,361 Erziehunqsberatunqs
-stellen of the NSV's youth welfare section."^
A dependence upon large numbers of honorary helpers who made
themselves available for social work duties with the NSVJ, meant that
the NSV itself had a vested interest in promoting the values of
selfless devotion to hard work which took little notice of
individualistic or privately motivated concerns. Such activity was
rewarded by being acknoweldged publicly by the NSV who printed
photographs of the tireless workers of the Volksqemeinschaft in the
journal Ewiqes Deutschland. A short list of the achievements would
1. Ibid.
2. NSD 30/7, Ewiqes Deutschland May 1937, p.30-31.
3. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung' p.33.
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be described, and they were given as an example to follow, a sign the
NSV declared, of that 'spirit of sacrifice' and service for the Volk
which all citizens of Germany ought to emulate."'' At Ort level, where
work was undertaken and organised within the office of the department
2
Mutter und Kind, staff would be expected to support the Kreis office
in the search for voluntary helpers whose suitability for these posts
depended utterly upon 'political reliability' as well as proof of
'Aryan' descent. By the end of 1938, the NSVJ was employing 76,287
youth welfare workers, the majority of whom were men, that is to say
33,720.3
The youth welfare policies of the NSV.
'Social work is concerned with social justice, social
security, and consideration of individual needs and
rights. These aims cannot be reconciled with the denial
of political, civil and religious liberties; suppression
of public criticism; encouragement of racial and
national prejudice; or the complete subordination of the
individual to the larger social unit'.
(A)
This statement was included in the first paper which was given at the
Third International Conference on Social Work held in London in July
1936. It had little to do with the current practice or the
philosophical direction of NSV social welfare in general; indeed the
statement pinpoints that which had been lost to German social welfare
after 1933, and the words were those of the American Chief of the
1. BA, NSD 30/7, Ewiqes Deutschland, May 1937, pp.30-31.
2. HA, 13/259, 'Reichsrichtlinien', p.10. BA, NSD 30/2
NS-Volksdienst, 'Die ehrentamtliche Heifer
in der dffentlichen Wohlfahrtspflege und in der NSV',
May/June 1938, p.252; 'Die ehrentamtlichen Mitarbeiterin
in MuK', p.254.
3. BA, NSD/30/11 Informationsdienst, July 1939, p.177.
4. Report of the III International Conference on Social
Work, London, 1936, London 1936, p.22.
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Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor who gave the paper
to the first General Session of the London Conference."^ It is
tempting to assume that the statement was made as an intentional and
barely disguised challenge which the German delegates, including
Althaus, Frau Scholtz-Klink and Erich Hilgenfeldt, who led the
delegation, could hardly fail to register. By 1936, as the American
delegates to the London conference no doubt realised, German youth
care - of the Party largely, and of the state perhaps less so - no
longer placed the needs of the individual at the centre of its
2
specific measures. Even though there existed in the youth care
section of the NSV a strong emphasis upon the need to 'educate' the
young towards a sense of service, a sense of Opferbereitschaft, at
the same time, juveniles would be supported and given care insofar as
they were each regarded as a 'useful' part of the greater whole. In
other words, the needs of the community would transcend those of its
individual parts. While the fundamental relationship between
community on the one hand, and its individual members on the other,
was a subject which Althaus, Reher and even Hilgenfeldt puzzled over
in both writings and speeches, such ideas were hardly new or
original. But they had received in Germany after 1933 a new emphasis
that was, if not original in conception, then utterly chilling in the
ruthlessness both of the manner, and of the means, through which new
1. Ibid.
2. Reher, Social Welfare, pp.1-12;
BA, R36/1996 Dr. Schow to DGT, 12th August 1941.
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ideas about the Volksqemeinschaft would be put across."^
The London Conference in 1936 was made aware of the alteration
and the shift of emphasis which had occurred in the German social
welfare system after 1933. It was made clear to the international
audience that the youth of the nation would be brought the benefits
of welfare assistance on the basis of certain 'principles' viz, that
individual needs even if they were of a serious nature, no longer
occupied a central position in the German welfare system.
/
Following from these propositions, the starting point of all
NSV/ juvenile care was held to be the larger social unit - in every
case. As the NSV/ put it in the Zusammenstellunq:
In the previous liberal system of youth welfare specific
measures were considered from the point of view of the
individual juvenile. National Socialist youth welfare
will however consider the needs of the community in
relation to juvenile welfare as a whole.
(2)
For this reason, Hermann Althaus in his paper Soziale Einqliederunq
in Deutschland which was written as a contribution for the London
conference, began his first statement with that favourite, most
repeated of Nazi statements, Gemeinnutz geht vor Eiqennutz."^ But
there seems no reason to doubt that, as head of the youth welfare
section of the NSV/, he meant it. In the measures outlined in the
Zusammenstellunq, the philosophical foundation of the NSV/'s youth
welfare scheme was explained, and the opportunity was taken to
1. As Erich Hilgenfeldt put it, 'Nur ein gesundes, starkes
V/oik kann die Aufgaben erfdllen, die der Herrgott uns als
deutsches Schicksal stellt', Aufqaben der Nationalsozialistische
Wohlfahrtspfleqe.
2. HA, 13/239, 'NSV/-Jugendhilfe', 'Zusammenstellung' , p.l.
3. Hermann Althaus, 'Soziale Eingliederung in Deutschland' in
A Contribution III International Conference, pp.6-14.
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emphasise that NSV youth and child care had nothing to do with
anything that had gone before."^ This was made only too clear when in
the outline it was declared that only certain categories of the young
would be given the benefit of NSVJ assistance. The distinctive
feature of such care was that resources would be restricted only to
those who could be regarded as 'qemeinschaftsfghlg ' (socially
worthy and socially capable) and 'erziehbar', (potentially educ-
2
able). Others who were regarded as anti-social in character to an
unacceptable degree, according to NSV welfare policies, would not
necessarily find that help would be forthcoming from the Party
organisation. Those who had shown themselves to be habitual
trouble-makers and potentially ineducable, would only be aided
insofar as valuable economic resources were not drawn away from the
more 'deserving' cases.^ The NSV was quite unashamed when it
proclaimed that it would provide care only for 'worthy' cases. For
it firmly believed that:
'the boundless charity of the last fifty years has been
concerned with the protection of the chronic sick and the
disabled, to the cost of the healthy, and if we seem to
employ harsh criteria, it is only in order to make it
possible that support for the potential worthiness and
capability of countless numbers of socially worthy
persons be made available for in the past nothing was
left over for these deserving cases.
(4)
1. HA, 13/259, 'Reichsrichtlinien' p.l. 'Die dabei
notwendigen Massnahmen werden in Rahmen der
nationalsozialistischen Familienhilfe durchgefdhrt
als Erg9nzung der natUrlichen Erziehungsfaktoren
Familie, Hitler-Jugend und Schule'.
2. Ibid., pp.1-4.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1001, fol. 2, 'Das Wesen' see,'Die
Aufgabe der NSV'. 'Wir verteilen keine Almosen',
pp.2-3.
4. Reher, Social Welfare in Germany, see pp.1-12.
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Juvenile care of the Party organisation provided assistance for
juvenile welfare cases coming from low-income and other families who
showed a certain forthrightness and ability to surmount financial and
other problems. Juveniles from such families would be given access
to all NSVJ resources if their families were, in addition,
'politically reliable' and of 'Aryan' stock. Poverty was not
regarded by the NSV as a 'social problem' as such, but as something
to be alleviated through Party welfare if possible; it would remain
however as a hard fact of economic life within the Third Reich for
many working - class people. Such lower income families who needed
extra welfare assistance from the NSV, either in the form of free
holidays for mothers and their small children, or other help in kind
from WHW and MuK, were certainly not regarded as 'feckless' because
of that. Given that the government wished to continue to pursue a
low wages policy no opprobrium would attach to wage-earners whose
income was below an adeguate level.^ The value of the NSV and its
various sections for the Nazi government, now including juvenile
care, rested upon the organisation's ability to meet some of the
problems which arose out of the government's own economic policies.
Poor, but socially 'worthy' families would be given help from all the
sections of the NSV including juvenile care. The family of a
juvenile under Schutzaufsicht (protective supervision) would be
allowed every help from the NSV social workers who would, to some
extent, treat the family unit as a whole by offering advice to the
parents and supporting them in the attempt to 'improve' the behaviour
of their offspring.^ j0 understand the NSV interpretation of the
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
socially 'worthy' category, it is necessary to look at the 'asocial'
label to see how the use of this, and also the 'potentially educable'
one, was part of the NSV's tendency to label cases of need according
to its own pre-selected list of social 'acceptability'. But these
had little, if indeed any, basis in a well-thought out (or well
argued) consideration of moral, ethical and social conduct
to serve as a model for the citizens of the 'new' nation. Far
from being attached to a firmly based conception of existing values,
criteria which attached to 'acceptability' or 'educability', were
utterly debased by being conceived as mere devices to foster the
political aims of the new leadership."^ While it would be incorrect
to say that Nazi values and those of the lower-middle and
middle-class were mutually anti pathetic - for clearly they were not
it is true to say that the liberal emphasis of earlier charity
based ideas of social welfare had slipped out of the grasp of the
Nazi view of charitable conduct and thereby out of the reach of the
2
design of the measures of the NSV itself. That the staff of the NSV
perhaps did not fully understand such criteria of 'acceptability' is
not surprising; that the officials of the state also did not was
perhaps predictable, given the need of state officials to conform to
certain modes of procedure which are capable of being administered."^
The various criteria of the NSV, especially in the measures designed
1. Reher, Social Welfare, see Introduction by Hilgenfeldt,
'Our most important and difficult task is to re-educate'.
2. BA, NSD 30.75, NSV. Propaqanda-Dienst, November 1944.
3. BA, R36/1001, report from DGT to RMdl, 'Zusammenarbeit
zwischen Offentlicher und freier Wohlfahrtspflege',
27th July 1938.
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for the care and protection of the young were not only difficult to
fully understand (most notably that of 'potentially educable'), but
virtually impossible to administer."'' State officials certainly
seemed to find this to be true, even though they themselves were
having to administer welfare payments in relation to the concept of
the 'asocial' category. That these categories of 'worthy',
'educable' and 'racially valuable' were being put to use in the
system of child and youth care was to their greater discredit. In
order to look at the petty and ill-thought out ideas which lay at the
base of some of the selective procedures of NSV administration, one
must examine the various articles and guidelines for staff which were
2
circulated internally, and distributed by head-office in Berlin.
In one of these internal information pieces of 1936, an example
of socially 'worthy' behaviour was outlined, no doubt to clarify to
NSV voluntary workers how choices between claimants were made."* A
short description of two hypothetical families was given whose income
and living standard were exactly the same, but, importantly, where
there was no question of 'political unreliability' or any other
serious barrier to receiving NSV aid. It was explained why
assistance would be given to one family, but not the other. In the
first case, the NSV voluntary worker had come upon a disorganised
household with neglected children who were being forced to live in
dirty conditions, clearly showing signs of parental neglect. Surely
this was a prime example where a social worker might offer help and
1. BA, R36/1996, see correspondence between leading
Prussian officials of the FOrsorqeerziehunqsbehdrde,
August/September 1941.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1001, Fol.2, 'Das Wesen'.
3. Ibid.
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advice. However, it was just this type of behaviour which showed
problems of perhaps an intractable nature, which the NSV advised its
staff to 'reject'. The reason for this decision lay in the degree of
'fecklessness' which was being exhibited so obviously by the family
under scrutiny. Indeed such a family was considered to be, if not
'asocial', for that was a more serious label carrying with it many
penalties within the Nazi state, then definitely 'unworthy' by virtue
of the degree of serious disorganisation which it had shown to the NSV
social worker."'' Indeed, 'worthiness' as described by the NSV often
looked like the ability to get on entirely without any help at all
from Party welfare workers. An example of a 'deserving' case was the
one which, in spite of exactly the same economic difficulties, ran an
organised and tidy home, in which clean though poorly dressed
children were properly looked after. The article drove home the
message by asking the question, 'which of these two families should
we (the NSV) help? Answer, the second!'. In the article, however,
it was admitted that the most obvious social need lay with the first
example, and it freely declared that the more traditional charitable
agencies would definitely favour family number one: but the NSV and
the NSVJ were not 'charitable' agencies. In the cause of efficiency
and economy, but also on the basis of a new perception of the nature
of social welfare, the NSV stressed how utterly essential it was that
the more obviously 'worthy' cases should be given help first so that





The 'asocial' category, if it was applied, allowed the NSV to
exclude individuals from the various honours which were given by
both the Party and the NSV. No family who had been in serious
conflict with the law, or who had tried to burden the welfare
services unduly or who had been seen to be financially incapable of
managing by being 'feckless' - for example by using the money
received from the child benefit schemes for useless luxuries rather
than for essential items for the family —would receive any
consideration from the NSV."^ Honours such as the Mother's Cross
would not be given, and benefits such as free holidays would be
withdrawn, indeed a family would find that Winter Aid might only be
given if extreme poverty could be shown which would result in any
2
children going without. Such 'feckless' parents would be liable to
a certain amount of harassment from local NSVJ staff, especially if
there were very young children in the family. They would set about
'looking out' for instances of child neglect. Should that be shown
to be the case then the family would be contacted and included in the
remedial section of the Jugendamt. Of the various measures which
might be applied, the most likely one, in this case, was
'Schutzaufsicht'. ^ The NSVJ would only continue to make contact
with such an 'asocial' set of parents if the children were
potentially 'educable' or 'biologically worthy' - only then would
1. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst March 1939, see
section III, list of 'asocial' categories in
'Merkblatt fUr die Auslese der Mutter, die ftlr
Verleihung des Ehrenkreuzes, der deutschen Mutter
vorgeschlagen werden sollen', p.104.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., see also 'Jugendhilfe ftlr Kinder aus politisch
unzuverlMssigen familien', p.168.
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their own facilities be made available. Otherwise the state
provisions only would come into operation, even though in many cases
the NSVJ might be the referring agent in the first place.^ These
harsh policies were readily admitted to be uncharitable, but by
pursuing a ruthlessly hard line, the Party agency would 'protect'
those who came 'first'. Such a policy, with its Social Darwinist
overtones, would be systematically followed through in all Party
welfare care. Once the criterion of 'worthiness' had been
established, it became virtually impossible for the NSV to include,
except on a last resort basis (if economic resources allowed), those
who certainly according to most criteria would be regarded as
having a genuine and urgent need of social work assistance. Neither
is it difficult to see how arbitrary the labelling of claimants into
'worthy', 'unworthy' and 'asocial' cases must have been. The
officials of the state welfare offices were not slow to see this, and
many other problems of both a conceptual and a practical nature which
the NSV had allowed to come into its social welfare policies. Given
its independent status, harsh policies could be pursued without the
NSVJ coming into difficulty with legal reguirements to provide
juvenile care. Not surprisingly, state officials resented the manner
in which NSV officials could include, or reject, welfare cases
2
according to their very own strict rules and regulations. None of
these were illegal of course, but being strictly applied especially
in respect of the 'biologically' unhealthy category, in the opinion
1. Ibid.
2. BA, R36/1418, Wohlfahrtsverwaltung, Jugendamt Stettin to
DGT, 'Besprechung uber die Zusammenarbeit der JugendSmter
mit der NSV', 18th November 1938.
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of staunch Nazi state officials, such asFiehler of the DGT, they
greatly complicated the work of state social welfare. Much extra
work and trouble was given to state officials who had to shoulder the
burden of excluded cases from the NSV."'' State officials seemed to
be entirely sceptical of a rigid set of rules which moreover, they
had no time themselves to put into force. While the Juqend£mter
kept to racial guidelines regarding 'Aryan' descent, or applied the
2
'asocial' category when it was required, the very narrow
of the
distinctions of the 'biologically worthy' onesLNSV were not favoured
by state youth welfare officials, and they showed themselves to be
impatient of NSV nit-picking in this area."^ Nor were state officials
able, or willing, to make such fine distinctions as they themselves
pointed out, but neither were they legally required to do so.
Moreover, such work would have been hopelessly time-consuming and
impossible to administer in a regular manner throughout all the
4
JuqendSmter in Germany. One gains an impression that state
officials strongly disliked the NSV's tendency to extend the
'unworthy' categories, which may have been regarded as expanding the
'asocial' designation beyond 'reasonable' limits. Clearly, they
felt, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to carry on with the
work of youth care if they too were required to use the fine
1. Ibid., the 'splitting' of responsibilities between NSVJ
and the state provisions would only result in extra work.




distinctions of the NSV's 'potentially educable' label in an
assessment of welfare cases.^
The depth of irritation which was aroused by NSV policies on
this matter was made very clear in 1941, during discussions of NSV
proposals to be involved to a greater degree in correctional
2
education in Prussia. Many worries were expressed on the part of
the leading officials of the Prussian FT boards over the lack of any
clear guidelines for particular methods of choice of 'suitable' cases
for the NSV. These, in the main, seemed to be not only ineffective
but beyond the ability of long experienced state welfare officials to
follow. The issue under discussion was the one of the exclusion of
'unworthy', 'ineducable' and 'biologically unworthy' categories from
NSVJ homes. Interestingly enough the Prussian FUrsorqeerziehunqs-
behdrde unanimously questioned such policies, not so much on the
basis of their inherent wickedness, but on the less emotive one of
sheer ineffectiveness.^ Both in practice and in conception these
policies, it was felt, were too rigid. This is not to say that Nazi
policies on the question of the 'racially valuable' had also been
rejected, but that it was privately admitted that the NSV's policies
with regard to correctional education, at least, would prove to be
1. Ibid., as one report puts it, 'That the distinctions
(between GemeinschaftsfShiq-unfahiq) cannot be carried
out is shown by figures in Prussia where in a four year
activity in the work of FT in which 6,000 cases have been
taken up, only 25 of these have been accommodated in an NSV
Home'. This exceedingly low figure refers only to cases
'in treatment' rather than those FT cases being taken up
after an initial spell in non-NSV Homes; i.e. in 'nachgehender





It was agreed, in the form of not very strong hope, at the
conference of the Prussian FT Boards, that Party welfare should
restrict itself to social welfare activities with less 'difficult'
clients such as mothers and children, or with other preventive
measures which the NSl/ had taken over and in which they had (to some
extent) gained a monopoly and this included Familienfdrsorqe. In
this and other less 'complicated' welfare measures, the Prussian
officials showed themselves to be pleased to delegate to the NSV. To
some extent they believed that such measures had been shown to be
really effective and were to be greeted warmly - especially in time
of war. However, during 1941, most importantly, the NSV with an eye
on the wider field of FT and its administration in Prussia had failed
to persuade experts in juvenile care that there was a possibility of
making a really worthwhile contribution to the whole question
of institutional, correctional education. Apart from jurisdictional
problems which arose at the time, the really harsh, selective
policies of NSV child and youth care alienated the support of the
Prussian Boards for an increased level of NSVJ case work in this
2
area. One senior official at least seemed to be shaken by NSVJ
policies and declared them to be 'absurd' for the purposes of
correctional education. This issue would be taken up again in 1943
but this will be further examined in Chapter Seven. At this point
the question must arise, why, or for what reasons, were these
1. Ibid., p.7. It was also believed that only a small section of
cases would be taken up by the NSV, those who were considered
to be 'erziehbar', in other words, who showed to the NSV
definite 'proof' of educability.
2. Ibid.
policies so inflexible - for so they were regarded by state officials
in Prussia and elsewhere."'' When experienced state welfare officials,
who were Nazi supporters and Party members, regarded NSV policies
often enough as unworkable, why did such rigidity exist in NSV/NSVJ
policies even when the problem of caring for the more serious
juvenile welfare cases came to the fore? These and other related
issues may be answered in two ways, firstly, by saying that in
conception, Party welfare was extremely abstract, viewing individual
welfare cases in ways not customary for an organisation supposedly
designed to help the needy. A ruthless determination to foster
certain social values which revolved around the concept of
'community' lay at the base of NSV philosophy, but the collection of
at times unrelated ideas - rather than the construction of a
philosophical framework - sought to relate these to particular
'duties' existing within the framework of the political aims of the
regime itself. Secondly, Party welfare sought a new theoretical
base, wishing to find a new frame of reference which would be
relevant to and intimately connected with the idea of
Volksgemeinschaft. Welfare which was carried out within the
Volksqemeinschaft would have to allow for the claims of that entity
if it was to remain ideologically 'true' to Nazi goals, both in
conception and in practice. Welfare policies which supported
individual Volksqenossen would have to make first reference to the
whole community before its individual parts if, that is, they were to
remain logically fixed within their own set of ideals, however opaque
1. Ibid., 'The 'GemeinschaftsfShigkeit' of juveniles cannot be
decided before the entry to FT it can only be decided after
lengthy observation under medical and pedagogical supervision'.
BA, NS 37ii/1001, 'Das Wesen', Fol. 2, pp.1-6.
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they undoubtedly were.
There existed a distorted comprehension in NSU ideas (and in
Nazi ideals) regarding the nature of hard effort and the need to
develop a sense of 'self-help'. The N5V perspective stressed that
'pitiless' goals were the ones for which the newly 'strengthened'
nation would continuously have to strive. But these themselves were
conceived out of a whole range of cloudy, emotional outpourings which
attached to the claims of devotion to a charismatic Leader. The
idea of a 'pitiless' charity, located as it was in Nazi aims, was
part also of the NSV's deep and abiding interest in the moulding of
2
social attitudes regarding 'duty' and 'self-reliance'. As they
themselves were to say, 'our welfare has nothing to do with
charity'."^ But a contradiction had crept into such ideas as they
were transmitted through propaganda, and this could only serve to
obscure the call to the Volksgenossen to put behind them their own
selfish interests and concerns. The determination to foster these,
and other related ideas, all came within the framework of a call to
'strengthen' the nation. This allowed a serious misunderstanding of
the nature of charity and charitable behaviour to emerge, not only in
4
the writings but in the practices of NSV welfare itself.
Given the need, and the desire, to relocate certain traditional
values of cooperative activity within the still unrealised
1. Althaus, 'Soziale Eingliederung', see 'Die sozialen
Prophylaxe', in A Contribution/Ill International Conference,
pp.10-14.
2. Reher, Social Welfare, pp.1-12.
3. Ibid.
4. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst, July 1939, see section,
'Aus der Erziehungsarbeit der NSV-Jugendhilfe', pp.168-173;
see also 'NSV Jugendhilfe-Allgemeines', p.174.
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Volksqemeinschaft, this was not surprising. Such values would have
to be detached from their traditional base - from their roots in the
working-class and be transferred into the new social entity which was
still in the process of creation, for the Volksqemeinschaft still
had to emerge. This is not to say that cooperative values (or goals)
were unknown among the lower-middle or middle classes, but that such
social behaviour according to some sociologists, at least, describes
more closely the social patterns prevailing within working-class
life"*. These values would, in the Nazi Volksqemeinschaft, be 'tacked
on' as it were to the individualistic emphasis on 'self-help' (or
even self-improvement) which characterised lower-middle class
patterns of behaviour. Given the intention to foster such a
development, but as a manipulative measure entirely, it was bound to
2
fail so that the unified, people's community would never emerge.
That this complicated task would have to be undertaken also by the
propaganda of the NSV is clear, for this emphasis exists in every
measure in one form or another. Given that the nation would be urged
from 1933 to 'discover' the cooperative values through the medium of
the self-regarding ones of self-help and individual effort, a serious
distortion of the nature of charitable activity would also take
place. This, in turn, would lead to a perverse variant of the Nazi
slogan, 'the common interest before that of the individual' emerging
in NSV policies as, 'self-help before charity'. That self-help might
not logically be equated with 'common interest' (even though it might
be with 'strength', or Nazis first, the rest last), would lead to a
markedly cruel emphasis upon the need to exclude everyone who
1. John H. Goldthorpe et al, The Affluent Worker in the Class
Structure, Cambridge 1971, p.13.
2. Alternatively, the cooperative values describe social patterns
in traditional communities, see R.A. Nisbet, The Sociological
Tradition, London 1970, pp.47-107.
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might be seen to endanger the interests of the larger group. These
contradictions would exist in the welfare policies of the NSV and in
the selection procedures of cases for treatment in the NSV section
devoted to juvenile care.
A flat and repetitive tone suffused the attempts in NSV
writings to deal with ideas such as the relative unimportance of
individual need. But this was not a stylistic fault entirely, for it
was part of the related inability to formulate a more complicated set
of ideas than the ones which had existed during the 'time of
struggle', and which were relevant to that time alone. The
impossibility of transferring these into the value system of a
sophisticated society led to serious and cruel inconsistencies
flowing into the welfare system itself."^ Where charity as dispensed
by Nazis had once been a matter for a small in-group protecting
itself in a hostile environment, it now became something which would
be transformed into an ideological issue; one of 'care' exclusively
directed towards the 'community'. Individual need would simply
disappear from the picture.
Perhaps the results of all this mistaken effort to relocate the
values of 'community' and 'cooperation' within a mythical social
entity were seen most clearly during the war. The failure of these
attempts has been outlined in a recent study of Wdrttemberg where,
under pressure from war-time rationing, the more familiar
self-seeking (not necessarily selfish) attitudes came to the fore
once again - had they ever been replaced? Long-held traditional
values and practices came to the surface once more; indeed,
1. Hilgenfeldt, Idee; see also outline of NSV training courses,
see 'Stoffplan-Kindergdrtnerinnen', NS 37ii/1031, n.d.
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self-help as it might normally be interpreted, came to spoil the war
effort through the unwillingness of the population to conform with
the rules and regulations of war-time rationing. The war effort was
thereby seriously affected by such a lack of willingness either to
participate in the cooperative values of Volksqemeinschaft, or to
give in to pressure from the regime itself."^ The long-term aims
of the NSV would ensure an adherence to a rigidly held view of a
non-charity based, harsh provision of welfare which would also be
applied in its youth welfare section. The many difficulties which
this caused would only lead to the questioning of NSV policies by
leading state officials who themselves could only wonder at times
about the real worth of such policies given their inherent
weaknesses.^
Regardless of the more traditional practices of social welfare,
and even regardless of individual need, help would be dispensed by
the NSV when such help was properly located within its own
ideological base, and nowhere else. Even if that particular base did
not necessarily relate to the practice of welfare care and went
against the intentions of state officials, it would not be
disregarded. And such seems to have been the case, for there was no
indication that Hilgenfeldt would alter any of the more fundamental
NSV ideas regarding care for those in need to suit the needs of
certain substantive areas of the social welfare system. The
absurdity of preferring certain 'acceptable' modes of behaviour over
1. Jill Stephenson, 'War and Society in WUrttemberg,
1939-1945: Beating the System', German Studies Review,
February 1985, pp.89-105.
2. BA, R36/1996, Dr. Schow to DGT, 12th August 1941.
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others in, an assessment of children under observation for the
placement of FE_, and looking for behaviour, or physical attribute,
which virtually exempted them in the first place from needing such
care, hardly needs emphasising, as state officials in private at the
time were able to point out- Nor was it believed that in the
complicated and difficult work of correctional education, the
honorary helpers of the NSVJ could contribute much of value. It was
feared that they simply had neither experience nor training for such
work to which they had brought only their own limited, personal
experiences of family life."''
Nevertheless, in spite of the hostile stance of some state
officials, the NSV endeavoured to simultaneously carry through an
'educational' function as well as a welfare one within their youth
care measures. Indeed the NSV and the NSVJ continually stressed how
important the role of 'educator' was. Within youth welfare
especially, the lesson which they wished to drive home was not only
the development of the spirit of 'self help' (either in individuals
or within the family unit), but the awakening of a sense of civic
responsibility in the hearts and minds of the young. It was these
two virtues which would supply the corner-stone of the new 'strength'
2
of the people. The very substance of the NSV's youth welfare
measures, supported as it was by an altogether abstract conception of
the role of the 'worthy' citizen, would not alter significantly and
it would continue to reject the more 'charitable' characteristics of
the Weimar period. By excluding entirely from NSV youth welfare the
1. Ibid., 'Die ehrenamtlichen Heifer der NSV sind fdr die
Mitwirkung in der FE^ nicht geeignet, weil sie lediglich die
Erfahrungen aus ihrer eigenen Familie mitbringen und gar nicht
wissen oder nicht wissen kdnnen, was sie mit 'verbogenen'
Kindern anfangen sollen', see report of 9th September 1941.
2. Hilgenfeldt, Idee.
idea of charitable aid for those in need, it became easier to reject
those who were not only socially or politically 'unacceptable' in NSV
terms, but those who were 'biologically unhealthy' as well."^ As
instructions to the Landesjuqendamt der Rheinprovinz in 1934,
outlined,
'it should be remembered that in the co-operative work of
the state youth welfare office, the church agencies and
the NSVJ, as far as the latter is concerned, only the
'biologically healthy' will be allowed to make use of the
resources of the NSVJ'.
(2)
As one official of the NSV put it,
'It is to be remembered that as the religious agencies
place the charitable nature of their work at the
forefront of all welfare measures, it will be to them,
and not the NSVJ, that the care of the 'asocial' and the
'hereditarily sick' will be assigned.'
(3)
DGT fears that the NSVJ would eventually leave the burden of caring
for the physically disabled,and others coming within the NSV rejected
categories, not only to the churches, but to the state agency as well,
were quite justified.
The institutional and other care which was organised by the
NSVJ placed a high degree of emphasis upon re-training and
re-educating those in their care. The numbers of those being cared
for under NSVJ Schutzaufsicht or protective supervision in 1936 were
13,587, and this figure would rise to 28,478 in 1937. Altogether
1. While this was not a logical step, once the process of
'exclusion' of certain categories got underway it encouraged
a tendency to reject all potentially 'useless' individuals;
see BA, NS 37ii/1001, fol. 2, 'Das Wesen', pp.2-4.
2. HA, 13/259, 'Zusammenarbeit mit der freien Wohlfahrtspflege',
report of December 1935.
3. Reher, Social Welfare, see pp.1-12. BA NSD 30/11,
Informationsdienst, March 1939, 'Bevdlkerungspolitik,
Erb-und Rassenpfege', pp.99-104.
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between 1936 and 1938, 72,861 juveniles were delegated from the
Juqendamt and came under NSVJ 'protective supervision'. Young people
in this category had been held to be in danger of total moral
neglect, or to be committing petty crimes: either case resulted in
Schutzaufsicht being applied through the JuqendSmter, but did not
necessarily result in the person's being placed within institutional
care. FUrsorqeerziehunq on the other hand usually resulted in the
removal of the juvenile from the influence of the family home.
Between 1936 and 1938, 45,973 cases, mainly of the non-institutional
variety it seems, were 'transferred' to NSVJ care and a much
smaller number of cases altogether were taken into institutional care
in the existing N5l/-Juqendheimst8tten of which 40 existed at the
end of 1938."^ These homes provided 2,547 available beds for such
2
cases. FT under the Nazis seems not to have followed a uniform
pattern within state institutions and Homes, with some using very
harsh regimentation, while others followed a more 'enlightened'
regime to instil the values of self-reliance and self-discipline.^
However, the former example, that of strict regimentation, seems
mainly to have become more apparent during the war and no doubt the
NSVJ too employed a strict regime which had, increasingly, fewer
4
members of staff to deal with 're-education'. The conditions in
NSVJ institutions under which young people had spent some time, were
supposed to encourage a useful return into the Volksqemeinschaft.
1. Ibid., July 1939, p.177.
2. Ibid.
3. Basic and Zonal Handbook, 'Youth Welfare', p.16.
4. Ibid.
5. HA, 13/259, 'Reichsrichtlinien', pp.1-19.
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iA typical NSVJ Home before the war accommodated between 30 and 40
juveniles, and was designed to take on the character of a large
family community."^ During a stay in one of these the youth would be
expected to attend both school and the local HJ. Normally he would
be expected to remain in institutional care for a period of a few
months only, up to the maximum of one year, for the NSVJ was mindful
of avoiding the consequences which might follow from a longish stay
in an institutional environment. As the NSVJ itself put it, to
2
avoid, 'an estrangement from the requirements of practical life'.
Even though NSVJ officials could show themselves to be 'enlightened',
in this respect, they were less concerned about the individual
juveniles than with a desire to avoid rendering those who had spent a
long period in a Home under the provisions of FE,and other measures,
incapable of leading a useful life once a return to the normal
conditions of social life had been made.^ The NSVJ were usually
careful about ensuring, as far as they could, that no extra burden on
the community would be created by their own particular social work
4
measures. However, it is difficult to say how far they were
successful in this respect; no doubt the desire to save money may
have served as an extra encouragement to shorten the length of an
average stay.'' The percentage of delegated cases of FT, as opposed
to other NSVJ care in 1938, was 4.2%, and non-institutional care,
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., see also 'Zusammenstellung', pp.1-7.
4. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 'Reichsrichtlinien', pp.1-19.
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such as welfare advice to juveniles, came to 16.In other words
the use of FE_ was not significantly greater than other measures but
this was due mainly to difficulties in co-operating with the
Jugendamt, and in the nature of NSVJ care itself which stressed
Vorsorqe not RJrso£ge,' Schutzaufsicht or protective supervision came
to 5.9?^ of the total amount of cases in 1938.^ By 1938, the total
number of youth welfare cases of the NSVJ throughout the Reich came
to 441,144 and was seen to average between 33,300 and 40,000 cases
per month during the year."^
1. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst July 1939, p.178.; see also
BA, N5 25/1233, 'Entwurf' RMdl, January 1941.
2. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst July 1939, p.178.
3. Ibid., p.179.
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Troubled Relations between the NSV and State Facilities
for Youth Care
The existence of organised Party welfare from 1934, as state
officials were soon to be aware, could only serve to create
significant alterations (for the state agency) within the delicately
balanced structure of private and state welfare."'' The system of
youth welfare had not been designed to accommodate a non-state agency
which sought not only to dominate the private agencies, but the state
sphere as well. From 1937 it was to prove that these issues would
increasingly come to the fore. Until an effective clarification of
the existing laws over the relationship between NSVJ and state
officials was provided, or until a policy with regard to the role of
the private agencies was worked out between the Party and leading
Nazi officials in Berlin and Munich, then juvenile welfare would
remain a potential battle-field upon which the ambitious claims of
2
the protaganists of Party and state would be fought out.
Inevitably, youth welfare would become an area where a bitter
struggle for power would come to vitiate those measures which were
intended to provide care and protection for the young. Issues such
as adoption procedures especially, and the provision of
institutional care would soon become jurisdictional, not welfare
matters per se."^ Leading Party and state officials would be pulled
into the continually emerging arguments over the balance of the
1. BA, R36/1001, see correspondence of 1938.
2. Ibid., discussion document 'Zusammenarbeit zwischen
tiffentlicher und Freier Wohlfahrtspflege', 1938.
4. BA, R36/1996, 'Aufzeichnungen Uber die Besprechung
zwischen Vertretern preussischer FUrsorgeerziebungsbehdrden',
9th September 1941, report on proposed NSVJ participation in
correctional education.
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various youth welfare provisions. In any matter which concerned
state over Party control, Frick would be prepared only to support
the claims of powerful officials such as Muthesius of the RMdl and
others. On the other hand, Hess and Bormann were prepared to give
support to NSl/ claims, though not unreservedly. Such disputes would
emerge as a common occurrence and would involve Frick, Bormann, Hess,
Fiehler, Hilgenfeldt and RMdl personnel in time-consuming and, often
enough, fruitless discussion."^ According to the opinions of several
of the leading state and Party officials of both the DGT and the
department for Kommunalpolitik, the NSV/J was determined to achieve
the fullest participation in youth welfare, but it also showed itself
to be desirous of achieving a supremacy over all youth care, as well
as other state welfare arrangements such as the provision of public
2
assistance (flffentliche FUrsorqe). While the NSV would remain
unsuccessful in the latter case because of a strong defence by state
officials in 1939, it seemed likely that the NSV/J would eventually
gain its wishes, if not sooner, then later. But the state system of
juvenile welfare would not easily succumb to pressure, since senior
staff of the Juqend9mter had no intention of allowing the NSV to
disrupt, and then take over, the responsibilities of the officials of
the state without a real struggle."^
The issue of the balance between state and non-state facilities
for social welfare which had arisen in the last years of the Weimar
1. BA, R36/1001/2/3; 962/964/974; 1418; 1996. Correspondence
between Hilgenfeldt and leading state officials can be found in
the files of the DGT and the department for Kommunalpolitik: the
files of the NSV/ such as NS 37ii are not so useful, for this only
contains much routine correspondence.
2. BA, R36/1002, see correspondence of 1938/39.
3. Ibid.
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Republic, emerged again and was subjected during the Nazi period to
the impact of an increasing number of dilemmas. Between 1935 and
1939, these would generate a massive correspondence going between
NSV, DGT, RMdl and the state JuqendMmter senior staff, with numerous
study papers also being produced by state and Party officials. In
addition, the NSV would be unable to produce such interesting
material as its opponents who were keenly motivated at this time to
make a spirited defence of their own facilities."^ The contribution
of the NSV seems to have been restricted mainly to the production of
the draft for a new law in January 1934, so that such considerations
at
had been in mind^this time. The NSV would, of course, take over the
Arbeitsqemeinschaft der freien Wohlfahrt later in the year and the
draft proposals were drawn up under NSV direction. These proposals
outlined the responsibilities of state, church and the 'Kraft der
Volksqemeinschaft', all of whom - though no doubt not equally - would
2
have the task of supporting and protecting German youth. It is
clear that the NSV had already realised that if it were to obtain a
significant share of the work of the state welfare system, then it
must do so under conditions which would, at first, relate to the
existing legal arrangements. But it seems that this attempt to draw
up a new law and discard the one which had been designed with a
strong state participation in mind, would come to nothing. But this
would not work against the NSVJ, on the contrary, for the law was
designed with the protection of non-state agencies in mind and could
1. BA, R36/1002, see report of meeting between NSV and DGT
officials in Berlin, 27th February 1939.
2. HA, 13/259, Reichsqemeinschaft der freien Wohlfahrtspfleqe
Deutschland, 'Entwurf eines Reichjugendgesetzes',
3rd January 1934.
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only work in favour of the frei NSVJ. The democratically conceived
law of 1922 worked in favour of the expansionist claims of the NSV
and, frequently enough, entirely at the expense of the state
arrangements. Thus it would be Fiehler of the DGT who would consider
that a new law should be drawn up after the war, not, as far as can
be discovered, Hilgenfeldt.^ Nevertheless, it does seem that a
strong non-state system had existed in minds other than Hilgenfeldt1s
for in Prussia in 1933 it looked as though non-state facilities would
be given strong support. But this seems only to have been an
uncharacteristic aberration of Goering, who had been interested at
2
that time in this idea. However, such moves to reduce the state's
role were only to mis-read the future direction of the regime; they
were to miss the mark entirely. From the time of the creation of the
Deutscher Gemeindetaq in 1933, there existed little real possibility
that the participation of the state would diminish."'
Juvenile care failed therefore to offer the scope, or the
opportunity, for an ambitious early Party domination of the welfare
system. The youth care of the Party had entered into a sphere where
others had long been active. Not only the state, but also the
churches would be unwilling to relinquish their own participation in
the juvenile care system in favour of the new Party organisation.
It was one thing rapidly to build up the NSV's 'Winter Aid' through
1. BA, NS 23/1270, 'Jugendhilfe im Rahmen der Gemeindlichen
Selbstverwaltung', speech to the Hitler Youth given by Fiehler,
n.d. (71943).
2. Friedldnder and Myers, Child Welfare in Germany, pp.20-21.
3. BA, NS25/124, Fol.l, \/B, 'Der Auftakt der Kommunalpolitische
Schulungswoche', 5th December 1933.
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the auspices of the Propaganda Ministry, thereby creating a huge
welfare scheme which would remain entirely a matter for the NSV/, but
quite another to make a premature bid to take control over the whole
system of juvenile welfare care in Germany. But this is not to
underestimate the influence of the NSV/ and its new youth welfare
facility. It gained significant victories, one of these being the
ability to make strong and successful representations when it looked
as though NSV subsidies were coming under fire from officials who
where trying to reduce expenses, as well as perhaps, trying to limit
the scope of the Party organisation.
Of the various documents which were devoted to an examination
of this situation, perhaps the most sensitive of these came from the
office of the department for Kommunalpolitik. It was written by
neither an NSV/, nor a state welfare official, but by someone who was
concerned to examine the whole question from the point of view of the
2
Gemeinde, or local government and local community arrangements. It
was explained how welcome the new participation of the NSV/ had been,
at least at the beginning. This had been welcomed on the basis of
the need for extra help, however good relations between NSVJ and
local government staff had become erroded entirely by the actions of
the NSV/, certainly by the beginning of the war."' More in sorrow than
in anger it seems, the document set out the serious problems which
had affected the whole area of social welfare, not only youth care
itself. The DGT had realised in 1939 that a major part of the
1. BA, R36/962, Hilgenfeldt to Dr. Lippert, letter of 7th December
1936; see Chapter Two, p.69.
2. BA, NS25/1162, 'Gemeinden und NS-V/olkswohlfahrt', p.2.
3. Ibid., pp.1-24.
'attack' coming from the NSV over the question of the administration
of public assistance rested upon two serious accusations. Firstly,
that state social welfare was 'too bureaucratic' in form and
organisation, with no interest being shown in the importance of the
need to reduce staffing levels. Secondly, and more seriously
perhaps, was the suggestion that the material substance of all state
welfare belonged within the previous era,and its perceptions were
'rooted' in the liberalistic period of the Weimar Republic. The NSV
leadership seriously suggested that state officials were
'excessively' concerned with devotion to fixed norms of procedure and
efficiency of operation which themselves interfered with the aims of
the Party organisation. This was certainly on target, for it had
been necessary, in one serious disagreement between Hilgenfeldt and
Spiewock in Berlin over the arrangements for subsidies for pre-school
facilities, for Spiewock himself to quote in a letter (and in its
entirety) his own oath of allegiance as a state official. This was
in order to drive home the point that he was unable to change
certain rules of procedure in favour of the NSV, for this would have
been entirely illegal. This serious dispute had also involved,
indirectly, church provisions and it would be the denominational
arrangements which would suffer most in this particular issue which
2
arose during 1938.
These and other problems which arose at the time may only be
understood as something which can be described as a 'trivial'
1. BA, R36/1002, 'Entwurf einer Denkschrift zur Frage der
Vereinfachung der bffentlichen FUrsorge', n.d. (71938).
2. BA, R36/1001, see Spiewock to Hilgenfeldt, 'Denkschrift' of
10th May, and letter of 17th May 1938.
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expression of an underlying structural problem. Far from being
unimportant at the time, and in certain cases of utmost urgency,
these issues were nevertheless a sign of something else. Inevitably
they were an expression of the fundamental problem which lay at the
heart of the disagreements between Hilgenfeldt and state officials.
They were undoubtedly an expression and a sign of the troubled
relationship between the Party on the one hand and the state on the
other, which the regime itself would continue to be unable to solve.
In the system of social welfare however, any set of jurisdictional
issues which brought about a quickening of the tempo of the
conflicting claims of state and Party, aroused yet again the issue of
the unsolvable problem of the structure of the regime itself."^ The
very existence of the NSVJ, given its long term aims, was a potential
irritant within the existing arrangements, for with every foray
across the border into the realm of the state's legitimate sphere of
influence the NS\IJ could only activate a whole set of Party/state
problems which were impervious of solution. It was for this reason
that in the report 'Gemeindenund NSW it was stated, perhaps rightly,
that the only solution to these jurisdictional and other issues would
be for the NS\l to reduce its claims by restricting its ambitions;
otherwise, it would become a 'Fremdkflrper' within the social welfare
system itself and it would only serve to undermine the goals of
welfare in general.^
The realisation (in 1941) that two separate types of juvenile
care would emerge if the NSV were allowed to persist in attempts only
1. Caplan, 'The Civil Servant in the Third Reich', see Chapter
Seven.
2. BA, NS 25/1162, 'Gemeinden und NS-Volkswohlfahrt', p.2.
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to take on the more hopeful cases was regarded to be not only a
misfortune for state youth welfare but for German social welfare as
a whole. The sad comment of one senior official that he would, 'lose
his best children to the NSVJ', speaks volumes on this particular
topic.
By 1935/36 it was clear that the NSV itself had became
seriously interested in many areas of the social welfare system, none
of which strictly speaking had anything to offer an organisation
which was ideologically committed to using honorary staff; public
assistance being one example of this. Perhaps the general view
coming from local welfare offices reporting that NSV/ participation
poirtte^
had turned into something which was entirely unwelcome,^the direction
of the thrust of the NSV/ from almost the beginning of the war, and
2
this also included the arrangements for youth care. As the report
'Gemeinden und NSV/' asked, when many local state welfare officials were
being 'pressed to the wall' by the actions of NSV/ honorary workers,
how, on any level whatsoever, could such practices be described as
'cooperative'?"^ Nowhere perhaps was the absence of the 'spirit of
the V/olksqemeinschaft' more apparent than in the correspondence and
in the reports of the DGT and the NSV/. A simmering enmity which lay
beneath the surface at all times, was ready to break out at a
moment's notice whenever a new set of proposals was presented by
Hilgenfeldt for a greater degree of participation. The state
officials carried out their struggle with the Party agency by
1. BA, R36/1996, Dr. Schow to DGT, 12th August 1941.
2. BA, NS25/1162, "Gemeinden und NS-Volkswohlfahrt'.
3. Ibid.
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carefully circulating copies of letters to every official who needed
to know of the latest developments in whichever Runderlass was in
process of discussion. The care with which this was done shows how
relatively powerful the NSV was, for it had influential supporters
2
not least of whom were Goebbels and Himmler. A continuing concern
of the state officials, which had emerged during 1935/36, was that
the NSV would soon manage to achieve a position of real power and
dominance, if this were to happen it could only mean that the state
agency would be reduced to operating merely as a funding body for the
NSV.^ This fate was regarded as being of decisive importance not
only for state officials who wished not to lose their own powerful
positions, but also for its significance for the question of the
relationship between Party and state. Through such developments it
was feared that Hilgenfeldt would be transformed into a 'sort of
4
commissar for social welfare'. The relations between the two
agencies were increasingly fraught with problems; officials of both
Party and state agencies showed how unwelcome the proposals for
either a greater (or a lesser) degree of participation were. Neither
party wished to give way in any jurisdictional issue and for this
reason discussions over new proposals were usually unsuccessful. One
victory at least could be seen to have been gained in 1939 by the
state agency when the leader of the NSV was obliged to state openly,
1. BA, NS 25/1233, 'Vereinbarung zwischen RMdl und Stellvertreter
des FUhrers Uber NSV-Jugendhilfe'. Discussion document from
department for Kommunalpolitik.
2. See Erich Hilgenfeldt file, Berlin Document Center.
3. BA, R36/1002, report to DGT, 'Aufzeichnungen Uber den Gedanken
einer Ubernahme der Uffentlichen FUrsorge durch die NSV'. n.d.
(71939).
4. BA, R36/1002, DGT to Fiehler, letter of 21st December 1938.
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during discussions in Hess's office, that his intention was not, nor
had it ever been, ev/entually to take over the responsibilities of the
state arrangements."^ But Hilgenfeldt was quite used to making such
statements, not only out loud, but in long letters to state officials
who, as far as Spiewock in Berlin was concerned, showed little sign
2
of believing him. State officials, and especially Spiewock, had
every reason to mistrust NSV claims and pronouncements, for they were
usually given with some other aim in view. Althaus himself was
heard to say that agreements reached could be altered later when the
time was ripe to do so."' These and other utterances would shock some
state officials who were trying genuinely to reach a workable
arrangement with the Party agency. State officials wished to be
kept informed of opinions favourable to an NSVJ dominance of state
responsibilities and wanted to be made aware of all such responses
which came to notice.One of these, which is interesting only
insofar as it was uncharacteristic of leading Nazi personages to be
quite so openly favourable to the NSV, was the one which was
reported to have been given by Reichstatthalter Friedrich Hildebrandt
who gave voice to the opinion that there existed a certain confusion
1. See Siegel, 'The National Socialist People's Welfare Organisation
1933-39', p.234.
2. BA, R36/262, Spiewock to Stadtprdsident Berlin, letter of 20th
January 1937.
3. BA, NS 23/1162, from Dr. Stiemle to Dr. Jobst, letter of 9th June
1942.
4. Ibid., see also R36/962, Spiewock to Hilgenfeldt correspondence
of 1937; R36/1001, Spiewock to Hilgenfeldt letter of 17th May
1938; NS 25/1162, see 'NSV und Gemeinden' and 'Gemeinden und
NS-Volkswohlfahrt', 1942.
5. BA, R36/1001, 'Zusammenarbeit zwischen tiffentlicher und
freier Wohlfahrtspflege', Anlaqe zu III, 3246/38, 1938.
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with regard to the system of juvenile social welfare. For example as
he put it,
I do not understand why so many social welfare
organisations exist when the FUhrer has commissioned the
NS-Volkswohlfahrt with the social care and support of the
\/olk. The NS-Volkswohlfahrt with its thousands of
diligent workers is in the best position to watch over
the welfare activities of the people. A reduction of the
divergent nature of all areas of private, communal and
administrative welfare can only succeed where it is the
party that fulfils the goals of welfare.
(1)
This was a sentiment with which the NSV would have happily agreed.
At the end of 1938, the NSVJ was carrying out 37% of the
existing juvenile care in the Altreich, and in the newly annexed
Austria, where Party/state problems did not apply, it would rise to
2
as much as 80%. The NSV's own figures show that the levels of NSVJ
participation varied greatly from area to area. This was true for
various reasons, one of which was the need to build a good
relationship, not always an easy matter, with the local senior state
official of the area in question."' In any case Caritas and Innere
Mission were still carrying out a significant level of youth care
activities in co-operation with the JuqendElmter though such levels
were dropping through the intention of some state officials to reduce
4
such activity just as soon as it was feasible. Where shortages of
suitable welfare workers existed, the NSV would find that an offer to
supply extra helpers was greeted most warmly as in Stettin, where a
1. BA, R36/1002, extract from the Niederdeutscher Beobachter
31st December 1938.
2. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst, July 1939, p.179.
3. BA, R36/1418, Juqendamt/Stettin, report to DGT of
18th October 1938.
A. BA, R36/1996, new regulations and instructions from the
OberprSsident Rheinprovinz, Dusseldorf, on NSV participation
in FamilienfUrsorge', 7th February 1939.
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short while before the setting up of the NSVJ in the area, only one
Volkspfleqerin had existed in one country Kreis to carry out welfare
and health care duties."^ In the work of 'outdoor' care, for the
carrying out of FT in the Stettin area, the NSWJ would find that such
help as it could offer would be happily accepted. It may well be
that the provision of much needed auxilliary help was the ideal way
in which the NSWJ could begin to make a real contribution to youth
welfare in local areas, and begin to participate in a really
significant way. An uneven and hard-won distribution of NSVJ
participation indicates how problematic this would prove to be,
however. In Berlin in 1938, the total number of juveniles under
registered NSVJ care came to 16,213, of these cases 2,783 had been
delegated through the Juqendamt, and only 26, and 3, from Innere
2
Mission and Caritas respectively. These figures do not include
kindergarten or other pre-school provisions. In the city of Berlin,
the NSVJ reported that it was carrying out 81.3% of the existing
juvenile care - which seems to be a high figure - however, there was
no outline of the precise levels of church and state care included in
the NSV figures."^ This would mean that the share of denominational
youth care in Berlin came to well below 10% at that time. Such an
extremely high percentage of NSVJ participation was not registered in
other cities; in Ddsseldorf for example the level was 20.1%, but
given that this figure represented a total of 49,309 cases
altogether, it must be assumed that the NSVJ was operating somewhere
1. BA, R36/1996, Verwaltunq des provinzialverbandes Stettin
to Frick, on regulations regarding 'AussenfUrsorge',
18th July 1939.
2. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst, July 1939, p.179.
3. Ibid.
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near an optimum level in that city."* The Juqendamt in DUsseldorf
had delegated the highest number of juveniles of all the Gaus to the
NSVJ during 1938, with a figure of 37,012 cases being referred, so
that it must be assumed that the city had a very high level of
juvenile welfare cases to deal with at this time, possibly more even
2
than in Berlin or Hamburg. However, the figures which describe
levels of participation do not at the same time reveal the problems
and difficulties which lay behind the inclusion of the NSV/'s youth
care section into the juvenile care system. " A rich source of
information on this issue are both the files of the DGT, and those of
the department for Kommunalpolitik. ^
In 1938 a fairly typical draft agreement was presented to the
leading officials of the state and the Party agencies for
examination, it set out the responsibilities of both and it tried to
arrange for new 'delegatory' tasks to be worked out according to
Article 11 of the RJWG. Cooperation and participation were intended
to be built into these formal agreements between the Juqendclmter and
the NSU, but NS\l officials would continually try to push forward
their claims wherever possible and gain as much as they could in
every attempt to try to clarify and work out the responsibilities of
a welfare agency of independent status according to the provisions of
the law. The NSV intention to work strictly within its own
guidelines for caring for the 'erbqesunden' and 'qemeinschaftsfghiq'
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, R36/1418; 1001/2/3, see also R36/962/4.
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emerged at this time as a possibly unsolvable problem in the minds of
some at least.^ It was pointed out by one official who had been
asked to comment on the 1938 draft proposal that the NSV's
determination to deal only with such categories introduced a serious
hindrance into the cooperative character of future welfare work
between the two agencies. If the care of 'erbioloqische belasteten
Kinder' were to be left to the care of the JuqendSmter exclusively
2it would hardly contribute to the development of good relations.
Not only that, but the expertise of the specialist staff of the youth
welfare office would be lost to children on the basis of 'NSV/ care
only', indeed such a rule could only be regarded as a source of many
future difficulties. However, at the same time it was pointed out
that a solution to the problem had been found. Unusually, it may be
emphasised, the officials of the state welfare office in one district
of Stettin and the Gauamtsleitung of the NSV had undertaken to agree
that the NSVJ would take on full responsibility of the work of foster
children without the NSV's making use of the 'unworthy' distinction
between individual cases. Supervision and control of the foster
children would be managed without this category being applied so
that all foster cases would be taken up by the NSVJ and unity of
treatment would be ensured.^ State officials too would undertake not
to make visits to families where an NSVJ helper was active so that no
1. BA, R36/1996, Dr. Schow to DGT 12th August 1941.
BA, R36/1421, 'Untersuchen zur Problematik in der
ErziehungsfOrsorge: Aus der Arbeit der
Jugendpsychiatrischen Klinik und dem Landes jugendamt
der provinz Oberschlesien'. n.d. (71943).
2. BA, R36/1418, Juqendamt/Stettin, report to DGT of
18th November 1938, p.2.
3. Ibid.
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interference which would ruin the confidence of those being given
care would occur, and unity of treatment procedures would be
secured. However, such a concordance was only achieved out of a
real flexibility on the part of the NSV Gauleitunq who acknow idged
2
the predominance of the state's responsibilities in Stettin. The
NSV/Stettin agreement ensured an 'insertion' of NSVJ assistance, so
that the QberbOrgermeister was hopeful at this time that these
agreements would only lead to useful participation of NSVJ welfare
workers in the area. However in Frankfurt/Oder at exactly the same
time, officials were mostly concerned about the existence of the
honorary status of the NSVJ helpers and it was a matter , they felt,
which the DGT and the Juqendamt should undertake to consider fully
for its significance in relation to all youth welfare."^ This
particular report included the important problem of the
'contradiction' now introduced into the decision making process
through the administration of tasks to be delegated to the NSVJ.
This, it was added, disturbed the unity of the Hrtlichen
Verwaltunq. All of these problems had to be not only capable of
solution, but they had to be solved before any firm guidelines could
be put into operation. On the other hand, both in 1938 and 1939, it
was demonstrated that where the NSVJ could provide an 'extra pair of
hands' it made a valuable contribution to the work of youth welfare.
Where it could also prove to be flexible, then this could only
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, R36/1418, 'Zusammenarbeit der JugendSmter mit der
NSV', secret discussion document, 28th October 1938.
4. Ibid.
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increase the valuable help which was given. Such flexibility seems
not, however, to have been the norm, for no other reports of such
agreements have been found, but at the local level a few such
agreements might have been informally concluded so that the NSVJ
could co-operate more fully and thereby participate in a meaningful
way in juvenile care. However, this conclusion is merely conjectural
and until further evidence of such agreements is discovered it must
be assumed that the NSV/J would hold to its harsh, and probably
unshakable, policy.
Further formal agreements were drawn up in 1939, and they were
discussed at that time within the Interior Ministry in order that a
decree could be drawn up. This matter had been in hand from 1937
when Hilgenfeldt participated in a meeting organised by him to which
state and NSV officials were invited to discuss the legal
implications of the delegatory tasks of the NSVJ - to see how these
could continue to be taken up."^ It is clear that the question of the
unsalaried honorary helper which came up at the time, was proving to
be one of the more important sticking points in the consideration of
2
Party welfare work. The numbers of NSVJ staff at the end of 1938
numbered altogether 76,070, and the number of salaried specialists
who worked in the Gau and Ort offices came to 4,294. It is clear
that the majority of NSVJ social workers were entirely honorary,
received no salary and worked on a part-time basis though Gau and
1. BA, R36/974, Hilgenfeldt to DGT, letter of 1st October 1937.
Ibid., ' Ta^ordnung', for meeting on 28th October 1937.
2. BA, R36/1418, DGT Landesdienstelle Thurinqia to DGT,
Berlin, 17th September 1938, BA, R36/1996,
'Besprechunq/preussischer FE/Uber/NSV', 9th September 1941.
Kreis full-time staff were salaried."^ However, not every opinion of
the honorary unpaid social worker was an entirely negative one: the
work of preventive welfare, it was put forward in 1941, might just as
effectively be carried out by honorary staff as by full-time paid
staff. To a large extent the NSVJ was committed to the use of the
honorary unpaid worker who undertook to carry out the work of
2
welfare, and much else. Given the impetus of the need to create the
ideal 'sense of service' within the minds and the hearts of the
people, the use of"honorary helpers had become an ideological matter.
To this extent, the NSV had become a prisoner within the
philosophical framework of its own policies, for it would find that
it could not now withdraw from its own, perhaps now 'dysfunctional',
policies either publicly, or in the eyes of the Party in Munich. It
had to maintain the semblance of unity of purpose for the sake of the
common weal within its organisational arrangements, for the absence
of this would have made it likely that the rationale of the NSV might
have evaporated entirely by the end of 1938/39 or thereabouts."^
Staffing policies were dictated by such considerations though there
is little evidence to show that Hilgenfeldt greatly disliked them,
even when they were causing him trouble in his bid to arrange for the
increased participation of his voluntary staff within the system of
1. BA, NSD 30/11 Informationsdienst, July 1939, p.179.
BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.23.
2. BA, R36/1418, report to DGT from Juqendamt/Stettin letter of 18th
November 1938; BA, R36/1996, Verwaltunq des Provinzialverbandes
Stettin to Frick, 'Aussenfdrsorge', 18th July 1939.
3. As state officials put it, why should the NSV be better than
the state arrangements, in providing 'National Socialist'
welfare; BA, R36/1996, Dr. Schow to DGT, 12th August; see also
Fiehler's speech to the HJ in 1943, BA, NS 25/1270.
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youth care."* This enterprise had to succeed of course, for no
welfare organisation could leave out of its sphere of activity the
support and the care of young people.
State officials may have begun to realise as early as 1938/39
however that the NSV was heading into serious difficulty with regard
to its policies which were proving to be a hindrance to NSVJ
efficiency and, worse, its ambitions - because of the growing
reluctance of state officials to make arrangements for NSV
2
participation in the Juqendgmter. For it had now to suffer
criticisms not only of the inefficiency of its staff but also of
policies regarding the strictly excluded categories as well. This
was seen nowhere more clearly than in the objections to the proposals
of the Ministerial Order of 1941, for greater NSVJ participation in
youth welfare work from Pfleqekinderschutz (care of foster children)
to Juqendqerichtshilfe (participation in the juvenile courts), the
Kreisleiter of the office for Kommunalpolitik in Kassel greeted the
proposed guidelines insofar as they would simplify the work of
arranging for NSVJ participation. But that did not leave out of
consideration the familiar problems which remained, the most obdurate
of these being the question of the tendency of NSVJ honorary welfare
provisions to be subject to frequent and disruptive changes of
personnel. In any case, it was believed, they could not match either
in training or experience the staff of the JuqendSmter in Kassel.^
The issue of the NSVJ exclusion of various 'unworthy' categories too





was raised, for it could pick and choose from among the existing
cases of 'Aryan' individuals while the state officials in Kassel
could not."'' To some NSV the extent had painted itself into a corner
by 1940/41 on the issue of staffing policies especially, but also
with regard to the strictly applied guidelines on the exclusion of
'unacceptable' categories.
While at the level of the decision making process state and
Party officials would continually find that an agreement which was
acceptable to both parties might be hard, if not impossible to find;
at the local level, at the very base of the system where individual
welfare workers had to make arrangements to work together, it was
clear that this was frequently both productive and even harmonious.
Provided no jurisdictional problems had set in at the time, then NSVJ
honorary workers worked in a variety of ways to assist the staff of
the state JuqendMmter. Families who had come under special notice
such as 'asocial' ones or others who were in conflict with the
regime, would find that cooperative efforts of state and Party
welfare could be utterly devastating. When the NSVJ became aware of
any case which needed attention from the state welfare offices it
would alert the Juqendamt as soon as possible. Those families who
were members of the International Bible Circle would find that an
NSVJ helper would be prepared swiftly to altert the Juqendamt if they
were unwilling to send their children to the HJ. Once this was
discovered, then the Juqendamt would set in motion an order for the
1. Ibid.
children to be placed under Vormundschaftsqerichtlichen VerfUqunq.*
The family effectively lost control over their children at this
point. Either the state or the Party would become actively involved
from this time on. Even the agreement to send a child to the HJ
would not in itself remove pressure, for the child would then be
included in the HJ's own 'Erziehunqsarbeit', and it seems, continue
to be under the supervision of the Juqendamt. Either way, the family
would be unable to escape from the attentions either of state or of
Party welfare. Strenuous attempts on the part of the NSVJ to
cooperate in such work shows that the participation of honorary
helpers might have been an ideal field for this type of 'policing' of
the population. That it remained to masquerade under the title of
'welfare' only shows the direction of Nazi measures as they had been
developing over time. On the other hand, at local level, state
officials frequently questioned the efficiency of the NSVJ for, in
practice, it was often unable to carry out the proposals which had
been worked out in Berlin. The NSVJ offered to increase
participation where no facilities existed; but once arranged, they
would be hurriedly put together, so that to this extent it could be
described as a 'dynamic' operation. The improvisatory nature of some
of the NSVJ arrangements was something which the state officials
worried over, and more frequently, deplored. But NSV facilities
would remain in this form perhaps, until the outbreak of war, for it
had taken time to build up an effective network of youth care
1. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst July 1939, see
'Jugendhilfe fUr Kinder aus politisch unzuverlSssigen
familien', p.168-170.
facilities."^ Even though state officials hoped that the NSV and its
youth care section would restrict their ambitious schemes, it is
clear that no such reduction would take place.
In 1943 the NSVJ would become more closely involved in the work
of Ftlrsorqe as well as in preventive welfare. It would be this
development which promised the continued participation of Party
welfare within the juvenile welfare system, even though some
ambitions had failed to be realised immediately, as in 1941 over the
arrangements for EE_. The NSVJ would increase its facilities and
offer an increased level of both 'treatment' and preventive care.
Even though a partial solution was offered in 1944, and in favour of
the Party agency, until that time these and other related issues
would arise to complicate and to undermine the work of juvenile care
in Germany from 1934 until just before the end of the war. It is
impossible to say how far the new regulations of August 1944 would
have provided a solution to the problem of the system of Party and
state facilities for by that time, it was already too late for them
to function effectively.
1. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst, July 1939; the
section 'NSV/ - Jugendhilfe' provides fairly detailed
information, including statistics, on the development
of the NSV/J in the years 1936 to 1938. pp.177-179;
see p.35, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung'.
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The NSV and the Churches: An Overview
When the NSV claimed that it had broken new ground in
establishing a type of child and youth care which depended for its
success upon the principle of timely intervention, it gave the
mistaken impression that such measures had never been tried before.
The innovatory character of NSV policies was usually described to be
due to this type of welfare activity, and it was seen as the basis of
the 'success' of their measures. The much vaunted orginality of the
NSV certainly comes into question in the light of the churches' own
particular type of early intervention."^ Just like other welfare
agencies the NSV had not entered upon unexplored territory; on the
contrary, the Party agency, as it perfectly well knew, only followed
in the footsteps of the churches, which had long since made
preventive welfare a prominent feature of their own social welfare
2
programmes. Included in the extensive list of the responsibilities
of the Catholic agency Caritas were the measures devoted to active
participation in 'vorbeugende' (preventive) care."' Health care and
child care too were prominent features of Catholic charitable welfare
work. To the extent that the Catholic church claimed the 'whole'
person, training and education were both important and ideologically
relevant features of the churches' activity in these areas during the
1920's. Preventive welfare of an ideologically-based type was not an
1. BA, R36/966, 'Festschrift zum Deutschen Caritas Tag
1928, Dresden vom 29. Mai-1. Juni'. Herausgegeben
von der SSchsischen Volkszeitunq, Dresden, n.d. (1928).
2. Ibid.; FriedlSnder, Child Welfare in Germany, see Introduction
and Chapter One.
3. BA, R36/966, 'Festschrift/Caritas 1928', see p.5 for
details of organisational outline. Caritas employed 80,500
specialist staff and had 600,000 members in 1928.
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innovation of the NSV alone.
Both Caritas and Innere Mission had provided until 1933 a
sizeable amount of social welfare, both of a general type and also of
specific child care measures, even allowing for the greatly increased
input of the state's facilities after 1922. Before the Nazi takeover
the Catholic church through its agency Caritas owned and operated 930
homes for 'Erziehungsfdrsorge', 770 hospitals and 382 recreational
homes. This compares with a figure of 845 hospitals and 331
recreational homes still in operation in 1936."^ No category which
refers to 'Erziehunqsfdrsorqe' was included in the Caritas report
2
to the DGT in 1936. A comparison of the numbers of female staff
(Pflegerin/V/olkspflegerin) working in both denominational and NSV
facilities in 1938 shows that the N5V had the largest amount with
1,500 while the denominational agencies between them employed the
smaller figure of 1,200."^ These figures show clearly that there
would continue to be a substantial amount of church activity in
almost every area of social welfare for some time to come, even
allowing for the creation in 1934 of additional youth welfare
facilities coming from the Party itself. State Juqenddmter would
continue to make many cases available to the denominational agencies,
and allow a full use of certain particular specialist facilities such
as reformatories and correctional homes, so that Edrsorqeerziehunq
1. BA, R36/966, 'Eestschrift/Caritas 1928', p.4; Ibid, Deutscher
Caritasverband e.V.,Hauptvertretunq Berlin, report to DGT,
21st January 1936.
2. Ibid., Caritas to DGT, p.l.
3. BA, NSD 30/11 N5-Volksdienst July 1939, p.290.; see
also Kramer, 'Das EUrsorgesystem im Dritten Reich', which
reproduces this table of figures, p.195.
4. See this Chapter.
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(FE) cases, in many instances, would be directed to church, not state
or Party institutions. Given that the church had carried out such
work over a long period of time, it is hardly surprising that the
JuqendSmter were prepared to send on cases to institutions , which
in terms of strictness of regime, possibly surpassed even that of
the state.^ This particular practice continued into the war to the
2
chagrin of the NSVJ, and Althaus in particular. Neither the state
nor the NSV could have replaced overnight the facilities of the
churches. From the points of view of both popular opinion and, most
importantly, financial constraints it would not have been possible to
dispense with church facilities, nor for social welfare in Germany to
become entirely secularised. As one state welfare official put it,
they would have to wait until the end of the war when such changes
could be made gradually and without causing too many problems for the
leadership."' In 1935, Bormann's attention had been drawn to
continuing high levels of denominational participation, which were
preventing the NSV from taking on as many cases as they would have
liked. In a letter to Frick, Bormann requested that he remind state
officials that they had an agreement with the NSV whereby as many
4
suitable cases as possible would be transferred to party facilities.
Bormann stressed in his letter how important it was that a reduction
of church welfare begin to make itself noticeable, for not to do this
1. Basic and Zonal Handbook, 'Youth Welfare', pp.17-19.
2. BA, NS 25/1233 Hermann Althaus, report to Artur Axmann,
20th November 1940.
3. BA, R36/1996, 'Besprechung/preussischer FE/Uber NSV',
9th September 1941, see opinion of Landeshauptmann Kolbow, p.17.
4. BA, NS 25/105, Bormann to Frick, 'Auslegung des
Reichsjugendwohlfahrtsgesetzes', letter of 9th December 1935.
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would only prevent the 'Entkonfessionalisierunq' of national life."''
However, the organisation and practice of youth welfare would not
experience significant levels of secularisation, to the profound
disappointment of the head of the NSV's youth welfare section,
Hermann Althaus, and youth welfare would lag behind the NSV's
kindergarten facilities in the extent to which the churches would be
entirely exluded from taking a leading role in the work with young
2
children. The Concordat of 8th July 1933 between the regime and
the Catholic church had seen to it that the Catholic church, through
section 1, of Article 31, would be allowed to continue to run and to
operate those organisations 'devoted exclusively to religious
cultural and charitable purposes'."^ Caritas therefore came under
this protection. It would not be until just before the beginning of
the war that a more serious attempt would be made to exclude the
churches from an area which the regime was determined to regulate, in
terms both of organisation and of policy; this was of course the
organisation of private adoptions.^
In 1939, a law was introduced which allowed for the removal of
church participation in the work of private adoptions. This was the
law of the 19th April 1939, the Gesetz Ober die Vermittlunq der
Annahme an Kindes Statt.^ From this time it would be an offence for
any agency apart from the JugendSmter and the NSV, and shortly later
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NS 25/1233, Althaus to Axmann, letter of 20th November 1935.
3. Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany,
London 1964, pp.63-91.
4. BA, NSD 30/2, NS-Volksdienst, February 1938, pp.155-157;
Christa Hasenclever, Jugendhilfe und Juqendqesetzqebung
seit 1900, GOttingen 1978, p.148.
5. Ibid.
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the SS "Lebensborn" e.V., to be involved in this important field.
Eugenic policies would be carried through strictly according to fixed
rules regarding both children up for adoption and those parents
wishing to adopt. The arrangements for private adoptions would
therefore be taken over by the NSV and the "Lebensborn" homes, while
the centrally organised Reichsadoptionstelle would exist as the main
2
regulating body. No official role for the churches would exist from
this time, and they would find that persistence in such work would
bring severe penalties, even including imprisonment of those
administering unofficial adoptions, and large fines.^ From 1941,
such activity would come under the scrutiny of the Gestapo and, it
seems, be subject to very severe penalties. The placing of 'Aryan'
children in suitably 'politically reliable', 'racially desirable'
homes was a matter in which the NSV, the SS and the JuqendHmter
4
would become closely involved.
The rules of the Reichsadoptionstelle which the NSV carried
through in its own office in Berlin, intended its dealings to be in
line with the strictly laid down requirements of the law of April
1939. All future parents of an adopted child would have to prove
their suitability in five areas, these were:
1. physical health/racial purity;
2. social worthiness/competence to guide young persons;
3. good reputation;
4. political reliability;
5. racial compatibility with child up for adoption.
(5)
1. BA, NSD 30/2, NS-Volksdienst, February 1938, p. 157.
2. Hasenclever, Juqendhilfe, pp.147-148.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. BA, NSD 30/2, NS-Volksdienst, February 1938, pp.155-157.
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However from 1936, the NSV had been involved in the work of private
adoptions in cooperation with the SS "Lebensborn" e.V., so that this
particular development was not new. Suitable cases which required a
discreet handling and which came to the attention of the NSV, were
directed to the officials of the SS "Lebensborn" Home. These
adoptions were arranged in the strictest secrecy to protect the
individuals involved, and they were organised in such a way as to
keep an illegitimate birth an entirely secret matter. Beyond the
introduction of such particular cases to the "Lebensborn" home, the
NSV may have had no further contact with these particular
arrangements and it would remain as a matter which would be handled
in complete secrecy by the SS Homes themselves."''
After 1939, the cooperation of the SS "Lebensborn" e.V., and
the NSV was extended and, as Christa Hasenclever has pointed out,
this work increased substantially with the additional
responsibilities incurred by the arrangements for adoptions of
2
chidren from the occupied areas. It is not clear whether these
cases were processed through the Reichsadoptionstelle, or were a
matter only for the SS and the NSV, although it seems likely that
offical channels were used given the strict guidelines laid down.
Nevertheless, the adoption arrangements carried out by the SS and the
NSV seems to have been less carefully regulated, according to legal
provisions regarding the adoption procedures themselves, as time
went on. It seems that the NSV and the SS both arranged for a swift
transfer during the war of
1. BA, NS 37ii/1030, instructions to Gauamtsleiter Amter fdr
Volkswohlfahrt, Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind, 'Unterbringung
werdender lediger Mtltter in den Heimen des Vereins
"Lebensborn" e.V.', 21st March 1938.
2. Hasenclever, Juqendhilfe, p.148.
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procedures such as the signing of final papers, which allowed the
adoptive parents to assume full parental responsibility at an earlier
stage in the proceedings than the law itself had intended. The law
had intended that this would be carried out at about the age of
eighteen months, only then would the adopted child be legally allowed
to be given entirely over to the new parents. Adoptions by the NSV
and the SS would be processed very quickly without taking heed of the
natural mother who, as Hasenclever points out, was pressured into
signing away her rights over her child at a very early point in the
adoption process."^ It seems that the law of 1939 was not closely
observed in many cases during the war either by the SS, or by the
NSV.
The exasperation of the NSV over continuing high levels of
church participation came to a head at the end of 1940, when a
report was sent to the office of the ReichsjuqendfUhrer Artur
Axmann, by Althaus, whose pent-up fury over the entire issue was
manifest. In the first part of the report he revealed that, in spite
of the 1939 regulations, the churches were continuing to play a very
active role in placing children for adoption. This, he said, was
having a detrimental effect on the activities of the NSVJ, which was
virtually excluded from the adoption process as a result of the
unacceptably high level of church involvement in it. While it is
possible that Althaus was one of those Party activists who was so
eager to act against the churches that he was prepared to disregard
2
Hitler's strictures about the dangers of alienating popular opinion
it is clear that he was also prepared to admit that the churches
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NS 23/1233, Althaus to Axmann, report of 20th
November 1940, pp.2-3; Kershaw, Popular Opinion, p.333.
were able to continue to play a prominent role in the adoption
process almost by default, through the inability of the relevant
state and Party agencies to work amicably together."* The old rivalry
between the NSV and the state Juqendglmter consumed much of the
energy of both, and prevented either from effectively countering the
power and influence of the two denominational agencies in the whole
field of social welfare. It was not the case that the church
agencies always won their battles against the NSV or the Juqend9mter
- on the contrary, they often lost. But from his report it is clear
that Althaus viewed with anxiety the way in which the Party agency's
room for maneouvre was continually being circumscribed by the
2
activities of the churches' agencies. This was seen by him to be
one of continuing NSVJ exclusion at the same time as the churches
continued to function at unacceptably 'high' levels. But it was, as
he pointed out, as much the continuing difficulties with the state
JuqendMmter, which were allowing these practices to continue, as the
popularity and influence of the two denominational agencies within
the particular field of juvenile welfare. In other words, the
churches were gaining almost biy default, through the inability of the
state and the Party to work together to organise child and youth
care. For example, Nazi officials, perhaps rightly, saw the
continuing participation of the churches to be less threatening than
increased NSV/ power and influence within the system of juvenile care.
Indeed, state officals who had to make arrangements for increased
participation of the NSV in the provision of kindergarten care, were
1. BA, R36/1001, letter from Spiewock to Hilgenfeldt on use of
church facilities in Berlin 1938, 17th May 1938.
2. BA, NS 23/1233, Althaus to Axmann, report of 20th November 1940.
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liable to view the exclusion of the churches as offering an increased
opportunity for an early N5V takeover of existing state facilities.
For this reason they were liable to 'support' the continued existence
of denominational kindergartens for as long as they could, or at
least until firm agreements which protected the state facilities
could be drawn up. These agreements over the NS\l assumption of
denominational kindergartens raised the fear that such agreements
could be used in such a way as to facilitate an NSV takeover of state
kindergartens at the same time. The inability of NSV and state
officials to cooperate fully was only made worse by the nagging fear
o
that a handover of denominational kindergartens was merely a prelude
to a total exclusion of the state in the work of pre-school
education. In this report and at this time, it was clear that
Althaus saw the power and the influence of the Party agency coming
under continued threat through the ability of the churches to take
advantage of the situation"^.
Firstly as Althaus pointed out, there was a continuing high
level of institutional care (especially with regard to FE_) being
provided because of the continuing willingness of many state
Juqendamter to make use of the cheaper institutional facilities of
the churches, rather than those of the NSV. Secondly, too many
officials of the state were still reluctant to make better use of the
NSV provisions because of the existing rivalry between state and
Party officials. The churches would continue, Althaus suggested to
2




However, one may argue that it is difficult to see how the HJ would
have been able to assist the NSW in this matter for their own
relations with it had been, if not entirely acrimonious, then not
ideally cooperative."'' Althaus's report, which was intended to alert
the HJ, was being presented to the leading officials of an
organisation with whom relations had been uneasy in many instances
and entirely strained in many others. According to de Witt, a
prolonged feud had existed between the HJ and NSW over jurisdictional
issues. However, while it is true that the NSW had a certain
monopoly of preventive child care, it is equally untrue to say, as de
Witt does, that the NSW would eventually gain a monopoly in welfare
2
work over the 'protection of juveniles' at the expense of the HJ.
There is no reason to suppose that the HJ would lose control over its
own active participation in the work of 'Erziehunqsarbeit' or in
correctional welfare as a whole. During 1941, in the discussions of
the increased participation of the NSW in correctional education, the
FE boards in Prussia were reluctant indeed to do anything that might
jeopardise the good relations which had been built up over the years
between themselves and the Hitler Youth leadership."^ On the
contrary, as they said in 1941, an increased NSWJ participation in
the administration and in the selection procedures of £E would almost
certainly prove to be a provocative measure which the HJ would find
to be unwelcome. It may even be true to say that such a
1. de Witt, 'The Nazi Party and Social Welfare', p.259.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, R36/1996, 'Besprechunq/preussischer FE/Uber NSW',
9th September 1941, p.5.
263.
consideration figured largely in decisions to oppose the claims for a
greater NSVJ input at this time."^ In addition, in 1943, the
increased participation of the NSVJ in correctional education was
conceived in relation to a proposed increased cooperation with the
2
HJ itself. It would be wrong to say therefore that the NSV would
gain a virtual monopoly in child welfare, not only in recreational
facilities - which seems to be true - but in the 'care and
protection' of juveniles as well. The HJ seems to have played a
strong role in the administrative provisions of correctional
education in relation to the FE^ boards, for this reason officials of
the FT Boards were keen to stress the need to ensure a continuing
peaceful cooperation with this particular organisation, regardless of
the NSV it may be added."'
The longer these problems continued, and the more complicated
they were, the more they threatened to compromise the Party's schemes
for youth welfare provision in the indefinite future. The churches
would only gain from this situation, as Althaus knew only too well,
and he hoped to alert the leadership of the HJ to this particular
4
'danger'. It may have been Althaus's intention that the HJ and the
NSV together would be able to bring pressure to bear in order that
the state's own provisions would be made more sensitive to Party
claims within the whole field of juvenile care."' But it does
1. Ibid., pp.1-17.
2. Haserrclever, Juqendhilfe, p. 130-132.
3. BA, R36/1996, 'Besprechung/preussischer FT/Uber NSV',
9th September 1941.
4. BA, NS 25/1233, Althaus to Axmann, report of 20th November 1940.
5. Ibid.
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seem that it would take until 1943 for the NSV to become increasingly
involved in correctional care at the expense of the churches, even
though a partial monopoly had been gained in kindergarten care, in
adoption procedures and in recreational measures themselves. More
detailed research into the relationships between church, HJ and the
NSV must be carried out before jurisdictional problems and other
related issues can be fully understood. The period between 1940 and
1943 needs to be studied in some detail before a real understanding
of these complicated problems can emerge. However, such an
examination deserves a study devoted entirely to itself so that the
following arguments may be regarded, through lack of space, as an
initial study only.
Included in Althaus's report of 1940 was the serious suggestion
that church activity in social welfare even with the 'asocial' and
the 'hereditarily sick' juveniles should come to an end as soon as
possible. Alternative facilities would then be set up and run by the
state.^ Such a suggestion^ with its undisguised dislike of
denominational facilities^ shows how determined Althaus was to exclude
the participation of the churches in youth care. But the suggestion
also depended on two pre-conditions. Firstly that the regime could,
in time of war, both fund and organise such a programme of increased
state and Party youth welfare work. But secondly, that the regime
could, regardless of the consequences, entirely ignore popular
opinion in time of war; this was wildly far from the mark given
Hitler's fears about the consequences of losing the support of the
" 1. BA, NS 23/1233, Althaus to Axmann, report of
20th November 1940, p.4.
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German People. Clearly, popular opinion would not be discounted,
and the regime would find it difficult to reduce the participation
of the churches in juvenile care and in child care as well. The
vital issue of the maintenance of popular opinion demanded that, in
Prussia, the correctional homes of the churches would be retained.
As one state official in Prussia himself put it, to do otherwise
would have been resented by a majority of the population who were
themselves 'deeply shaken by the policies of the Nazis', which they
saw as a threat to the right to a private existence and,
2
importantly, the freedom to worship. The extent to which the Party
had been seen to forsake such values threatened a weakening of
support for the regime itself; state officials in Prussia were
unwilling to disturb matters further by making changes in the
organisation of denominational youth homes.^ It would be for these
reasons that the NSV would find itself when confronting the vitally
important structural problems of the social system, that it was at
the mercy of forcesTwhich it had little or no control. From
this point of view, Althaus' report would remain just another one of
many documents in which there was an outline of problems but little
hope of solution. It may have been that Althaus's deep dislike of
continuing church activity was as much fuelled by this realisation as
by a deep seated objection to the practice of denominational care as
such. If popular opinion demanded that church participation in
correctional care continue, as the example of Prussia in 1941 showed,
1. Kershaw, Popular Opinion, pp.334-336.
2. BA, R36/1996, 'Besprechung/preussischer FE/Uber NSV', p.17.
3. Ibid.
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then there was little or nothing that Althaus could do if state
officials, but also the leadership in Berlin, had no intention of
putting to the test the most deeply held prejudices and preferences
of the population at large.^
While Althaus could see the reasons for the state being
prepared - at least on the issue of cost - to allow continued high
lev/els of church participation, he could not see why there should be
a continuing a high level of adoptions as well. Even allowing for
exaggeration in his report in order to drive home the point, there
seems to have been some truth in the claims that the churches were
still carrying on with the work of adoptions even though they were
2
forbidden to do so by the law of 1939. Even if the churches were
not themselves intending to carry out their work in a provocative
opposition to the NSV, nevertheless a close scrutiny of all adoptions
was made the more difficult by an unofficial programme which the
churches seem to have been involved in, even if it was less in volume
than Althaus feared it to be."^ Less serious, but equally irritating
was the realisation at the end of 1940 that denominational
recreational work was earring on apace. Again, the churches were
continuing to participate in an area in which the NSV had become
closely involved. Apart from the MuK (Nutter und Kind) holidays for
mothers scheme, the NSV also provided recreational facilities for
adults and children through, on the one hand, the
'Erholungshilfswerk' and on the other the 'Kinderlandverschickung'
1. Stephenson, 'War and Society in WUrttemberg', p.89.
2. BA, NS 23/1233, Althaus to Axmann, report of November
1940, p.2.
3. Basic and Zonal Handbook, 'Youth Welfare', p.17.
267.
schemes. The intention that all recreational facilities would
eventually come under the direct responsibility of the NSV was put
forward by Althaus in his report of 1940. He proposed that the NSV
should, as quickly as possible, assume total control over all
confessional recreational homes. For, as he put it, of the existing
520,000 places which were available at the time, 110,000 were still,
'in the hands of the two confessional agencies'."'' However it may be
that this issue was decided by the conduct of the war, for in 1940,
while the NSV sent away 518,705 children for a country or other type
of break, in 1941 this figure would fall to 262,267.^ The NSV would,
in any case, soon become very closely involved in the work of
evacuation in which it would have a monopoly, so that the matter of
church recreational facilities was partly solved given that the NSV
would have the right to appropriate suitable denominational homes in
which to accommodate evacuated children from the bombed-out areas of
Germany."^
It seems that during the war, from about 1941, the welfare
activities of the churches began to be less 'obvious'; in other
words, it went 'underground' to some extent when the continuing work
of church welfare began to be carried out, as far as possible, out of
reach of the knowledge of the NSV. To a large degree it must have
been that further church work in adoptions had gone 'underground'
given the penalties involved for such continued participation. It
may have been that the Catholic church, especially, had found ways of
escaping detection, as Althaus seemed to indicate, for if such work
1. BA, NS 25/1233, Althaus to Axmann, report of 20th November 1940,
'NSV - Jugenderholungspflege', pp.2-6.
2. BA, NSD 26/26, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.32.
3. Basic and Zonal Handbook, 'Youth Welfare', p.17.
were only being carried out 'illegally' then it must have been
organised only at the level of the parish where a local priest could
undertake to participate secretly in the work."^ In any case, ways of
continuing such work had been found, as the report from Althaus
shows. Due to the determination on the part of Catholic priests to
encourage people to avoid the NSV which seems to have been building
up during the war, the Catholic church had begun as far as possible
to avoid active contact with the NSV. This in particular involved
trying to prevent the NSV getting control over Catholic children in
their evacuation procedures. Catholic priests themselves arranged
for the evacuation of children, before the NSV with its legal
COolet
monopolyk have the opportunity to make arrangements. Certainly
doubt is cast by this on the popularity of the NSV and its measures
2
and this was something which state officials too remarked upon.
For as long as uncoordinated policies regarding church
participation continued, then the NSV would find that the
denominational facilities would continue to flourish thereby taking
up many cases which could have been dealt with in NSV homes. While
it is true to say that the state officials were, in many instances,
quite willing to continue to use denominational homes and other
institutions (as in the past) this was only true of some Juqenddmter
but not others. Even if, as Althaus suggested, this seemed to be
true of a majority of state youth welfare offices this is not to say
that in some areas, such as Hessen-Nassau that a Gauleiter
would be willing to use these for longer than was absolutely
1. Ibid.
2. BA, R36/1996, 'Besprechung/preussischer FE/Uber NSV',
9th September 1941.
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necessary."^ In these cases at least, the NS\l would find that its own
facilities would be preferred over those of existing denominational
ones in the area in question. Inevitably, these particular
developments would largely depend on levels of existing need and
these too would determine how far, and for how long, church
facilities would be expected to provide continuing care for young
people.




THE HEALTH CARE MEASURES OF THE NSV
NSV preventive health care consisted of various measures of a
supportive type from the care of children from infancy to
adolescence, to financial support schemes for TB patients in order to
help combat Tuberculosis in Germany."'' Holidays for young children
would be organised through the NSV and these were conceived within
the structure of the NSV's preventive health care as a whole. NSV
adult holiday schemes were also available apart from the 'Mother and
Child' holidays, though these seem to have been only of minor
significance in relation to the main holiday provision for children,
2
the Kinderlandverschickunq or KLV. The NSV would also organise and
run an order of nursing sisters the NS-Schwesternschaft, and it would
be this particular group of nurses who would be sent to the border
areas of Germany in 1938/39, to the occupied areas in the east, and
to France and Belgium after 1940."^ It seems fair to say that
Hilgenfeldt was genuinely interested in the kindergarten and child
care provisions as a whole, and he was completely determined to
establish his own NSV pre-school facilities throughout Germany by
taking control gradually over the kindergartens of the churches and
the other private facilities still in existence. The NSV would also
come to assume a powerful position in relation to growing
developments in pre-school education in war-time, and it would be the
1. BA, NS37ii/1014, organisational outline, 'Amt fdr
Volksgesundheit im> Hauptamt
fUr Volkswohlfahrt, 1936.
2. BA, NS 25/1162, Fol. 1, VB, 'Zehn Jahre NSV', article
by Hilgenfeldt 1943; Ibid., 'ein Volk hilft sich Selbst:
ein Jahrzehnt NS-Volkswohlfahrt' 1943.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1039; 1041.
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war itself which would ensure that the NSV's incursion into this
particular area would continue to develop and to increase."^ By 1941
it would be clear to state officials that the NSV would be allowed to
take on the running and organising of all the new kindergartens which
2
were intended to be provided at this time. New facilities being
planned would therefore become part of the NSV's growing empire
rather than being included within the provisions of the state which,
for long, especially in Munich, had been running extensive
kindergarten facilities of its own. - NSV kindergartens, or NSV-run
kindergartens, would be established throughout the Altreich but also
in the occupied areas of the east. In Hungary too, the NSV would
establish its health/welfare facilities for mothers and children
which, according to the NSV there, proved to be very popular and
promised to grow substantially, at least until 1943, when the Russian
advance came to interrupt the work of the Party's welfare
organisation in that country. In the Ukraine a slowly developing but
successful set of NSV welfare/health care measures would have to be
abandoned when it became necessary to evacuate the Volksdeutsche
(ethnic Germans) from that area."* However, until that time, the NSV
would flourish outside the boundaries of the Altreich, from
4
Alsace-Lorraine to the eastern borders of Hungary.
There is every reason to believe that the future development of
1. BA, NS 23/1158, Bormann to Fiehler, '(Jbernahme neuer
KindertagestMtten durch die Hauptstadt der Bewegung',
letter of 16th August 1941.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NS 26/261, see report to Berlin on the activities
of the NSV in the Ukraine, 1st November 1943.
4. Ibid.
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the NSV lay with its health-oriented welfare measures, and these
would show themselves to be popular with the head of the Office for
the People's Health, Dr. Conti.* Conti and Hilgenfeldt seemed to
enjoy a good working relationship which had begun in the period of
the end of the 'time of struggle'. Conti had allowed the still
unacknowledged (by Hitler) Berlin-based organisation to arrange for
holidays for children, and he certainly seems to have counted the
later contribution of the NSV to preventive health care as an
important one. He seemed, in addition, to view the future
participation of the NSV as a vital part of future health care
arrangements in Germany. For this reason a victorious war might have
2
seen the NSV further expanding throughout this particular area.
To understand the construction of the health/welfare schemes of
the NSV it is necessary to look first of all at the country holidays
for children whose importance was certainly acknowledged by Hitler.
He ordered that they should be continued even in time of war and
after beginning of the bombing raids over Germany. At the end of
1942, he expressly ordered that the Kinderlandverschickunq (KLV) be
continued as far as that was possible."' The KLV however should not
be confused with the EKLV, or Erweiterte Kinderlandverschickunq,
which was an evacuation measure entirely, and which was established
in 1940 and placed under the direction of von Schirach, not
1. BA, R18/3793, 'Zur Neuordnung des Gesundheitswesens nach
dem Siege', speech of Dr. Conti, (?September) 1943.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1010, from Lammers to all Reich Ministers,




Hilgenfeldt.^ The NSV would cooperate and participate in the EKLV,
but it did not itself run the scheme; in effect, the EKLV was a
joint operation which involved the HJ, NSV, NSF and other Nazi
organisations in what was essentially an emergency measure rather
2
than a recreational one. The KLV, on the other hand, was one of the
NSV's own favourite holiday schemes and other Nazi organisations
which participated in the KLV would do so in cooperation with the
NSV, not the HJ.
1. BA, NS37ii/1011, 'Anordunung des Reichsleiters von




'The present regime shows that it has no intention of
trying to win over the nation by coercive methods but
rather the whole hearted suffrage of the public through
the influence of practical and visible results'.
(1)
One of the practical ways of gaining popular support was to make
provisions for the annual sending of children from town and cities to
the country areas, to the lakes and, where possible, to the sea-side
as well. Kinderlandverschickunq was regarded by the NSV as a most
important and potentially popular facet of the provision of health
care for young children, who might not otherwise have enjoyed a
2
country break or other type of holiday. A spell in the country,
perhaps up to six weeks in duration, was viewed as being capable of
having a profound impact on the well-being of the children involved."'
The NSV fully intended that the child's holiday trip away from the
city or the town would provide not only a recuperative spell for
those in most need of it, but that the holiday itself would have an
important 'educative' function. Werner Reher emphasised how children
would return refreshed by the whole experience of being in the
country, which no doubt in most cases they were, but also that the
child would 'relate the wonders and the beauties of the countryside
to his companions on his return'. One of the unintended
consequences of the KLV was to reveal to Gau officials the neglected
and poverty stricken condition of some of the children being sent





into their own Gau areas."'' Children were sent into the Gau Sachsen
without adequate shoes on their feet and with insufficient clothing,
so that Gau officials would have to arrange for shoes and clothing to
be given to those in most need. Other problems such as behavioural
ones would be revealed to the host families, and holiday 'mothers'
would find that wash-day would be greatly lengthened by the need to
2
provide clean linen for chronic bed-wetters. The free-place
accommodation which would be provided by farmers' families was a most
popular method, as far as the NSV was concerned, of giving a country
holiday to young children even though they would need to make efforts
to raise enough places for the KLV schemes. One way of doing this
was to advertise for free holiday places from those who could be
expected to provide them. Specially contrived messages, supposedly
from children to their parents, were supplied on post cards to the
local Party offices and they were either displayed in the Party
offices or were sent off to farmers and others who might offer a free
place that summer. Children could also use the postcards for sending
to their parents without the specially contrived text. To farmers
who might offer a place would be sent postcards with pictures of
children on a hay-waggon and the supplied message would read:
'Often the country-folk would take me to work with them
in the fields and that was great fun'.
Or a harvest scene with NSV holiday children would be provided and
would carry the following message:
'Today I have been helping - that was wonderful'.
To a prospective giver of a free place from the more prosperous
1. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen, 'Stimmungsbericht der
Wohlfahrtsabteilung' (331256), May 1935.
2. Ibid.
would be sent postcards showing the message:
'It is lovely here, I play the whole day in the garden
with the other children and eat as much as I like'.
(1)
The writing on the cards imitated a childlike hand and care was taken
to see that the correct card was sent to the appropriate prospective
host family. A call from the Gauleiter or NSV Gauamtsleiter would be
put on the reverse of the card saying:
'In countless numbers of letter and cards comes the
description of the joy and happiness of children on
holiday. We would like you to help us bring this
happiness to children and ask you therefore to donate a
free place for a child on an NSV holiday.
(2)
Such measures show how precisely the propaganda of the NSV took into
account every detail with regard to arousing interest in the
children's holiday scheme."' NSV holidays, whether they were part of
the holiday schemes for mothers through the MuK, or whether they were
part of the children and young persons' schemes, should be regarded
as a preventive health and welfare measure even though they were
also clearly meant as a propaganda measure to drum up support for the
leadership. All NSV holiday schemes including the KLV, were provided
on the basis of a renewal of physical health and strength as well as
giving an opportunity to contemplate at leisure the attractions of
4
the countryside. The Nazi belief in the influence of the natural
environment as a potentially strengthening one was a darker
representation of other, not altogether unsimilar, back to nature
movements of the 1930's, which stressed the importance of rambling or
1. BA, NS 22/731, 'Werbepostkarten fUr Kinderlandverschickung',
27th July 1936.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 'Terxtvorschlag fUr den Aufruf'.
4. Reher, Social Welfare, pp.25-26.
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in other ways discovering the benefits of the countryside.
The Nazi 'back to nature' movement however was a less simply
conceived one with its emphasis upon finding one's roots in the soil
of Germany in order to achieve an understanding of the 'strength' of
the racial/tribal group. Many could have been forgiven, when looking
through the NSV publication Ewiqes Deutschland, for believing that
Germany was a land of farms and countryside pursuits peopled by hardy
peasants whose love of hard physical labour had marked them with a
rugged cheerfulness which could, moreover, sustain them in every
adverse situation."^ However, the NSV leadership was well able to
comfortably accommodate the inherent contradictions of its own
propaganda which drew a picture of an archetypal Germany which
existed only in the minds of those who, in a very small number of
cases only, might have been carried away by the portrayal of a
bucolic paradise. However, these dark, romantic fantasies did not
prevent the NSV leaders from understanding how important it was for
them to exclude the churches from the provision of recreational
breaks for the young. Althaus hoped, in 1941, that it would soon
fall to the NSV alone to make arrangements for this type of welfare
measure, for there was no doubt that he deeply resented the
2
continued participation of the churches in such work. It seems that
the NSV and the Reichszentrale Landaufenthalt fUr Stadtkinder e.V.
shared the task of sending children away on holiday from towns and
1. BA, NSD 30/9, Ewiqes Deutschland, March 1939, see 'Volk und
Sprache in Schleswig-Holstein', pp.83-84.
2. BA, NS 23/1233, Hermann Althaus, report to Artur
Axmann, 20th November 1940.
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cities in Germany. It also seems that the Reichszentral? undertook to
dispatch the largest number of children, with the NSV arranging for
the smaller amount of between one half and one third of the total
number of children to be sent away.^ The Reichszentrale figures
were included in the NSV statistics and this organisation was itself
closely connected with the NSV; it had virtually become an adjunct
in perhaps the same manner as the nursing organisation, Reichsbund
2
der freien Schwestern.
From 1940,^the Kinderlandverschickunq programme was altered to
include the measure called the Erweiterte Kinderlandverschickunq
scheme which was set up to move children out of the bombed areas for
lengthy periods of time should that be necessary. This meant that
the EKLV was really an evacuation scheme which could be used as the
occasion arose.^ However, this and other evacuation schemes will be
4
dealt with in Chapter Seven.
The numbers of children who were sent away by the NSV and the
Reichszentrale each year from 1933 to 1941 (including the EKLV) were
as follows:
1. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.32.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1039, 'Anordnung Nr. 1', 28th March 1934;
Ibid., 'Vorlaufige Richtlinien filr die Schwesternschaft
der NSV'.
3. Ibid., BA, NS 37ii/1010, instructions to NSV officials,
'Erweiterte Kinderlandverschickung und Umquartierung aus



















From the figures given above, it is seen that the year 1938 saw the
largest numbers being sent away with a drop in numbers in 1940 and
1941 showing the response to war-time conditions, and the beginning
of bombing raids over Germany.
That the NSV saw the children's holiday scheme as one of its
most important health care projects was shown by the report from the
NSV Gauhauptstellenleiter of East Hanover who included some research
2
findings on the KLV in the NS-Volksdienst in July 1940. Such
holidays were viewed as a serious exercise in improving the general
physical condition of children. In Berlin and Hamburg a study was
1. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.32.
2. BA, NSD 30/4, NS-Volksdienst, 'Die Kinderlandverschickung
als vorbeugende Gesundheitsmassnahme', July 1940, pp.126-133.
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made of the effects of the KLV trip on children sent away in
1939/40."* For example the findings indicated that the health and
well being of the Hamburg children, 3,827 in all, were greatly
improved on their return home from the countryside. For 768 of the
children, the holiday had greatly benefited their physical condition
and they had all put on some weight; these were given the result
'very good'. For 2,282, the holiday had proved to be 'good', and for
2
731, 'medium'. Those described as having benefited not at all - 'no
success' amounted to 46. Following this examination of the children
it was decided that further measures for a total of 819 of them would
have to be taken later in the year.^
In Berlin, too, one Kreis had made a similar study of the
returning KLV participants and, in addition, made an examination of
the weight gains of all the children which showed an increase of
4
between 2.05kg and 2.71g. Of the numbers of Berlin children who had
been sent to Thuringia, Mecklenburg and Schles ieu- the
Berlin Kreis reported as follows with regard to the percentage of
children sent to each area and in relation to their general





















Average weight gain kg.
2.8 2.7
(1)
From the figures given above it seems that the best area to send a
child on holiday was to Mecklenburg in this particular instance;
though from another table given it was shown that perhaps other areas
which offered a similar opportunity for a child to put on weight if






















Certainly from these figures and the ones given above it seems that
holiday places either in Thuringia or Kurmark, did not offer the same
advantages as those in East Prussia."' However, precisely the same
accommodation facilities were not necessarily on offer every year and
the research which was undertaken was not intended only to discover
how good or bad these had been. As suggested above the figures were





was on returning home from the country.^
The practice of sending children to board with farmers'
families, which was significantly revived after 1933, was a measure
2
which was criticised by Walter FriedlSnder in his study, and he
certainly seemed to believe that children would be better off in
holiday homes. The figures which he gave showed clearly that the
'free place' accommodation in farmers' homes was greatly preferred
from 1933. This was shown with regard to the development of the KLV
schemes (and earlier children's holiday schemes) from 1923. The
figures show the distribution of holidays according to use by the
city of Berlin alone.
Berlin: Holidays for children from 1923 to 1934
Year In Children's Farmers' Foreiqn
Homes Families Country
1923 6,700 41,200 480
1924 15,800 25,800 2,130
1929 41,946 12,041 1,797
1930 30,428 11,261 1,158




From these figures given above it is clear that during the Nazi
period the total number of children sent away on holiday was not
increasing markedly in comparison with the period of the Depression,
as for example:
Total number of children sent on holiday in Berlin.
1929 - 55,784 1930 - 42,847/1931 - 43,458
1933 - 46,580
1934 - 51,790 (4)
1. Ibid., p.133.
and Meyers,




This is to say that the figure for 1934 (31,790) had not managed to
catch up with that of the year 1929 (55,784) even though it exceeded
the 1930 figure of 42,847. In other words, as FriedlSnder has
pointed out, the figures of the Nazi period (see above) were hardly
impressive with regard to the arrangements for children's holidays in
the capital of Germany. This is not to say that increases were not
registered at a national level, for the numbers of children given a
holiday throughout the Reich amounted in 1933, to 352,501 and in
1934, to 646,065.1
The NSV had not of course (as the figures above show) been the
first to organise the holidays for children schemes and they were
only carrying on with a long tradition of providing holiday
arrangements for those most in need. According to reports from Gau
Sachsen, the activities of the KLV were popular, and the fact that
new facilties and homes for the use of the KLV scheme were being
developed suggests that the NSV did not intend completely to abandon
2
the practice of making use of holiday homes. Two new homes were
opened in Sachsen in 1935, which accommodated 137 during that year."^
It seems that the children from Sachsen were sent into Hessen-Nassau
or to Kurmark, and it was reported that 1,100 Sachsen children came
4
back after 'a really good holiday' from these areas. During 1935,
Sachsen accommodated children from Essen and Danzig numbering 1,265
in all. However, it also seems that apart from problems such as
bed-wetting and poorly clad children, host families were also
1. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.32.




reporting to the Gau office in Sachsen that children were arriving in
a poor medical condition and were sometimes infested with lice, but
certainly in a dirty state generally. This information caused the
NSV officials in Sachsen at least to establish new regulations
regarding their own KLV schemes by trying to ensure that their
children would not arrive in other Gaus in a similar state. From
1935/36 it seems that medical examinations of children going on KLV
holidays were tightened up. It may have been that the appearance in
other Gaus as well of children with behavioural and other problems
did allow some possibility of a better arrangement for pre-KLV
medical examinations of those children going away on a holiday. For
this had certainly been an intention of the NSV scheme, namely, that
only those children who were physically well at the time should be
sent off in order to stop the spread of illnesses such as diptheria,
and other infectious diseases. It seems however that NSV guidelines
to prevent the spread of serious illnesses were not always followed
and in 1936, Hilgenfeldt had had to remind his staff to take more
care over medical examinations in order to prevent the spread of
diptheria especially."^ However, for the less immediately serious
problems of bed-wetting or other behavioural problems it seems that
NSV staff would, at least in Sachsen, try to make sure that they had
made arrangements to discover those children who might have to be
2
considered in advance of a KLV trip. From this point of view alone,
it seems that the KLV might have been useful for revealing to NSV
staff what the less obvious needs of children in their Gaus were, and
1. BA, NS22/751, Hilgenfeldt to all Gauamtsleiter NSV on
guidelines for prevention of diptheria, 1st April 1936.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1062, Gau Sachsen,'Stimmungsbericht', May 1935.
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even if they only dealt with them in order not to reveal these to a
neighbouring Gauamtsleiter, at least it would be a gain for the child
as well as for the reputation of the local NSV office.
28G.
The Kindergartens of the NSV
In an article in the NS-Volksdienst on the ten year existence
of the NSV's 'Mother and Child scheme', an opportunity was taken not
only to write about the MuK as a whole, but to give a detailed
outline of NSV facilities such as the existing arrangements for NSV
kindergartens and day-care nurseries.'*' Within NSV kindergartens both
health and recreational care were described as being an intrinsic
part of the whole enterprise, forming the basis of the care of very
young children by the NSV on a daily basis, far from looking after
these children from the point of view of allowing a respite to
mothers who were not themselves working outside the home, NSV
kindergarten care was meant to play a far more serious part in
National Socialist education as a whole. The NSV kindergarten was
meant to supply an additional educational facility of much importance
2
in the light of the NSV provision of 'MenschenfUhrunq' . The
promotion of the health and well-being of growing children was not
only seen by the NSV to be a vital part of kindergarten care but the
kindergartens themselves were seen as a fundamental contribution to
the future development of each child within Nazi society.'*
Up-to-date knowledge both of biology and of child-care methods was
intended to support the work of the NSV kindergarten nurse who would
be entrusted with the care of 'Aryan', 'biologically worthy' children
of politically reliable parents. In other words, the NSV would put
into operation its normal entrance requirements and refuse to include
1. BA, NSD 30/4a, NS-Volksdienst, 'Zehn Jahre Hilfswerk
Mutter und Kind', December 1943, pp.161-182.
2. Ibid., Section 4, pp.175-179.
3. Ibid.
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those children who they had deemed to be unacceptable."^ NSV/
kindergarten care was considered from the point of view of a
'balanced alternation' between rest, play and physical exercise, all
three of which were required by a growing child in carefully managed
2
proportions. Support for the physical development of the 'normal*
child was meant to be provided by the measures of a health care
programme which was designed around a careful consideration of the
dietary needs of very young children.^ It seems that the NSV
provided well-run kindergartens and nurseries, for this seems to have
been an area in which they showed themselves to be efficient, as one
4
state official at least was prepared to admit. Given that a keen
effort was made to supply good nourishment in the kindergartens
themselves, and to educate mothers in the best ways in which their
children should be fed, it may be that the NSV/ kindergarten was
capable of making a real contribution to the general health of young
people."' The specific health care provisions of the NSV/ kindergarten
also included measures to combat rickets, indeed to provide special
treatments in the kindergarten itself to remedy the effects of this
particular disease with vitamin and sun-ray treatment being given in
most nurseries. The NSV/ regarded its kindergarten provisions as
1. Ibid., p.175.
2. Ibid., pp.175-176; BA, NS 37ii/1031, 'Stoffplan-
kindergdrtnerinnen', 1942; NS-Seminar ftlr soziale und
sozialpddagogische Berufe: Staatliche anerkanntes Seminar
ftlr KindergSrtnerinnen.
3. Ibid.
4. BA, NS 25/1158,('Tatigkeitsbericht des Gauamtes fdr
Kommunalpolitik, Sachsen, July 1941.
5. BA, R36/1396, VB, 'Alle Hilfe fUr Mutter und Kind',
17th May 1942.
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being a first step in the National Socialist education of the new
generation; it was also to be seen as a not-to-be underestimated
'Kulturfaktor'. ^
However, the NSV explained that such child-care measures needed
to be given support within the home, and for this reason parents, and
the mothers in particular, would have to be given instruction on the
new type of health care for children which the NSV hoped to
encourage. The difficult task of ensuring a continuity in emphasis
and in method meant that the NSV kindergarten nurse was entrusted
with the important task of trying to create a good relationship with
2
the parents of the children attending the kindergarten. To this
purpose, parents but mothers in particular, were expected to attend
special 'parent evenings' where the NSV staff would take the
opportunity to explain their work and introduce parents to the NSV
programme of child care which, it was intended, the parents should
continue at home.^ Not surprisingly, a close cooperation existed
between the kindergartens and the NSV's 'Mother and Child' scheme
which was supposed to send on information on all needy cases to the
local NSV kindergarten, and mothers were usually persuaded to take up
a place for a child who was in 'need' of NSV child care. For those
who could not pay, NSV kindergartens would not make a charge.
There existed several types of kindergarten which served
different purposes in relation to the situation of working mothers.
For example, the Harvest Kindergartens were set up during the summer





months specifically to aid farmers' wives who were required to work
especially hard during harvest time. As the NSV put it, 'for the
Landfrau whose work makes her child-care duties something which has
to be done in addition to her work as a farmer's wife', the Harvest
Kindergartens (ErntekinderqHrten) would provide extra help in time
of special need. These were organised for the duration only of the
summer months. In the summer of 1934 the NSV managed to provide 600
of these for farmers' wives."'' The importance of this particular
measure was recognised in the provisions of the Four-Year plan, for
in 1936, extra Harvest Kindergartens were made available; indeed,
they were a part of those NSV facilities which were designed to aid
working married women with children and these also included city
2
based Hilfskinderqgrten. Given that no Gemeinde, according to the
NSV's publication, the NS-Volksdienst, was able to provide a really
significant level of increased kindergarten facilities it had fallen
to the NSV to provide these. The state provisions were liable to
suffer from 'shortages of personnel' so the NSV pointed out, hence
the valuable contribution of the NSV's new provisions.^ This
suggestion was true to some extent, but to suggest that the NSV
itself was not liable to suffer from shortages of personnel was of
course to paint a false picture for it had to make strenuous efforts
to find enough staff; not least of these was the tendency to pay
more than the state welfare facilities could, in order to attract
suitable numbers of staff.^ The importance of the Harvest Kinder-
1. Ibid., p.177.
2. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.25.
3. BA, NSD 30/4a, NS-Volksdienst, December 1943, p.175.
4. BA, R36/1996, Dr. Schow to DGT, 12th August 1941.
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gartens as labcj^ on the land became ever scarcer was shown in the
rise in the numbers of these between 1934 and 1936. From a figure of
600 in 1934, the Harvest Kindergartens rose to 751 in 1935, and 1,410
in 1936. The numbers of places available therefore were as follows:
1934 17,538 1937 131,765 1940 226,419
1935 26,534 1938 168,864 1941 261,453
1936 49,563 1939 279,562 (1)
Also within the framework of the Four-Year plan were the 'work place'
kindergartens which came under the auspices of the DAF and its own
Frauenamt section. For this reason, no figures were included with
2
regard to these in the NSV's own statistics. During the war there
was, of necessity, an increase in kindergarten facilities both of
Harvest type and including new ones which were set up in the
industrial areas and named Hilfskinderq^rten^ At the outbreak of
war, 1,949 of the new Hilfskinderqclrten were set up, offering
altogether 73,497 places. This provision would steadily increase so
that by 1941, there were placed at the disposal of those mothers who
wished to work (not a compulsory duty in time of war for mothers with
children, nor indeed for single women until January 1943), 3,654 new
kindergartens with 129,033 places. These were of course in addition
to the existing arrangements for nursery care. The numbers of
DauerkinderqSrten (permanent kindergartens) were as follows from
1935 to 1941:
1. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.27;
Wunderlich, Farm Labor in Germany, p.318.
2. BA, NSD 30/4a N5-Volksdienst, December 1943, p.178.
3. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.27.
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Number Places Staff
1935 1,061 42,443 1,878
1936 1,935 86,269 3,557
1937 3,501 153,477 6,204
1938 5,216 238,054 9,799
1939 8,122 374,516 16,219
1940 10,020 466,888 20,677
1941 14,828 689,154 35,835
(1)
However, it certainly seems that from 1937 or thereabouts the
NSV was beginning to suffer seriously the effects of shortages of
enough trained personnel. At the end of the summer of 1937, after
the Harvest Kindergartens had ceased to operate, it was necessary to
direct all senior kindergarten staff who might be set to
administrative work in offices at this time instead to work in these
2
areas which were severely short of specialist staff. Not only that,
but Hilgenfeldt was concerned to warn his staff that they could
expect shortages again in the following year (1938) in the Harvest
Kindergartens."^ However, these worries were later offset to some
extent by the NSW practice of paying its full-time staff above the
going rate, something the state officials were to deplore in 1941.
During the war, however, a serious shortage of NS-Wolkspfleqerinnen
led to the shortening of existing courses so that enough trained
1. Ibid.




personnel could take up a position sooner."* A serious criticism of
the NSV's staffing policies was given by Fiehler in 1941 when he
raised doubts about the NSV's manner, and the lengths to which it
2
would go in order to find enough staff for its own kindergartens.
However, these particular problems were by no means the more
important ones with regard to the NSV's venture into the area of
pre-school education, for it would find before the war that in some
of the larger cities, such as Berlin and Munich, it would be
extremely difficult, though by no means impossible, to set up -its
own kindergarten facilities. This is to say that the provision of
NSV kindergartens as well as the other forms of NSV child and youth
care, could hardly be described as a straightforward pre-war
contribution to existing child and youth care in Germany."^ On the
contrary, the NSV's new venture was a strong indication that
pre-school education and welfare care for small children would
eventually come under the control of the NSV. This area of child
welfare would largely be given over to the NSV from about 1941, but
the diminution of the state's participation would begin before the
war began. However, state objections to NSV kindergartens which were
offered hardly made the same impact as they did with regard to the
provision of youth welare itself. In any case the NSV, as far as the
provision of Party welfare was concerned, did not have to vie with
1. BS, NS/37ii/1010, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 91/43',
28th May 1943.
2. BA, NS 23/1158, Fiehler to Bormann, 'Ubernahme neuer
KindertagestStten durch die Hauptstadt der Bewegung',
18th July 1941, report on the Munich kindergartens.
3. See correspondence between Hilgenfeldt and the Berlin state
welfare offices, in 1936 and 1938; BA, R36/962, December
and January 1936/37; BA, R36/1002, May 1938.
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the HJ for a share of the work with very small children, for the
responsibility for these pre-school ages lay with the NSV itself, it
was for this reason above all that the state officials viewed with
resignation rather than surprise the ever-increasing participation of
the NSV in the work of kindergarten care, for they knew only too well
how determined the NSV could be in its arrangements over the
insertion of ' zusatzlicheor additional welfare, which was less an
extra set of facilities than a continuing threat of future
replacement of existing state welfare."^
In Berlin in 1936, three NSV kindergartens had been put up and
there were another eleven planned, which would be erected at a later
2
date. However, these (and the prospect of further) NSV
kindergartens were creating several problems for the existing Berlin
state kindergartens through the promotion of particular policies of
the Party's welfare organisation at this time. A really serious
conflict had emerged between Hilgenfeldt and Spiewock and they had
been conducting a series of arguments by letter over the activities
of the NSV.'' Not only were state officials, and Spiewock in
particular, being expected to view calmly the idea of the proposed
new NSV facilities which would be set up in the districts of Wedding,
Kreuzberg and Neukfllln, but they were, in addition, having to suffer
the existence of Party kindergartens which were openly operating as
1. BA, NS25/1158 'Die Errichtung von KindertagestStten
durch die Stadt Mannheim', Karlsruhe, 12th March 1940;
BA, R36/962, Spiewock to Stadtprdsident, Berlin, letter
of 7th January 1937.
2. BA, R36/962, Hilgenfeldt to Dr. Lippert, letter of
7th December 1936, p.2.
3. Ibid., Spiewock to StadtprSsident, Berlin, letter of
7th January 1937.
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rivals to the nearby state facilities. There is good reason to
believe the accusation that the NSV kindergartens had been set up on
purpose in close proximity to the existing state kindergartens in the
areas in question, but that they were offering what amounted to free
accommodation for children in these. This unfair and competitive
action was seen reasonably enough as only one more sign of anNSV
intention to replace the state's own arrangements with Party ones.
Not surprisingly, parents had come forward to enquire if the state
officials were also intending to offer free facilities, for if not,
then they would seriously consider transferring their children to
the NSV. A specious claim that no wish to offer 'free' places was
intended through the practice of asking parents to offer to pay what
they felt able to was offered to 'prove' that a donation was an
equally effective method of payment as any other. State officials,
the NSV argued, should not see a donation as an opportunity for
non-payment. Nor as a method of 'free' entry to NSV kindergartens,
for in fact the opportunity for a freely given donation had raised
'quite a substantial amount', and moreover, such a method ensured
that those who could not pay the required charge would not be
excluded from such care. Evidently the state charged (and intended
that the NSV should also charge) from 0.10 to 2.50 marks according to
family income;this the NSV merely ignored."^ There is little reason
to doubt that this was a competitive practice on the part of the NSV
as the state officials believed, the state welfare offices had
1. Ibid., 'Der Oberbtlrgermeister Landes - Wohlfahrts-und
Jugendamt Berlin, 'Personalvermehrung in Krippen,
Kindergarten und Horten', September 1936; Ibid.,
'Beitrage fUr die Kinder in den TagesstStten von
Vereinen, die stcldtische Zuschsusse erhalten, und
die TagestStten der NSV', 12th September 1936.
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attempted to make it clear that no-one would be charged more than
they could afford*, even though facilities were not free, a charge of
0.10 marks may have been regarded by many as a reasonable one until
the NSV had introduced its own particular form of 'fair' charges for
all.''' It certainly seems that Hilgenfeldt had no intention
whatsoever of changing this particular policy and it seems to have
been carried through in other NSV kindergarten facilities throughout
the country, even though no other state official, so far as can be
discovered, made reference to this. The most galling situation for
the Berlin Landesjuqendamt at the end of 1936 was that many parents
were beginning to question the right of the state to make charges
for these facilities, and indeed a 'ganze Reihe von Eltern' had been
bothering the Berlin officials with requests that they adopt the same
2
policy. Such a situation certainly had its more serious side, for
it called into question the payment of the NSV state subsidy which,
strictly speaking, the NSV was putting into jeopardy through its
willingness to ignore the existing regulations. However, Spiewock's
attempt to threaten the NSV at this time (1936) with non-payment of
the subsidy for its kindergartens in Ross Strasse, Garten Strasse and
Am Friedrichshain (RM 769.29, RM 638.0 and RM 1,589 respectively)
came to nothing."^ This matter should not be confused however with
4
the attempt to reduce the whole NSV subsidy in 1936.
1. Ibid.
2. BA, R 36/962, Spiewock to Stadtprgsident, Berlin,
letter of 7th January 1937.
3. Ibid.
4. See Chapter Two.
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At the end of 1937 and into the spring of 1938, a series of
problems arose yet again over the NSV's activities in the city when
it became known that it was about to take over entirely the Berliner
Hauptverein fdr KindertaqestStten which had been set up in 1933 to
act as an umbrella organisation for some of the previously existing
private kindergartens in Berlin.* This included the kindergartens
of the former paritfltischer Wohlfahrtsverband which had been
dissolved, and whose kindergartens in other areas had been taken over
entirely by the NSV. Most importantly, the Berliner Hauptverein, run
now by state officials, also administered and controlled the
subsidies which were paid out by the state.
The kindergartens of the 'Berliner Frdbelverein' received
33,230 marks, and the Verein Volkskindergdrten, also in Berlin,
2
received 25,290 marks per annum. Nevertheless, there seems never to
have been any real possibility that the Berlin Landes.juqendamt could
have retained its own management of the Berliner Hauptverein once the
NSV had set in motion the mechanisms to assume full responsibility.
However, Spiewock was most concerned at this time to make a firm
effort to dissuade Hilgenfeldt from divorcing the running of the
Berliner Hauptverein entirely from the state, indeed he hoped that he
could persuade the NSV to operate a joint control of this umbrella
organisation.^ An offer to allow the NSV to run the Verein while the
state would retain some say in the control and management of the
1. BA, R 36/1001, Spiewock to Hilgenfeldt, letter of
17th May 1938.
2. BA, R36/964, 'Aufwendungen f(Jr Vereine auf dem
Gebiete der Wohlfahrt', 1936, pp. 281-286.
3. BA, R36/1001, 'Denkschrift', Spiewock to Hilgenfeldt,
May 1938, p.5.
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subsidies and of bureaucratic arrangements met with a negative
response, however.The Gauamtsleiter of the NSV in Berlin, (who had
taken over from Spiewock in 1936), stuck to his original emphasis of
allowing the Verein to go into liquidation, a process which was duly
2
completed on the 2nd April 1938. This meant that the NSV itself
would be able to take on the running of the kindergartens which had
come under the control of the Verein. Certainly, Spiewock had known
from the end of 1936 that the NSV was extremely interested in the
Berliner Hauptverein and its kindergartens and at this time he warned
that the NSV was looking forward to taking on this responsibility."^
Spiewock regarded this matter as blatant ingratitude for the help he
had earlier given in transferring some private kindergartens (not
owned by the confessional agencies) to the NSV, which seems to have
amounted to approximately 38 out of the existing 471 subsidised
(including state-owned) kindergartens existing in the city. The NSV
by this time (1938) had set up 17 of its own facilities,^ and the
confessional agencies of Caritas and Innere Mission owned and
operated 183 of the total number of private kindergartens in the
city. From this time, therefore, the 32 former parit^tische
kindergartens and a few other private kindergartens would now (with
their subsidies) come under the control of the NSV.^ There is no
1. Ibid., Gauamtsleiter, NSV Berlin, to Spiewock, letter of
1st March 1938.
2. Ibid.,'Berliner Hauptverein fUr KindertagesstStten
e.V., Liquidator to Spiewock', letter of 2nd May 1938.
3. BA, R36/962, Spiewock to Stadtprdsident, Berlin, letter of
7th January 1937.




doubt whatsoever that Hilgenfeldt and Spiewock had come into serious
conflict at this time which the NSV's intended control over the
administration of the Berliner Hauptverein threw into strong relief.
The NSV had proposed that no state auditing of NSV finances in Berlin
should be undertaken even after the assumption of control of the
Berliner Hauptverein. This NSV claim angered Spiewock greatly given
that he felt himself to be constrained by his legal responsibilities
to make an examination of the NSV finances in Berlin"^ now that the
NSV would be looking after the affairs of the former umbrella
organisation and its existing kindergartens. It certainly seems as
though the prospect of the NSV being in direct charge of state funds
in respect of other private facilities put Spiewock into an
impossible position as a leading state official. For the NSV would
be seen to be administering state funds in respect of another party,
but without the need to have state supervision of its financial
affairs. This is not to say that the NSV had not done this type of
thing before, which Spiewock himself admitted, for the NSV had been
allowed to take on the full responsibility for the funds of the
confessional 'Bahnhofsmission' in Berlin, 'in spite of strong
opposition from the charitable agencies'. Other confessional welfare
measures too were supervised in this manner by the NSV, and this
2
included such measures as the churches, Hauskrankenpfleqe/Hauspfleqe.
Perhaps Spiewock had entertained the hope that the creation of the
Berliner Hauptverein would render unnecessary the NSV takeover of
more private kindergartens than seems to have been the intention on




the part of state officials in the city. Certainly, in Munich
a. pre-emptive measure of Fiehler's had prevented the NSV from gaining
control of a majority of the private kindergartens there for these
had been already taken over by the stated But it seems to have been
a difficult legal operation to carry through apart from other
considerations, and Spiewock was not able at this time to fend off
the extensive NSV/ incursion into the Berlin private kindergarten
2
sector. Possibly the main problem for the state officials was, as
Hilgenfeldt had already pointed out, that the NSV/, though a frei
agency, was nevertheless not like other private agencies, and was
supposed to be given, whether grudgingly or not, every support by the
state officials who were expected to regard the Party agency in a
'favourable' light and give it assistance when possible, and this
included helping in an effective transfer of existing private
facilities for welfare to the Party agency."' However, by 1938, the
clear impression is given that the Hitler Youth itself had managed to
find a good working arrangement with the Berlin state welfare
offices, and it was certainly a matter of some regret to Spiewock
that he had failed similarly to arrange for a good working
4
relationship with the NSV/. The HJ and the Berlin
Landes-Wohlfahrts-und-Juqendamt had arranged for a working
compromise in that the state owned Homes, sports arenas and youth
hostels being used by the HJ would continue to be so owned and
1. BA, NS 23/1138, Fiehler to Bormann, report/Munich/Kindergartens,
18th July 1941.
2. Ibid., Bormann to Fiehler, 'Ubernahme neuer KindertagestStten
durch die Haupstadt der Bewegung', letter of 16th August 1941.
3. Ibid.
4.
. BA, R36/1001, 'Denkschrift' Spiewock to Hilgenfeldt, May 1935,
p.14.
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administered, but that the HJ itself would take on all responsibility
for the activities being organised. The state would, in other
words, not lose its responsibility with regard to their
administration."^ The HJ would of course be entirely responsible for
all matters to do with the training and education being carried out
in these various sports halls and other facilities. Interference of
the kind which the NSV feared, namely that the state would have
access to administrative details such as finances, which the NSV
could not relinquish or wish to reveal, came to spoil the
possibility of the Party and state agencies from reaching a
compromise at this time. It may also be true to say that the state
welfare offices usually managed to reach agreements with the HJ
whenever that was necessary and far more easily than they had ever
been able to do with the NSV, and, in addition, in a majority of
2
cases. Above all, the NSV wished to keep its own finances an
entirely secret matter. The difficulty in finding any evidence of
NSV finances is testimony to its success in this respect.
To a very large extent the outbreak of war came as a solution
to NSV developments in the participation of kindergarten work
throughout Germany. From this time, new agreements would ensure
that the NSV would be allowed to take on the full responsibility for
the new kindergartens which would be set up in the expectation of an
increased participation of women in war work, and in other areas as
well.^ This meant that these state officials who had resisted as far
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NSD 30/4a, NS-Volksdienst, December 1943, p.161;
BA, NS 23/1138, 'Entwurf', 'Zusammenarbeit der Gemeinden/ .
NSV, zur FOrderung der KindertagesstStten, 1940.
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as they could an increased NSV participation, would find that this
was no longer possible from about 1940. Hilgenfeldt would find that
he had the full support of Bormann, and others such as the Education
Minister in MUnchen/Oberbayern, which would have a most important
effect on the NSV's activities in the city of Munich."'' It certainly
seems as though up to 1941, the state officials in Munich, with the
support of Fiehler, had successfully prevented any real NSV presence
2
there with regard to kindergarten work at least. However, by 1938,
the high percentage of NSV participation in the work of Juqendhilfe
in the Gau MUnchen/Oberbayern itself (88.6%) points to quite another
type of development, so that the two separate types of youth and
child care cannot be held to be similar from the point of
view of participation in certain substantive areas of welfare.^
Fiehler's reaction to new guidelines of July 1941 (which would
ensure the future strong participation of the NSYwithin the city,
given that the NSV would be officially allowed to organise all new
kindergarten facilities there and elsewhere in Germany), was to make
an argument for the continuation of state organised facilities,
including a state-arranged organistion of the new facilities. In a
report to Bormann he showed how utterly against NSV kindergartens
and, indeed, the NSV in general, he was at this time. It is
absolutely clear that a promised interference by the NSV into the
Munich kindergarten arrangements was greeted with deep dismay when it
became known that the new Regulations of 1941 would support this. A
1. BA, NS 23/1138, Bormann to Fiehler, Munich/kindergartens,
16th August 1941.
2. Ibid., Fiehler to Bormann, report/Munich/kindergartens,
18th July 1941.
3. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst, July 1939.
4. BA, NS 25/1158, Fiehler to Bormann report/Munich/
kindergartens, 18th July 1941.
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spirited defence of the existing arrangements of state kindergartens
was made in his long report - it can hardly be called a letter - to
Bormann in July 1941.^ Fiehler gave what can be seen as a strong
support of the provisions of the state which had carried out its
duties effectively and responsibly. In an effort further to show how
suitable the state arrangements were in the participation of Nazi
welfare measures, Fiehler stressed that in Munich, at least, church
facilities had never been strongly represented - even those of the
Uatholic church - due to the tendency in Munich to offer an
2
extensive, but state-organised, kindergarten welfare provision.
Indeed the first state kindergartens in Munich had been put into
operation as early as 1868, so that by 1907, there already existed 20
kindergartens belonging to state welfare. This meant that by 1913,
it had been necessary to erect a training school for kindergarten
teachers in the city."' However, a long history lesson from Fiehler
was not appreciated by Bormann who answered only briefly, and
negatively. Bormann seemed not to be impressed by the fact that
after 1933, the state had assumed control of a majority of the
existing church kindergartens (or other 'unacceptable' arrangements).
Neither was Bormann impressed by the fact that National Socialist
principles were being applied in a 'unified' manner within Munich
regarding this particularly important pre-school educational
measure. Fiehler's trusted colleague Stadtschulrat Bauer was in






(and schools), and he was of course himself a trusted member of the
Party."'' In addition Fiehler wanted Bormann to know how the
Stadtverwaltunq MOnchen had paid out very considerable sums of money
for all pre-school facilities and therefore had a very strong stake
in such work. For example, in the financial year 1940/41 the cost
of the pre-school programme in the city had amounted to RM
2
1,508,385. To this figure could be added the sum of RM 80,000 which
the city had given as a contribution to the costs of children's
meals. It was also pointed out that only one twentieth of this large
sum had been allowed from other state resources and he (Fiehler) was
unable to see how the NSW would itself assume such a responsibility
should that become necessary."' However, this was to jump the gun,
for the 1941 guidelines had not instructed that the NSV assume
control over all state kindergartens, only over the new ones which
were intended to be built at this time. Interestingly enough, many
state officials seemed to see this new development as the thin end of
the wedge, promising as it did the growing strength of the NSV in
this particular welfare area. Fiehler's reasonable request that the
new arrangements not be allowed to disturb the city's administrative
processes, as they undoubtedly would, made it clear that he was
attempting to put every possible reason forward for not implementing
the new arrangements."







istrative arrangements' it was obvious, he hoped to show, that it
would be necessary to leave the state completely in control of the
new and also existing, kindergartens and nurseries in Munich. These




But this was a digression which had little to do with the matter in
hand and Bormann did not'question the fact that Munich kindergartens
were well run and came under a Hdrteinspektor whose duty it was to
ensure that Munich's facilities were being properly run. Most
importantly, however, all pre-school facilities came under the
unified control of the Stadt.juqendamt. Unfortunately, Fiehler did
not give the numbers of remaining church or other private facilities
or even (it would seem) the few NSV arrangements which existed at
2
this time. Certainly it was clear that anNSV leadership over new
kindergartens would disturb such a unity of procedure, both of
control and of leadership, but this did not seem to be a matter
which Wagner, the Education Minister, or Bormann himself, were
concerned about. It seems obvious that neither man had such a high
opinion of the Munich kindergarten administrative arrangements as
Fiehler himself. From these several arguments of Fiehler's it seems
clear that he had sought earlier, and with some considerable success
to pre-empt an NSV development in the city's nursery arrangements for
a few years at least. There seems no reason to doubt that, as he




created in Munich in order to accommodate new NSV kindergarten
arrangements.^ The whole problematic issue of a double supply of
Nazi welfare facilities was raised by Fiehler who quite justifiably
wondered (though not to Bormann at this time) why the NSV should be
in a better position than he and his trusted staff to provide
2
ideologically acceptable social welfare measures. Had an answer to
this question readily presented itself, then many of the problems of
the German welfare system from 1933 would have been solved over¬
night."' No such solution would be forthcoming, however, and the
city of Munich's kindergarten facilities would be, albeit briefly,
drawn into the Party/state struggle over jurisdictional issues.
However, given that the further development of pre-school measures
would now lie within the scope of the Party's welfare organisation -
a development hastened by the outbreak of war - many problems which
had arisen in peace time would be circumvented. However, it must be
stressed that NSV Juqendhilfe measures did not always receive quite
such a strong thrust of support from the Party leadership, and the
NSV would find that it would remain as a more difficult nut to crack
in some areas, even in time of war.^ In the summer of 1941 it was
made clear to powerful state officials, including Fiehler himself,
that the thrust of child-care and kindergarten care would favour the
NSV and it seems that they would have to adjust to this development as
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. See Chapters Two and Five.
4. BA, NS 25/1138, Bormann to Fiehler, Munich/kindergartens,
16th August 1941.
5. See Chapter Seven.
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best they could. Fiehler's report, which outlined in great detail
the absolutely impeccable credentials of his own staff, and those of
the state welfare officials who were in charge of supervising the
kindergartens of the city, pointed out that the same thing could not
be said of the NSV."^ Whereas the leading officials of the Juqendamt
were all well-known National Socialists, ^all the staff employed in
the state kindergartens were proven beyond doubt to be 'politically
reliable', such a claim could not be made for NSV kindergarten
personnel. On the contrary, though he was not in a position to know
precisely how the NSV chose their staff, it was 'personally known to
him' that some of the former applicants for state positions in
kindergartens who had been trained in the confessional schools, and
who had been turned down by the state agency, had themselves been
taken on by the NSV. This meant that persons who had, 'only shortly
before' been working within the framework of the church's charitable
emphasis were, 'now working for the NSV'. This was a serious
allegation, given that the NSV had long since asserted that the
philosophical bent of its own measures rejected absolutely the idea
of 'charity', but it may have been an entirely accurate one. In
Baden at the end of 1942, it was clear that the NSV was still
2
employing 'confessional personnel'. In Mannheim too it was known
that the NSV had been forced to retain confessional staff in the
kindergartens which they had recently taken over."^ However, as
Bormann must have known, he could trust Hermann Althaus and
1. BA, NS 25/1158, Fiehler to Bormann, report/Munich/
kindergartens, 18th July 1941.
2. Grill, The Nazi Movement, p.601.
3. BA, NS 25/1158, report to DGT, 'Die Errichtung von
. KindertagestStten durch die Stadt Mannheim',
12th March 1940.
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Hilgenfeldt to make changes whenever that became possible and there
seem to have been no worries on that score especially as Bormann
must have been aware of the views of Althaus who, in 1941, tried to
raise support in order to exclude the churches entirely from the
whole field of welfare as it was organised for the young.^ As
Bormann's short reply to Fiehler shows, he wished to continue with
the guidelines of 1941 as set out, and this was with the agreement of
Wagner who strongly wished to see the NSV/ take on the new
responsibilities. There really was no possibility that Fiehler would
be successful in his attempt to halt NSV developments in his own
city, even though his defence of the state kindergartens was almost
as desperate as the one he would become to prepare for the situation
at the end of the war when he was concerned to protect the Brown
House, at all costs, from the Allied advance. There is little doubt
about the disparate development of social policy as it relates to
social welfare during the early part of the war, an examination of
the period up to 1941 reveals this to be the case. However, from
1942 there seemed to develop an attempt to coordinate social
policies, at least for the provision of welfare for very young
children, and less successfully perhaps, for older juveniles. From
1941, day-care facilities would be organised by the NSV/ in such a way
as to provide a strong National Socialist emphasis which at the same
time aimed to use the latest developments in ideas about the
2
nutrition of children and the development of the 'normal child'.
1. BA, NS 25/1233, Althaus to Axmann, letter of 20th November
1940.
2. BA, NSD 30/4a, NS-Volksdienst, December 1940, pp. 175^176.
BA, NS 37ii/1031, 'Stoffplan-KindergSrtnerinnen', see
Section C/Entwicklung und Pflege des Kindes', p.14.
That the future development of the NSV's kindergarten programme
from 1941 was firmly established, was recognised at the time by a
report from the Gau Schwaben which acknowledged the recent advances
of the NSV in such work by a recognition of the NSV's highly
successful 'Vormarsch' which the example of Munich had shown. This
particular report saw the now strongly based developments of the NSV
in the most favourable light and pointed out that, without doubt, the
NSV kindergartens were organised in the 'most modern sense' using the
best methods and that the NSV was, without doubt, better able to
carry out such pre-school provisions than the Gemeinden or local
government facilities."^ It was also pointed out however that the
funding of the NSV kindergartens, which were partly or even
completely financed by local government funds, had to be regularised
in some way and that the NSV itself should take on the funding of
their own facilities as soon as possible. The Gemeinden were faced
at this time with a most complicated job, for it was a time-wasting
and a difficult task to administer subsidies because of their complex
nature. Indeed, another way of funding such welfare would need to be
found.^
While the guidelines of 1941 firmly set the development of the
NSV kindergarten programme on its path, an earlier one of late 1939
had begun this process so that in Karlsruhe in 1940 there had emerged
worries about whether the new kindergartens which had been planned
for the city earlier were now going to be run by the state,
1. BA, NS 25/1138, 'Tatigkeitsbericht' Gau Schwaben,
report of July/August 1940/41.
2. Ibid., 'Die Errichtung von KindertagestStten',
Monnheim, 12th March 1940.
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or by the NSV."^ Karlsruhe had for long organised a comprehensive
provision of pre-school facilities which took in various categories
of children, including those in need of extra care and attention as
2
well as those whose mothers were fully employed. It was felt that
at the time (March 1940) the earlier plans lay outside the 1939
agreements, for the new kindergartens had been originally planned as
early as 1938. For this reason it was believed that the Hilgenfeldt
Fiehler agreements of 1939 did not come into question. It certainly
seems as though these particular 'agreements', a copy of which has
not been discovered, were a preliminary set of proposals which were
less binding than the later one of 1941. It may be that Fiehler had
made the agreements in the vain hope that a further set of of new
proposals would not arise which would disturb the Munich kindergarten
facilities, or that he could somehow circumvent them, as his letter
to Bormann in 1941 shows.^ It seems however that Hilgenfeldt had
been able to persuade Bormann that another, perhaps firmer set of
guidelines was required. Undoubtedly however, there existed a strong
move away from state to Party facilities for kindergartens from the
time of the outbreak of war, which was utterly decisive for the Party
organisation's own development within the whole field of child care.
However, this does not mean that the NSV would begin to solve all its
problems, for the difficulty of finding sufficient staff would
remain. Officials in Karlsruhe during 1940 had realised that the NSV
was having problems over its staffing levels 'as usual', and it was
noted that in 'dozens of cases' in NSV kindergartens taken over from
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NS 23/1138, Fiehler to Bormann, report/Munich/
kindergartens, 18th July 1941.
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the confessional agencies, nurses of the Catholic and the Evangelical
orders were still active in these and that ministers of religion
could be seen in these kindergartens going freely back and forth.
With regard to such kindergartens, it was pointed out, one could
hardly talk of a Nationalsozialistische ErziehunqstStte.^ But it
was acknowledged that the NSV/ could hardly be expected to take over,
and run entirely, the 580 confessional kindergartens which still
existed in the Gau Baden. As J.H. Grill has pointed out in his study
of Baden, as late as October ]943, confessional kindergartens were
2
still flourishing in the Gau. But this meant less than it seems,
for Baden had made arrangements similar to those made in Gau Sachsen
in 1940, which would arrange for the transfer of all its confessional
kindergartens to the NSV/ in relation to all senior staff which meant
that all decision-making power was transferred, and the confessional
staff would no longer be allowed to undertake any decision-making
roles. But it may be questioned how far the NSV/ could exclude
church influence if a majority of the subordinate kindergarten staff
also remained. But these policies were conceived in a step-by-step
manner given the sheer impossibility of replacing all confessional
kindergarten staff by those of the NSV/ ovepnight. ^ Nevertheless,
an agreement with the NSV to take on the running of confessional
kindergartens carried with it the underlying fear, on the part of
state officials, that they were allowing the NSV a potential foothold
in the state sphere at the same time. This certainly seems to have
1. Ibid., 'Die Errichtung von KindertagestStten', Mannheim,
12th March 1940.
2. Grill, The Nazi Movement, p.603.
3. BA, NS 25/1158, Wohlfahrtsamt Stuttgart, 'Die Kindergarten
der NSV/ in Stuttgart: Entwicklung der Einrichtungen',
report of 1942.
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been the case in 1940 in Sachsen for great pains were taken to see
that agreements being drawn up between the NSV and the state
officials did not allow for a future take-over of the state run
kindergartens of the Gemeinde»-as well. Officials were very seriously
concerned whether the agreements could open up the possibility of a
swift take-over of all the Gemeinde kindergartens, 'on the spot'."^
The agreement under scrutiny did not openly set out such an
eventuality, but it was feared that a clever (or cunning)
interpretation by an NSV offical could have made such a situation
possible or even very likely. For this reason, in discussions
between the DGT, the Saxon Minister of the Interior and the NSV, it
had been expressly emphasised that the NSV should not then, nor in the
2
future, disturb the running of the kindergartens of the Gemeinde.
This clarification of the agreements in question, the Order of the
2nd December 1940, seems to have set at rest the minds of the state
officials in Sachsen at that time.
However, the NSV did not always operate within such a hostile
and suspicious environment with regard to the allocation of the
confessional kindergartens and their future. For example, in Gau
Hessen-Nassau the Gauleitunq was quite happy to see the NSV make
promises to take over all the existing confessional kindergartens,
indeed it also asked that the NSV to take on the running of 20 state
kindergartens in the city of Frankfurt, though the state would
continue to administer them while the NSV would take on the
responsibility for the running of the facilities.^
1. BA, NS25/1158, to DGT, 'KindertagestStten', discussions
of the new regulations, 28th February 1941.
2. Ibid., see letter from Amt fUr Kommunalpolitik, Dresden,
8th March 1941.
3. Ibid., Gauleitung Hessen-Nassau to Frick, letter of
16th September 1941.
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At this time in Hessen-Nassau, it had been decided that
pre-school facilities could be left to the NSV where necessary, and
in any case, state officials had seen the need to ask for NSV help in
the light of increased shortages of staff due to the war."'' On this
subject, Bormann seems to have taken the line that where no very
serious difficulties existed, the state should hand over to the NSV
where the war itself, through shortages, had caused many problems to
arise in the kindergartens of the Gemeinden.
from 1941, Bormann saw the development of pre-school education
entirely from the point of view of a Party take-over and his attitude
in the summer of 1941 certainly showed this, given his refusal to
contemplate a request virtually to exclude the NSV in Munich from new
2
kindergarten arrangements.
From 1942, these developments were going on apace at the same
time as many new harvest kindergartens were being set up in the
country area of GSnserndorf. In this area 11 Gemeinden were in the
process of setting up new Harvest Kindergartens since so many mothers
were failing to take on work because of the lack of kindergarten
facilities there.^ These kindergartens would be available to mothers
who would find that all or half of the cost would be paid by their
4
employers, if they wished to take advantage of them. The whole
question of the willingness of women to make use of these facilities
however is one which perhaps the NSV had not fully considered,for
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., Bormann to Fiehler, Munich/Kindergartens,
16th August 1941.
3. Ibid., 'an alle Herren BUrgermeister des Landkreises
GSnserndorf, NS-KindergSrten', 30th March 1942.
4. Winkler, Frauenarbeit, see pp.35-66.
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many woman seemed reluctant to return to work in war-time. In its
anxiety to create an empire for itself, the NSV certainly neglected
to consider the opinion of the potential consumers of such new
facilities. And it certainly seems that the NSV's own kindergartens
were usually short of staff. Even in those kindergartens which were
taken over and run by the NSV, shortages of staff ensured the
continued participation of confessional nurses so that in these,
especially,the input of the NSV was entirely superfluous and hardly
helpful; indeed the running of these particular kindergartens would
have been best left to the original staff who had been working in
them."^ At least Fiehler in Munich was able to show that he did not
make the same 'mistake' by allowing confessional staff to be taken
into his state kindergartens, or so he claimed in 1941. Most
importantly, the confessional kindergartens would remain to be
popular and they would only be replaced gradually by the NSV as the
example of Berlin shows. Indeed an NSV assumption of control was in
many cases only a partial one, both there and in Stuttgart, it seems
that where state officials were keen to allow the NSV to take over
existing church kindergartens, then this would take place. However,
the opposite was also true: if the existing confessional
arrangements were not to be disturbed, according to the wishes of
leading state officials, then the NSV would find it far more
2
difficult to obtain its goal. It must be remembered that state
officials frequently saw an NSV takeover of confessional arrangements
as the first step in the takeover of the state facilities as well,
1. BA, NS 25/1158, 'Die Errichtung von KindertagestStten',
12th March 1940.
2. BA, R36/1001, DGT to RMdl, report to Ministerialdirektor
Dr. Suren, 'Zusammenarbeit zwischen dffentlicher und
freier Wohlfahrtspflege', 27th July 1938.
314.
and were therefore less enthusiastic about the exclusion of church
facilities than they might have been in the first place. But the
move was toward NSV kindergartens or, NSV-run kindergartens; this
was something which the state officials knew about from 1941, and it
would be written into the Order of Hitler of 1944 which outlined the
responsibilities of the NSV for the 'future'. Hitler intended that
all the various categories of kindergarten should remain."'' It was
also shown that the NSV should continue to participate in this work
as before in relation only to the 'worthy' categories of family,
whose children would be sent to the NSV facilities. For the Hitler
Order did not envisage a reduction of the distinctions between
'worthy' and 'unworthy' families; on the contrary, it provided a
firm written confirmation of such work and ensured its continuation,
both at that time, and, as far as the leadership were concerned (and
Bormann in particular) for the future as well.
NS-5chwesternschaft
The NSV did not only become involved in health care through
their work with children in the kindergartens and in other ways
through holiday schemes for children and adults. Indeed, the NSV was
charged in 1934 with organising the arrangements for a Nazi
sisterhood of nurses (NS-Schwesternschaft).^ This new organisation
of nurses was announced on 28th March 1934 with the additional
information that the existing organisations of nurses of the
1. BA, R36/963, 'Verfdgung 11/44', FUhrerhauptquartier ,
22nd August 1944.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1039, 'Anordnung Nr 1', instructions of
28th March 1934.
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'Rote Hakenreuzschwestern', and the 'Braune Schwestern' had been
dissolved on the 15th January 1934 and would now be included within
the new NSV order of nursing sisters. The new NSV order was, it
seems, widely known as the 'Brown Sisters' and, perhaps less
frequently, as the 'Blue Sisters', depending upon whether they were
active in nurseries and kindergartens (Blue) or in hospitals, and in
the Community Health stations of the NSV (Brown)"'' Generally speaking
the nurses of the NS-Schwesternschaft were occupied in the Gemeinde-
pfleqestationen of the NSV which were also set up in 1934, and the
numbers of these would rise year by year until they amounted to 5,717
in 1941 while the number of NS-nurses came to 5,891. But this was
not nearly enough, for in 1943 when the numbers of NS-nurses stood at
7,000, it was stressed that there needed to be 30,000 community-care
nurses available. Indeed, the intention to supply a better hospital
nursing service generally included the calculation that it should be
increased by 10% at the latest by 1950, (and by 20% by 1960) to
2
accommodate the needs of an ageing population. The NSV Community
Health stations were available for visits by the local population or,
on the other hand, they provided a home visiting service by nurses
whereby health-care for the community was carried out by trained
senior nurses who might in addition be able to stand in for busy
doctors. It seems that the NSV sisterhood of nurses (hereafter
NS-nurses) would consist of an organisation of both trained and
trainee nurses who would see the duties of the nurse from the point
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.28; BA, NSD
30/4a, NS-Volksdienst December 1943, see Section 3,
'Gemeindepflege', p.174; BA, NS 37ii/1010, 'Rundschreiben
Nr. 31/43', 18th February 1943.
of view of the National Socialist 'spirit of service for others'.^
By the 16th April 1934, the NSV Gauamtsleiter of the department
for Organisation in the NSV head office in Berlin was asked to report
on the existing numbers of hospitals , clinics, Mothers' Homes,
community nursing stations, Kreis social welfare stations and
Children's Homes. At the same time he was asked to report on the
numbers of beds available for patients in hospitals. This list
suggests that an attempt would be made to coordinate information on
available health care in order to see how the -measures of the NSV
could best be organised in relation to its newest venture, the
provision of community health care. However, it seems that this
particular new section like the sub-divisions of the NSV created in
the light of the Four Year Plan, such as the Erndhrunqshilfswerk,
and possibly also the TB Hilfswerk, was subordinate to the main work
of the NSV which revolved around the provision of welfare for women,
juveniles and pre-school age children, as well as the annual charity
scheme, the Winterhilfswerk/Kreiqswinterhilfswerk. Indeed the
danger of the NSV spreading itself too thinly within a growing
variety of welfare schemes reflected the propensity of the NSV
leadership to take on any and every chance further to involve itself
in the whole provision of Nazi welfare, from handing out quantities
1. Ibid.; BA, NS 37ii/1039, 'Anordnung Nr 1'; 'Anordnung Nr. 7',
instructions 28th March; 11th October 1934, the oath of the
NS-Nurse read, ' Ich schwflre Adolf Hitler, meinem Ftlhrer,
unverbrUchliche Treue und Gehorsam. Ich verpflechte mich, an
jedem Platz, an den Ich gestellte werde, meine Berufsaufgaben
als nationalsozialistiche Schwester treu und gewissenhaft im
Dienst der Volksgemeinschaft zu erfUllen, so wahr mir Gott
helfe!'
2. See Chapters Three and Five.
of potatoes on a cold winter's day to advising a mother about the
problems of a young adolescent.^ However, given the thrust of NSV
policies and developments, every opportunity would be seized to take
on more responsibility not only for the welfare but also for the
health of the nation. A hugely ambitious organisation, the NSV had a
wish to see itself being included in the work of health, as well as
welfare guidance. There seem to have been a few problems arising at
the time of the creation of the NS-nurses with the Office for
People's Health, which arguably would have been the more logical
framework within which an order for Nazi nurses would be organised,
but these were minor and it would be the NSV which would be expected
to take on this particular duty. But the NS-nurses should be seen
rather more in the form of a community-nurse service rather than as
2
an organisation of hospital nurses per se. Membership of the N5
Schwesternschaft was open to any German Volksqenossin who was a
National Socialist 'by conviction' and who was under the age of 35.
The youngest NS nurse had to be over the age of nineteen before she
could join. However, the lower age limit was given to be age 18, in
the NSV handbook, Schule fOr das Lebe^ein Beruf in der NSV, which
suggests that quite soon the NSV had decided to include more
potential trainees, certainly by 1936 or thereabouts.Training for
the Nazi sisterhood consisted of a two year spell in a hospital at
the end of which the state examinations would be taken. The costs of
the training were nil and those undertaking training received a
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1040, 'Entwicklung der NS-Schwesternschaft',
n.d. (71943).
3. BA, NS 37ii/1039, 'Anordnung Nr 1', 28th March 1934;
NSD 30/50, Schule fdr das Leben, p.18.
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monthly sum of RM 15, to provide for small purchases; indeed it acted
as 'pocket money' for the young women until a salary would be
received."^ However, one pre-requisite for entrance to training as an
NS nurse was the necessity of spending one year as an NSV Household
2
Help. At the end of her training and at the very start of her
nursing career, the NS nurse could expect to earn RM 175 per month.
She would also receive a free uniform and additional social security
coverage. Her career prospects seem to have been fairly good, and






The numbers of NS-nurses from 1934 to 1941 was given by the NSV to be
as follows:













4. BA, NSD 30/51, Peine Arbeit, see 'Schwestern'.
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It certainly seems that the NSV never had quite enough of these
NS-nurses to go round and strenuous efforts were made to gain new
recruits for the sisterhood."^ In 1938, a substantial publicity/
advertising campaign for the NS-nurses was undertaken in the months
of January and February of that year. It was hoped that new recruits
would be gained not only for the NS-nurses but also for the
Schwesternschaft of the Red Cross and the Reichsbund der freien
2
Schwestern und Pfleqerinnen e.V. The propaganda material for this
campaign was put together by the Rundfunkstelle of the department for
Werbunq und Schulunq in the NSV offices in Berlin, and there would be
broadcast a series of programmes lasting approximately fifteen
minutes each, which would deal with the NS-nurses and their work from
the point of view of a listener who might be interested in joining
the sisterhood.^ The intention was to broadcast a set of items which
were designed as Vorpropaqanda und Beeinflussunq, (introductory
propaganda material) and programmes under this heading were put out
one month before the recruitment drive in February. The first wave
of programmes was meant to serve as a support and as an introduction
to the drive. In January, some of the programmes would include such
ideological/propaganda messages to the listeners as, 'Next to the
vocation of 'mother', a female has no finer, more womanly, task than
1. BA, NS 22/747, 'Arbeit der NSV', propaganda instructions,
'Rundfunkstelle des Amtes Werbung und Schulung, Hauptamt
fdr Volkswohlfahrt', 9th December 1937; BA, 37ii/1042,
'Werbefeldzug Schwesternschaftjermine Januar-Februar 1938'.
2. BA, NS 22/747, 'Arbeit der NSV', see 'Die drei
Schwesterngruppen: "Deutschen Schwesterndienst"'.
3. BA, NS37/1042, 'Werbefeldzug Schwesternschaft', Anlage,
'Terminplan'.
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the career of a nurse'.^ The first programme would include a
reportage from the Rudolf-Hess-Krankenhaus in Dresden (the first
nurses' training school). Other programmes to follow would be given
from the point of view of a diary of activities of 'Sister Else',
which would give the listener the chance to learn about the daily
round of an NS-nurse and what this was likely to entail. However,
something on the free time of the nurse would be included also - no
doubt to relieve any suspicion that NS-nurses were occupied to an
"inordinate degree in unrelieved hard work for the health care of the
2
community. It would also be stressed in the propaganda material
that the descripton of tasks of the NS-nurse should include as much
information on the three existing groups of Nazi nurses
(NS-Schwesternschaft, Schwestern DRK, Reichsbund der freien Schwester
und Pfleqerinnen e.V.) as possible."* Most importantly it would be
pointed out that the task of the nurse was something which had an
'exalted' side (not an altogether unfamiliar idea, given that the
nurse in many societies, though not necessarily highly paid, was and
perhaps still is, viewed in such a way by those in her care).^ The
introductory propaganda material however, would include an emphasis
on short items which covered such themes as:
a) Serice for the individual or service for the Volk?
b) The activity of the nurse in war-time;
1. BA, NS 22/747, 'Arbeit der NSV', 'Vorpropaganda und
Beeinflussung'.
2. Ibid., 'Aus dem Tagebuch von Schwester Else'.
3. Ibid., 'Die drei Schwesterngruppen'
4. Ibid.
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c) The nurse and her work;
d) Nurse or dauqhter? (Haustochter).
(1)
A follow up to this introductory material would then go on to explain
in more detail (after the listener's interest had hopefully been
raised) to include an explanation of important factual information
such as how one became an NS-nurse, the cost, if any, of the
training, and where one could receive information on a career in
nursing. Information on what the nurses were expected to learn was
included in this later material as well as an expansion of the
2
ideologically motivated theme of 'from nurse to housewife'. The
very carefully organised series of broadcasts shows how anxious the
NSV was, and how seriously it regarded attempts, to gain more
recruits for the NS-nurses. The broadcasts would be given support by
printed articles in the press, and Kreis offices would hold open
discussion times on the subject of the NS-nurses.^ The sophisticated
propaganda material may have been originally designed by the
Propaganda Ministry rather than the NSV, though no mention was made
of this in the hand-out for NSV staff; however, it seems more than
likely that such was the case given the style of the layout of the
material which was very similar to some of the WHW propaganda. In
the special field of arranging for a community service of nursing
staff who would be available for consultation by the public at the
local level, the NSV seems to have had if not a monopoly, then a
free hand. But the NS-nurse was not a particularly popular figure,
1. BA, NS 37/1042, 'Werbefeldzug Schwesternschaft',
'1-16 Januar, Vorpropaganda', p.l.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., see 'Allgemeine zur Werbewelle', p.2.
4. BA, NSD 30/4a, NS-Volksdienst, December 1943, pp.174-173..
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especially if she was used to replace confessional nurses, or nuns,
in existing nurseries and kindergartens. In the work of community
health care the NS-nurses seem to have taken an important, even
leading role, though this did not mean an automatic attainment of
popularity, as Kershaw has shown.^ In Bavaria the replacement of
Catholic nurses by those of the NSV during 1941 only served to
increase the climate of unrest which had been caused by the general
clamp down on the churches at that time. The attempt to put
NS-nurses in the Bavarian nurseries in place of nuns was entirely
unacceptable to the population at the time and certainly calls in
2
question the general popularity of the Nazi nurses as a whole. For
example, one SD report showed the NS-nurse was regarded to be less
well trained than other nurses and that she was regarded as an
unwelcome addition to community health care in general, especially in
Catholic areas. However, the attempts to replace confessional nurses
with Nazi nurses was part of an emphasis upon a reduction of the
influence of the church in favour of the Nazi Weltanschauung, in the
area of health and welfare care of children.
In 1937 the scope of the activities of the NS-nurse was
significantly increased, and those NS-nurses who had completed their
training would find that they would be sent to the border areas of
Germany in order that the populations there would be encouraged
1. Kershaw, Popular Opinion, p.333.
2. Ibid.; SD reports showed how unpopular the NS-nurse was (1943).
I am grateful to Dr Jill Stephenson for confirming this.
3. Ibid.
4- J.S. Conway, The Nazi Persecution of the Churches 1933-43,
London 1968, see Appendix 13, p.383.
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by the provision of a health care service to give a stronger
allegiance to the regime. This development would how itself more
clearly from this time on."^ Two new Reichschulen were opened in
Dresden and Dortmund and in special extra monthly courses the
NS-nurses were given ideological training in the various aspects of
2
their work. With the beginning of the war however 'special duties'
were created which allowed that NS-nurses would be sent to the newly
occupied areas as well as the border areas of Germany. The first
extension of the work of the NS-nurses had occurred in Bavaria in
1937/38 where new community health care stations were set up. In the
Bayeris che Wald area, 75 of these stations were established, in the
main, it was said, to combat the scourge of infant deaths in the
district or - perhaps more realistically - to prevent, or at least
inhibit, the practice of abortion. NS-nurses were also taken into
the SS-Lazaretten, the SS Mothers' homes ("Lebensborn" e.V.), the
Ordensburqen and into NSV institutional provisions for juveniles."^
By 1937, the membership of the NS-nurses stood at 3,751 trained and
4
1,471 nurses still in training. In 1938, the NSV took over many of
the existing schools of nursing and it was reported that 36 hospitals
belonging to the NS-nurses were now in existence. This is to say
that by the beginning of the war the NS-nurses' organisational
activities had been ranging widely, from local community health care
to work in the SS "Lebensborn" Homes. However, the start of the war






saw them begin to travel ever more widely through the occupied areas
of the Nazi regime, for example, in the Sudetenland (where 60
NS-nurses already lived) 180 were sent to carry on with community
care there. In the Protektorat Bohemia-Moravia as many as 600 nurses
were made available, while Wartheland received only 30, but this
particular number would increase and they would, in Wartheland,
undertake to provide all manner of care for mothers and children
there.^
In the first, year after the 'Campaign in the East', the newly
occupied areas could count 300 of the NS-nurses who had been placed
within newly created Community Health stations, and approximately 400
nurses had been set to work in hospitals. By 1939, the membership of
the NS-nurses was approximately 10,586 with slightly more than half
2
of that number consisting of trainees. After the fall of France and
Belgium and by an order of Hitler, 100 nurses were dispatched into
these countries for the 'care of the populations there'. This was
entirely in line with the work of the NSV which would also go into
France and Belgium, at first, mainly to oversee the flow of refugees
and to secure food supplies where that was possible."'
Other new tasks for the NS-nurses would emerge in 1941 which
involved working not only in the Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen, Malmedy and
Luxembourg, but in the Netherlands as well. Norway would also
receive an influx of the NS-nurses; however, it seems that this
1. Ibid., p.3.
2. Ibid., p.3, see also BA, NSD 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung',
p. 40.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1040, 'Entwicklung der NS-Schwesternschaft',
pp.3-4.
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venture was probably restricted entirely to the use of these nurses
by the SS in their own medical facilities."^ It seems that the NSV
was providing a useful service for the SS in this respect by allowing
their own trained staff to be used by the SS medical clinics where
2
necessary. Other duties included the reception of repatriated
ethnic German (Volksdeutsche) and this service was provided for those
returning from the eastern areas of Galicia and the Ukraine. In
Lithuania, 42 nurses were available to aid the returning
Volksdeutsche who had been accommodated in special reception camps.^
The growth of the NS-nurses organisation, going as it did from
1,001 in 1934 to 7,679 in 1941 (to which figures should be added the
numbers in training for these years that is, 396 in training in 1934
and 4,033 in training in 1941), may have represented something close
to an optimum growth in numbers for during the war there existed a
very serious shortage of NSV Volkspfleqerinnen in practically every
Gau, which meant that NSV staff had to be supplemented by newly
created Volkspfleqehelferinnen who underwent a shortened training
course in the NSV training schools so that the duties of the NSV
Volkspfleqerinnen could be taken over by trained personnel, even if
the length of the training courses (four months) could hardly match
the normal two-year course of the fully trained NSV Volkspfleqer-
4
innen.
1. BA, NS 37ii/1040, 'Entwicklung der NS-Schwesternschaft', p.4.
2. Ibid., p.4.
3. Ibid.
4. This shortened course did not ignore ideological training,
BA, NS 37 ii/1010, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 91/43', 28th May 1943;
BA, NSD 30/50 Schule fUr das Leben, p.23.
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The NSV's involvement in health care which included a close
participation in the important measures for combating TB, was
organised through its own TB Hilfswerk section, which was included
within the NSV Amt Volksqesundheit. This particular arrangement
within Head Office in Berlin was divided into five sections:
a) Heilverschickung;





Through the NSV's TB Hilfswerk it was possible for citizens who were
acceptable to the NSV on the basis of their own strict guidelines to
receive assistance with the costs which might be incurred by patients
who had to undertake a spell in a sanatorium or other type of TB
hospital or TB clinic. This was seen by the NSV as a means of
encouraging effective preventive medicine, which would not only help
to heal the sick, but prevent the spread of the disease within the
population at large. It would be possible for those in need to
obtain financial help from either the Hitler-Freiplatz Spende but
more usually the NSV, when insurance or other financial support had
run out, or was perhaps proving to be inadequate. However, this
financial assistance acted as a safety net only for certain
categories of patient who were not regarded as incurable, and only
2
medium to light cases would obtain such help. At all times the
financial help received would, primarily, be an addition to what
1. BA, NS 37ii/1010, 'Amt fUr Volksgesundheit in Hauptamt fUr
Volkswohlfahrt', 1936; BA, NS 37ii/1001, Fol. 2, 'Das Wesen',
p.7.
2. Reher, Social Welfare, p.30.
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could be received from all other sources. As Werner Reher explained,
'The fight against tuberculosis furnishes one of the most
important grounds for the activities of the NSV. This is
a problem that is of primary importance not only in
Germany, but in all civilised countries. The tuber¬
culosis problem is not a new phenomenon. But the fight
against it has hitherto not been conducted under a
unified command. For this reason a Central Committee to
combat tuberculosis was established in 1933'.
(1)
It was within the framework of this committee that Reher placed the
activities of the NSV. For it was within such an attempt to take on
the problem of combating TR within the population at large that the
2
NSV's work was perceived. It was considered that the NSV's
resources could be put to good use by 'filling gaps' where the need
arose, and this would serve to consolidate the fight against TB
itself. Both the medical and insurance authorities had, Reher
explained, been finding the cost of a TB aid programme difficult to
support and it had been a long, continuing problem which, from 1933,
promised to receive an increased input of resources from the Party,
through the NSV rather than from the government itself. Reher was
most concerned to stress that there was no question of relieving
others of the financial responsibility for such work, but the NSV
would be charged with seeing to it that those who were responsible
for the financial costs of a cure, the social insurance funds and
other sources of financial support for the treatment of TB, were
meeting their full responsibilities and obligations in an efficient
way, so that to this extent the NSV was keeping a close watch over





to an end, according to the terms of an existing social insurance
contract, the NSV would step in and take on the responsibility of
further supporting those TB cases who came into difficulty, by
meeting any further costs. As the complicated application form of
the NSV Tuberkulose Hilfswerk showed, detailed questions would be
asked about the financial situation of the applicant. Equally
detailed answers would have to be given regarding whether the
applicant had been insured through either:
1. Landesversicherunqsanstalt
2. Sonderanstalt der Invalidenversicherunqsanstalt,
or indeed any other type of social insurance scheme in which the
applicant had become involved. These questions would be asked in
order to see whether the aid coming from such schemes available had
been fully exhausted."^
However, the NSV saw its role within such health care schemes,
mainly as a preventive one so that it would also be prepared to offer
aid for measures designed to improve the living conditions which
tended to encourage the spread of disease. These were seen by the
NSV to consist primarily of the prevalence of an insidious and
continuing under-nourishment of certain sections of the population,
insanitary housing conditions and insufficient clothing and warmth in
2
the winter. To some degree the WHW would supply a minimum of these
needs for those who were unable themselves to purchase sufficient
quantities of fuel or of certain important staple items in the diet.
It can be argued that the population as a whole was better fed at the
start of the war than would have been the case without the input of
1. BA, N5 22/751, 'Richtlinien ftlr TB HeilstSttenkuren', n.d.
2. Reher, Social Welfare, p.31.
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WHW aid. It might also be that the ability of the Germans to prevent
major epidemics during the war was due in some part to the continued
donations of foodstuffs and of vitamin supplements which could be
obtained from the NSV, so that there existed a majority of people who
were not going completely without the more important items in the
daily diet. The NSV was most emphatic about the necessity of good
dietary habits and promoted this idea whenever the occasion arose,
especially to mothers who were strongly urged to think seriously
about the nourishment of their children. From this point of view the
NSV could be seen to be involving itself closely within the health
care measures of the regime, and in a distinctive way, supporting the
measures of the Office for the People's Health. A deep interest in
preventive health measures underwrote many of the NSV's schemes
which, though restricted to certain sections of the German population
only, which diminished their value, can be seen to have been forward-
looking and perhaps entirely effective in the sense that they were
widely available in many instances. For example one report about the
economic situation in the Gau Mecklenburg in 1941 pointed out that
due to severe shortages of goods such as children's shoes in the
area, one mother had been prompted to write,
'what use to me are Vigantol and Cebion-Zucker (two
vitamin supplements) when my child is learning to walk
and I cannot find any shoes to put on his feet'.
(1)
NSV concern with preventive measures meant that it stressed the
importance of supporting the breadwinner of a family who had to go
1. BA, NS 1/285, Fol. 447, Per Gauwirtschaftsberater,
Gau Mecklenburg, 'Bericht Uber die Wirtschaftslage in
den Monaten MSrz/April 1941'.
330.
for treatment for TB, if necessary, as soon as possible and without
having to fear for his family's well being. He should be allowed,
the NSV emphasised, to take up a place in a hospital or clinic sooner
rather than later and not to avoid such treatment through anxiety
over financial matters. If early treatment was sought, then the NSV
promised to undertake to support the family through its worst
financial crises and it would set itself to 'become the trustee of
the family and make itself responsible for the family's welfare'."^
Whether or not these promises were actually fulfilled , it is clear
that the NSV only came forward with its aid, as customary, at the
last possible moment when all other sources had been explored, and
such aid was given only after a complicated bureaucratic procedure
had been gone through which may have hindered the donations of sums
of money to applicants.
In 1936/37 the WHW donated RM 3,000,000 to the NSV's TB
Hilfswerk but this may not have represented the entire costs of the
scheme. So far no figures of the costs of the NSV's aid scheme have
been found for they were not included in the Aufkommen und Verwendunq
of the NSV which only outlined the numbers of cases taken up
2
according to year. However, the NSV's TB Hilfswerk did take up more
cases year by year as the figures show, and from a figure of 1,363
cases in 1933, the numbers of those aided who were sent to TB
sanatoria were given as follows:
1. Reher, Social Welfare, p.31.
2. Ibid.; BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.37.










It is not, however, clear whether the drop in numbers from 1938 to
1940/41 is due to a decrease in applications made or to a restriction
of the service which coincided with the extra war-time activities of
the NSV. It may have been that it was due to severe pressure upon
the existing numbers of beds available, which meant that more
individuals were having to wait for a longer period before treatment
could be given. The numbers of existing TB homes and clinics in
Germany in 1938 amounted to 160 specialist clinics which could offer
2
22,130 available beds. To this was added the 13,000 hospital beds
which were made available to those cases requiring urgent treatment
before a bed could be found in a TB clinic. From the figures given
above it seems that the NSV may have been supporting under a third of
the existing TB cases according to beds available from about 1940 or
thereabouts.^ Also in 1938, the NSV made strenuous efforts to
discover how effectively the provision of TB care was being
organised, and questionnaires were sent out to all TB Homes and
clinics in Germany with the request that they make known how long
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst, March 1939, p.98.
3. Ibid.; Informationsdienst, November 1938, p.33.
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their waiting lists were."^ From the replies to the NSV questionnaire
it seems that the average waiting time was 4-6 weeks in a majority of
cases, while in a smaller number of clinics the waiting time was
2
reported to be about 8 weeks or slightly longer. At this time the
NSV was in the process of encouraging clinics only to take up those
cases which could be described as having a hopeful outcome, and they
were reminded that they should seek to make beds available for those
cases which required surgical treatment which could itself aid a
speedy recovery or, at least, offer the promise of a shorter stay in
the clinic. The terminal cases would be disregarded entirely by the
NSV it seems and pressure would be put on clinics to do likewise and
one way of discovering how efficient clinics were in choosing
'suitable' cases was to keep a close watch upon the numbers of cases
awaiting treatment.^ The harsh and pitiless selection procedures
which the NSV wished to encourage were entirely in line with NSV
policy of course, and certainly supported the absence of a charitable
impulse in the search for efficient use of existing resources.^
There is no doubt that there existed effective TB health care
in Germany, for the German figure of 6 deaths per 10,000 of the
population in 1937 could be contrasted with the Austrian figure of
10.1 deaths per 10,000 in the same year. As soon as Austria was
included within the Reich a TB action was set up and the NSV began
its work there; 20 new clinics were supplied through the Office for






brought into line with the German ones as soon as possible.^ This
swift appraisal of the health arrangements for combating the disease
of TB was later introduced in the occupied areas too, for in 1940
i i
Conti made a visit to Wartheland and decided that a TB action had to
be put into operation right away under the supervision of German
doctors, though Polish TB cases would be treated by Polish doctors
only. It was reported at the time that the previous Polish
arrangements had been so 'lax' that a virtual epidemic of the disease
existed in this part of the former Poland (Litzmanstadt).
Whether or not such was the case, the input of a German TB action
would separate the lighter cases from the more hopeless ones and no
2
doubt introduce an 'efficient' treatment of the disease. It is not
clear what the immediate fate of the rejected cases in Wartheland
was.
In Austria in 1938 the NSV would support the battle against TB
with sum of RM 420,000 but the undoubted succes^ which were achieved
in Germany were outlined in the figures of the NSV which gave the
numbers of deaths from the disease from 1881/83 to 1934 (Prussia),
and within Germany itself up to 1936. These were given as follows:
1. Ibid., Informationsdienst, March 1939, p.98.
2. HA, 13/260 'Artikeldienst' ii, ld/22407, 'Energische
Gesundheitsfdhrung im Warthegau', 20th July 1940.
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Percentage of deaths per 10,000 of the population from TB
Males
Prussia Germany
Age 1981/85 1910/11 1924/26 1932/34 1932/34 1936
under 1 21,8 20,7 13,7 9,3 8,4 6,5
1 - 5 12,2 9,3 6,7 5,7 5,0 4,8
3 - 15 4,8 3,9 2,7 1,8 1,6 1,5
13 - 20 17,8 12,1 8,7 5,8 5,1 3,6
20 - 25 33,3 19,5 17,0 8,9 8,2 7,7
25 - 30 36,7 19,1 16,5 9,7 9,2 8,6
30 - 50 50,2 21,1 12,5 10,2 9,8 9,9
50 - 60 77,5 28,8 14,4 11,2 11,5 11,4
60 - 70 100,4 29,0 16,9 12,1 12,2 12,7
70 and over 62,1 16,7 12,2 9,5 9,6 10,1
total 34,2 15,7 11,2 8,2 7,9 7,8
Females
under 1 19,6 17,0 11,6 8,4 7,5 6,0
1 - 5 13,0 8,7 6,5 5,4 4,7 3,9
5 - 15 7,3 5,9 3,9 2,2 2,0 1,9
15 - 20 20,4 15,0 11,5 8,0 7,3 5,7
25 - 30 34,4 21,8 16,3 10,3 10,0 9,4
30 - 50 39,5 18,6 11,5 7,3 7,2 6,9
50 - 60 - 16,1 10,2 6,0 6,2 5,9
60 - 70 - 19,4 13,0 8,6 8,4 8,4
70 and over 13,6 11,3 8,2 8,3 8,8
total - 14,6 10,9 7,0 6,8 6,4
(1)
The improvement in the numbers of cases was seen in the numbers of
deaths in the higher age groups of women rather than men, in the
1. BA, NSD 30/11, Informationsdienst, November 1938, p.33.
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years 1932-36. However, the figures for female deaths showed a
tendency to fall (1936) from the age of 30, while for men, the
numbers of deaths rose after the age of 23-30, in 1936. The numbers
of deaths in the age group 30-60 of women were much lower than for
men of the same age in 1936; but for younger women aged between 15
and 30, the prospect was less hopeful. This no doubt represented the
period of the most fertile years, and the interesting drop in such
figures in later age groups showed a marked contrast with the higher
figures for male deaths between the ages of 30 and 60 years.^ The
figures for Prussia as a whole show how the fall in numbers of deaths
from TB had occurred at a steady rate and were being continued in the
years 1932-34. The presentation of the improvements in the figures
of deaths after 1933 from the disease were, however, given without
claiming prime responsibility for the NSV or the Party in this work
but rather as a study of how the scourge of TB had been successfully
2
reduced during the fifty years from the 1880's to 1930's. It seems
possible to say that the NSV made less of an issue of the propaganda
effects of such work though they made reference to the Tj3 Hilfswerk
whenever the occasion arose. But the section itself seems to have
operated from the point of view of a genuine, though harsh, attempt
to provide health care rather than from the point of view of gaining
'support' by constant reference to the measure. However, this must
remain a tentative conclusion only. But it seems that the main
function of the TB Hilfswerk was to ensure a 'rationalisation' of
treatment procedures which depended upon a selection from among the
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
cases coming forward for treatment - The fact that the NSV was in a
position to offer help to those in need meant that the early
intervention policy may have served to bring cases forward for
treatment sooner, given the necessity of proving one's 'suitability'
for financial help.* Even if this effect could hardly be described
as being inspired by charitable goals, then the application of a
first come, the more likely to be served principle, may have operated
to improve the chances of those few who had come forward for
treatment through seeking aid from the NSV for their families for the
2
duration of the spell in a TB clinic or hospital.




WAR-TIME ACTIVITIES OF THE NSV: WELFARE IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS
AND THE ALTREICH DURING THE WAR
Fanfares of Victory ^
A clear distinction should be made between the activities of
the NSV in the period between 1940 and 1943, and those of the period
between 1943 until the end of the war. In the first phase, the
activities of the NSV, as they related to specific war-time duties,
showed a marked degree of optimism and enthusiasm for the new tasks,
both in hand and in sight. Expansion was the order of the day, and
the extension of the organisation within every one of its social
welfare measures in the Altreich as well as in occupied areas,
promised Hilgenfeldt, Althaus and Reher that due to the war, the
developments of the recent past were now, being consolidated. This
was seen nowhere more clearly than in the growth of NSV participation
in the provision of kindergartens, in the activities of the 'Mother
and Child' section and in the new supportive role of the
2
Krieqswinterhilfswerk in the work of the DRK. In Austria, and later
in the Netherlands, in France, Belgium and in the occupied eastern
areas, the NSV expanded greatly, even massively, and promised to
become a real force to be reckoned with after a victorious war. One
of the most important duties of the organisation in the period of the
successful part of the war, when Blitzkrieg had delivered vast areas
of the continent of Europe into German hands, was the swift and
unexpected incursion of the NSV into France and Belgium on the heels
1. Bramsted, Goebbels, p. 295.
2. See this Chapter.
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of the German army in the summer of 1940. It would also later move
into the occupied territories in the east.'* The enthusiasm with
which the NSV went into France, especially, revealed the effects of
the welcome taste of victorious conquest which the NSV officials who
visited these areas themselves experienced. Senior officials of the
NSV would travel through the newly acquired regions of Western
Europe, and reports from Paris and Brussels show the impact of the
German victories in the west on NSV staff, one of whom, Werner Reher,
could not contain his delight in finding himself driving through the
French countryside into an area where he could freely organise NSV
special welfare measures, at this time only for some refugees and
other special categories, but later more extensively in
2
Alsace-Lorraine.
In the summer of 1940, less than a month after the signing of
the armistice between France and Germany on 22nd June, a visit by
Hilgenfeldt, Reher and senior NSV staff was made to inspect the
Sondereinsatz (special assignment) of the NSV. Reher seems to have
made a visit to Paris, parts of Belgium and northern France, and
Hilgenfeldt travelled to Compiegne in France to inspect an NSV
refugee camp which had been hurriedly set up there."' Perhaps this
NSV welfare action might be described as the reverse side of the
introduction of the Einsatzqruppen of the SS who also entered the
1. HA, 13/260, 'Artikeldienst' ll/ld/15407, 'Der Parteieinsatz im
besetzten Gebiet (1): Mit der NSV. in Belgien und Frankreichj
6th July 1940; see also BA, NS 26/260, report to Berlin on
NSV 'Ukraine'.
2. HA, 13/260, 'Artikeldienst* ll/ld/15407; 16407, July 1940;
see also Grill, The Nazi Movement, pp.612-621.
3. Ibid., 'Artikeldienst' ll/ld/15407, 'Mit der NSV in Belgien
und Frankreich (2): "Venez a la NSV.!'" 10th July 1940.
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conquered territories in the east after the victorious German
armies.^ Required to 'clean up' the areas in question through the
removal of obstacles to a German occupation, the NSV in the west was
expected to give aid and attempt to organise existing food supplies
and to oversee the movement of refugees. Refugees and others who
belonged to the perceived 'valuable' nations such as the French and
Belgians (who were regarded to be less 'valuable' racially than the
Dutch or the Norwegians), would receive an initial amount of German
aid and supervision to relieve their immediate problems. As Reher
explained, they would experience the magnanimity of the Germans who
would not impose upon the population the harsh oppression of a
conquering nation.^
At the beginning of June 1940 the NSV went into these countries
after a special order had come from Hitler at that time. Hilgenfeldt
had been flown to the FOhrer headquarters on 3rd June 1940, and
given instructions that the NSV would be expected to carry out
special duties in the newly conquered areas in the west. On the
'same evening', five Gauamtsleiter of the NSV from western Germany
were charged with this task. Every Gauamtsleiter had to find 10
Kreisamtsleiter or suitable Ortamtsleiter, and twenty nurses of the
NS-Schwesternschaft, so that the NSV could begin what amounted to an
emergency rescue operation following the army's victory. Reher was
pleased to report that the operation was carried out tirelessly and
1. Ibid., 'Artikeldienst' 11,ld/16407,'Mit der NSV in Belgien und
Frankreich (Schluss): Beim Einsatzstab Paris', 14th July 1940;
Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, pp.123-139.
2. Ibid., 'Artikeldienst' ll/ld/15407, 'Der Parteieinsatz im
besetzten Gebiet (1)', 6th July 1940.
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enthusiastically.^ NSV activity in the summer of 1940 in the area of
Alsace-Lorraine, and in northern France, was essentially a
preparatory exercise designed to seize hold of the existing resources
of the areas in question. In France especially, refugee camps would
be required, and special accommodation made available,for certain
categories of individual. For example, in Brussels a special home
for Reichsdeutsche and for nationals of friendly countries was set
up, and this home was able to accommodate 100 to 130 refugees and
others. The consulates of the friendly nations were contacted and
they were asked to report to the NSV on the situation regarding their
own nationals, who would be cared for by the NSV in Belgium and
France.^
Evidently 'no-one' was turned away; one example of such a
friendly national was a Hungarian Berqarbeiter who was given help for
his wife and two children in Bussels at this time. In Paris,A 7
consular officials expressed 'deep gratitude' for the help of the
NSV. When those consulates were later visited by Reher (and possibly
Hilgenfeldt) they 'endlessly' expressed wonder over the efficient
organisation of the work of the NSV.^ In 1940 one hundred lorries
with various types of food and with assorted clothing, were driven
into France following after the victorious army. These lorries when
empty were used to return refugees to their own hornet thus
swiftly relieving whole areas of unwanted, slowly moving columns of
people. One of the main functions of the Sondereinsatz of the NSV





attempted to pull together all the strands of the activities
regarding the control of the refugees from the disrupted (and
destroyed) areas of France and also tried to control the flow of the
refugees coming from the south.^ Reher was most anxious to
distinguish between the situation of the French and Belgian refugees,
and that of the refugees in Poland. He pointed out that unlike the
Polish people, the French and the Belgians came from 'civilised'
countries whose inhabitants were thrifty, industrious and essentially
independent. The 'Rentner Ideale', added Reher, is 'nowhere as
strong as it is here in France'.
With Reher and other leading NSV officials, Hilgenfeldt visited
the temporary NSV camp at Compifegne in which French military doctors,
would find themselves working for the NSV which had removed them from
the prisoner-of-war camps expressly for this purpose, and they had
2
been set to caring for the refugees. Rapidly, and perhaps
ruthlessly, the NSV proceeded to organise and 'rationalise' the use
of resources whether they consisted of supplies or of trained French
personnel.
Not only doctors but other captured military personnel were
transferred to work in the NSV refugee camp in Compiegne for the
purpose of caring for the refugees whose numbers Reher described as
growing 'all the time'."' In the 'light of a candle', as Reher
reported, Hilgenfeldt and his staff were given information about the
whole NSV Einsatz in France and Belgium. Very soon, NS-Nurses
and Frauenhilfsdienstmgdel would be sent into France, some of whom
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., 'Artikeldienst' ll,ld/15407, 'Mit der NSV in
Belgien und Frankreich' (2): 10th July 1940.
3. Ibid.
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went to Compi^gne. According to Reher, as many as 10,000 people were
reported to have been given some form of help and assistance during
one day in 1940 in France.* The NSV refugee camp in Compiegne had
been set up in a former school and women and children were given
sleeping quarters in the reception rooms. It was here that Reher
discovered a blackboard on which was written, 'Maman et enfants,
venez a la NSV., acceptez ses bons soins sous le patronage du
2
FUhrer Adolf Hitler'. This statement delighted Reher greatly, for
he believed it to have been written by a French woman refugee, and it
was taken, apparently, as a good omen. The NSV team travelled to
Paris some days later, and a brief sight-seeing tour was made. Reher
and others took a stroll up the Champs Elysees to the Arc de Triomphe
in the vicinity of which was located the NSV Einsatzstab Paris. The
so-called 'gigantic' tasks to be undertaken were described, apart
from the regulation of the flow of refugees, as consisting of taking
over control of the Parisian stores and warehouses to prevent
plundering. The French Red Cross at this time would find that they
would come under the control of the NSV and that they would be
directed to work with refugees under the direct guidance of
NS-nurses."^
As in Brussels, arrangements were made in northern and western
France with consulates of the friendly nations for the special care
of their own nationals. From Paris the NSV team went on to Le Havre
where Reher ended his report, and he recorded that in the seven days'
1. Ibid.; see also 'Artikeldienst', III, ld/14408, 'So hilft
die Partei den ElsMssern', 13th August 1940.
2. Ibid., 'Artikeldienst' 11, Id/13407, 'Mit der NSV.
in Belgien und Frankreich (2)', 10th July 1940.
3. Ibid.
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journey through France and Belgium it could be seen that the National
Socialism would not take the road of other traditional war-time
practices and the NSV would be prepared to help civilians in the war
endangered areas. The 'Wehe den besieqten' was not taken up by
National Socialists who had shown 'real dignity' and 'honour' in the
victory over France and Belgium."^ But not, it must be added, either
in Poland or in Russia.
Alsace in August 1940
Enthusiasm was shown also in the welfare measures which began
the work of the NSV in the region of Alsace-Lorraine. This area, the
NSV said, had been 'shamelessly plundered' by the French troops,
2
houses had been burned and 'senseless destruction' lay everywhere.
The area was said to be derelict and lacking the most basic
necessities such as shelter and food. Soon in Alsace the 'new
letters of the NSV' appeared on posters and in public transports,
giving information regarding emergency feeding centres and other
facilities. In Colmar where the NSV would later set up its offices,
an emergency kitchen was organised in a former German VolkskUche
which had long since been closed by the French.^ In Mulhouse,
Strasbourg, and in other towns, the feeding problems were described
to have been 'solved'. It was also reported that many were genuinely
grateful for the help of the welfare organisation at this time and
according to a British report of these actions, (viewed by this
primarily as a German propaganda exercise) they seemed to have
1. Ibid., 'Artikeldienst' 11, Id/16407, 'Mit der NSV in Belgien
und Frankreich (Schluss)', 14th July 1940.
2. Ibid., 'Artikeldiest' lll,ld/14408, 'So hilft die Partei den
ElsSssern', 13th August 1940.
3. Ibid.
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succeeded in providing emergency facilities for many who were without
shelter or food at this time. The rapid NSV entry into Alsace-
Lorraine was of course mainly a preparation there for the restoration
of German rule in that area and this would be achieved and carried
out with success, for the Gau Baden would take over all NSV activity
in Alsace."^ NSV personnel also undertook to supply special aid in
northern France with the main task of organising and controlling the
distribution of food. In Arras, Lille, Bethune and Amiens the
populations there would find that the NSV had taken control of
special emergency feeding arrangements, but it had also taken
possession of supplies left behind by the departing British army so
that some families found that they were being allowed captured tins
2
of British condensed milk and some other items for the children.
But all this activity had been carried out less for the benefit of
the population in such areas than in the interest of the occupying
troops, as well as being a preparatory measure which would support an
initial NSV presence in the newly conquered west. The propaganda
value of such activities according to British reports may have been
'considerable'. However, whether or not this claim was valid is less
important than a consideration of its real function."'
All this activity must be seen as part of the initial creation
of the Nazi New Order, for German policy at this time envisaged a
'great constructive enterprise' taking place within the occupied
areas. The necessary prelude to reconstruction had been conquest,
1. Grill, The Nazi Movement, pp.612-621.
2. HA,13/260/Artikeldienst ll,ld/16407, 'Die NSV hilft in
Nordfrankreich', 1940
3. Basic and Zonal Handbook, Chapter VII, pp.169-170.
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but in France and in Belgium, where the populations were regarded as
'racially valuable', it would be the NSV and its Sondereinsatz which
would enter these areas, not the Einsatzqruppen of the SS.
A year after the NSV Sondereinsatz in Alsace-Lorraine and in
Luxembourg, other Nazi organisations would set up their operations,
for example, the NSF/DFW would carry out its measures and activities
for mothers in the area and indeed the whole paraphernalia of German
2social welfare activity would be introduced. In Alsace where the
NSV would become firmly established,-the organisation would spend the
first few months supervising the returning Alsatians and setting up
its own organisation. Indeed, the NSV offices in Colmar would
continue to function until the end of 1944, at which time the NSV
there reported on a hopelessly deteriorating situation. However,
%
until that time the Gau Baden would act in a controlling role over
the Alsatian operation, building an NSV organisation of some
considerable size which was dedicated to supporting the German
occupation there."'
The creation of the new Nazi Order in the east was also
supported by the strong presence of the NSV in Hungary, which
according to reports from the Hungarian NSV, could be seen to be
popular with the Volksdeutsche there. By 1944, the Hungarian
organisation could count 155 head office staff, 42 Gebiets-
Kreiswalter, 24 Kreisabteilunqsleiterinnen and as many as 20,000
honorary helpers. According to Dr. Schlitt, the Landeswalter of the
1. HA,13/260, 'Artikeldienst' 11,Id/15407; 16407; July 1940.
2. Stephenson, The Nazi Organisation of Women, pp.178-207.
3. Grill, The Nazi Movement, pp.608-621.
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NSV in Hungary, the success of the Winter Aid there was assured by
its popularity which would be seen in the huge increases of the
amounts which had been donated in 1943/44. These were described as
being 100% over the previous year of 1942/43 and his report included
hopeful plans for the Winter-Aid Drive in the coming year 1944/45.
If such a glowing report may be believed, it seems that the
NSV/'s most successful venture in Hungary was the 'Mother and Child'
operation which had shown itself to be popular. As Dr. Schlitt
pointed out, apart from its health-care value, the 'Mother and Child'
scheme was of great significance, both from an ideological and from
2
a political point of view. To this extent the NSV in Hungary
regarded the MuK as being of 'great value' for the fostering of a
strong sense of 'Germandom' within the Volksdeutsche population.
From the numbers of the facilities which were being put to use, and
in the absence of reports to the contrary, it is clear an effective
NSV operation had been established in Hungary. Apart from those
facilities which had been set up for the use of the wives of the SS
in the district of Neustatz, it was reported that approximately
20,000 Volksdeutsche women and children had been making use of the
Hungarian 'Mother and Child" facilities. This included the provision
of kindergartens and other special harvest kindergartens. Some 700
mothers during the period of a year had made use of the holiday
arrangements provided, and in the whole two and a half year existence
of the 'Mother and Child' operation 2,000 women had been allowed a
1. BA,NS26/260,'Rechenschaftsbericht Uber das IV. Kreigs -




four week break through the Hungarian MuK.^ Dr. Schlitt seems to
have genuinely believed in the ability of his own MuK operation to
offer the means by which views of women could be 'strengthened', and
that their attitudes could be shaped by access to such facilities,
and he saw the whole measure from the point of view of gaining the
loyal participation of those who were involved in the new adventure
2
of Germanising the eastern parts of Europe.
Whether such a report was greeted with relief, or disbelief, in
Berlin, NSV activities would continue to be carried out in the
occupied areas nowhere more determinedly perhaps than in the Ukraine
where the NSV there would create an organisation in what were
admitted to be the most difficult of circumstances. Though a far
easier task would face the NSV in Memel where, it seems, much of the
work had already been carried out by the Volksdeutsche groups there,
indeed it was left to new NSV arrangements mainly to support and to
consolidate the work which had already been going on for some time.^
One of the first tasks of the new Memel NSV was swiftly to
assume command over the existing Memel Winter Aid scheme. This had
been very successfully organised by the Volksdeutsche, but it would
now pass to the NSV officials furtherto organise and expand the
Winter Aid measures there. Based exactly on its model in the
Altreich, the Memel Winterhilfe emphasised the principle of
'self-help' and it had supported 3,000 Volksdeutsche in the first
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; see also Grill, The Nazi Movement, pp.612-621.
3. HA,13/260, 'Avtikeldienst' 11,Id/30404,'25 NSV.-
Lastwagen eroberten das Memelland: Ein Jahr erfolgreiche
NSV.- Arbeit im befreiten Memelland', n.d.
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year of operation as well as giving holidays to 300 children."* From
the membership figures of the Memel NSV it seems that a majority of
the Volksdeutsche, 8,600 in all, as the reports claim, were willing
to join the organisation. But these and other reports from the
occupied areas, including Hungary, were written by officials who were
not only influenced by the desire to prove their successes to
Hilgenfeldt in Berlin; in addition, they seemed genuinely
to believe that a sense of Germandom could be fostered (and
strengthened) by the measures of the welfare organisation. Not only -
could such measures be used as a method of supporting the process of
Germanisation, but they could also be used as a 'signal', back to the
leadership, of 'support' for the expansionist goals of the regime.
Officials in Memel were pleased to use the figures of the amounts
collected for the Winter Aid drives as 'proof' of support, both for
themselves and for Nazism as a whole. This is to say that in Memel
and in Hungary, the practices of the NSV in the Altreich, which had
for long used the sums collected in Winter Aid drives as a barometer
of opinion, were also introduced into these countries and in the most
emphatic manner. Officials in Memel were happy to report on the
collections as having shown the requisite 'spirit of sacrifice' by
pointing to the higher sums collected in Memel in comparison with its
neighbour in East Prussia."' This only shows however that the NSV had
exported its highly competitive practices into the occupied areas as
well. Indeed, the belief that a 'sense of sacrifice' had been shown
1. Ibid.
2. BA,NS26/260, ' Rechenschaftsbericht/KWHW/Ungarn 1943/44'
Ibid., report to Berlin on NSV 'Ukraine'.
3. HA,13/260, 'Artikeldienst' Id/30404, 'Ein Jahr erfolgreiche
NSV Arbeit im befreiten Memelland', n.d.
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in Memel, and in Hungary through the hard work and effort of
officials who had achieved high levels in the collections, only
showed how anxious those officials were to fulfil directives coming
from Berlin. It did little to reveal the true nature of support or
the opinion of the population."^ Even though the Volksdeutsche in
Memel had shown themselves willing to undertake a Winter Aid drive
in advance of the new NSV presence, is unclear how far the process
of Germanization could be aided by this means. But the illusion
would remain, as it seems to have done also in Alsace where officials
there would come to believe in the possibilty of fostering, through
the provision of social welfare, a sense of 'acceptance' of German
2
occupation, and the new German Order.
However, the difficult task of the NSV in the Ukraine was
reported more honestly perhaps and without making use of the signs
and signals of 'proof' of the support of the Volksdeutsche there.^
In the Ukraine the NSV had the difficult task of working within a
large geographical area, part of which remained in the battle zone
4
and under army control. In 1943 the existing ethnic Germans,
numbering approximately 200,000, would be given welfare help by the
NSV. For these ethnic Germans in the Ukraine, (Wright gives a figure
of 300,000), a variety of special privileges would be provided, one
of which was the provision of welfare from the NSV.'' However, NSV
activities in the Ukraine would come to a halt in 1943 with the
1. Ibid.
2. Grill, The Nazi Movement, p.614.
3. BA, NS26/260, report to Berlin on NSV operation in the 'Ukraine'.
4. Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, p.110.
3. Ibid., p.113.
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'altered' military situation ^ namely, the German retreat. Until
that time NSV activity in the six Generalkommisariate,
Wohlhynien-Podolien, Shitomir, Kiev, Dnjepropetrowsk, Nikolajew and
Melitopol had consisted of slowly building up the necessary
facilities for social welfare for families. In Wohlhynien - Podolien,
where the largest part of the German population had returrW. to the
Reich in 1939/40, the remaining Volksdeutsche would find that the NSV
was providing3welfare facility which was designed primarily from the
point of view of fostering a sense of 'Germandom'" in the children who
came into the care of the welfare organisation. For this would be
top priority with regard to the support of the population and it
would exist as the first duty of 'MenschenfUhrunq' in this
2
particular area. By the summer of 1942, kindergarten work had begun
and by September 1943 eight kindergartens had been set up.
Familienhilfe was slowly being established, and a children's home had
been put into operation. A maternity home for mothers and infants
was also made available in Kremianez but it had to be closed again in
the spring of 1943 due to the activities of partisans in the area.
Alternative facilities however were set up in Luzk. In
Generalkommissariat Shitomir which had a population of 48,00
Volksdeutsche, the first task had been to provide a home for orphans
and homeless Volksdeutsche children. Nurses of the DRK, members of
the NSF and FrauenhilfsdienstmSdel all provided medical and other
aid."' In Hegewald in the Shitomir district exited 28 villages with
8,000 inhabitants, and the chosen ''reindeutsche, Kinderreiche




wertvollen' settlers there were allowed a rapid introduction of NSV
Familienhilfe. For this purpose 38 Kindergartens and MuK clinics
were established. By September 1943, six Gemeindepfleqestationen
were added.^
In the city of Kiev there were 12,000 Volksdeutsche and the
first Mother's holiday homes for their use were opened in the summer
of 1943. In many areas of the Ukraine however the NSV warned of the
difficult conditions under which the NSV officials would have to work
at first, for they would find themselves in a working environment
which was described as being of the most primitive kind. Before the
whole NSV adventure in the Ukraine came to its end in the autumn of
1943, when the Volksdeutsche were evacuated out of the area and into
the neighbouring former Polish provinces, the NSV in the Ukraine had
begun to establish its organisation and responded to existing
conditions as best they could. But the NSV/Ukraine was established
primarily to offer a welfare service which supported the building of
a family-based, family-orientated set of measures for the
2
Volksdeutsche population. This was meant to give aid for those
'frontier settlers' who were to people this land. The support and
the ideological training of the Volksdeutsche populations would be a
task which the NSV would take on enthusiastically, but how
enthusiastically it was received by the ethnic Germans themselves,
the NSV in the Ukraine failed to reveal. But the NSV's main concern
was a practical, rather than an ideological one at first, with the
setting up of facilities in a large area where the existing problems,




promised to make such a task a long and a protracted one. But this
task would hardly be completed, or even substantially begun, before
the developments of the war and the Russian advances would destroy
any hopes of colonisation of the Ukraine. This was in an area where,
only a short time before, the German presence had looked to be a
long-term one. The empire in the east which the NSV/ would help to
create and support would melt away even before the work of welfare
for the new settlers and the Volksdeutsche could really begin.^
Winterhilfswerk in war-time
It has been shown that the work of the Winterhilfswerk of the
NSV/ was intended to support several goals whose importance and
significance for the regime were to be guaranteed by propaganda
measures put forward by the NSV/. These goals, which both Hitler and
Goebbels themselves recognised as being of prime importance, were
2
given total support through this NSV/ measure. During the war, the
WHW would continue to operate fully, taking on extra tasks such as
the organising of the collections for the German Red Cross."' But
there would emerge a different emphasis in the war, one which was
conceived as a response to the changed situation in which the mass of
the population would now find themselves. The NSV/ saw its changed,
and changing, role to be the urgent task of supporting the home
front, relating its measures to this idea and providing welfare for
the civilian population whose support for the regime would need to be
strengthened and maintained in time of war. The reluctance of the
1. Ibid.
2. BA, R36/1007, see detailed instructions on WHW in Mitteilunqen
der Stadtischen Wohlfahrtsverwaltunq Bielefeld, Bielefeld 5th
October 1935; Wohlfahrts-Korrespondenz Sozialpolitisher
Zeitunqsdienst, 'Das Winterhilfswerk 1935/36', 22nd August 1935.
3. BA, NS37ii/1055, 'Propagandaplan des Kriegshilfswerkes fOr dgs
Deutsche Rote Kreuz', 18th April 1940.
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leadership to place too many strains upon that popular support would
lead to the provision of extra welfare measures."^ But the marked
reluctance of Hitler to over-strain popular support for the regime
would also lead to anomalies arising in domestic policies which in
terms perhaps of their unexpectedness is testimony to the seriousness
2
with which the regime viewed the need to preserve this support. The
contemplation of the fall of the Second Reich, caused, Hitler
believed, by the 'stab in the back', led to a domestic policy in the
Second World War which was dominated by the wish to avoid a similar
occurrence."' His fears of civilian discontent directly influenced a
domestic policy whose priorities were to avoid discontent at home and
to support the home front at all costs. This allowed that the
funding of extra social welfare provisions, would continue to be run
4
by the Party agency through semi-official means and by voluntary
donations from the public. This was made clear in the instructions of
the first winter war-time WHW; of the eight particular areas to be
supported by the WHW in the war, some were familiar, but new areas
were to be added. The list outlined by Hilgenfeldt included:
1. the collections for the German Red Cross
2. the collections for the Deutsches Frauenwerk
3. TB Hilfswerk and Heilverschickunq
4. Subsidies for the FUhrer's anti-rickets scheme
1. BA, R18/3781, Hilgenfeldt to Conti, on the extension of the
Haushalthilfe scheme, letter of 15th November 1939.
2. Stephenson, 'War and Society in WUrttemberg', pp.89-91;
Winkler, Fraunarbeit, pp.176-186, for a description of
lenient conscription policies regarding female labour.
3. Ibid.
4. This refers to the 'donations' from wages and salaries and
subscriptions from firms, see BA, R2, 4867, see 'Guidelines', •
on amounts required to be donated to WHW in 1940/41.
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5. Help for the war-time duties of the MuK and the
NS-Schwesternschaft
6. Aid for the erection and the support of war-time
kindergartens
7. Aid for the work in the eastern areas.
These various areas of social welfare and health care policies would
2
be given financial support from the WHW until the end of the war.
During the war it was openly admitted that the money collected
from the" public would now support the newly included - not
specifically winter-time - welfare schemes of the NSV. It was now
freely admitted that support for the 'Mother and Child' scheme was
being funded,in large part, by the KWHW. This seems to have been an
admission which could easily be justified in time of war, and there
was no need to under-emphasise such funding as there had seemed to be
in the peace-time years. At that time the NSV seems to have been
very anxious not to complicate the message of 'no-one should go
hungry or cold', which was itself the continuing Leitmotiv of all
pre-1939 WHW campaigns."^ For this reason, the Monatsparole for
September 1942 was, '29,000 Hilfstellen (advice centres) of the
"Mother and Child" eases the burden of the working mother - for this
4
give your pledge in the Krieqswinterhilfswerk'. As before, the KWHW
would allow some collections to be made for National Socialist
organisations such as the NS-Reichsbundes fdr LeibesUbunqen
1. BA, R2/4867,Hilgenfeldt to Reichsfinanzministerium, letter of
19th March 1940.
2. Ibid.; BA, R36/963, 'Verfugung 11/44', Fuhrerhauptquartier,
22nd August 1944.
3. See Chapter Three.
4. BA,NS 37ii/1016, 'Rundschreiben Nr 3/42', 4th September 1942.
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(Reichsbund for Gymnastics NSRL), and they would find that the KWHW,
at least at the beginning of the war, would provide instructions on
the activities to be undertaken and provide all the written material
which would be used in the press, and design suitable programmes for
putting out on radio.* In other words the KWHW would continue to
provide an efficient package of advertising material for the Nazi
organisations which were still being allowed a set of collections on
a specific day during the drive. Other provisions of the WHW would
continue as before for the recreation of the population," and free
entrance to film theatres would still be available for KWHW
2
recipients. But more war-time oriented appeals and drives would
also take place. The German people would be asked to aid the
expansionist aims of the regime by contributing to the specific
measures of the newly 'freed' eastern areas, and to contribute aid
for the returning Volksdeutsche who required to be given material and
other help.^ Goebbels himself seems to have taken charge of the
appeal for the returning Volksdeutsche from Poland in 1940. This
particular measure was put into operation after the fall of Poland
and was intended to gather together articles of clothing for the use
of those ethnic Germans now returning to their homeland.^ The
intention was that every Gaupropaqandaleiter of the NSDAP would put
out a call for a collection throughout his Gau of warm clothing and
anything that could be 'spared' to help the returning Volksdeutsche.
1. BA, NS 37ii/1016, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 3/42', instructions for




Goebbels ordered that this action be regarded as an urgent one to be
taken up as soon as possible, and advertised in the press under
strict guidelines which would have to be followed exactly. The
appeal would be outlined to emphasise the 20 year 'struggle' of the
returning Volksdeutsche who had spent all these years in an
, I
unsuccessful struggle to establish themselves in the former Poland
and who now had to return, given that the 'war-mongering' of the
British had made impossible a continued stay in that land. This had
led to the increase of Polish 'hatred' of the Germans so that a
continued existence in Poland was now 'impossible'.^ How far from
the truth such a statement was shown by the reality of the situation
which was not revealed in the propaganda. But it was obvious that
emotional appeals by the WHW, now KWHW, would continue as before to
lend a hand in the instruction of the German people in issues which
the Leadership wished to make 'clear' to the people, however
distorted the interpretation of events, or of reality itself.
By 1941, Hilgenfeldt was secure enough in his own assessment of
the continuing successes of the KWHW to write to Ley to propose that
the NSDAP leadership consider lengthening the period of the Winter
Aid Drive. His reasons for doing this seem to have been based on the
need to raise more money, but he seems to have considered carefully
whether or not it would be an unpopular move. From this point of
view it seems that Hilgenfeldt was confident enough of the popularity
of the drives to put forward a serious suggestion that the public
2
could be asked to put up with an extended KWHW. Hilgenfeldt was
perhaps genuinely worried at this time that the new and increased
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NS22/750, Hilgenfeldt to Ley, 'Einnahmen und Leistungen
des Winterhilfswerk und der NSV', letter of 8th April 1941.
level of claims on the KWHW funds could not be met so that it would
be necessary to extend the drive by at least one month. Included
with the letter to Ley was a selection of the WHW and KWHW
statistical material whose use Ley was asked to restrict to those of
his closest colleagues according to the Order of Hess of the 25th
October 1939. One at least of the accompanying documents has been
consulted here though it seems that many more must have originally
existed which perhaps showed details of NSV income levels as well."^
However, the Rechenschaftsberichten which are available give detailed
information on the amounts of money collected, the amounts raised
from the individual Gaus and a detailed account of the items given
2
out according to values of the goods received by the public. They
are a useful source of information which does not show either
entirely, or in detail, the economic activities of the WHW as they
might have been put to uses other than the subsidies paid out by the
KWHW (or WHW) welfare collections as such.
The war-time Rechenschaftsberichten give no indication of how
such funds might have been channelled into other uses such as
armaments production, or other war-time aims which were unmentioned
and completely unconnected with social welfare measures. Indeed the
Rechenschaftsberichten show a responsible use of all incoming monies
and it would be difficult indeed to deduce from these that KWHW funds
were being used for other purposes, in spite of the fact that
Hilgenfeldt made a strong request that his statistical material be
1. Ibid.
2. See Rechenschaftsberichten for years 1934/35, 1942/43, BA,
R43ii/564; R36/1007; NS26/261; R43ii/564a; R43/560; NS22/750.
closely restricted in use.^ Nevertheless, a copy of the
Rechenschaftsbericht of 1936/37 found its way into the files of the
DGT; whether it had been sent there in 1941 or at an earlier date is
not clear, but it may be of course that such statistical material was
not of the totally restricted type, even though detailed information
2
was contained in the 1936/37 statistical reports.
The winter collections for the KWHW in 1942 were put into
operation from the 19th September and this does suggest that some
sort of compromise had been reached over the extension of the drives
which, in peace-time, had not begun until the month of October."^
However, collections for the German Red Cross were not undertaken
only in the winter so that, strictly speaking, the KWHW was much
longer than the peacetime drive in any case. For example,
collections for the German Red Cross were carried out on 23rd May
1943 in the Gau MUnchen/Oberbayern and yielded RM 1,664,298. This
was an improvement over the previous year's figure of RM 1,395,264.
The city of Munich donated RM 812,776 to the DRK in 1943 as opposed
to 699,496 in 1942. It was calculated by the Gau statistical office
of the NSV that an average of 3.13 marks had been donated per
household in the Gau for the Red Cross collection."* In 1942, the
1. BA, NS 22/750, Hilgenfeldt to Ley, letter of 8th April 1941.
2. BA, R43ii/564a, 'Rechenschaftsbericht WHW , 1936/371
3. See Chapter Three.
4. NS1/285 Folder 1-447, Per Traditionsgau, 'Die Gauleitung




DRK collections throughout the Reich (street collections), had taken
place on the 27th and 28th of June that year."^ In Hilgenfeldt's
request for an extension of the drive for KWHW to raise greater sums
of money, he did not refer, specifically to these DRK collections
whose funds, as far as can be discovered, were directed as claimed to
this agency. However, it might be emphasised that the amounts
collected from the people remained as high as in previous years, and
there seemed to exist no particular danger that less money was being
2
collected on the streets of the Reich. The amounts collected in the
winter of 1941/42 showed a marked improvement in relation to the sums
collected in the previous year."' To Lammers, at least, Hilgenfeldt
was prepared to assert, in the face of growing evidence to the
contrary, that these figures gave a continuing 'picture' of support
for the regime and existed as proof of the Sieqeswillens of the
4
people, if such proof were required. The amounts collected in the
KWHW collections were given as follows:
1939/40 680,717,428
1940/41 916,240,096
1. HA, 13/261, 'Artikeldienst' 'Zur ersten Strassen-Sammlung im
Kriegshilfswerk fur das Deutsche Rote Kreuz am 27. und 28. Juni
1942'.
2. BA, R43ii/560, 'Rechenschaftsbericht 1942/43', amounts
for Reich street collections came to RM 294,309,33,p.7;
Reich street collections in 1935/36 amounted to RM 18,409,31,
BA, NS22 3750, 'Rechenschaftsbericht 1935/36',p.9.
3. BA,NS 26/261, 'Rechenschaftsbericht 1941/42', p.2; BA, R43ii/560
Hilgenfeldt to Lammers, letter of 25th September,1942; the
Rechenschaftsbericht for the year 1940/41 has not been discovered
but Hilgenfeldt reported to Lammers that the amounts collected
during 1941/42 had shown an improvement of 1.2 millions.
































(listed as Arbeitsbereich i.d.Niederlanden) the General Government,
WUrttemberg, Vienna and the other Austrian Gaus."', the Sudetenland
too was also in these lists.
The Greater German Reich was now involved in KWHW which would
continue to hold street collections and other methods of collection
4
from Opfersonntaq to the sale of badges in the streets.
1. BA, R43ii/560, 1Rechenschaftsbericht 1942/43', see section
VIII, 'Aufkommen der Winterhilfswerk des Deutschen Volkes'.
2. Ibid., p.5; BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Werwendung', p.21.
3. BA, R43ii/560, 'Rechenschaftsbericht 1942/43', p.8.
4. Ibid.; See Chapter Three.
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The total amount collected for WHW and KWHW from the years 1933 to
1943 came to RM 6,892,047,000."* This is to say that just under 7
billion marks had been donated by the population of Germany (and in
the occupied areas) in a period of ten years to a measure which had
2
begun in an exceedingly modest way for needy Party activists. By
1943 an average of 2,307,872 families (including single persons) were
given aid in each month of the winter in that year which, expressed
in another way, meant that 60 individuals per 1,000 inhabitants were
given some form of KWHW welfare. This consisted of Wertscheine
(vouchers) and some items according to the regulations and
availability of goods in time of rationing."' The distribution of aid
1942/43 was calculated as follows:
Ausgegebene Wertscheine RM 286,941,984
Sachspenden RM 13,335,710
Erweitertes Kriegs-WHW RM 5,905,000
Wertscheine
RM 308,182,694
A monthly average of 60 KWHW recipients for 1942/43 received grants
from the above donations to KWHW.
An examination of the written articles which were included in
the 'Artikeldienst' service of the NSV for use in propaganda reveals
how sentimental this had become, even though such a stress had
existed right from the beginning. Items offered for use included
ones whose flights of fancy indicated a retreat from reality, rather
1. Ibid., see section VIII.
2. HA, 14/262, 'Das Winterhilfswerk setzt ein', pp.180-211.
3. BA, R43ii/560, Rechenschaftsbericht 1942/43p.3.
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than an attempt to grasp hold of the task of appealing in time of war
for money and for support from the population. An appeal for the
second street collections of the DRK in 1940 was given in the form of
a curious tale of a dream in which many flowers figured, from bridal
bouquets to roses given by someone leaving on a journey."'' On waking,
the storyteller, (a girl or young woman) awoke to find that thoughts
of war had now become connected with thoughts of flowers of all types
which are given in farewell scenes and in leave-taking of all kinds.
The waking realisation that the father of the girl might never
return, 'perhaps, perhaps he will return no more', had set her to
thinking that she must go out at the weekend to buy the flowers,
'which would be on sale during the street collections on 22nd and the
23rd of August 1940, when the HJ the BdM the NSKOV and the
Reichskrieqerbund, and members of the DRK, would be on duty to sell
small articles and artificial flowers to raise money'. However, all
this latter information was contained in the same paragraph which
2
told of the 'dream'. This particular article must count as one of
the stranger propaganda pieces of the KWHW, given the
uncharacteristic mixing of 'fact' and fantasy in such an obviously
unsophisticated manner.^ Other less sentimentally conceived ones
were also meant to be used, and these appealed to the 'sense of duty'
which was now in war-time seen to be the giving of support to the
soldier at the front by considering, and remembering, the dangers of
Bolshevism from which the Germany army at the Russian Front was
1. HA, 13/261, 'Artikeldienst', see 'zur 2. Strassensammlung des





protecting the homeland. This particular emphasis would as Berghahn
has shown, turn into a virulent anti-Russian 'crusade'."^ The
propaganda articles of the NSV kept closely indeed to this emphasis
and mirrored the conduct of the war. KWHW propaganda was meant to
support the expansionist aims of the regime by warning of the danger
2
in which Europe now found itself, which must be combated. The
'case' for these arguments in the form of dire warnings was presented
to the population in NSV/KWHW material, as a simplified outline of
the speeches of Hitler, especially of those which were made at the
beginning of the KWHW drive."' Such articles were prefaced by
statements such as 'are we clear about what the words of the FUhrer
mean?' They then went on the explain the theme of the speech itself.
the opening speech of Hitler in 1941 for the KWHW was given such
treatment in the 'Artikeldienst' of the NSV, only weeks after the
4
invasion of Russia. In an article entitled, "Everyone knows how to
fulfil his duty', the theme of the Hitler speech was underlined by
drawing attention to the pointed references to the danger which
existed from the over-running of Europe by the 'Stalinschen Horden'.^
The reader was to be made aware of the necessity of always keeping
in mind the dangers facing the German nation (and Europe too), 'again
and again such dangers must always be before one's eyes'.^ No
possible mention of the true situation was contemplated in such
1. Berghahn, Modern Germany, p.164.






written material which failed to tell of the infamous 'Commissar
Order' issued a fortnight before the invasion itself and which
allowed that captured Soviet political officials would be shot
immediately."^ Not only this, but Himmler's Einsjtzqruppen, who had
followed the conquering army, had been active during the early months
of the invasion working with, as Wright puts it, 'deadly efficiency'
and no official record of their liquidations seems to have survived.
The total divorce between what the NSV now produced in it own
propaganda and the reality of the war showed that the manipulation of
facts, and actions, even though they were hardly believable in many
instances, would create the conditions and opportunities for
confusion arising in the minds of many, and perhaps not least in the
2
minds of the NSV officials themselves. The ability to 'distance'
oneself from the true facts of the situation would lead to a 'moral
anaemia' developing in the behaviour of officials and other
leadership cadres, and not least among the officials of the NSV and
KWHW themselves."'
At the end of December 1942 Schwarz was forced to raise the
matter of the mismanagement of the collections procedures of the KWHW
collections by Hoheitstrdqer and others, at first with Hilgenfeldt
and then with Ley. Ley had been contacted in the matter of the use
of 'forbidden' measures by DAF Amtswalter and other DAF officials in
4
the collections. In a letter to Bormann, Schwarz had been
relieved to report that Ley had understood the situation but had
1. Wright, The Ordeal of Total War, p.125.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p.126.
4. BA, NS 22/751, Schwarz to Bormann, 'Verbotene Sammlungs-
massnahmen von Dienstellen der Deutschen Arbeitsfront
anldsslich der von ihr durchgefdhrten Reichstrassensamlung
am 24.und 25.0ktober 1942', 15th December 1942.
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expressed the fear that the DAF alone would be left unfairly to
shoulder the guilt for the mismanagement of the procedures. Schwarz
was deeply worried at this time about the continuing infractions of
the collection procedures by leading officials in every Gau,
including the Gauleiter."'' The infractions consisted of attempts to
increase income- .. by every possible method in order to achieve higher
2
and higher amounts during each drive within the Gaus. This practice
had reached such a point that, simply in the interest of the Party,
Schwarz argued, it could no longer be 'calmly considered' for the'
'abuses and mis-handling of the collection procedures could only
destroy the reputation and the standing of the Party itself in the
minds of the people'.^ It is not clear whether Hilgenfeldt, who had
been in contact with Schwarz at this time, totally agreed with this
assessment, but he had been prepared to discuss the matter, admitting
that some gross infractions had occurred, but claiming that the
collections were still capable of acting as a reliable barometer of
public opinion when they were carried out, as he put it,
'honourably'. However, it seems as though Schwarz despaired of the
possibility of making real improvements with regard to the collection
procedures, for the infractions had not only been going on for some
time, but they were in war-time actually increasing. The problem had
emerged mainly because of the tendency of various Gauleiters to use
the amounts collected for WHW (and later KWHW) as a sign to the






relation to other Gauleiters who might not be managing to produce
increased, and increasing, lev/els of KWHW income. These competitive
practices were now held by Schwarz to be utterly unacceptable at this
time given that they were proving to be destroying the trust of the
people in the regime. As Schwarz explained, he considered that
popular opinion was a matter of utmost importance, indeed a top
priority which was far more important than the sums collected. In
his opinion, the maintenance sf favourable popular opinion meant that
the leadership must calmly contemplate a reduction of the KWHW income
if that was what was required to regularise the collection
procedures."'' As he pointed out, the 'trust of the people seems to me
to be far more important than the results of the collections
2
themselves'. The Gauleiters and other Hoheitstrdqer were trying to
outdo one another year by year, and this accusation could be levelled
at Goebbels himself in his role as Gauleiter of Berlin. Hilgenfeldt
had privately pointed out to Schwarz in conversation that even he
(Goebbels) had been putting pressure on his staff in Berlin, to
produce better results. Some Gauleiters had gone so far as to impose
punishments on officials in those cases where the single Kreis or
□rtsqruppe showed no sign of achieving an increase in the amounts
being collected. From this letter it is clear that Hilgenfeldt's
goals and those of the Gauleiters were not only unrelated, but the
ambitions of these men were totally counter-productive, and even
destructive of the aims of the NSV.^ Most importantly, Schwarz now





situation and did not even know how to gain the trust of the people.
Such a damning criticism of Party functionaries certainly
pointed to an urgent reason for finding another way of funding social
welfare and other measures, this perhaps, Schwarz himself now
realised.^ But if it were impossible to impress upon. Party
functionaries in the Gaus the importance of allowing the collections
to be carried out without coercion being used, then the whole
apparatus and practice of the KWHW itself was being called into
question. However, Hilgenfeldt himself still seemed to believe that
2
these collections could be carried out 'honorably', given time,
perhaps, or the right type of guidance, this shows that the Reich
treasurer and the head of the NSV were quite unable to agree or to
understand this problem in the same way. Obviously for Hilgenfeldt,
whose reputation came into question in any serious criticism of the
KWHW, such a matter was of utmost seriousness. However, no letters
from him have so far been discovered on this matter, neither was a
copy of the letter from Schwarz contained in the NSV's own files.
Through manipulations and irresponsible methods of accounting which
could only give a false picture, it seems that the 'sign' of support
which the donations to the KWHW were meant to reveal"j' and had been
for some time, utterly worthless."^ For this reason it is impossible
to use the levels of the sums collected as a sign of anything other
than, on the one hand, the application of successful pressure by
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., Schwarz reported that Hilgenfeldt had expressed
this view; see also Hilgenfeldt to Lammers, BA, R43ii/560,
letter of
25th September 1942.
3. BA, NS 22/751, Schwarz to Bormann, report of 15th December
1942.
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Party officials or, on the other, a sign of a false and manipulative
use of accounting techniques in the Gaus whose responsibility it was
to send on their figures to Berlin. As Hilgenfeldt himself pointed
out to Schwarz, or was forced to admit, perhaps, in the Gau Salzburg
the amounts of the street collections and those of the donations from
industry had been shamelessly counted together to give the impression
of a larger figure."^ However, according to Schwarz at this time,
both he and Ley were of the opinion that this matter should be put
right, as a matter of the utmost urgency, for if these destructive
practices were not halted then finally Hitler himself would have to
be brought into the picture so that he could himself perhaps take
2
steps to prevent the continuation of such mistaken methods. There
seems every reason to accept completely Schwarz's accusation of
malpractices by Gau staff in the organisation of the finances of KWHW
accounting, and in the collection procedures themselves, and there is
also every reason to believe that no solution would be forthcoming
until the whole organisation and the rationale of collections by
donation were entirely changed. It is difficult to see how the
regime could have extracted itself from this problem given the
endless amount of propaganda which had declared how 'valuable' the
winter collections were. However, until further documentation of
this particular issue found it is impossible to say further how the
NSV itself reacted. Nevertheless, Schwarz's account of Hilgenfeldt's
immediate response shows it to have been a remarkably cool one and




have been that problems between Hilgenfeldt and Schwarz, which had
emerged in 1942 over the legal and financial affairs of the whole
KWHW, had something to do with the raising of this issue at this
time."'' These problems had arisen over the precise responsibilities
of Hilgenfeldt over the finances of the KWHW, which Schwarz believed
came under his jurisdiction alone; certainly he had been in charge of
these funds since the beginning. A complicated series of discussions
in 1942 (at the time of the ten-year existence of the NSV whose
anniversary would shortly be celebrated), brought Hilgenfeldt and
Schwarz into sharp disagreement, but the issue was resolved through
the involvement of Goebbels who allowed that the KWHW finances be
left to the NSV to administer, not the Reichsfinanzministerium which
would be responsible ultimately for a final reckoning of the
accounts.
The KWHW had several functions to fulfil: it had to arrange
for the collection of huge sums of money from the population who
would not be formally taxed in order to raise much needed revenue,
but it had to do it in such a way as to make it seem as though this
was not really happening, indeed to give the im^ssion that the people
were giving 'freely'. That the KWHW had failed in this particular
task was shown by the failure of the Gauleiters and of NSV officials
themselves, who put personal ambition before the important goal of
preserving popular opinion."' But Hilgenfeldt, it seems, remained
convinced of the need to examine and report popular opinion from the
point of view of the donation given to the Party's
1. BA, NS1/2259, see correspondence between Schwarz and
Hilgenfeldt, July/August 1942.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NS 22/731, Schwarz to Bormann, 13th December 1942.
Winter Aid, for this would 'show' how the people really felt about
the regime. That his position had become increasingly less tenable
was clearly shown by the problems which Schwarz had revealed, and by
the destructive practices which he clearly knew about. This included
the impossibility of controlling the actions of WHW officials such as
one (perhaps not untypical) in Berlin who was prosecuted for carrying
on a black market operation in foodstuffs in the city in 1943.^ It
may be that Hilgenfeldts continued 'protection' of the continuation of
the public collections was no more than a lack of opportunity to do
anything else, for it is not clear how the NSV/, and Hilgenfeldt in
particular, and particularly the Propaganda Ministry itself, could
have put stop to the KWHW by raising finances in some other way. By
1942/43 the regime was utterly committed to continuing to use this
method of financing certain welfare and other measures, and it would
be a hope rather than a certainty that the KWHW would serve as a
2
real barometer of opinion or as a support for the home front. It
certainly seems as though that particular expectation had been
abandoned by 1943 when the NSV/ itself was charged to undertake all
rescue work in air-raids and provide all material help for bombed out
citizens.'' Significantly, there was no mention made of KWHW in the
instructions from Goebbels regarding the NSV/'s new responsibilities
1. BA, R35/1266, 'Feindliche Stimmen gegen die NSV/', confidential
report of 18th August 1943.
2. BA, NS 22/751, Schwarz to Bormann, 15th December 1942; see also
the opening remarks of Hitler at the formal opening of the KWHW
1942/43 which show the continuing stress on support for the home
front which should itself support the war effort, see BA,
R43ii/560, 'Rechenschaftsbericht WHW 1942/43', p.2.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1011, Reichsministerium fOr V/olkssaufkl§rung
und Propaganda Interministerieller LuftkreigsschSdenausschuss,
'LK-Mitteilung Nr 21 an alle Gau'leiter', 15th August 1943.
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in war-torn Germany. Indeed, the one fairly short reference to the
KWHW in the Hitler Order of 1944 came on page six after the
introductory statement of the general tasks of the NSV. Within the
first section of the Hitler Order came significantly, mention of the
'Mother and Child' operation, which would be seen as the first
important task of supporting the home front. In the absence of men
in time of war, the NSV would concentrate on the MuK and on its whole
child care operation."^ To this extent the KWHW was allowed to show
honestly perhaps what it really was, namely a means of raising money
from the population without using the officially regulated system of
taxation. KWHW would go on with its propaganda, but it would
increasingly spend more time and effort on the DRK collections so
that propaganda would play down the 'hunger and cold' image of the
2
pre-war years. Where other sections of the NSV grew and flourished
in time of war, ironically perhaps, the Winter Aid drives reduced in
importance insofar as they existed as a propaganda action. In time
of war, more effort and expense would be spent on the MuK which came
to supplant the Winter Aid as the regime's most important welfare
measure, certainly in the Altreich if not elsewhere. Though the KWHW
was carried out in other areas, in the occupied east and elsewhere,
it would never again in the Altreich achieve the popularity of the
first heady days in 1933/34 when it looked as though many believed,
for a few days in the winter at least, in the 'real' existence of the
Nazi Volksqemeinschaft when the streets were packed by curious
sightseers eager to see the new leaders who were promising to create,
in a 'partnership' with the Volksqenossen, the new Social Order.^
1. BA, R36/963, 'Verfu'gung 11/44', FUhrerhauptquartier,
22nd August 1944.
2. Ibid.; HA, 13/261, 'Artikeldienst', Gll/1041, 1941.
3. See Chapter Three, pp.7? ~94-.
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Mutter und Kind in war-time
The war-time activities of the MuK were intended to provide
support in the Altreich for those women who would be expected to take
on full-time employment, and for those whose husbands had been taken
into the armed forces. The wives of soldiers would be encourged by
the Party not to worry unduly over any problems and difficulties
which they should direct to the NSV's Mutter und Kind advice
centres. In East Prussia in 1942, a letter was sent to all soldiers'
wives in the Gau to ask them to make more use of the NSV and "its
Mutter und Kind Section"^ The Gauleitunq urged these women to take
their problems, of whatever type or level of difficulty, to the Party
itself. One of the functions of the MuK in the war would be not only
to provide advice centres for the normal every-day issues of child
care, but, in addition, to fulfil the functions of war-time citizens'
advice centres designed specifically to aid those mothers who now
2
found themselves alone. The Gauleiter of East Prussia, with the
NSV, arranged that officials deal with all requests coming from
soldiers' wives at least eight days after contact with the MuK had
been made. At the the very least, they were to provide some form of
interim reply until problems could be fully dealt with. The NSV also
gave an assurance that such requests would be processed as quickly as
possible and there is every reason to believe that such an effort
would be made. The NSV in East Prussia had made arrangements for the
expected increase in visits from the public and it now included an
extra facility in its Konigsberg offices, where it would be possible
1. BA, NS37ii/1006, 'Der Gauleiter Ostpreussen, an alle
Soldatenfrauen', (?March) 1942.
2. Ibid.
to visit the office to obtain advice between the hours of 7 a.m. and
1 p.m. and from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. daily. This information was sent
out to those who were likely to need this facility. Importantly,
soliders' wives were requested to make contact with the Party,
through the NSV, with regard to their problems instead of writing to
a soldier husband who was fighting for his country. Soldier's wives
were strongly urged to bring 'every issue that worries you' to the
offices of the NSV in the future."^ Women were told that they should
'write to the Party with all your cares, and the Party itself through
the its organisation the NSV Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind, which has
undertaken to provide special advice, will help you'. Those
particular areas of difficulty in which the MuK would now be prepared
to give help and advice were described as follows:
1. Difficulty with family allowances;
2. Worries over a child's education;
3. Children's illnesses;
4. Problems and difficulties over the purchase of
food and clothing;
3. Problems with rent or other difficulties with
accommodation of whatever kind;
6. Problems over employment for those in full-time work;
7. Pre and post natal care and any problems arising
over these.(4)
This fairly comprehensive list of possible areas of concern to many
women at this time - ones which might assume gigantic proportions in




to supply a useful service. However, it was with the agreement and
cooperation of the Gauleitunq in East Prussia as well as the NSV head
office in Berlin that this particular list of practical problems had
been drawn up, though no instruction coming from the NSV in Berlin
has yet been discovered.
That the MuK in war-time was already carrying out a reasonably
popular service is seen in the rise in the numbers of visits to MuK
clinics between 1939 and 1941. The numbers of visits rose year by
year, going from 4,601,311 visits in 1939,- to 10,311,121 in 1941.
The numbers of visits from 1938/41 is shown as follows:






The increase in the numbers of visits between 1940 and 1941 meant
that 3,153,958Twomen were attending MuK clinics during 1941. This
figure represented over three times as many women visiting a clinic
or advice centre than in 1935."^ These figures can only mean that the
war-time service provided in the clinics was showing itself to be a
reasonably popular one, and perhaps showed that the MuK had responded
to the changed conditions of war-time Germany by offering a practical
4
and useful service to those who needed advice and help at this time.
1. Ibid.
2. BA, NS 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.26.
3. See Chapter Four, p.148
4. BA, NS 37ii/1006, !Der Gauleiter an Soldafenfrauen',
(?March) 1942.
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In the Gau MUnchen/Oberbayern in 1942, numbers of visits were
carefully recorded on a monthly basis showing that, for that
particular year, the numbers were recorded to be 8,617 in July,
10,333 in August and 9,119 in September in the 675 MuK clinics in the
Gau."^ This is to say that the NSV in MUnchen/Oberbayern could
expect to record an average monthly number of visits to its MuK
facilities of between 12 and 15 visits. In the City of Munich, the
numbers of visits to the 113 clinics amounted to between 1,792 and
2,635; thus, the clinics were being visited by between 15 and 23
women per month. This was higher than the average figure for the
whole Gau. These figures can be seen as follows:
Nos. of Clinics Total Number of Visits % Visits to
MuK, each
Clinic
July August Sept. July August Sept.
Gau Mdlchen/
Oberbayern 8,617 10,333 9,119 12.76 15.30 13.50
Munich 1,792 2,635 2,104 15.85 23.30 18.60
This is to say that the highest figure for visits to the Munich MuK
clinics of 23.30% was twice the average percentage figure for the
2
Reich in time of peace.
By 1943 there existed just over 30,000 clinics within the
Altreich itself and in the occupied areas the Mutter und Kind
facilities were being established as guickly as possible, nowhere
more successfully than in Hungary, where, though not one of the
occupied areas, the NSV, was building up a sizeable organisation, the
1. BA, NS 1/285 Folder
March 1944, p.374.




most important of which (and the most successful) seems to have been
the welfare facilities for mothers and children."'' Within the
Altreich each Gau had its own specialist medical adviser who was also
2
a member of a Reichsarbeitsqemeinschaft fdr Mutter und Kind. This
particular body seems to have been put together as a war-time
contingency, for it seems that the existing specialist medical advice
arrangements organised by the NSV needed to be expanded at this time
(1943).^ The members of the Arbeitsqemeinschaft consisted of
professors of medicine and doctors including one Gauamtsleiter of the
4
NSV, also a doctor, Dr. Benzing, in Kassel. But access to such
expert advice by MuK clinics was also being provided in the
Wartheland and in the Protektorat of Bohemia-Moravia.^
There is every reason to believe that Dr. Conti regarded the
NSV's Mutter und Kind in a favourable light for he listed this
particular welfare facility as having been one of the 'causes' of the
fall in the maternal mortality rates from 1933.^ Conti showed in
1942 that the fall in this rate had been of a substantial nature,
going from 3.3 deaths per 1,000 mothers to 3.5 deaths in 1942.
Child-bed fever had been claiming fewer deaths, though this
1. BA, NS 26/260, 'Rechenschaftsbericht Uber das Kriegs-
winterhilfswerk des Deutschen Volksgruppe in Ungarn,
1943/44'; Ibid., 'Ukraine' 1st November 1943.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1026, 'Gau-Fachberater der Reichsarbeits-
gemeinschaft ftlr Mutter und Kind', 71943, list of




6. BA, R18/3805, 'Stand der Volksqesundheit, p.11.
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particular development was due not to welfare advice as such but to
better management of hygiene and aseptic conditions at the time of a
delivery."^ Numbers of deaths from this cause had fallen from 1.0 per
1,000 deaths to 0.6 per 1,000 deaths in the period from 1936 to 1940.
However, at this time (1949), Conti was forced to report that this
figure was beginning to creep up again due to war-time influences and
2
other difficulties.
In war-time the MuK also received an increased level of
participation with the existing Gesundheitsamt of the Party.^ It was
intended at this particular time in 1941, that the NSV and the
Gesundheitsamt would begin to organise facilities from the point of
view of a much closer cooperation, not least of which would be the
increased participation of the NSV in infant care within the
framework of its section MuK. In time of war, the increase of a
preventive health provision such as MuK was regarded as a matter of
some urgency, though not, as far as some doctors were concerned, a
really welcome development. The prospect of a far closer connection
between NSV and Gesundheitsamt brought several problems to the fore
which the new regulations of 1941 had not forseen. However, before
dealing with the criticisms of this measure it is necessary to
outline what the new regulations were designed to provide.
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NS 22/750, NSDAP, 'ReichsverfUgungsblatt, Anordnung
A50/41', Munich, 2nd December 1941.
4. Ibid.; BA, R36/1396, Deutscher Gemeindetaq, Reichsqaudienstelle
Danziq-Westpreussen, 'Einrichtung und Ausbau von SSuglings-
beratungstellen', letter of 18th October 1941.
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On the occasion of an Arbeitstaqunq of the section
'Gesundheitsamt' of the NSV in May 1942 an opportunity had been taken
to discuss these new arrangements. Both Hilgenfeldt and Conti had
attended, and both spoke at some length about the new plans,
emphasising how important was the need to support working wives and
kinderreich mothers during the war."^ The new arrangements for a
closer cooperation related mainly to the care of infants rather than
to increased responsibility for the welfare of expectant mothers.
-This set of regulations intended to include the NSV more directly in
vital community health care,not unfamiliar to MuK, but it ensured an
increasingly, medical, rather than strictly welfare oriented
emphasis. By 1942 it was becoming more noticeable that the NSV was
itself becoming more interested and indeed, involved in preventive
medicine, as well as in all its other welfare oriented schemes which
related closely to the care of the health of very young children
2
especially. NSV ambitions certainly at this time looked to be
pointing in this direction; not only that, but such ambitions were
beginning to be realised with the aid of Dr. Conti himself."* New
efforts were made to increase all MuK facilities including the
important Haushalthilfe scheme which Conti expressly wished to be
1. BA, R36/1396, Vj3, 'Alle Hilfe ftlr Mutter und Kind', article
of May 1942.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1010, •Rundschreiben Nr 33/43',
'Institut fUr nationalsozialistische Volkspflege',
6th April 1943. This was intended to act as a specialist
institute which would undertake research and training in
three areas: family and people's education and training,
people's health care, welfare care and the law.
3. BA, R18/3805, 'Stand der Volksqesundheit', pp.11-13;
BA, R18/3793, 'Zur Neuordnung des Gesundheitswesens nach
dem Siege', 1943.
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further developed.^ To a large extent these developments, coming as
they did before the increased bombing raids over Germany interfered
with new NSV plans, revealed how the NSV could have expected to grow
and develop in the future; and a closer cooperation with the
2
Gesundeitsamt seemed to point the way. From 1941, the new
regulations stated that where the Gesundheitsamt had not itself set
up Advice Centres for infant care, the NSV would come in and set
these up instead, in order to build up the new cooperative venture."^
Medical supervision would be left to the Gesundheitsamt but the NSV
would increase its advice/health care facilities in the framework of
an increased infant-care scheme. But the main difference between
this new scheme and the older ones already in existence was that the
NSV and the Gesundheitsamt would now be expected to work together
under a set of previously laid down guidelines which themselves
promised a greater degree of possible involvement (or interference,
perhaps) in the work of the Gesundheitsamt itself.
Both State officials and medical staff were critical of the
new arrangements for they feared that they would only allow
complications to arise in the whole organisation of infant care. One
doctor at least was reluctant to contemplate the necessity of working
with staff not attached to the Gesundheitsamt or in unfamiliar
1. BA, R18/3781, Hilgenfeldt to Dr. Conti 'Hauspflege und
Haushalthilfe', letter of 13th November 1939.
2. BA, R36/1396, see Guidelines - Agreement, NSV/Kreisamtsleitunq
NUrnberg-Stadt, 1941.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., Per Vizeprgsident des DGT to Fiehler, 'Zusammenarbeit
zwischen Gesundheitsamt und Hilfswerk "Mutter und Kind" der
NSV', February 1942; Ibid.', Per 59schsiche Minister des
Innern, 'Erlass', 15th January 1942.
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surroundings in the NSV clinics. State officials knew that a
wasteful, double supply of welfare care would probably arise. In one
example a mother had reported to a state welfare official that she
had received visits from three NSV aides and one state social welfare
worker when the new arrangements came into operation. On the other
hand, in Danzig, discussions over the new arrangements had foundered
completely and had led to a serious breakdown in the hitherto
friendly relations between NSV and Gesundheitsamt. From Salzburg
however came the report that the NSV was completely unable to take on
the extra work involved."^ Fiehler's opinion of the new regulations
seems to have been that the most painstaking care would have to be
taken over the final form of the new regulations in order to avoid
the danger of Doppelarbeit.
But these new arrangements only showed the direction of future
social welfare/health welfare arrangements which intended that the
NSV, and the Office for the People's Health, would cooperate more
closely in the provision of general health care for the nation in the
future.
War-Time Juvenile Care
From 1942/43, the organisation and the practice of all types of
official treatment of juveniles came increasingly to be divided into
two separate developments, these were essentially opposite in
2
conception to one another. These developments were supported by new
war-time legislation which had been put into operation as a response
1. BA, R36/1396, from DGT Danzig-Westpreussen to DGT in
Berlin, 'Einrichtung und Ausbau von Sauglings—
beratungsstellen', 18th October 1941.
2. Hasenclever, Juqendhilfe, pp.149-151.
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to increased fears about the need to provide a suitably harsh set of
penalties for those young people who showed themselves willing to
break the law, or to offend in other ways by coming into conflict
with the regime. It is clear that the absence of fathers, who were
now in the armed forces, was seen as a potential threat to the stable
continuity of development in juvenile behaviour which would,
therefore, require to come under the influence of stricter controls."^
On the other hand, preventive youth welfare increased, and
supportive measures were made available in an 'enlightened' attempt to
give aid before too many difficulties might arise.
State juvenile welfare began therefore to make far more use of
preventive measures at the same time as highly strict measures of
punishments and penalties for various types of juvenile misdemeanours
2
also came into force. To some extent, the state would be taking a
leaf out of the NSVJ book when it began to put into operation a
system of 'Erziehungsfdrsorge' in which the NSVJ itself would also
be included."' But the war was the real midwife of such a
development, though the example of the NSVJ over some number of years
might have helped to suggest this change in emphasis.
An alternative to proposals in 1941 for a greater NSVJ
participation in FT selection procedures was found in 1943 through
allowing the NSVJ a greater part to play in the new arrangements of
the state for 'ErziehunqsfUrsorqe ' which would be carried out in an
1. HA, 13/258, 'Artikeldienst', VI/133910, 'Die Mitarbeit unsere
Volksgenossen in der NSV-Jugendhilfe ist ebenfalls Dienst
an der Inneren Eront'.
2. Hasenclever, Juqendhilfe, p.149.
3. Ibid.
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institutional setting."'' It would become likely from 1942/43 that the
existing Homes of the NSV would be put to increased use, this was
something which the NSV (though not the Gemeinde or local government
officials) seemed to welcome at the time. From 1939/42, ministerial
Orders would set out proposals for new measures so that by early 1942
at least, Hilgenfeldt seemed to be convinced of a new, increasing
role for NSVJ homes and facilities. This was clearly shown in
February 1942 when he sent out a set of detailed instructions to all
2
the Gaus and the NSV leaders active in them.
However before looking in detail at the instructions of 1942 it
should be useful to consider how the work of the NSVJ had been
developing from about 1939 with regard to numbers of cases taken up
by the Party organisation, for these had been showing a marked
tendency to fall. Indeed the NSVJ had been going through what can
only be described as a falling off in numbers of cases, and moreover
in relation to most of its provisions. It can be seen from the
figures given below that the outbreak of war had not significantly
increased participation of NSV youth welfare even though war time
conditions called for an increased input of the youth welfare
services."^ To an extent, the NSV had been powerless to promote the
cause of its own increased share in the less straightforward cases of
juvenile care and it would have to wait for new legal arrangements to
1. BA, R36/1421, 'FUrsorge fdr erziehungsbedurftige Minderjahrige
(Erziehungsfdrsorge; Unterbringung in Jugendheimstdtten der
NSV), RdErl.d.Rmdl v.23. 8.43'.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1006, Instructions from Hilgenfeldt to all Leiter
'Hauptstelle Wohlfahrtspflege u. Jugendhilfe', 20th February
1942.
3. BA, NSD 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Verwendung', p.35.
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come from the Interior Ministry itself. But these did not come
forward until 1942/43 at the earliest.
In 1941 the NSV's youth welfare section had been carrying out
its various measures in respect of 441,522 young persons of both
sexes, that is to say 2,099 fewer than in 1940 and 1,127 fewer than
2
in 1938. This means that in a period of about four years, from 1938
to 1941, the numbers of cases being taken up had failed to increase
in a significant manner, and they had even fallen very markedly
n J
between 1938 and 1939 by 38,511 cases. ' But this reduction had been
taking place at the same time as a growth in numbers of N5\l Youth
Welfare Homes, which went from 26 in 1936 to 92 in 1941. The numbers
of specialist and other staff also continued to increase, going from
34,291 in 1936, to 141,746 in 1941.^ For this reason it seems
unlikely that a very serious shortage of NS\l helpers or social
workers had dictated a drop in numbers of youth welfare cases of the
NSVJ. Apart from the continuing high levels of church participation
which Althaus at least believed was preventing a greater degree of
Party child and youth care from developing, the fall in numbers did
not refer to Austria as well, and it would be mistaken to regard such
figures as a sign of a decreasing participation within the Greater
German Reich itself.
Nevertheless it is difficult to account for such a slow
development in NSVJ participation, especially between the years






in Austria had allowed for a reduction of activity within the
Altreich. However, it is clear that Hilgenfeldt had decided to make
an increased effort to establish his youth welfare organisation at
the beginning of 1942 when the signs of a lengthening war made it
more likely that youth welfare would increase significantly as events
were to show."* Indeed the war proved to have a 'positive' influence
on NSV developments, and it would be charged with ensuring that its
own provisions for youth welfare would act as a support for the home
front. As Hilgenfeldt pointed out, given the changes in the nature
of 'family relationships' in time of war, when men were away at the
front and women were occupied in the workplace as well as in the
home, it would fall to the NSV to supply extra facilities from new
kindergartens to increased care for young people. The NSV (and the
regime) intended that soldiers at the front would rest assured that
the Party had taken every opportunity to provide help for their wives
at home, but also for the children whose education and guidance would
2
be given extra care and attention. In other words, men at the front
would be able to forget about their cares over their families and get
on with the difficult task of fighting the war. While the emphasis
upon fostering the idea of the Volksqemeinschaft did not entirely
disappear from NSV rhetoric during the war, it certainly experienced
a reduction in importance from 1942/43. NSV activities, especially
those of child and youth care came increasingly to stress service for
the home front rather than support for the claims of the People's
1. BA, NS 37ii/1006, Instructions from Hilgenfeldt,
20th February 1942.
2. HA, 13/238, 'Artikeldienst' VI/133910, 'Die Mitarbeit
unsere Volksgenossen in der NSV-Jugendhilfe ist ebenfalls
Dienst an der Inneren Front'.
Community."^ At the beginning of 1942 Hilgenfeldt showed how
optimistic he was about a new increase in the work of the
NSV-Juqendhilfe section, in the Altreich as well as in Austria where
the NSVJ was well established by 1939. After a series of discussions
with his Amsleiter, Hilgenfeldt sent a detailed outline of youth
welfare activities to every Gau office with the instruction that the
2
NSV Jugendhilfe would, during 1942, be receiving a greater emphasis.
Hilgenfeldt wished to make it known that the Arbeitsplanunq for
1942 included the expectation that all NSV Gau officials would be
expected to undertake an increased involvement in the NSV Juqendhilfe
sections, so that all leading NSV officials were informed that they
would be expected to make a greatly increased effort in supporting
their own Juqendhilfe sections to achieve a new growth of NSV youth
welfare."' Most importantly, Hilgenfeldt instructed that NSV leaders
should achieve an effective meshing together of propaganda and
practice in every single area of youth care. Instructions would now
go out from head office to say that propaganda only made sense, and
reached its goal, where the success of practical measures could be
guaranteed. Hilgenfeldt was most concerned to warn that extravagant
claims of an increased level of participation with the JuqendSmter
should not be put forward if the NSVJ was not itself in the position
l\
to take on extra work. In other words, care should be taken to be
as 'realistic' as possible about the levels of participation which
1. Ibid.





could be achieved. This paticular instruction showed that
Hilgenfeldt had become aware of criticisms of the propensity of the
NSV's youth welfare section to offer more than it could deliver, to
discredit where it could not provide a remedy, and to organise where
activities themselves could not be carried out."^ Certainly the
instructions of 1942 seems to have been an attempt to combat the
effects of the unrealistic promises of earlier years, and to set
forth in a spirit of renewed determination to become really effective
in what promised to be a climate of increased attention and interest
2
in the youth care of the nation.
The following tasks had to be fulfilled in 1942 and they were
set out as follows:
1. Unified training of specialist staff.
2. Intensive explanation of preventive youth care to
all Party organistions.
3. Promotion of further developments in every aspect
of youth care.
4. Recruitment and training of suitable specialist and
other staff.
3. Propaganda advertising the increased NSVJ facilities,
to be carried out both through and within the Party,
and in newspaper propaganda.
6. The creation of new NSV youth homes and the improvement
of the existing ones.
7. Every Gau to have at least two suitable experts for






Hilgenfeldt also intended at this time significantly to increase and
develop the NSVJ Erziehunqsberatunqstellen the numbers of which
stood at 3,054 in 1941. However it is clear that this particular
facility had not been flourishing, for in 1941, there existed fewer
of these advice centres for youth care than in 1936, a reduction in
numbers which amounted to 307 in all."^ It was obvious to Hilgenfeldt
that the time was ripe for a renewed attempt to develop these centres
which seem to have consisted of a small welfare/advice office, or
similar facility, expressly designed for members of the public to
2
approach the NSV on what seems to have been a first time basis.
The NSVJ's war-time activiti did not differ significantly
from earlier measures except to the extent in which it was more
strictly divided into three essential components going from advice,
to full-time care in a home.
The three stages were as follows:
a) Erziehunqsberatunq (advice to juveniles)
Erziehunqshilfe (care of a non-institutional type)
c) Erziehunqsfirqe (period of stay in a home) (3)
These activities, which would be set up in a greatly increased way
through the provisions of Ministerial Orders of 1942 and 1943,
intended that specialist and honorary staff should undertake a
three-fold task. Firstly, they had to provide immediate help of
whatever type, for it was crucial, especially in war-time, that as
1. BA, NSD 26/261, 'Aufkommen und Uerwendung', p.35.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1006, Instructions from Hilgenfeldt,
20th February 1942; see also BA, N525/1270, VB, article
explaining this NSVJ measure, 'Erziehungsberatung',
25th June 1941.
3. BA, R36/963, article by Hermann Althaus, 'Gegenwartsaufgaben
der NSV-Jugendhilfe', in Deutsche Jugendhilfe, April/May 1942.
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little time as possible be wasted between the introduction of a case
and its treatment programme. As Althaus pointed out in his article
for the publication Deutsche Juqendhilfe, the NSVJ would expect to
put into swift operation its own favourite type of 'early
intervention' schemes. They would also emphasise a 'client
orientated' treatment rather than a last-resort intervention in the
manner which, the NSV said, the state (rather than the Party
organisation) tended to favour in its own treatment programmes. The
NSVJ made a renewed commitment to early intervention now that they
were being promised, through the new regulations, to be more actively
2
involved in institutional care. Given that the NSV had already taken
up a substantial provision of youth welfare in the areas of the
Sudentenland and Danzig, as well as in Austria, the NSV leadership
looked forward in 1942 to participating more effectively in the
Altreich itself. During 1943 however, it soon became clear that
local community officials were less than enthusiastic about the
proposals for increased NSV participation in welfare work with
erziehunqsbedOrftiqe juveniles. Local community officials offered
many reasons, during the course of their own discussions of new
regulations of 1943, why the NSV might find an increased level of
institutional welfare difficult to organise. It was carefully
pointed out in the internal discussions of the Ministerial Order of
1943, that the NSV really lacked an adequate number of suitable
Homes. On the other hand, the Gemeinden could, and did, provide a
'dichtes Netz' of local community Erziehunqsheime. ^ Certainly, the





facilities might introduce the possibility that the NSV itself might
be allowed to take on the responsibility for existing Gemeinde Homes
in order to fulfil the provisions of the new Ministerial Order of
1943. In other words, if the NSV could prove that it needed existing
community facilities to carry out its new responsibilities, then it
would be able to assume control over available Homes of the
Gemeinde.^ This fear was certainly in the minds of state officials,
who saw the new regulations of 1943 offering an opportunity for NSV
officials to make use of new legal arrangements entirely in their own
2
favour. Casting around for every possible argument against
increasing NSVJ participation, state officials raised again the
question of the problem of the 'double' provision of state and Party
youth welfare, which interfered with the efficient running of the
youth welfare services.'' But it can be argued that it was already
far too late for such arguments to have any effect, and in any case,
they had failed in 1938/39 to halt the NSV advance. State officials
were, yet again, struggling over a lost cause, for the NSV was now
winning the battle over the youth welfare system even though the
4
conduct of war itself would come to slow down the rate of success.
Nevertheless, state officials would try to warn that state and




4. The NSV would assume extra duties in the summer of
1943 through the increased number of evacuations taking
place, see BA, NS 37ii/1011, 'LK-Mitteilung Nr. 21',
13th August 1943.
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together an efficient provision of youth welfare. For example, in
Steiermark, the organisation of placements had come into serious
disorganisation and disarray due to the NSV's practice of making a
'choice' from among the cases which had come forward. Due to the
delay caused by the NSV's highly selective- procedures, there had
proved to be a lack of places in the Gemeinde Homes in Gau
Steierimark for those who had been rejected. This meant that
neighbouring areas had to be approached in order to find a suitable
number of places. Unhappily for the JuqendMmter officials, an
admission of disorganisation had to be made even though the NSVJ was
itself the cause of the resultant over-crowding which occurred in
Gemeinde Homes in the vicinity of Steiermark. Understandably, state
officials, both before and during the war, deeply resented the manner
in which the NSVJ frequently disrupted the youth welfare services
instead of supplying them with additional aid."^
The basis of objections to the NSVJ still centred around a fear
that the selective processes of the NSVJ would prove to be
unworkable. However, during the war, it was argued that NSV youth
welfare policies were wrongly conceived and based upon such an
insufficiently researched understanding of the 'erbbiologische' ideas
2
of the Party as to be practically worthless. However this was a
damning criticism by the DGT of the basis of the Party's own
adherence to these ideas, even though it was couched in a critical
appraisal of the NSV's youth welfare provisions."' The very nature of
the 'partial' or non-statutory care, which was characteristic of




the 'erbbiologische' basis of NSV and youth welfare meant that state
officials continued to resent the NSVJ and view it as a semi-serious,
not fully professional attempt to become involved in the work of
youth care.^ Most seriously of all, it was freely admitted that the
existing status of genetics did not provide a substantial measure of
whether a juvenile could be judged to be capable of developing into
2
a 'worthy' member of the community or not. As the DGT report to
Frick pointed out,
If the NSV wishes to take on the whole area of Juqend-
hilfe it will have to do it either with the entire
apparatus of the state, or, create one for itself, the
extensive duties of the state will have to be taken on by
the NSV and its youth welfare section if it seriously
wishes to be responsible for this field of social welfare
care that is, the care and the protection of the youth of
the nation. However, to take on the executive functions
of the state can only distance the NSV from the Party
itself. In any case, it should be remembered that the
Hitler Youth and the state community officials have long
since undertaken to carry out cooperative work in youth
care and the important goals of the HJ are secured,
(unproblematically it is suggested) ...In my opinion
therefore, it is entirely unclear why the Dienstellen of
the NSV should be in a better position to carry out the
tasks of MenschenfUhrunq, or be better suited to this
task than the state and the community arrangements. In
view of the Edict of the FUhrer, "Vereinfachunq der
Verwaltunq" of 25th January 1942 which expressly forbids,
during the war, the undertaking of any work which is
unnecessary and which does not serve the war effort, it
is essential to leave arrangements as they are. The
existing form of the organisation of the official/communal
youth welfare institutions fulfil their goals adequately
already and necessary improvements are already in hand.
I consider any major increase by the NSV within this
welfare provision to be completely unnecessary. It would
on the contrary far from improving the existing
facilities only lead to a completely unnecessary
disruption for the population in time of war. it must be
urged that at least for the duration of the war further





This request which was sent to Frick only weeks before the arrival of
Himmler in the RMdl ministerial seat seems not to have been given
really serious consideration.
From August 1943, the developments towards a greater NSVJ input
into institutional youth care would continue and in December of that
year new regulations allowing for a greater degree of participation
in all areas of youth care was conceived in relation to a greater
degree of cooperation with the Hitler Youth. This was put into
operation, covering specific areas from Juqendhilfe to Juqendschutz."*"
Though not allowing the NSV a free hand with regard to assuming
control over every section of the youth welfare system, the legal
arrangements of 1943 promised to make the NSV/'s own section into a
force to be reckoned with.in the future and they promised that
subsequent changes, should they be made, would be further supportive
of the Party agency. However, the conduct of the war would, to a
large extent, dictate the speed, and the degree of success of such
alterations. However, before looking at the developments of 1944,
when the NSV was given increased duties, it is necessary to look at
the other war-time development of greater control over the young
2
which was to become a prominent feature from 1940.
Control of Juveniles in the War
After the outbreak of the war it became possible for juvenile
offenders over the age of sixteen years to be excluded from the
juvenile courts and to be tried in the ordinary courts.^ This meant
the reversal of measures which had been in existence since 1923 when
the juvenile courts had been put into operation and they had been
1. Hasenclever, Juqendhilfe, p.149-151.
2. Hasenclever, Juqendhilfe, pp.151-153.
3. Basic and Zonal Handbooks,; Supplement to Chapter XIV/,
•Youth', pp.27-90.
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established to exercise jurisdiction over all offenders between the
ages of fourteen and eighteen years. Penalties and educational/
training measures at the disposal of these new juvenile courts were
much more flexibly applied than those available to the ordinary
criminal courts. Both the Jugendamt and the Guardianship Court had
worked closely together with the Juvenile Court, and after 1934 - and
to a limited degree - with the NSVJ itself. From 1940 it was
possible to impose stricter sentences through the juvenile and
criminal courts, and new categories of penalty were brought into-
play, this was clearly shown in the measure Juqendarrest. The
juvenile court would of course continue to impose certain measures
such as the ordering of FT, or the imposition of a spell in
'Erziehunqsfdrsorqe ' (both measures being first taken up and
proposed by the Jugendamt), but it was now possible for the courts to
impose a period of confinement which was conceived as a strict
disciplinary and educational measure, rather than a simple penalty
2
for a crime. Juqendarrest was an 'informal' type of arrest which
would not recorded in the Strafreqister so that the future life of
the juvenile would not to come under severe difficulty through the
effects of having a criminal record.^ Juqendarrest consisted of a
spell in detention which could be served on a continuous basis and
later, from about 1942 or 1943, during weekends and in other periods
of the free time of the offender. The Hitler Youth too were able to
impose serious penalties on their members, and in 1941 it was
1. Hasenclever, Juqendhilfe, see, 'Reaktion auf die Kriegsbedingte
GefMhrdung der Jugend', pp.148-153.
2. BA, NS 25/1270, VB_, 'GemeinnUtzige Arbeit statt Jugendarrest' ,
article of
7th August 1943.
3. Basic and Zonal Handbook, supplement to Chapter XIV, 'Youth',
pp.27-90.
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possible for juveniles to be detained for an indefinite period
following an order from the Public Prosecutor for confinement in a
Juqendschutzlaqer where the conditions were harsh indeed.^ Camps
were constructed to accommodate offenders (one of these being in the
vicinity of Ravensbrtlck) and the inmates seem to have been aged
between 16 and 21 years. These young people had slipped through the
preventive welfare net (including the stronger measures of FE)
because their perceived anti-social and criminal tendencies had shown
them to be in need of police attention. For this reason they were
2
included in criminal, rather than welfare, procedures. It seems
that by 1944, the police had made application for 1,150 boys and 800
girls to be sent to detention camps under the Juqendschutz category."^
However, any incorrigibles who had ended up in FE_ would now find,
during the war, that they would be transferred to one of these
detention camps if their behaviour was proving to be insensitive to
change.^ The official response to the effects of the war, which saw
a need to impose firm discipline meant that the juvenile
welfare/juvenile court system increasingly came under the influence
of a harsh set of penalties as well as an increased set of treatment
possibilities. This revealed how anxious perhaps the leadership was
in relation to the whole question of dealing with those young people
who were showing themselves difficult either to control, or to







itself to find 'solutions'.^ In addition to the arrangements for
Juqendarrest a new regulation was put into service when a new law of
21st December allowed that the measure 'Arbeitserziehunq der Juqend'
would be put into operation. This measure consisted of a three month
spell in total confinement, but where young offenders were put to
work which contributed to the war effort. Those who had continued to
absent themselves from work, or who could be shown to be in danger of
serious neglect through stealing, immoral conduct, etc., were given
what amounted to a three month jail sentence so that the new measure
was an exceedingly strictly applied form of correctional education.
But it seems to have been intended mainly for those cases which did
not necessarily come within the category Juqendarrest, or where FE
2
and other educational measures were considered to be unsuitable. As
Hasenclever points out, it was a completely 'new' way to treat older,
'endangered' juveniles who were difficult to include within the
correctional educational measures in existence at the time. Its
precise relationship with Erziehunqsfdrsorqe seems to have been that
only the very serious cases would be taken into total confinement.
The less serious cases would continue to be placed within less
punishment-oriented institutional facilities of welfare, rather than
into total confinement in camps."' The very complicated system which
was being put into operation must have provided something close to a
comprehensive list of possible options and alternatives for the
treatment of juvenile misdemeanor of many types and categories. The
1. BA, NS 25/1270, V/B., ' Gemeinndtzige Arbeit statt Jugendarrest' ,
article of August 1943.
2. Hasenclever, Juqendhilfe, p.150.
3. Ibid.
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danger must have been that too many different methods of dealing with
juvenile delinquency would be counter-productive; but the
determination to impose controls whenever the situation seemed to
demand it meant that young people would be liable to come into the
punishment oriented measures, as well as the welfare oriented ones.
In some cases at least it would be a matter of luck whether or not
one was sent to the punishment camps or to the training/'educational'
establishments of the state and the Party.
Juqendarrest, which had come under scrutiny in 1942/43, seems
to have undergone both modification and extension at this time. New
regulations promised that those having such a penalty imposed on them
would undertake work in their free time and this, it was said, had
already shown very 'good' results in NUrnbit-j. A modified
Juqendarrest gave the opportunity for paying for a less serious
misdemeanor in the form of compulsory work for the community which
was held to be of great educational value as well as offering an
opportunity to do something really useful as a 'payment' for bad
behaviour.
Youths were directed to undertake work for the NSV, especially
for the NSV's ErnSihrunqshilfswerk , (NSV garbage collections for
pigs) or they would be put to gardening; girls were assigned to work
2
with the NSF, and given the job of mending socks for soldiers.
Girls undertaking a weekend spell of Juqendarrest might also find
that they would have to do a stint in one of the NSV's communal
kitchen/feeding centres, for these facilities were still in use
1. BA, NS 25/1270, VB, 'Gemeinnutzige Arbeit statt Jugendarrest',
article of 7th August 1943.
2. Ibid.
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during the war. Offenders undertook an eight hour week-end
work-duty (if a first offender). It seems that the intention existed
mainly to limit the longer periods held under Juqendarrest to second,
and subsequent, offenders and give the opportunity to first offenders
to make amends in the service of a payment to the community by
undertaking a period of hard work in their own free time. It was
reported that this measure had shown a very low instance of
recidivism, and a majority of those who had undergone an initial
spell of modified Juqendarrest had carefully avoided the occasion
2
whereby a second, longer period of punishment might be imposed.
Evidently in NfJrn ,berg, this measure had been greeted by both
parents and teachers alike and it was being used as much as full
Juqendarrest itself and proving to be of much value. It was a
measure which offered an opportunity of learning a sense of
'responsibility', in relation to the community in which the juvenile
himself was living, indeed it was seen to be a ' volksttlmliche'
worthwhile means of dealing with young offenders whose 'crimes' had
been relatively minor ones."^
4
While it has been pointed out in one study that the NSV would
eventually take 'control' of the state welfare system, such was not
to be the case, even though there was put into force the




4. Siegel, 'The National Socialist People's Welfare Organization
1933-1939', p.253.
398.
duties of the NSV's youth welfare section. But these new
regulations allowed only for a consolidation of the gains of 1942/43,
not a 'take-over' of the whole juvenile care system itself. The
levels of existing state welfare by the end of March 1943 were high
indeed and it seems impossible to imagine how the NSV could have
assumed control over the whole of the state's youth welfare
arrangements without a massive alteration taking place within the
complicated political structure of the regime itself.
Reports from state officials over the difficulties of producing
their statistical material in war-time shows how the state
JuqendSlmter were still, in 1944, providing an extensive provision of
juvenile and child care including the organisation of fostering
arrangements for children, the guardianship of minors and many other
2
welfare activities. Even though NSVJ participation was increasing
in certain substantive areas of the juvenile care system, the very
nature of this complicated provision promised that the NSV would have
to build up a considerable organisation as the state officials had
pointed out, before a real Party take-over could occur.
Certainly it was proving more and more difficult to produce
statistics relating to the activities of the Juqendflmter and the
problems for the state officials who had to compile these were made
nightmarish by the air-raids which had increased over Germany."' One
official in Hanover was forced to report that all his statistical
material had been lost in the raids of July 1943 and he now had the
1. BA, R36/963, 'VerfdJgung 11/44', FUhrerhauptquartier
22nd August 1944.
2. BA, R18/3271, letter to the RegierunsprSsident Hanover
from the Wohlfahrtsamt Hanover, 'Reichstatistik uber die




task of starting all over again to produce the figures which would
not be ready for some time.^" By the beginning of October 1944 there
existed in the area of Greater Germany 1,364 Juqenddmter whiA had to
make provision for 329,222 Foster Children of whom the majority were
illegitimate. But it was feared that the rise in the numbers of
legitimate cases being taken into care were entirely due to 'the
growing numbers' of mothers now out at work throughout Germany. It
was believed by some state welfare officials at least, that such an
increase could only be due to this cause, for the numbers of working
married women had increased so they thought, quite substantially.
However, it has been shown that the numbers of working married women
in war-time fell far short of those in the allied countries where the
percentage of women out at work, and who had young children, was much
2
higher than in Germany. The understandable fears of 'neglected'
children was a matter which the NSV too considered to be one of great
importance. It can be argued that it was these considerations of the
needs of children and juveniles in war-time which had eventually
ensured the continued growth of the Party agency's youth welfare
section rather than a firm realisation by the leadership that the NSV
was better able to carry out the duties of youth care than, for
example, the Gemeinden. However, by the time of a hoped for victory,
the NSV and its youth welfare section would have been in a strong
position to assume full responsibility for a powerful Party-based
provision from which state participation had been significantly
diminished in importance."' But the war itself could not ensure the
1. Ibid.
2. Winkler, Frauenarbeit, p.177.
3. BA, R36/963, 'Verfugung 11/44', Fuhrerhauptquartier,
22nd August 1944.
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swift take-over by the NSV of the entire youth welfare system even
though the new regulations of 1944 made it look as though this
eventually might occur at some later date. That this later date
never arrived means that the NSVJ developments can only be examined
from the point of view of a growing and strongly based increase from
the year 1942, one which did not promise to diminish, though NSV
statistics are not available for the year 1944."^ The further
increase of NSVJ activity was ensured by the Order of Hitler of 1944,
and there is every reason to suppose that all youth care would
eventually have come under the leadership of the Party, rather than
continue asacombination of state and Party activity,in a victorious
Reich.
Evacuation/Aid for the Bombed Areas
In March 1943 the NSV was still considering a set of plans for
modified holiday arrangements for young people through the KLV for
2
the coming summer. In the NSV Haushalt plan of 1943/44 the
intention existed that a percentage only of various age groups would
be sent away on a KLV trip during the year."' However the intention
to to carry on with KLV arrangements came expressly from Hitler, for
in December 1942 he had ordered that children who were not living in
the Luftqefclhrdeten (bomb-endangered) areas should still be sent
away on a KLV trip if parents were agreeable. However no pressure
was to be brought to bear if parents refused to take up an offer in
1. BA, R36/1421, see correspondence August-October 1943; see
also discussion document, 'Untersuchungen zur Problematik
in der Jugendpsychiatrischen Kinik und dem Landesjugendamt
der Provinz Oberschlesien1, 1943.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1010, Hilgenfeldt to all Gauamtsleiter NSV,
Rundschreiben Nr. 40/43, 'DurchfdJhrung der Jugenderholungspflege
1943/44', 9th March 1943.
3. Ibid.; see also Chapter Six p. 280
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the light of war-time conditions. Indeed, one may argue that these
arrangements show how highly regarded these schemes were, given the
stress being put upon the need to maintain them in the face of
obvious difficulty, and even danger."^ Hilgenfeldt's instruction,
though pessimistic about the numbers which could be taken up, also
included arrangements for the older age groups up to the age of
2
twenty-one. The value to the government of the holiday schemes
organised by the NSV, was also reflected in the preparations which
were being made in April 1943. Those who were recuperating from
injuries received in the air raids would be sent on a holiday within
the framework of the Hitler Freiplatz Spende. These holidays would
be allowed to those living in DUsseldorf, Essen and Hamburg, and in
the Gaus KOln-Aachen, Schleswig-Holstein, Weser Ems, Westfalen Nord
and Westfalen Sud."' However these seem to have been the last of the
arrangements which would be made in respect of free holidays, for the
KLV would be wound down from the summer of 1943 to meet the newly
increased arrangements for EKLV and the official evacuation scheme.
The NSV dealt with an increasing number of war-time tasks and duties
some of which would show the NSV in its best light as state officials
4
had to grudgingly admit. The first test of the NSV's ability to
1. BA, NS 37ii/1010, Instructions to all Reich Ministers
from Dr. Lammers on KLV arrangements during the war,
17th December 1942.
2. BA, NS 37ii/1010, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 40/43',
9th March 1943.
3. BA, NS27ii/1010, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 57/43*, 'Erholungsverschickung
im Rahmen der Hitler-Ereiplatz-Spende', 9th April 1943.
4. BA, NS 25/1162, fol. 1, letter from the Oberbdrgermeister
Stuttgart, to Dr. Steimle, Hauptamt fdr Kommunalpolitik,
"13th May 1942.
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come to the aid of a population after a serious bombing raid,
presented itself immediately after the air-raids over the city of
LUbeck in the spring of 1942."^ At this time the NSV quickly set up
an extra headquarters, and proceeded to organise facilities for the
care of those who had lost everything in the bombing. Distributions
were made of food and clothing, and other essential items such as
milk for children. An emergency feeding centre was quickly set up to
deal with approximately 3,000 people, and canteen facilities were
organised until the city was able to return to normal. During a
period of fourteen days in LUbeck, the NSV succeeded in arranging
for the distribution of 40,000 loaves of bread, 16,000 eggs, and
other quantities of foodstuffs which included, because it was Easter,
2
some chocolate and Easter eggs for families with children. The
provision of aid for those who had been rendered homeless would be
one of the main tasks of the NSV after an air-raid, and it would have
to make suitable arrangements for emergency canteen/cooking
facilities.^ These, and other duties, would be undertaken in other
cities including Hamburg. There is good reason to believe, as
Arthur Marwick has pointed out, that the German welfare services,
including the NSV, showed themselves able to respond efficiently in a
1. Ibid., article in Stuttqarter Neuen Taqeblatt,
'LUbeck-Nach 14 Tagen', 2nd June 1942.
2. Ibid.
3. BA, NS 37ii/1011, 'Rundschreiben Nr. 148/43',
Hilgenfeldt to all NSV Gauamtsleiter, 'Schaffung
von Koch-und Heizgelegenheiten fUr Umqartierte bzw,
EliegergeschUdigte', 12th August 1943.
4. BA, NS 26/260, report to Berlin 'NSV - Einsatz
in den Hamburger Grosskatastrophentagen', 1943.
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desparate situation, nowhere more effectively it seems than in
Hamburg."''
The new responsibilities of the NSl/ which were outlined by
Hilgenfeldt in July 1943 called for significantly increased
arrangements for evacuating people from the endangered areas; these
2
would be put into operation right away. The NSV would be expected
to regulate the movement of evacuees who would be given
immediate assistance on arrival in the so-called 'reception' areas
Entsendeqau/Aufnahmeqau. NSV workers would be expected to meet the
trains of the evacuees and arrange for food to be available, however
the practice showed that problems would continually arise, causing
much wasted time and effort. After one bombing raid over Berlin the
NSV officials in Angermtlnde were told to expect 900 evacuees, and to
make suitable arrangements. The subsequent arrival of an empty train
in the middle of the night greatly angered officials who had to try
to dispose of large quantities of food or let it go to waste."'
Evidently this was no isolated case and many similar errors in
4
organisation arose to infuriate everyone concerned. Nevertheless,
other war-time duties of the NSV, were also outlined by the
Propaganda Ministry in August 1943 through Goebbels'
1. Ibid.; See Arthur Marwick, War and Social Change in the
twentieth century, London 1974, pp.114-118.
2. BA, NS37ii/1011, Hilgenfeldt to all leading NSV officials
'Rundschreiben Nr. 133/43'Umquartierung
Wegen Luftgefdhrdung und Bombenschdden', 24th July 1943.
3. BA, NS 26/260, report of Gustav-Adolf Ventner, to NSV Berlin
Redner der NSDAP. 'Bericht flber meine Reise in die Kreise




Interministerialler Luf tkiregsschgdenajpschuss.^ seems that all
Gauleiters would be contacted through this office in order that there
could be a coordination of the information on bombing raids coming in
from the Gaus. However, it seems that this did not always run
smoothly, and Goebbels had to remind Gauleiters to channel
2
information through this office. The care of the material needs of
evacuees also included the responsibility for coordinating the
activities of the other Party organisations, but one of the more
important tasks would be arranging in advance for a supply of
suitable accommodation which could, if necessary, be used for
reasonably long periods. Arrangements for the control of the
movements of the evacuees would be made through the system of
official reception areas so that each Gauleitunq would know exactly
how many places were available and in which Gau area, and this system
seems to have run fairly smoothly. Given that each Gau had its own
allocated reception area, evacuees were sent through a strictly
ordered system of travel permits, and this functioned as a means of
regulating the billeting of those leaving the towns and cities."^
Official permission to be evacuated had to be obtained even if a
private arrangement was made, for a private billeting could only be
permitted if arrangements were made with relatives, otherwise,
evacuees had to be processed through the official evacuation
programme.
1. BA, NS37 /1011, to all Gauleiters, 1Reichsministerium fdr
Volksaufkldrung und Propaganda Interministerieller
LuftkriegshSdenausschuss, LK-Mitteilung Nr.21',
15th August 1943.
2 Ibid., instructions to all Gauleiters, 9th August 1943.
3. NS37 ii/1010, NSV to all leading officials, 'Rundschreiben „
Nr. 123/43, EKLV', 14th July 1943.
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The city of Berlin for example would send evacuees to Mark
Brandenburg which could offer 197,000 places, or to East Prussia
where 95,000 places would be made available for Berliners. Hamburg,
which needed an unbelievable 1,000,000 evacuation places in 1943 had
earlier been allocated 231,800 accommodations; in Schleswig-Holstein
(52,000), Bayreuth (117,000), Ost Hannover (7,700), Mark Bradenburg
(15,000) and Danzig (40,000)."^ The NSV was kept regularly informed
about the distribution of the numbers of places, so that on the first
of July 1943, there remained for the use of the city of Hamburg
2
186,384 places given that 45,416 had already been used. This meant
that the official evacuation scheme had to find emergency alternative
accommodation for one million people, after the air-raids of
July/August that year? The NSV also organised reception areas after
an air raid where the homeless could go while waiting to be sent
hoi
away, and there they would be given aid and clothing if they lost all
their possessions. While the EKLV (Erweiterte Kinderland-
verschickunq) scheme would be run by the HJ, the NSV retained its
responsibility for younger age groups (children aged up to ten years)
and it seems that they also took on the running of evacuation homes
for these younger children. However, no information on this practice
has been discovered, apart from a brief reference in a British
4
government report. In the reception areas, the NSV worked with the
local authorities, and made arrangements for the financial support of
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., see 'Anlage', p.l.
3. BA, NS26/260, report to NSV Berlin, 'NSV-Einsatz/Hamburg'
1943.
4. Basic and Zonal Handbook., Chapter VII, p.169-170.
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evacuees through the Raumunqs - Familienunterhalt, a support measure
which was meant to cover the extra cost of rent and other essential
items. But the practice would show that such arrangements did not
always go down well with the inhabitants in the reception areas, for
they could see that women evacuees were being allowed generous
payments for themselves and their accompanying children."* This only
created 'bad blood' between the evacuees and the hard-working, poorly
paid inhabitants in country areas who knew perfectly well that
evacuees were receiving extra payments from the N5V over and above
their allowances as soldiers wives. In country areas the sight of
women evacuees wearing trousers and make-up aroused a shocked
2
response in many of the locals. The dislocation of populations
created many problems, not least for the indigenous populations in
the country areas, the most serious perhaps being the extra pressure
brought to bear on the maternity services which could not cope with a
huge influx of extra cases in country districts due to a veritable
'Zustrom' of expectant mothers who had been sent into the country
from the bomb-endangered areas.^
Goebbels was not^ware of some of the less serious problems
at least, and ordered that recreational facilities should be made
available in the reception areas. Every Qrh, which had a large
number of evacuees, was asked to make available a large room or
suitable area where the evacuees could meet, listen to the radio or
1. I am grateful to Dr. Jill Stephenson for confirming this.
2. Richard Grunberger, A Social History, p.336, (see note).
3. BA, R18, 378, SD report to Dr. Conti, September 1944. This
particular report also included an outline of how difficult
it was to encourage more women to have their babies at home
in the country areas.
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just get away from cramped living quarters. Goebbels also intended
that evacuees should not be left entirely to their own devices at
this time, and arranged that one of his senior staff should make a
series of arrangements for cultural activities in the evacuation
areas for those whose lives had been changed so dramatically."^ Most
important of all was that access to films and reading material should
not be cut off, and great pains were taken by the Propaganda Ministry
to supply these. The practice would show, however, that people
stayed away in droves frurn the 'serious' films on offer, and one
report suggested that more popular ones really should be made
2
available which catered for a taste in more light hearted themes.
The responsibility for these cultural activities fell to the
Propaganda Ministry, and also the Reichskulturkammer, but not the NSV
which would be solely concerned with providing for the material, not
the cultural needs of evacuees. The work of aiding the evacuees
returned the NSV to its original function and to its earlier concerns,
which had originally consisted of providing the most basic help for
those in dire need."^
These tasks were graphically described by the Hamburg NSV,
which was active during the catastrophic bombing raids over the city
from the 25th July to the 3rd August 1943. NSV officials there had
to come to grips with the failure of their plans to cope with a
disaster the size of which had dictated the use of ' blitzschroellen
1. BA, NS37 ii/1011, 'Betreuung der Bombenschddigten und
Umquartierten', instructions of August 1943.
2. BA, NS26/260, report to Berlin from Angermdnde/Prenzlau,
December 1943.
3. BA, NS37 ii/1011, see 'Rundschreiben 133/43', 24th July 1943.
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Improvisationen'Not least of the problems which affected the NSV
in Hamburg, was the partial destruction of the Gauamtsleitunq and the
total breakdown of the telephone connections between that office and
the local ones. NSV workers who had tried to make their way to the
Gauamtsleitung on the first night had been prevented from reaching it
because of the conditions in the streets, these were blocked by
rubble, and also panic-stricken people who were trying to make their
2
way out of the areas of the worst disaster. By the second evening,
the NSV was struggling with the need to cope with the results of a
serious under-estimation of the numbers of those who would need help
and re-housing. The existing 'GK-Plan' had allowed for a possible
50,000 persons rendered homeless or seriously injured, but this
figure had grown to almost 250,000 by the night of the 24th and 25th
July. As the NSV report to Berlin showed, the majority of the
Hamburg NSV took part in the rescue operation whether they were
honorary workers, or Blockwalter, and whether they were trained or
not."' From this report it is seen that an NSV rescue operation after
bombing-raids was conceived in three essential parts. Firstly,
access to food and drink was secured, and then arrangements to
evacuate pregnant women (mothers with children) swiftly out of the
areas were made; this particuar measure was urgently carried out in
Hamburg, and the NSV managed to move this particularly vulnerable
group out of the city by the first of August. Due to this action,
there were 1,000 fewer mothers, and 3,00-4,000 fewer children still




in the city by tha£, though too late to be spared the fire storms
which swept the area of the left bank of the Alster on the 28th of
July.
There seems little reason to doubt the claims put forward in
the NSV report which outlined in detail activities described as
having contributed to the saving of many lives; other reports of the
Hamburg catastrophe have commented on the speed with which the
evacuation of the city was carried through. Indeed the small towns
and villages lying in the vicinity of Hamburg were turned into
over-crowded 'cities' themselves overnight."''
Perhaps the main conclusion of the NSV at this time with regard
to the rescue of a civilian population after a bombing raid
was the realisation that the emergency plans in Hamburg had failed to
allow for the destruction of most of the existing railway stations,
and evacuation had been seriously hampered by the fact that no fewer
than 15 out of the 18 Hamburg stations had been put out of action
2
during the bombing raids. It is clear than expectations of damage
had, understandably, fallen severely short of the actual event.
Indeed, after the Hamburg raid the NSV intended that a new set of
plans for cities had to be drawn up at once which would take this
into account, and it would have to improve the provisions for raids
which might take place in the coming winter of 1943/44; for this
reason they would have to think again about all their emergency plans
and supplies. The Hamburg report added however, that the spirit of




evidence of up to then) had certainly come to the fore in the bombing
raids.^ This particular comment which really only outlined the
futility of the concept of the Volksqemeinschaft, showed that the NSV
officials were not able to accept perhaps that there really had been
no need to provide years of propaganda and NSV activity in order to
encourage the Hamburg population to respond to the conditions of
danger and destruction. The people of that city hardly needed to be
trained by the NSV to come to the aid of their fellow citizens during
the worst parts of the bombing-raids when a spontaneous action was
taken, and when many risked their lives in the rescue work. But this
does not take away from the value of the effective activities of the
NSV which came to the rescue in cities, and other areas, when the
tempo of the war increased. Citizens would find that the NSV would
be able to help with some of the more urgent needs in time of severe
danger.
From 1943 the NSV would continue with the work of evacuation
in addition to its other measures the most important of which was the
'Mother and Child' section. The prime position of this particular
measure was now reflected in the levels of the KWHW subsidy to the
MuK which in 1942/43, amounted to a huge RM 1,210, 982,357.^ The
participation of the NSV in youth welfare would develop throughout
the period, from the beginning of 1942 to 1943/44, promising a
significant, future level of Party care for the young.^ This was
seen in the provisions of the Order of Hitler of 1944 which also
1. Ibid.
2. BA, R43 ii/560, 'Rechenschaftsbericht 1942/43', p. 5.
3. See this Chapter.
referred to the war-time duties of the NSV, and these were listed as
follows:
1. Participation in the EKLV in the work with women and
young children up to the age of ten years;
2. Evacuation;
3. The organising of gas-masks for the civilian
population;
4. Urgent aid after air-raids;
5. Care of injured persons by providing help with
recuperation;
6. All aid for mothers and children;
7. Wehrmachtbetreuunq. (Support for the armed forces).
This included, the care of all unmarried soldiers
on leave to providing facilities in its own institutions
for the care of the wounded should that be needed."^
But the items in the above list which would take up more of the time
and effort of the NSV, would be evacuation and the care of the
population after air-raids. From 1944, the reports from the local
NSV offices to Berlin showed how the increasing air-raids over the
cities of Germany were making it impossible to continue with NSV
work, in Darmstadt in September 1944 it was reported to Hilgenfeldt
that the NSV Gau office there had virtually ceased to operate. The
Gauamstleiter had to report that since the raids of the 11th and 12th
September, he was unable to say where the majority of his Gau staff
were, neither did he know how many had been killed, though this would
o
be reported on as soon as possible.
1. BA, R36/963, 'Verfugung 11/44', FUhrerhauptquartier ,
22nd August 1944.
2. BA, NS26/260, Gauamtsleiter NSV/Hessen-Nassau to Hilgenfeldt,
16th September 1944.
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From this time there existed a telescoping of the organisation
which would, from the end of 1943, increasingly affect the work of
the NSV both within the Altreich and in the occupied areas as well.
This resembled a two-stage shrinking of the whole NSV operation, at
first in the eastern areas such as Hungary (1943), and the occupied
areas further west in the Wartheland (the beginning of 1945).
Within the Altreich itself, the telescoping of the organistion would
begin in the first quarter of 1944, reaching its most difficult and
2
dangerous point in Frankfurt/Oder at the beginning of 1945. The
activities of NSV staff who were working under the worst possible
conditions at the beginning of 1945 seem to have consisted mainly of
obtaining fuel for the existing homes of the NSV such as the ones in
the area of Darmstadt.'' The NSV in Darmstadt sent out what was
virtually an S.O.S. to Hilgenfeldt to ask if it might be possible to
get help through to the NSV in Darmstadt where fuel was so low that
the continued operation of the two NSV maternity homes in the area
was now in question. As the Gauamtsleiter of the NSV put it, 'what
use are five tons of coke for one large maternity home?'"' Many of
the NSV Homes in the Gau Hessen-Nassau were now suffering extreme
difficulty due to the impossibility of obtaining fuel*, existing
shortages had been worsened by the destruction of the Kdln-Mulheimer
1. Ibid., 'Bericht uber die Ereignisse Mitte Januar 1945',
Birnbaum/Wartheland, 30th January 1945.
2. Ibid., see report to NSV from Frankfurt of 31st January 1945.






bridge which now lay in the Rhein. From this report and others
which were sent to Berlin, it is clear that the NSV, from the
beginning of 1945, was closely involved in attempting merely to keep
things going as best they could, and to keep their various operations
functioning in spite of conditions which were difficult in the
extreme. As the Darmstadt report said, they were living a 'hand to
2
mouth existence' at that time, that is to say in January 1945.
In early 1945 in the area of Frankfurt/Oder the NSV had been
busy working with all available medical staff to arrange for the
control of the flow of populations coming west during January and
February 1945, and the NSV itself seems to have been involved mainly
in organising aid in the Frankfurt railway stations by providing
facilities for mothers and their small children."' The NSV officials
were, in early 1945, having to deal with the tragic spectacle of
their own people fleeing from eastern Germany instead of with French,
4
Belgian and other refugees, as they had in 1940. No doubt the
experiences of the earlier relief actions had been of some help in
organising the flow of refugees in 1945. But it would be this task
that the NSV would undertake as one of its last duties in the service
of the population of Germany. According to the Frankfurt report from
Dr. Syrie, the work of the NSV in the area at this time had been most
valuable, with medical staff they had seen the end of the flow of the
refugees going west and reported that virtually all the women and
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., see report to NSV from Frankfurt of 31st January 1945.
4. Ibid.
children under six years had left the city at this time.'* The NSV was
also involved in the evacuation of patients from the hospitals in
the city which were to be emptied and made available for the
military. However, the NSV which was increasingly involved in such
work did not always manage to be efficient, for unlike the
reports from Frankfurt/Oder, the description of the evacuation of
Kreis Birnbaum in Wartheland, also at the beginning of 1945, showed a
less efficiently organised control of refugees which could be better
described as a disaster, according to a Volkspfleqerin of the Mutter "
2
und Kind in Birnbaum. Evacuation of the Wartheland was, it seems,
the responsibility of the NSV there, and plans had been made for
moving the Volksdeutsche out of the whole area in two stages; from
the eastern areas first and from the western areas later, when the
situation might demand it."' However, as the Birnbaum report showed,
plans had failed almost entirely to cope with the situation so that
the whole operation had resembled a . rout with slow-moving
4
columns of women and children finding themselves in a desperate
situation through the lack of proper instructions on how best to move
through the area. Evidently many had been trapped in no-man's land;
this particular thought was the one which gave the NSV Volkspfleqerin
who was accompanying these refugees the most regret. Indeed she
described the whole experience as one which would stay with her for
the rest of her life, as well as the memory of the inefficiency of
the officials in the Kreis offices who had allowed such a situation
1. Ibid.




to arise in the first place."*
The report, which was made by this particular NSV worker on her
return to Berlin, might stand as an epitaph for the whole NSV
enterprise, not only in Germany, but especially in the east, where
high ambition had provided the conditions whereby the reality of a
possible loss of the war would make itself known only at the last
moment in increasingly endangered NSV operations such as Birnbaum in
2
Wartheland. The final comment on the whole NSV adventure in the
former Poland was, 'that is the end of the work of -> an NSV
Volkspfleqerin of the NSV'. She added, nevertheless in spite of all
the difficulties in Berlin, further help would be given when needed






The German defeat in 1945 brought an end not only^ the Nazi
regime but to the organisations of the N5DAP including the
NS-Volkswohlfahrt. However, it can be seen that the influence of the
more 'positive' NSV welfare policies did not disappear entirely, for
the Federal Public Assistance Act (excluding all other NSV emphases),
nevertheless includes in its description of the function of public
assistance the statement that 'a person who ... does not receive
sufficient assistance from other quarters, has a right to personal
and financial assistance ... this assistance being of the nature
that, most importantly, enables him, as far as possible, to help
himself to participate in the life of the community and to lead a
life worthy of his membership of the community of Man'."^ After the
war the private organisations for social welfare came again to
flourish, not least of these being the organisations of the churches,
Caritas and the reorganised (1957) Diakonisches Werk der
Evanqelischen Kirche in Deutschland e.V. New private organisations
and associations for the support and the welfare of the physically
and mentally handicapped were created after the war, including many
others, so that the freedom of private welfare organisations to
operate, which had entirely disappeared between 1933 and 1945, was
2
fully restored.
An assessment of social welfare in the Nazi period is
complicated by the particular form of the Nazi system which existed
as a two-fold supply coming from state and Party. Nevertheless, many
1. Franz Flamm, The Social System and Welfare Work
in the Federal Republic of Germany, Frankfurt 1980,
p.161.
2. Ibid., see 'Social agencies in the private sector',
pp.123-137.
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individuals were excluded from the social welfare provisions, of the
Party mainly, but also, in many instances, of the state's as well.
Others would find that some aid from the Winterhilfswerk might be the
only welfare aid which would be available from the NSV. But the
selection of 'worthy' cases would dominate entirely the provisions of
Party welfare.
There is good reason to believe that the existence of the NSV,
dominated as it was by ideological concerns, would have brought about
the complete split in the welfare system in the Altreich, as state
officials had feared, after a German victory. While in the occupied
areas the NSV swiftly gained a total monopoly, in the Altreich it
would have had to wait for some time before a similar situation might
emerge. Inevitably the difficult issue of the funding of social
welfare would have needed to be solved in order that a Party
take-over of social welfare could have occurred. An answer to this
particular problem would also have needed to be found in a victorious
Reich.
An assessment of Party welfare as it was provided by the NSV is
similarly complicated by problems which were not primarily those of
the NSV. These were never solved by the leadership, most notable
being the lack of a coherent social policy which would have perhaps
clarified earlier the role of the NSV. Instead, the NSV was forced
to improvise and manipulate a way through the existing system of
welfare without any clear ideas about the true intentions of the
leadership. The improvisatory nature of some of the NSV's practices
was a reflection of the ill-thought out policies of the Nazi
government itself, which left the system of welfare to function as
best it could with regard to the double provisions of the state and
the Party. But the NSV was both backward looking and forward looking
at the same time. Apart from a 'modern' orientation in child-care,
it looked into the past for inspiration, to the earlier system of
social welfare in Germany, the so-called 'Elberfeld' system which had
used honorary social welfare workers to provide aid for the
population."^ Indeed the NSV sought to return social welfare
practices to this type, partly as a solution to the problem of
funding - to keep down costs - but mainly in response to an
ideological commitment to the idea of the value of voluntary unpaid
labour by members of the Volksqemeinschaft. However, the NSV also
depended heavily upon state subsidies, and there seems to have been
every intention to continue funding Party welfare through a difficult
to administer mixture of state subsidies and private donation. This
was in spite of the problems which had emerged during the war with
regard to the collections procedures during the WHW drive in 1943.
Schwarz, and possibly Ley, felt that another way of funding Party
welfare would need to be found, although the NSV leaders themselves
seemed not have considered this to be necessary. Hilgenfeldt had no
intention of making changes in the Winter Aid drives, committed as he
was to asking directly for funds from the public through a propaganda
measure.
In 1940, Guillebaud pointed out that there was nothing to be
gained by reducing a description of Nazi Germany to a 'simple'
picture of a vast population deluded and oppressed by a small
minority of brutal gangsters. While he did not deny the actual
existence of a repressive regime, he cast doubt, as others have done
1. This particular development was deeply deplored by state
officials who rightly saw it as just one more example of
NSV measures which came into direct conflict with those
of the state. Inevitably many state social welfare workers
would have lost their jobs if this had been widely adopted,
not only by the NSV, but by the state as well.
X. Guillebaud, The
Social Policy of
Nazi Gemany,p. 118 .
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since upon the notion of a vast majority being coerced and
'persuaded' by propaganda into accepting the claims of the
leadership. Whether or not the NSV, and most notably the Winter Aid,
managed to 'persuade' a significant number of Germans of the value of
trying to build the new social order is open to question. But the
NSV took very seriously the responsibility of assuming a leading role
in the care of the very young. Increasingly, from 1941 the NSV was
in a position to mould the opinions and guide the development of
young children; indeed it would take control (with the HJ) over many
of the aspects of 'secondary' socialisation."^ The continuing
development of the NSV's child welfare measures would ensure that
social welfare in Germany would mirror the evil tendencies of the
regime; without doubt it would have continued to do so, given the
opportunity,after a victorious war.
1. This is not to argue that the NSV would find it to be an
easy task to mould opinions and attitudes, but that it had
at least from 1941 an increasing opportunity to do so.
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Year Average Number of Numbers of
Households with NSV Helper Helpers
1936 5 506 -
1937 6 294 -
1938 10 471 6 337
1939 15 192 7 350
1940 20 802 11 339
1941 25 418 16 123
Welfare for Expectant Mothers




















NSV Health Care Stations
Year Average Number of Home Visits Numbers of
Those Assisted V/isits
1934 2 332 48 160 7 800
1933 37 794 1 337 943 215 690
1936 79 410 1 830 724 493 200
1937 112 771 4 085 280 765 990
1938 163 235 7 087 201 1 148 377
1939 191 518 8 994 007 1 432 775
1940 210 923 10 162 954 1 669 485
1941 256 629 12 181 577 2 059 766




1935 1 064 1 147
1936 1 729 1 949
1937 2 401 2 431
1938 4 929 5 354
1939 5 210 5 419
1940 5 529 5 758
1941 5 717 5 891
432.
Sums collected by the WHW
from 1933 to 1942
Donations from Firms and Organisations
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Bund deutscher Mddel (league of German Girls),
female branch of the Hitler Youth, for girls over
14 years of age.
Deutscher Frauenorden (German Women's Order),
vfllkisch women's organisation founded by Elsbeth
Zander in 1923 and merged with other groups into
the NSF in 1931.
Deutscher Gemeindetaq (headed by Karl Fiehler) this
official body represented the interests of state
officials, DGT head office was in Berlin.
Deutsches Frauenwerk (German Women's Enterprise),
the Nazi-led federation of women's groups from 1934
to 1945.
(region) the major territorial division of the
national NSDAP organisation; there were 32 Gaus in
1933, 40 in the Greater German Reich of 1938.
NSV measure which provided domestic helpers for
families in need of assistance.
NSDAP Hauptarchiv, the Party's own archival
collection, started in January 1934.
Hitler Jugend (Hitler Youth), the Nazi Party's
youth organisation.
(time of struggle), the years from the founding of
the NSDAP until the NachtUbernahme.
Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (German
Communist Party).
(district), territorial unit of the NSDAP into
which the Gaus were divided.
takeover of power
Date of publication not given.
Place of publication not given.
Mutter und Kind, NSV section for welfare for
mothers and infants formed in 1934.
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei.
Nationalsozialistische Frauenschaft (Nazi Women's







NS-Volkswohlfahrt, the Nazi welfare organisation
founded in May 1933.
NS-Jugendhilfe, the NSV's youth welfare section
formed in 1934 to provide additional juvenile care.
(local branch), territorial unit of the NSDAP into
which the districts were divided.
(National Leadership), the highest decision-making
level of the NSDAP.
Reichsmtitterdienst (Reich Mothers' Service) the provision of training
courses in child-care and housewifery run by the
DFW/NSF.
RJF Reichsjugendftlhrer (National Youth Leader), the
title conferred on Baldur van Schirach in October
1931.
Reichsjugendftlhrung (National Youth Leadership),
Schirach's office.
Sturm Abteilungen (Storm Troopers), paramilitary
formation of the NSDAP.
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (German
Social Democratic Party).
Schutzstaffeln, Nazi elite paramilitary formation,
under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler.
Vdlkscher Beobachter, official Nazi Party
newspaper.
(racist-nationalist), the generic term used to
describe aims and groups similar to those of the
NSDAP, especially in the 1920's.
(ethnic German), used by the NSDAP to describe
ethnic Germans living outside the Reich.
Volksqemeinschaft The 'people's national community' the new social











(world view) term used to indicate the Nazis
philosophical frame of reference regarding the
destiny of the nation.
Winterhilfswerk, NSV annual charity scheme which
provided help in kind in the months of the winter
for those (mainly families, rather than
individuals) with low incomes.
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